Devolution and democratisation: policy processes and community-based natural resource management in Southern Africa by Rihoy, Elizabeth
 
 
 
 
 
DEVOLUTION AND DEMOCRATISATION: POLICY PROCESSES 
AND COMMUNITY-BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
  
 
ELIZABETH RIHOY 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Government, Programme on Land and 
Agrarian Studies (PLAAS), University of the Western Cape. 
 
Supervisor: Prof. Benjamin Cousins 
 
November 2009 
 
 
 
 
ii 
 
KEYWORDS 
Community-Based Natural Resource Management  
Policy Processes 
Democratisation 
Devolution 
Decentralisation 
Southern Africa 
Botswana 
Zimbabwe 
Resource Governance 
Natural Resource Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study undertakes a comparative analysis of Community Based Natural 
Resources Management (CBNRM) policy processes in Zimbabwe and Botswana 
and in doing so highlights that the devolutionary aspirations of CBNRM have 
failed to be realized in practice. Empirical evidence is presented which illustrates 
that at the heart of CBNRM lie issues of power and authority concerning access 
to and management of valuable natural resources. Attempts to develop 
appropriate natural resource governance regimes must therefore address some of 
the most contested social and political issues in these countries.  The study 
identifies those variables which have shaped natural resource governance 
arrangements, institutions and outcomes, and reveals that devolutionary failure 
has arisen from the failure of CBNRM policy to engage with broader political 
processes at levels from the local to international. 
 
In order to explore the links between policy processes and governance outcomes 
within CBNRM, the study combines two distinct research domains, each with its 
own conceptual framing, within one overarching explanatory framework. This 
analysis suggests that it is the nature of the CBNRM policy process – its actor-
networks, discourse and structured political interests – that hinders policy makers 
from engaging with wider political processes. Three framing assumptions of 
CBNRM are identified as having undermined its ability to engage politically.  
Firstly, the assumption that conservation is not political in character has 
prevented strategic political engagement and manoeuvring. Secondly, the 
assumption that the key focus of policy should be on correct institutional form, as 
suggested by an influential discourse on the merits of devolution vs 
decentralisation, which has placed too great an emphasis on structure and 
external design and failed to accommodate the realities of the highly complex and 
politicised context of CBNRM. Thirdly, the assumption that rural communities 
lack agency has hindered the development of creative local solutions to problems.  
 
By presenting case studies from the village of Mahenye in Zimbabwe and the five 
villages of the Okavango Community Trust in Botswana, the study looks beyond 
the objectives, discourse and contests of policy and undertakes an investigation of 
what actions rural people are undertaking inside the institutions established by 
policy makers, and of governance outcomes at the local level. These case studies 
reveal that unfettered devolution can lead to elite capture and the perpetuation of 
poverty; that rural communities themselves have agency and the ability to 
exercise it; and that there is limited and shrinking political space in both countries 
which is reducing opportunities for rural communities to engage with political 
processes.  The Botswana case studies demonstrates that an imported and 
imposed devolutionary initiative which lacks links to higher levels of governance 
can reduce political space at local levels. The Zimbabwe case study demonstrates 
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that political space may be more effectively created through decentralisation. The 
lesson drawn from these case studies is that institutional arrangements and roles 
should be determined by context specific issues and circumstances and move 
beyond the structural determinism that has characterized much of the CBNRM 
debate to date.  
 The study concludes with policy recommendations. These include the  need for 
recognition of the synergy between CBNRM and democratisation as mutually 
reinforcing processes and the need to be context-specific. Further 
recommendations emphasise: recognition of the significance of community 
agency and adaptive capacity; recognition of the appropriate role of external 
agents as facilitators of the process; and recognition of the significance of 
customary structures. The study confirms that CBNRM is a dynamic, evolving 
process, rather than a binary or limited number of institutional choice options 
based on central transfers of powers. CBNRM should be viewed as a process of 
applied and incremental experiments in democracy; of value because it involves 
not a single ‘holy grail’ of full devolution or ‘ideal democracy’ but the interaction 
of tiers of governance over time in adaptive processes. Governance arrangements 
must be context specific and should be determined by focusing on which 
approach will most effectively facilitate community engagement with political 
processes.  
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The majority of Africa’s population relies on natural resources for their livelihoods and 
consequently, few issues are more central to African societies than the use and 
governance of natural resources. This remains as true today as it was during pre-colonial 
and colonial eras (Hyden, 2008).  Natural resource governance is then fundamentally 
important to rural economies and this economic importance places issues relating to land 
and resource rights at political centre stage. Even so, natural resource management is 
also important to local, national and global concerns about environmental management, 
conservation and sustainable development. This represents a diverse array of parties with 
a stake in Africa’s environmental future and with the incentives and means to influence 
natural resource management policy. Many of these stakeholders will have different, 
sometimes conflicting interests. This thesis examines the politics and policy processes 
inherent within natural resource management, and highlights the intersection of natural 
resource governance and local, national and global concerns about environmental 
management, conservation and sustainable development. This analysis shows the diverse 
interests that have shaped natural resource management and environmental policy 
making in the two case study countries in southern Africa. It explores the way incentives 
and the manner in which different stakeholders influence the process of natural resource 
management policy development and the outcomes of this.  
 
The dominant approach to conservation of natural resources in Africa in the 20th Century 
was one of protectionism, which saw people excluded from their environment and their 
livelihoods undermined. The 1980s witnessed a paradigm shift in conservation from 
protectionism to community conservation and sustainable use (Adams and Hulme, 
2001). The result is that throughout the 1980s and 1990s Community Based Natural 
Resource Management (CBNRM) became a widely adopted and highly regarded 
conservation strategy in Southern Africa and elsewhere in the world (Adams and 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
McShane, 1992, Bonner, 1985, Western and Wright, 1994, Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, 
Roe et al., 2000, Hulme and Murphree, 2001). One of its greatest perceived strengths 
was that it permitted environmental and developmental (particularly anti-poverty) goals 
to be addressed simultaneously, resulting in ‘sustainable development.’ Considering its 
promise, the geographic, demographic and economic scope of CBNRM in Africa was 
considerable, and its appeal reached its height in the late 1990s covering significant 
portions of land in marginalised rural areas within countries throughout Africa and 
affecting millions of people (Fabricius and Kock, 2004).   
 
However, more recently, CBNRM has come under fierce attack from critics (Oates, 
1995, Brandon et al., 1998, Hutton et al., 2006) and it is now heavily contested. Critics 
argue that CBNRM has failed to live up to its early promises, particularly protection of 
biodiversity (Oates, 1995) or improving the socio-economic status of poor rural 
communities (Bond, 2001, Rozemejeir, 2003). While the jury is still out on the success 
and failure of CBNRM, the greatest challenge facing it in southern African countries is 
the introduction of governance reforms that lead to the establishment of local level 
governance institutions that are accountable to their local constituencies. This constraint 
threatens to undermine the legitimacy of CBNRM as a conservation and development 
strategy. In view of this realization, CBNRM practitioners, policymakers and 
implementers have started addressing some of the governance issues that impede and 
threaten the progress of CBNRM activities.  
 
Interestingly, the period of establishing CBNRM coincided with the spread of liberal 
democracy in southern Africa. However, some analysts question the degree to which it 
can be claimed that democracy exists in southern Africa (Bratton and van de Walle, 
1997, Bauer and Taylor, 2005, Cousins and Claasens, 2004).  An analysis of the 
requirements for effective CBNRM and for the development of ‘participatory’ 
democratic politics illustrates that at least rhetorically they share a common vision - the 
development of accountable and representative governance institutions, which 
institutionalize local participation, empower citizens equally and have effective linkages 
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with institutions at other levels.  The assumption is that CBNRM and (local) 
democratisation are theoretically mutually reinforcing processes, which share important 
synergies and complementarities. Turner (2004) highlights this point: 
CBNRM is about local governance. If local governance is ineffective, so is 
CBNRM…The current crisis in local governance is the real crisis of southern 
African CBNRM. (Turner, 2004:12-13) 
 
Nevertheless, these synergies are not simple and straightforward, and have to be worked 
at to make them of value. However, there appears to have been little strategic interaction 
or overlap between the policy processes and implementation strategies affecting 
CBNRM and those relevant to democratisation. CBNRM implementers and advocates 
have paid scant attention to the socio-political forces that mould local governance and 
broader democratisation processes determining the trajectory of CBNRM (Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007). Indeed, a central argument of this thesis is that there has been 
relatively little engagement with or understanding of macro or micro level political and 
related processes on CBNRM by policy makers and implementers.  This thesis explores 
why this situation has arisen; presents empirical evidence that demonstrates that this has 
resulted in lost opportunities and compromised outcomes for both CBNRM and 
democratisation as these potentially reinforcing processes failed to engage with each 
other; and explores ways in which new opportunities for synergy and linkages can be 
brokered. In order to achieve this, I critically examine some of the key framing 
assumptions of CBNRM approaches to date using the analytical framework of policy 
process analysis (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). 
 
The nature of the CBNRM policy process shapes natural resource management 
governance reforms and outcomes. Failure of CBNRM policy makers and implementers 
to engage with wider political processes undermines their ability to positively influence 
the development of national policies that support the CBNRM sector. I provide evidence 
that indicates that this failure to engage is largely a result of the origins and framing 
assumptions of CBNRM.  To ensure that CBNRM becomes an effective rural 
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development strategy it is necessary to ensure that the CBNRM policy processes trigger 
the appropriate governance reforms. I argue that governance reform, outcomes, and the 
CBNRM policy process are intimately linked in complex ways.  Thus, one of the key 
determining factors in explaining governance reform outcomes is the CBNRM policy 
process itself. This study attempts to trace, explore and unravel the threads of these 
linkages and in doing so offer an alternative way of understanding the mutually 
reinforcing dynamic between CBNRM and processes of democratisation in the region.  
 
This chapter: 
• describes the background and rationale for this study; 
• presents the research problem;  
• discusses the scope of the research; 
• presents the significance and strategic goal of the study; 
• describes its aims and objectives; and 
• outlines the structure of this thesis, including the research methodology.  
 
1.2 Background 
The development of CBNRM policy and approaches within southern Africa has been an 
evolutionary process and one whose goals and objectives have changed over time. 
CBNRM initially emerged from ideas that developed in the wildlife sector as an 
experimental approach to wildlife management through ‘community conservation’ 
(Hulme and Murphree, 2001). For the last 30 years, initiatives such as the ADMADE 
programme in Zambia and activities around the Selous Game Reserve and Ngorongoro 
Crater in Tanzania have experimented with limited co-management strategies - primarily 
involving benefit sharing from wildlife management activities. A later generation of 
initiatives emerging in the late 1980s, such as the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe, 
took this process a step further, advocating strong ‘ownership rights’ for communities 
over wildlife resources outside protected areas in communal tenure regimes. Murphree 
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characterizes the initiatives as reliant upon ‘state permission to experiment’ (Murphree, 
1995b) rather than a formal basis for devolution and tenurial security .  
 
Since the 1980s CBNRM has evolved into a more integrated approach to natural 
resource management and it is now widely accepted that for it to be successful, it has to 
be complemented by national policies and political and administrative decentralization 
and devolution of authority (Katerere, 2002, NACSO, 2003, Child, 2004, Fabricius and 
Kock, 2004, Roe et al., 2000). CBNRM has diffused throughout the SADC region, with 
most countries adopting it in some form, focusing on a broad range of resources, 
although wildlife still remains dominant (Rihoy et al., 1999, Hulme and Murphree, 2001, 
Child, 2004, Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Jones, 2007). Whilst CBNRM strategies are 
diverse as to some degree they have emerged to address the specific political, historic, 
cultural and ecological conditions of each country, the last fifteen years have witnessed 
the emergence of a shared set of principles and policies (Murphree, 1991, Rihoy et al., 
1999). There is an underlying recognition that natural resource management policy must 
offer local communities and other stakeholder’s clearly defined rights, responsibilities 
and benefits over the resources that they live with if they are to use them in a sustainable 
manner. Thus, ‘CBNRM seeks to provide the legal, institutional and economic 
frameworks for communities and other stakeholders to become managers of their natural 
resources’ (Jones and Murphree, 2004:63).  
 
CBNRM analysts and implementers argue that CBNRM is facing challenges and that 
foremost among these problems is the lack of progress in devolving genuine authority to 
local communities (Shackleton and Campbell, 2001, Ribot, 2002a, Katerere, 2002, 
SASUSG, forthcoming). Murphree (2000a) notes that whilst ‘the flag of devolution has 
been raised high and many times’ within CBNRM there has been relatively little 
progress in devolving powers to communities; Murombedzi (2003b) concurs that most 
CBNRM initiatives which characterize themselves as ‘devolved’ ‘reflect rhetoric more 
than substance’, and that, in reality, they continue to be: 
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characterised by some continuation of substantive central government control 
and management over natural resources rather than a genuine shift in authority 
to local people (Murombedzi, 2003a:27).  
 
Whilst SASUSG (forthcoming) concludes that:  
incomplete devolution of rights over natural resources – particularly wildlife – 
remains the single most disabling constraint on sustainable development based 
on natural resources (SASUSG, forthcoming:7).  
 
There is then general agreement that the enabling legislation for the use and control of 
natural resources in communal lands vests control in either central or local government, 
despite rhetoric to the contrary, and that this situation inhibits effective CBNRM 
outcomes.  CBNRM implementers and advocates intervention efforts in southern Africa 
have focused on ensuring that this situation is rectified by the introduction of a 
devolutionary approach and where possible from the outset of CBNRM implementation.  
 
Today the primary objective of CBNRM is to develop communal capacity for dynamic 
and adaptive governance in the arena of natural resource use through the devolution of 
resource rights to communal land residents (Hulme and Murphree, 2001, Murombedzi, 
2003b). The overall ‘success’ of CBNRM strategies is thus seen to rely on the transfer of 
power from the state to local communities (devolution) and the development of locally 
accountable and representative institutions. The distinction between devolution and 
decentralization is central to this, and is discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Ribot (2002b), a 
widely quoted source of definition of the ‘decentralisation’ narrative, defines 
decentralisation as any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to 
actors and institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial 
hierarchy. He also defines the related concept of ‘democratic decentralisation’, which 
occurs when powers and resources are transferred to authorities representative of and 
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downwardly accountable to local populations. Murphree (2000a) provides a definition, 
distinct from democratic decentralisation, which is commonly used in the context of 
devolution in southern Africa. He interprets devolution as ‘the creation of relatively 
autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and entitlement, with a primary 
accountability to their own constituencies’ (Murphree 2000a:6).  The critical difference 
here is that the devolution narrative is concerned with ‘relatively autonomous’ entities 
that do not have to be situated within a government political-administration hierarchy.  
  
In addition to upholding devolution as the only way forward, these same analysts and 
implementers are equally quick to condemn decentralisation - or ‘aborted devolution’ to 
use the phrase commonly adopted in southern Africa – as the root of the problem 
(Campbell and Shackleton, 2001, Child, 2004, Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Jones and 
Murphree, 2004). For example, the most prolific critique of the CAMPFIRE programme 
is that under the programme’s enabling statutes, authority passes to local government as 
represented by the Rural District Councils rather than to the producer communities. 
Analysts argue that this remaining layer of bureaucracy separates local residents from 
direct engagement in project management and allows the RDCs to co-opt benefits and 
hence the summary ‘aborted devolution’ dismissal (Alexander and McGregor, 2001, 
Bond, 2001, Hasler, 2000, Dzingirai and Breen, 2005). Other terminology with equally 
negative connotations is also applied. For example, Jones and Murphree (2004:25) note 
that ‘in Zimbabwe’s CBNRM programme devolution has been ‘emasculated’ to mean 
decentralisation.’ So for the last fifteen years there has been a broad consensus among 
implementers, analysts and academics within southern Africa, that lack of progress in 
devolving - as distinct from decentralizing - genuine authority to local communities is 
the greatest challenge facing CBNRM and one that, unless resolved will ultimately 
constrain it from delivering appropriate natural resource governance reforms.  
 
1.3 Research Problem 
This problem of ‘failure’ of devolution masks a deeper problem that this research aims to 
explore and understand.   There is compelling evidence from Botswana, Zimbabwe and 
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elsewhere in the region that CBNRM is not working as the theory and discourse of the 
idealized version of devolution suggests it should. As Murphree (2000a) laments the fact 
that devolution has yet to be broadly achieved outside a few isolated instances, and 
argues ‘[CBNRM] has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and 
not tried’ (Murphree, 2000a:7).  In a global review of CBNRM, Larson and Ribot (2005) 
come to a similar conclusion and note that the theory essentially posits an ‘if-then’ 
proposition. However, in practice, the first part of the proposition, the ‘if’ is not being 
achieved and obviously resulting in failure to achieve the ‘then’.  Understanding the 
failure to reach ‘if’ is the core problem that this research aims to unpack and explain. 
 
There is a consensus that the distribution of rights and control over economic and other 
benefits is a central determinant in the outcome of CBNRM, as with all other natural 
resource management strategies that necessarily take place in socio-ecological systems. 
Within southern Africa, focus of natural resource management scholarship and efforts to 
bring about natural resource management reforms over the last two decades in the region 
has been on the need for reforms that enable devolved natural resource management 
jurisdictions to emerge. However, despite the critical nature of natural resource 
governance reforms and the general acknowledgement that delivering these has been a 
significant impediment to CBNRM achieving its goals, there has been little emphasis on 
understanding why efforts to bring such reforms about succeed or fail - why ‘if’ is not 
achieved.  
 
Developing and deepening understanding of the macro political, economic and policy 
context and its implications for CBNRM policy processes and outcomes has gone 
relatively unexplored within CBNRM and related scholarship1. Little empirical research 
has been undertaken which focuses upon the political and economic implications of 
natural resource governance reforms and whose interests will be affected by those 
                                                            
1 Although there have been notable exceptions, with scholars such as Murphree (1995b, 2000a 
and b) Murombedzi (2003a, forthcoming), Anstey (2005) drawing attention to the broader 
political economy of CBNRM for many years.  
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reforms at the local, national or international scales.  Improving understanding of how 
and why key natural resource governance reforms occur, or do not occur, is thus a 
priority area for this thesis as it seeks to improve knowledge of key natural resource 
management issues in the region.  
 
A core argument of this thesis is that the uncritical and simplistic focus on devolution as 
the appropriate governance arrangement for CBNRM by proponents, analysts and 
implementers over the years has obscured the political dimensions of CBNRM and its 
policy context. In so doing the potentially critical links with the politics of 
democratisation have gone largely unrealized and important opportunities for both 
improved natural resource management and democratisation left unexploited. A further 
aim of this thesis then is to address this problem by providing empirical research and 
analysis that explores, describes and elaborates upon the complex linkages between 
CBNRM, power, politics and democratisation.  
  
Empirical evidence presented here from Zimbabwe and Botswana demonstrates that 
failure to reach ‘if’ arises for a number of complex and interrelated reasons, many of 
which have little to do with CBNRM per se but which relate to its failure to address the 
broader political economy in which it is situated.  A host of different factors that differ 
from village to village, let alone country-to-country shape CBNRM outcomes. But if this 
broad array of factors, many of which are apparently external to CBNRM itself, are 
constraining its outcomes, it is perhaps time to rethink it or to conceptually relocate it 
within the broader political economy.  The evidence presented here suggests that a 
critical area that needs review is the simplistic and  unquestioning assumption amongst 
CBNRM advocates that devolution is the ‘panacea’ and decentralisation the ‘problem’ 
that they are so often portrayed to be.   
 
The analysis of the CBNRM policy process undertaken by this study indicates it is the 
nature of the policy process itself that is a significant causal factor of this problem. 
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Achieving appropriate natural resource governance reforms requires not only a good 
policy design but also the power to put the policy into practice (Hyden, 2008). The 
failure of CBNRM policy makers, advocates and implementers to engage with the wider 
political processes affecting natural resource management and governance is explained 
by the nature of its origins and framing assumptions upon which it is based. Notably, the 
origins of CBNRM in the wildlife/conservation sector together with the framing 
assumption within CBNRM that conservation is not ‘political.’   
 
Given the strong linkages and interconnection between the two apparently distinct 
domains of democratisation and natural resource governance on the one hand, and 
CBNRM  policy processes on the other, in this study I bring them together. Both process 
and outcome are examined here.  This enables exploration and analysis of the causal 
connections between these two distinct but complexly and intimately connected domains.   
 
1.4 Research Aims and Objectives  
This study has two interlinked objectives. The first objective is to explore the 
connections between CBNRM and wider processes of democratisation in southern 
Africa, with a particular focus on devolution and decentralisation. The second objective 
is to investigate the nature of policy processes in the CBNRM sector in Zimbabwe and 
Botswana, with a specific focus on how policy processes have resulted in the strong 
emphasis on devolution of decision making within the sector.  
 
In this thesis, I seek to achieve the following objectives:  
• Review the social, economic and political contexts of CBNRM policies 
and programmes at global, regional and – for Botswana and Zimbabwe – 
national levels; and identify the complex linkages between these and CBNRM 
policy decisions and processes in each country.  
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• Investigate the implementation dynamics and operational specifics of 
CBNRM programmes in Botswana and Zimbabwe and identify how these have 
affected local and national level programme outcomes. 
• Explore local level outcomes of CBNRM in Botswana and Zimbabwe 
with a specific focus on community participation in CBNRM decision-making 
processes and the impacts of governance arrangements on the democratic space 
for engagement between communities and the state 
• Examine why ‘devolution’ became the dominant discourse within 
CBNRM and how this has affected outcomes. 
• Examine the origins of CBNRM and the nature of the actor-network and 
epistemic community that have developed as a result as well as the wider 
implications of these. 
• Explore the linkages between democratisation and CBNRM based on 
empirical evidence provided by the national and local level case studies.  
 
The aim of this thesis is thus to undertake an in-depth comparative analysis of CBNRM 
policy processes in two southern African countries, namely Botswana and Zimbabwe. It 
will shed light on the complex linkages between apparently unconnected elements within 
the broader national and international arenas and CBNRM outcomes. The premise of this 
study is that CBNRM is an innately political process. This implies that if it is to be 
successful in meeting its objective of increased participation in natural resource 
management it must create institutions and mechanisms that will enable marginalised 
rural dwellers to organise, engage and demand accountability from the state, allowing 
them to play a more active role in decisions that affect their lives. In effect, it must create 
new and enhance existing ‘democratic spaces’ for experimentation and enable 
communities to engage with and influence policy development themselves. The objective 
of this thesis is to explore whether CBNRM is or could be providing greater political and 
democratic space to enhance participation in the policy making process; and if so, under 
what conditions is this most effectively achieved.  
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1.5 Scope of the Study 
This thesis provides a comparative analysis of CBNRM policy processes and outcomes 
in Botswana and Zimbabwe and the role that international environmental policy making 
processes played in determining CBNRM in these countries.  The research focus is on 
the process of policy development and programme implementation from international to 
local scales.  This illustrates how process and outcomes comprise reactions to social 
complexity where decision-making is dominated by politics at all scales.   
 
The study contextualizes CBNRM within the broader ongoing processes of social change 
within the region and internationally which are attempting to redistribute social, 
economic and political power. Throughout the history of CBNRM, these apparently 
‘exogenous’ processes have shaped both policy and implementation and have in turn 
been shaped by it (Murombedzi, 2003b, Jones and Murphree, 2001). For example, many 
countries in the region are currently involved in policy and legislative reform relating to 
issues such as local government, land reform, agrarian reform, affirmative action and 
constitutional reform. These constitute a background legal and policy environment that 
has direct and indirect impacts on CBNRM. The focus is then on locating CBNRM 
within the larger political economy within which it is attempting to shift power2 to the 
periphery, and by doing so develop an understanding of the complexities that affect such 
attempts.   
 
Particular attention is paid to the degree to which CBNRM policy makers, implementers 
and advocates in the two countries have engaged mainstream political and development 
processes and in considering whether such engagement translated into the development 
of sufficient political power and momentum to ensure sustainability. This specific 
interest on the strategic political dimensions of CBNRM was driven by the recognition 
                                                            
2 The interpretation of power follows Hyden’s definition: ‘power is the ability to achieve a desired 
outcome in competition with other actors who lay claim to the same resources needed to produce 
that outcome’ (Hyden 2008:13). 
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that its political landscape has far-reaching implications for governance reforms and 
ultimately for changing the status quo and levers of power.  
 
Control over valuable natural resources is invariably a contested political process. Two 
central characteristics of CBNRM make it an inherently political process. Firstly, the 
transfer of power over resources that is implied by devolution, from the centre to local 
institutions, runs into powerful vested interests at many levels and is therefore a political 
process (Murombedzi, 2003a, Murphree, 2000a). Secondly, to date CBNRM in the 
region has focused on wildlife resources and as clearly illustrated in studies (Anstey, 
2005, Duffy, 2000, Gibson, 1999), wildlife is commonly used by politicians as a means 
to dispense patronage and consequently should be viewed as a ‘political commodity’ 
(Gibson, 1999). Given these far reaching political implications, understanding and 
resolving the problems which currently beset CBNRM, requires an appreciation and 
investigation that goes beyond viewing it as simply a technically feasible conservation 
strategy. Interrogation of the social, legislative and political factors that influence 
devolutionary dynamics is required. In essence, this study focuses its attention on the 
wider political landscape or terrain within which CBNRM policies have been developed 
and implemented. 
 
This thesis highlights that although CBNRM is inherently political in nature, 
implementers and analysts have largely failed to engage with the broader political 
processes and continue to fail to do so. Indeed, often consciously taking the attitude that 
politics is best avoided.  I explore the reasons for this and suggest that a number of 
factors have been important. Firstly, CBNRM was initially heralded as the means by 
which the objectives of both environmental quality and economic growth could be made 
mutually reinforcing (Adams and McShane, 1992, Martin, 1986, Western and Wright, 
1994, SASUSG, 1996). The presentation of ‘win-win’ solutions as the goal of CBNRM 
policy has stimulated the ‘depoliticisation’ of conservation policies as described by 
Duffy (2001) in the case of Zimbabwe. More generally, Buscher and Whande (2007) 
maintain that, at the interface of the social sciences and biodiversity conservation, the 
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concept of ‘politics’ has tended to have negative connotations, and is therefore largely 
ignored. This situation arises from the historical dominance of the natural sciences in 
scientific endeavours related to conservation, and compounded by the recent emphasis 
on social disempowerment and inequality related to conservation (Buscher and Whande, 
2007). One side effect of this has been that the concept and process of politics itself has 
become synonymous with negativity, and therefore preferably to be avoided. This 
approach exposes CBNRM to many dangers. Politics is pervasive given the interplay of 
interests and forces in pursuit of power, resources and status. Manor (2005) notes that 
attempting to insulate programmes and processes from politics is naïve, as well as 
impossible, with the outcome generally being that these processes intrude into local 
politics and reinforce the influence of powerful interests.  
 
In a 1995 keynote address to a regional gathering of CBNRM implementers in southern 
Africa - the overwhelming majority of whom were drawn from National Parks 
Departments, conservation and natural science backgrounds - Murphree noted:  
the mixed profile of success and failure in CBNRM in the region owes much of its 
ambiguity to our strategic pragmatism in its implementation. We have placed 
policy and practice before politics and thus have encouraged the birth of 
CBNRM into a politico-legal environment, which if not hostile, is hardly a 
nurturing one. ... I am suggesting that in our initial and successful end-run 
around political processes we run the risk of ignoring their centrality to long-
term CBNRM success… The khaki shorts ecology brigade has led us into a 
largely unrecognized struggle over property rights in rural Africa. Its 
implications are profound… Tenurial rights make the difference between rural 
democratic representation and the persistence of perpetual adolescence of rural 
peoples in national structures of governance… optimal conditions for CBNRM 
require strong tenurial rights, this requires fundamental devolution of power, one 
which politicians are unlikely to make unless there is a strong political reason to 
do so. This reason can only lie in a strong, politically potent constituency demand 
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that this takes place... this is the rural resource-managing communities 
themselves (Murphree, 1995b:47).  
 
In the fifteen years since Murphree made these comments there has been little evidence 
of strategic political engagement on behalf of CBNRM implementers and advocates, 
suggesting that Murphree’s concern that the centrality of political processes to CBNRM 
be recognized has gone largely unregistered and unaddressed. In an effort to address this 
concern, this thesis explores the reasons for this neglect.  
 
Prior to Murphree’s address, Parker (1993) noted, in relation to Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE 
programme and its decentralisation to RDCs rather than devolution to local governance 
institutions, that:  
Hopefully the dichotomy in policy is transient: a stepping stone to conceding the 
benefits of full ownership. Yet if it sticks halfway – as at present– the CAMPFIRE 
programmes will stress to the owners what they are missing – not what they are 
getting. And for this reason the project will fail (quoted in Murphree, 1997: 31). 
 
This thesis explores whether Parker’s perception of the inevitability of failure as a result 
of adopting decentralisation rather than devolution - characteristic of CBNRM analysis 
ever since – is valid. It explores the origins of this perception and notes that it is 
disconnected from mainstream democratisation and decentralization discourses and fails 
to take into account a range of political and power dynamics. One result has been the 
political sidelining of CBNRM which has had a significant impact on its ability to 
deliver governance reforms. I present evidence in the thesis that suggests that Parker’s 
assumption that a realization of what is ‘missing’ by rural communities will lead to 
failure is misplaced. Far from leading to failure, it appears to be stimulating engagement 
and negotiation between communities and local government and by doing so stimulating 
democratic processes and forces at the local level. The outcome is evidence that, in some 
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cases, ‘constituent accountability’ as explained by Murphree (2000a) is becoming 
evident:   
Local jurisdictions must become a significant political constituency of the state, 
a constituency strong enough to counterbalance expropriative interests at the 
centre and one to which the state is accountable. This condition of ‘downward’ 
accountability is critical for effectively linking local and larger scale 
jurisdictions. Indeed, we can posit constituent accountability as a principle in 
such relationships (Murphree, 2000:11; emphasis original).  
 
Murphree (2000a) goes on to identify two conditions necessary for this to happen:  
Firstly, local jurisdictions need to be able to organise and act collectively. 
Secondly, they need to embody, in principle and practice, an ideal that 
corresponds to a general public ethos that confers political legitimacy. 
(Murphree, 2000a:11). 
 
This research explores whether these conditions have developed/are developing; and if 
so, whether they are leading/will lead to ‘constituent accountability (an outcome) 
anticipated by Murphree (2000a).  
 
The research geographically focuses on CBNRM in Botswana and Zimbabwe, and 
compares the two countries systematically. Whilst sharing some significant 
commonalities, for the most part these two countries represent relatively different 
contexts. Similarities between the two countries, in particular they have both been at the 
forefront of a southern African wide movement to promote CBNRM and ‘sustainable 
use’, provide a good basis for comparison. Differences - particularly in relation to the 
implementation focus on decentralisation in Zimbabwe and devolution in Botswana - 
provide scope to undertake an analysis of those issues which lie at the heart of this study. 
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An expansion of the sample to other countries would have enriched the database but 
given time and resource constraints, could only have been undertaken at the expense of 
the depth of research in these Botswana and Zimbabwe. This in-depth analysis has 
allowed for a diachronic investigation which has revealed the dynamic and shifting 
social and political landscapes. This has proven to be a critically important 
methodological component of the research. The rationale for selecting these countries 
included: 
• CBNRM in both countries is well established, has been operational for 15 years 
or more, and programmes, and key events and processes are relatively well 
documented. 
• Significant physical and environmental similarities - e.g. relatively abundant and 
valuable wildlife resources, low human population densities in target areas, 
relatively marginal environments for rain fed agriculture – make the impact of 
social and political influences more easily identifiable and comparable. 
• Differing political cultures, social, economic and political environments and land 
tenure arrangements are represented allowing comparative analysis of the 
influence of broader contexts e.g., 
o  Relatively wealthy, Botswana has remained politically and 
economically stable since its transition from a British Protectorate, it is 
generally considered the most democratic country in the region, with an 
effective bureaucracy,  representative land boards and a decentralized 
approach to government;  
o Zimbabwe is mired in political and economic crisis, land and 
natural resource tenure in general ostensibly lies at the centre of this; early 
progress in CBNRM and decentralization is commonly viewed as having 
stalled. 
• There has been significant interaction, exchange of experiences and common 
activities undertaken between the countries, allowing for consideration of the 
influence of international and regional environmental activities. 
• There are significant differences in the programmatic development of CBNRM in 
Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
• The shape and character of local level natural resource management institutions 
in the two countries have significant variations; not least, that Zimbabwe broadly 
represented a decentralized governance system, Botswana, until recently, 
devolved.     
• I have firsthand knowledge and experience with the CBNRM programmes in 
both countries dating back to their inception and have well developed networks 
and contacts at both national and village levels to facilitate research.  
1.6 Significance and Strategic Goal   
Whilst CBNRM has historically received a great deal of support and acclaim, many 
observers and practitioners consider that it is now at a critical juncture (Hulme and 
Murphree, 2001, Ribot, 2002a, Hutton et al., 2006) with evaluations and assessments of 
its outcomes varying widely.  Since early 2000 there has been a growing perception in 
southern Africa and internationally that CBNRM in the region is in some form of ‘crisis’ 
(Turner, 2004, Hutton et al., 2006, Dzingirai and Breen, 2005, Murombedzi, 2003b,  Roe 
et al., 2000). The nature and extent of this crisis has been the subject of email discussion 
groups, workshops, seminars,  papers and books but there appears to be little consensus 
as to whether CBNRM is indeed in crisis and, if so, what constitutes this crisis and how 
to address it. Some policy makers and international environmentalists and some in the 
donor community are viewing criticism as ‘evidence’ that CBNRM, and indeed 
community participation in conservation per se, is not an appropriate conservation 
strategy (Hutton et al., 2006). A backlash is beginning to form against ‘community 
participation’ in natural resource management, which is threatening to undermine 
CBNRM, and other ‘community conservation’ strategies, just as they are beginning to 
address the core issues of governance (Ribot, 2002a, Hulme and Murphree, 2001). This 
backlash threatens a return to protectionist or ‘fortress’ approaches to conservation and a 
reversal of significant gains made by communities to date.  
 
Such a backlash is assuming increasing significance in the face of global challenges that 
are being faced in the 21st century and which threaten to be most severely felt in Africa 
(IPCC, 2007). Environment has assumed an immense transformative influence over 
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global economies (Gomera and Rihoy, in press). Two issues – climate change and 
ecosystem degradation – have occupied public and scientific discourse since 2007. 
CBNRM should be assuming increasing significance under these circumstances as the 
core issues with which it has been involved for the last 25 years - such as appropriate 
land and resource tenure arrangements, diversification of rural livelihoods and enhanced 
local governance - are the same issues that must be addressed if efforts to introduce 
appropriate adaptation and mitigation mechanisms for climate change are to be equitable 
and effective. To disregard the experience, knowledge and lessons gained over the years 
from CBNRM, would be to disregard potentially important strategies in addressing 
climate change at the expense of those marginalised communities who will endure the 
most of its impact.  
 
Criticisms of CBNRM range from vitriolic and hostile attacks, mainly from the animal 
rights and ‘protectionist’ advocates, who are opposed to what they perceive as a 
‘dilution’ of the conservation agenda (Oates, 1995, Brandon et al., 1998); to approaches 
questioning some of the assumptions of CBNRM, suggesting modifications to current 
policies and implementation approaches (Adams and Hulme, 2001, Rozemejeir, 2003, 
Katerere, 2002, Campbell and Shackleton, 2001, Murombedzi, 2003b, Hughes, 2006, 
Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007).  
 
The former critiques are primarily driven by philosophies, conservation paradigms and 
emotive responses that are largely alien to the context of conservation in southern Africa 
today (see Hutton et al, 2006 for a comprehensive review). They are also largely 
oblivious to the economic, social and political processes in which conservation 
interventions take place, which brings their sustainability into serious doubt.    Whilst 
these critiques do affect the process of policy development within the region - not least 
because of the impact that they may have on the donors’ willingness to fund CBNRM as 
explored further in Chapter 4 - they have little credibility within southern Africa itself 
(Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Rihoy et al., 1999, Hutton et al., 2006). It is the latter set of 
critiques, which are of primary interest here as these have led to a growing realization 
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that the theoretical foundations of CBNRM lack robustness (Turner, 2004, Fabricius and 
Kock, 2004, Peters, 1994).  
 
An exhaustive analysis of even these critiques is beyond the scope, or relevance, of this 
thesis as they range across the spectrum of social, economic, political and environmental 
issues.   Those that are of immediate relevance here  relate to the failure of CBNRM to 
improve local governance by not involving local communities effectively and may be 
leading to increased inequalities and elite capture of benefits (Hughes, 2006, Dzingirai 
and Breen, 2005, Agrawal and Gibson, 1999).  This critique reflects the contradictions in 
planning based on assumptions of homogeneity and fixity in an otherwise complex and 
dynamic world (Berry, 1993). Such critiques question the legitimacy and accountability 
of CBNRM institutions - a criticism that if valid undermines the core arguments 
presented by CBNRM advocates in making the link between CBNRM and democracy. 
Whilst this critique is now relatively common it was first clearly articulated by Agrawal 
and Gibson (1999) in an article that remains influential to this day.  
 
As discussed above, the most common criticism of CBNRM is on the grounds of its 
perceived inability to ‘deliver’ devolution, which is seen as a fundamental ‘flaw.’ 
Notwithstanding this, there is also acknowledgement that this is a component of an on-
going and evolutionary  process and that it would be premature to ‘write-off’ this 
approach at this early stage (Ribot, 2002b, Campbell and Shackleton, 2001, 
Murombedzi, 2003a, Hutton et al, 2006). Such serious scholarship, often from within the 
region, raises questions about some of the framing assumptions on which CBNRM is 
based. The strategic goal of my research is to contribute to this constructive debate; 
identifying, exploring and explaining key problems that are constraining CBNRM from 
achieving appropriate natural resource governance reforms,  as well as exploring the 
potential and actual contributions that CBNRM has made/can make to democratisation  
processes in the region.  
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My strategic goal is then to contribute to the ongoing debate surrounding CBNRM 
specifically by encouraging rethinking of the political process of negotiating politically 
supportive relations with policy-makers, politicians, the state and civil society 
stakeholders who may be involved in defining the policy context of CBNRM. Key to 
achieving this has been the need to demonstrate, with the use of empirical evidence, the 
extent to which CBNRM policy making process to date – its political interests, actor 
networks and discourses – has defined its context, which has in turn determined 
CBNRM’s ability to deliver appropriate natural resource management governance 
reforms. 
 
1.7 Research Approach and Methodology 
1.7.1 Research Approach 
This study is based on primary research, secondary sources and interviews. It has been 
informed by a combination of theoretical concepts and disciplinary perspectives, ranging 
from political science to public administration to anthropology to African studies. This 
has required the employment of various analytical methodologies. Following Keeley and 
Scoones (2003) the three primary analytical tools that have been employed are structured 
political interests, discourse analysis and actor networks.  This approach has necessitated 
the use of multiple sources of evidence in order to capture the complexities and overlaps 
of these different analytical approaches. The use of multiple sources of evidence had the 
advantage of ensuring there was some continuity of research variables and similar 
methodologies applied across the two case study countries. The use of this approach 
enabled triangulation to be built into the data collection process.  
 
However, the aim of the research was to explore and compare the policy processes of 
CBNRM within two different countries, identifying what worked when, where, why and 
how over a period of almost 20 years. This comparative approach required an assessment 
of different contexts and an analysis of the different implications these had.  Keeley and 
Scoones (2003) point out that the complexities of the individual policy processes do not 
allow for a direct comparison with an identical methodology applied across all countries 
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in relation to a fixed set of variables. Instead, in each country specific policy ‘stories’ 
have been uncovered, their histories explored, their contexts reviewed, the networks, 
coalitions and policy entrepreneurs identified and their impacts considered. This 
approach required a methodology that is, in the words of Keeley and Scoones (2003:19) 
‘necessarily both qualitative and eclectic.’ My approach has had then to be flexible and 
opportunistic to ensure that all opportunities to gain information and insights were 
maximized. The different sets of data required meant that a combination of 
methodologies had to be employed.  
 
1.7.2 Research Methodology 
The analysis in each setting started with a focus on relationships, processes and 
connections, and moved to a situated analysis of institutions, organizations and 
structures. As individuals moved across locales, practices were linked through specific 
initiatives (e.g. CBNRM projects, conferences and workshops) funding networks (e.g. 
USAID, Ford Foundation), and professional alliances (e.g. National Parks Departments 
or NGO affiliations such as SASUSG). These have been carefully traced with the use of 
methodologies such as key-informant interviews, actor-biographies, the construction of 
time-lines and document analysis. The document analysis included official government 
documents and internal correspondence, donor and NGO documents and 
correspondence, archival materials, newspaper articles and academic publications. I used 
participant observation at meetings, workshops and seminars.  
 
The same methods were employed in following the process and tactics by which 
networks were built and actors enrolled in order to construct the necessary national, 
regional and international coalitions. The research identifies the ‘policy entrepreneurs’ - 
the main protagonists of these networks - the roles they play and the strategies they 
developed to promote CBNRM policy. It identifies the knowledge and science driving 
CBNRM policy, including where this knowledge came from, who was able to use it and 
how it is used. It also looks at the motivations of various actors, both for those in the 
policy networks and those who were not but arguably should have been involved. It 
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investigates whose knowledge was included, whose was excluded and why. Furthermore, 
it explores the linkages and interactions at different scales, from global to local.   
 
In researching local dynamics, I employed a similar approach and methodologies, 
complimented with additional techniques. These additional methodologies included a 
variety of Participatory Rural Assessment (PRA) techniques such as social mapping and 
wealth ranking to identify key informants, and livelihood diagrams and charts to reveal 
natural resource use patterns. These were selected and adapted on a ‘trial and error’ basis 
and were combined with semi-structured questionnaires, key-informant interviews, 
participant observation and focus group discussions. Ongoing analysis of data throughout 
the fieldwork process enabled me to orient my research techniques and approaches to the 
particular information that I required. I developed an open-ended questionnaire, which 
was adapted for different interviewees that also contained some quantitative socio-
economic questions, and supported this with key informant interviews and oral 
narratives.  
 
I paid particular attention to narratives, including oral narratives, at all scales. This 
involved taping, translating when necessary and transcribing over 250 interviews.  A 
focus on narratives proved important in order to understand the range of perceptions and 
nuances at play. The collection of narratives from informants at a local level provided an 
empirical basis for discussing local perceptions of natural resources, power and politics. 
At the local level, comprehensive quantitative financial data was also collected and 
analysed. This quantitative financial data primarily generated descriptive statistics to 
substantiate the findings of data collected through more qualitative methods.   
 
The research was conducted over a four year period from 2003-2007,  with four field 
trips to Botswana, each field trip of at least 3 weeks, and I undertook three field trips to 
Zimbabwe lasting three weeks each as well. These trips incorporated research at the 
national level as well as the local.  A local post-graduate research assistant was employed 
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in each country for approximately 6 months. These research assistants assisted with the 
village level research, undertaking initial familiarization studies, including structured 
interviews with open ended questionnaires with sample groups of representatives, and 
identified key informants for further interviews with the primary researcher, myself. 
Ability on my behalf to communicate in Shangaan and Setswana would have made the 
field research richer but my research assistants provided translation services as 
necessary. When in a village location I chose to communicate exclusively in the local 
language with the use of translators to ensure that the respondent was conversing in a 
medium with which they were fully comfortable.   An unintended outcome was that 
through repetition of questions, answers and need for triangulation to make sure I was 
understood, clarification was often enhanced. 
 
Notwithstanding the relatively limited period for fieldwork and primary research 
activities, I drew upon 15 years of experience working in CBNRM in southern Africa, 
including in Botswana and Zimbabwe. I drew upon my extensive personal and 
professional contacts with colleagues from these countries to ensure that I was kept up to 
date with unfolding policy processes when I was not in the country. I also attended a 
variety of seminars and meetings in various SADC countries during this period, which 
brought me into regular contact with key informants from Botswana and Zimbabwe.   
 
My professional experience working with CBNRM has ranged from village-level 
extension work to national and regional policy advice and programme management, and 
international representational activities.  This experience and background knowledge has 
been drawn upon throughout the research process.  However, my professional 
background raises issues of ‘positionality’ and independence.  
 
1.7.3 Positionality  
Given my professional experience, knowledge and ongoing involvement with CBNRM 
policy and implementation and interaction with many key individuals involved in 
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CBNRM implementation in the region, it has been necessary to carefully monitor my 
own independence and positionality. In this regard, I was careful to acknowledge both to 
others and to myself that my positionality as a ‘situated agent’ whose own work could 
influence the policy process.   
 
On the one hand, knowing and having a trusted relationship  with many of the policy 
makers, implementers and representatives of affected communities in each country puts 
me in a privileged position to identify and access interviewees and gather and analyse 
information; but equally, it could  also lead to personal bias  in the selection of 
interviewees and analysis of findings. Particular care was taken to avoid this at the 
village level. For example, in Mahenye I had worked on an ad-hoc basis providing 
capacity building inputs for village and district CAMPFIRE officials in the early 1990’s, 
and was therefore, known by many of those involved in CAMPFIRE during this period. 
Here I ensured that the primary responsibility for identifying key informants was given 
to my research assistant. This avoided my personnel bias distorting the current research. 
This was necessary due to the ongoing conflict in the village between CAMPFIRE 
officials from the earlier period and those during the research period.   At the national 
level, in addition to drawing upon my own network, 2-3 independent informal advisers in 
both countries advised on the selection of interviewees to ensure that they are a 
representative cross-section of relevant parties. 
 
In acknowledgement of my personnel biases, I intentionally selected methodologies, 
such as open-ended questionnaires and participatory construction of timelines that 
encouraged interviewees to tell their own stories. This approach ensured that I had to 
hear, acknowledge and move towards understanding the complexity and nuanced 
interpretation of situations than would otherwise have been possible. When specific data, 
facts or incidences were revealed, every effort to verify these through triangulation was 
made. Given the sensitivity of the information collected, I have withheld names of some 
interviewees on ethical grounds.  
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1.8 Thesis Outline  
The thesis is presented in 10 chapters. The first three chapters, including this one, 
describe the objectives, history and background, the methodology, theoretical concepts 
and analytical framework for the research. These are followed by a chapter which 
explores the impact and implications of international environmental policy making 
processes on national CBNRM processes. The following four chapters are largely 
descriptive accounts of country-specific policy processes in Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
Chapters 5 and 6 are concerned with Botswana, with Chapter 5 providing a description 
of the macro political, social, policy and economic contexts and Chapter 6 providing a 
detailed description of the natural resource governance implications of CBNRM in the 
five villages of the Okavango Community Trust. Chapter 7 and 8 undertake a similar 
description and analysis for Zimbabwe, with a case study from the CAMPFIRE 
programme in Mahenye village.  Key emergent issues are then identified and analysed in 
Chapter 9, which provides a comparative analysis of the CBNRM process and outcomes 
within the two countries. Finally, key findings and policy recommendations are 
presented in the conclusion, Chapter 10.  
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CHAPTER 2  
CBNRM, GOVERNANCE, DEMOCRACY AND DECENTRALIZATION 
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, given the complex linkages and interconnections between 
CBNRM process and outcomes, this study encompassed both. Only by taking this dual 
approach is it possible to explore, illustrate and explain that it is the nature of the 
CBNRM policy process, and some of the key framing assumptions upon which it is 
based, that has resulted in the failure of CBNRM policy makers to engage with political 
and macro processes. This has in turn compromised its ability to achieve the necessary 
natural resource management reforms.  This encompassing of dual conceptual domains 
implies that a dual analytical framework is required for comprehensive analysis. Thus the 
literature review on CBNRM, decentralisation and devolution presented here provides 
the analytical framework for exploring and explaining the substantive outcomes; whilst 
that provided in Chapter 3 provides the analytical framework for exploring the policy 
process which has led to these outcomes. Consequently, the conceptual and analytical 
basis, as well as the research methodologies, for the study are broad and are provided by 
both Chapters 2 and 3 together.  
 
2.2 Background 
Historically in southern Africa, ‘alien’ and racially discriminatory environmental policies 
have regulated the use of natural resources, undermining locally evolved environmental 
management and livelihood strategies and entrenching state dominance of natural 
resource management (Anderson and Grove, 1987, Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Marks, 
1984, Murombedzi, 2003a, Mandondo, 2000). The transition to democracy, witnessed in 
the mid to late 20th Century,  ensured  political expediency in deracialising natural 
resource management policies and replacing exclusionary policies with those that 
promoted natural resource management  in achieving rural development objectives 
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(Mandondo, 2000, Jones and Murphree, 2004, Child, 2004). This new policy approach, 
CBNRM, focused on increasing public participation in environmental management.   
 
CBNRM was initially heralded as the means by which the objectives of environmental 
quality and economic growth could be made mutually reinforcing (Adams and McShane, 
1992, Martin, 1986, Western and Wright, 1994, SASUSG, 1996). One result of the 
creation of such ‘win-win’ ideals as the basis for CBNRM discourse has been to 
stimulate the ‘depoliticisation’ of conservation policies (Buscher and Whande, 2007, 
Duffy, 2000) within the region. However, because of the significance of patterns of 
natural resource use to rural and national economies, natural resource governance issues, 
such as land and resource tenure underpin evolving relations between the state and its 
citizens (Nelson, in press; Murombedzi, in press). One thread that this thesis explores is 
the implications of this ‘depoliticisation’ of what is a fundamentally political issue. I 
argue that this has prevented implementers, analysts and advocates from recognizing and 
strategically engaging with broader political and policy processes in areas such as land 
tenure and reform or local government reform and other relevant policy making 
processes. This raises the question, whether failures to achieve desired CBNRM 
outcomes arise from shortcomings in its operational principles or from failure to 
recognize the nature and extent of resistance to the necessary reforms. 
 
Despite this, CBNRM policies have met with some success in legitimizing interventions 
and enhancing prospects for sustainability (Child, 2004, Fabricius and Kock, 2004).  
Nevertheless, over the last decade, they have been coming under sustained scrutiny and 
criticism on the grounds that they have failed to live up to their earlier promise of 
delivering economically enhanced livelihoods and biodiversity conservation (Hutton et 
al., 2006, Turner, 2004, Roe et al., 2000, Adams and Hulme, 2001). The response of 
many CBNRM proponents to this criticism has been to acknowledge problems in these 
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areas but point instead to the success of the social and governance3 dimensions of this 
policy thrust (Turner, 2004, Jones and Murphree, 2004, World Bank, 2004). However, 
whether or not these new policies are able to deliver sustained improvements in natural 
resource governance and strengthen local democratic processes will depend upon a broad 
variety of factors external to the specific policies and policy makers in question.  
 
It is necessary to understand not just how conservation and rural development goals and 
agendas have affected CBNRM but also how colonial history and independence 
struggles, economic realities, political ideologies, international and regional 
environmental priorities, donor and international NGO agendas and the economic and 
political interests of elites have influenced the context and issues shaping CBNRM 
policy.  Political and government agendas within the southern African region are, in 
relation to land and natural resource management policies,  still focused to a large degree 
on removing past discrimination. The result in many countries, most notably Zimbabwe, 
is that they remain largely dominated by racial issues (Jones, 2004, Adams and Hulme, 
2001). Given this history, environmental governance regimes had to acknowledge and 
seek to redress the historical legacy of racial discrimination, which nominally CBNRM 
seeks to do.   Nevertheless, what other factors drove and are driving the development of 
CBNRM policy? What layers of complexity does the historical, social and political 
context introduce and what implications do these have for future policy developments? 
 
Through a literature review, this chapter explores the general historical and political 
context of natural resource management in southern Africa. It then focuses on the 
theoretical backgrounds to decentralization, democracy and governance once again 
highlighting the political implications of these processes and exploring synergies and 
complementarities between the objectives of CBNRM and the establishment of 
                                                            
3  Governance is used here to refer to; the formal or informal structures and processes of power, 
authority and accountability that govern decision making and dispute resolution, whether related 
to natural resource governance or national political and local social governance (adapted from 
Woodhouse et al, 2000). 
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participatory democracy in the region. It concludes with a summary of the main points 
raised to provide the basis for further discussion.  
 
2.3 The Historical and Political Context of Natural Resource 
Management  
The historical context of natural resource management in Africa has been critical in 
determining how CBNRM has evolved, not least because it is responsible for shaping 
contemporary public and political attitudes towards natural resource management 
(Whande, 2009, Mandondo, 2000, Murombedzi, 2006). It has defined the context within 
which CBNRM operates and has largely determined which elements of the overall 
national policy agenda have implications for the development of CBNRM policy today 
and vice versa. The following brief review of the history of natural resource management 
will focus on drawing out these implications for policy development.  
 
2.3.1 Pre-colonial Era 
In pre-colonial times, land and natural resources played a central role in the lives of 
Africans - as they continue to do today in rural areas - with people relying on the natural 
resource base as integral to their subsistence strategies. For example, land and natural 
resources provided grazing for livestock, water for domestic and agricultural use, meat 
from hunting, medicinal herbs, construction materials and survival options in times of 
famine (Marks, 1984, Cousins and Benjaminsen, 2000, Mackenzie, 1987, Anderson and 
Grove, 1987). This dependence on the natural resource base led to an appreciation of 
nature, resulting in its incorporation into the worldviews, belief systems and folklore of 
traditional societies. Concepts of the supernatural and spirit world were influenced by 
people’s relationships with natural resources, and in turn, these concepts influenced the 
perception management and use of certain resources and features of the landscape 
(Posey, 1999).  
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This dependence led to the development of institutions and tenure arrangements, which 
governed and regulated the use and management of natural resources. Land and natural 
resource tenure were communal in the sense that they provided group control in 
determining access to and exclusion from the use of communal resources, particularly 
land. Rights to natural resources and land were shared and relative, with flexible 
boundaries and high levels of security of tenure (Cousins and Claasens, 2004). Political 
power and authority were vested in the usually kinship based institutions of the ‘chief’, 
one of the principal functions of whom was to regulate access to land and natural 
resources (Marks, 1984). Customary institutions may have been stable and sophisticated 
instruments for the social allocation of natural resources and were firmly embedded 
within social relations both in terms of their centrality to livelihoods and the role of their 
political authority (Marks, 1984, Anstey, 2001, Cousins and Claasens, 2004).  
 
2.3.2 Colonial Era Policies  
Colonisation marked a critical juncture in African history and is widely considered to 
have set a context that remains a major factor in current debates on land and natural 
resource management policy and practice (Murombedzi, 2003a, Mandondo, 2000, 
Adams and Mulligan, 2003). Approaches to natural resource management and 
conservation adopted during the colonial period were determined by ideologies and 
values developed in the West (Buscher and Whande, 2007, Peluso, 1992, Brockington, 
2002). The impact of these policies saw the subordination of indigenous forms of land 
tenure, governance and institutions and has had a profound and lasting impact on rural 
areas and production systems.   
 
Throughout southern Africa, colonisation resulted in land expropriation and forced 
removals and involved the creation of tenure systems for the new ‘native reserves’ which 
were ostensibly based on the customary communal systems (Tshuma, 1997, Mamdani, 
1996). The most significant manifestation of this has been the creation of racially based 
land distribution and tenure systems, which continue to dominate southern Africa today 
in the form of the ‘modern’ (commercial) and ‘traditional’ (communal) sectors. Ranger 
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(1983) maintains that because of the expropriatory origins of the communal areas, 
modern communal tenure systems represent an imposed European attitude towards land 
with the purpose of extending the states control over the countryside. Thus communal 
tenure as it manifests itself today remains an intensely ideological and political issue 
(Murombedzi, 2003b).  
 
In British colonies, such as those in southern Africa, the formation and operation of 
colonial states was based on indirect rule, the objective of which was to establish and 
maintain subjugation of the local populations and to exercise political domination at 
minimum cost  to the imperial power (Mamdani, 1996, van Nieuwaal and van Dijk, 
1999, Hyden, 2008, Berry, 1993). Under indirect rule, the lower tiers of state 
administration in rural areas were allocated to the authority of  chiefs and headmen 
governing by the ostensibly ‘customary law’ of different ethnic groups, to which rural 
people were subject based on their ethnic identity as perceived and legislated by colonial 
rulers  (Ranger, 1983). While the powers of chiefs were entirely subordinated to those of 
the colonial state authority, they were often greatly increased in relation to their subjects. 
This colonial redesign of chieftaincy, in effect, fused executive, legislative and judicial 
powers of ‘customary’ authority in the countryside. Mamdani (1996) refers to this as the 
“decentralized despotism” of indirect rule. Communal land tenure was designed to 
maintain rural stability and control the local population under the patriarchal authority of 
their chiefs. Indirect rule resulted then in the ‘customary’ in Africa with respect to land 
and political status being reinvented to suite the purposes of the colonizers.  
 
In terms of conservation, the arrival of colonial settlers in southern Africa in the mid-17th 
Century heralded an unprecedented period of pressure on the natural resource base. Most 
notably, large wild animals came under enormous pressure from uncontrolled hunting by 
Europeans, which led to serious population depletions (Adams and Mulligan, 2003). By 
the turn of the 19th Century concerns about natural resource scarcity, particularly wildlife 
brought environmental issues to the fore. The result was state appropriation of formal 
control over all wildlife, with some limited, regulated use allowed by white settlers and 
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foreign tourists. This approach reinforced western imperialist notions of natural resource 
management, which supported the romantic ideal of the African sub-continent as an 
unspoiled Eden (Anderson and Grove, 1987). These served to entrench the privileges of 
European settlers, as well as perpetuating the ‘gentlemanly sport’ of hunting, 
differentiating it from African “poaching” for food or trade (Mackenzie, 1987). Africans 
meanwhile were alienated from wildlife, with all their customary uses of it now 
becoming outlawed (Anderson and Grove, 1987, Fabricius and Kock, 2004).  
 
Further attempts to preserve wildlife and natural resources resulted in the establishment 
of protected areas, initially game reserves and later national parks. The establishment of 
protected areas led to Africans being relocated, often forcibly, from areas which they had 
previously controlled, and the abandonment of established rights and resource-use 
patterns (Beinart, 1989, Adams and Mulligan, 2003). Local people no longer had access 
to the wildlife, pastures, farmland and water resources that they had relied upon for their 
livelihoods as well as shaped aspects of their belief and governance systems.   Protected 
areas became the preserve of game rangers, scientists, safari hunters, and later, tourists. 
The prevailing sentiment was that only Europeans knew how to conserve nature. 
Indigenous people were formally denied access to natural resources, although other 
racial groups continued to enjoy and build their political and economic power around the 
same resources (Suzuki, 2001). Everywhere in the region, a paramilitary structure was 
put in place, charged to protect, and in the event of infraction, prosecute offenders 
(Child, 2004). 
 
Thus, the preservationist approaches of the colonial period were rooted in imperialist 
perspectives, science and discourse.  Mackenzie (1987) notes that: 
from the early 1920’s the doctrine of trusteeship, which informed colonial 
thinking, drew increasingly on the authoritative claims of the ‘scientific method’ 
both to generate ‘crisis narratives’ in the Reserve and to construct discourses of 
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‘betterment’ and ‘environmentalism’ which legitimated a deepening of 
administrative control (Mackenzie, 1987:698-9). 
 
State control and nature conservation were effectively reinforcing each other under the 
banner of scientific progress. Such approaches failed entirely to take into account the 
conceptualisations of nature typical of African societies, which produced interdependent 
relationships between people and nature (Grove, 1987, Fabricius and Kock, 2004). As 
Mandondo (2000) notes, colonial natural resource governance systems resulted in over-
centralisation because they were crafted in the context of conquest and subjugation.   
  
Clearly, colonial dynamics around conservation and land in Africa triggered deep social 
changes, many of which, despite a burgeoning literature in recent years (see Buscher and 
Whande, 2007 for a detailed review), are only just being partially understood today.  
 
2.3.3 Independence Era Policies 
As African governments gained their independence, they tended to retain exclusionist 
colonial policies and legislation, with the colonial state effectively retained in form or in 
substance (Mandondo, 2000, Gibson, 1999, Hyden, 2008). The foreign and racially 
discriminatory approach to natural resources management  introduced in the colonial era 
and initially perpetuated by post-colonial independent African governments became, and 
remains, a highly emotive and divisive political issue charged with controversy. These 
policies generated a range of social conflicts that endanger the future of natural resources 
and of those people who rely upon these resources for their livelihoods.  Gibson (1999) 
considers these ramifications:  
The benefits and costs associated with wildlife policies have influenced African 
independence movements, legislative debates, government elections, and 
international agreements. (Gibson, 1999:5) 
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Conservation was, and remains to this day, associated by many as synonymous with 
western hegemony, racial inequality, alienation from resources, poverty and loss of 
cultural heritage and identity (Adams and Mulligan, 2003). It was partly as a politically 
motivated and popular attempt to redress the damaging social, cultural and economic 
effects of colonial approaches to natural resource management that CBNRM approaches 
emerged and were popularized (Child, 2004, Fabricius and Kock, 2004).  
 
The historically central role of the institutions of traditional leadership in natural 
resource management presents an additional layer of complexity in attempts to develop 
appropriate natural resource governance systems.  The relationship between traditional 
leaders and post-colonial states has been ambiguous. This ambiguity has resulted in part 
from indirect rule that incorporated chiefs as an extension of colonial regimes (Mamdani, 
1996). The result has been that many newly independent states saw them as collaborators 
and impediments to modernization and nation building and curtailed their roles in local 
governance, Botswana being one of a handful of exceptions to this. However, since the 
early 1990’s the earlier policy of containing traditional authorities has seen a reversal, 
with a wave of ‘retraditionalisation’ which has enlarged the formal role of chiefs in local 
governance and development (Kyed and Buur, 2006). This wave of retraditionalisation 
accompanied the wave of democratisation and liberalization policies of the 1990’s and 
indeed was interpreted by many as a means to reinforce democratic processes through 
the provision of new democratic space that enabled the marginalised to access the state 
(UNECA, 2007).  
 
Given the role that traditional authorities have historically played in determining natural 
resource use rights, coupled with the present wave of recognizing traditional leaders in 
governance, this has implications for the development of appropriate natural resource 
governance institutions and strengthening of democratic processes. Once again, the role 
of traditional leaders is greeted with some ambivalence. On the one hand, there is 
widespread recognition that incorporating traditional leaders into local governance 
structures could lead to efficient, culturally diverse local governance (UNECA, 2007). 
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Conversely there is also widespread recognition that this move might jeopardize the 
gains promised by democracy with regards to equity, rights and gender equality by 
handing over control of development ‘to an indeterminate huddle of unelected 
community organizations and groups’ (Kyed and Buur, 2006:9).  
 
‘Retraditionalisation’ in failed states involves incorporating non-state actors and 
regaining strength and territorial reach through the use of traditional authorities (Herbst, 
2000, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Kyed and Buur, 2006). The idea being that chiefs fill the 
authority gap left by failed state institutions, leading to the dominance of modern 
informal governance, on the one hand, and old-new chiefdom-type politics on the other. 
The state’s loss of control over its citizens provides room for the resurgence of chiefly 
rule based on tradition. The state then recognizes and incorporates chiefs in order to 
regain its own control over territories and people. By capturing the chieftaincy, the state 
is essentially able to (re)extend its rule in rural areas. The ‘failed state’ hypothesis is 
challenged by the case of South Africa where traditional leaders have assumed new 
significance despite the powerful and extensive state apparatus (Cousins and Claasens, 
2004). Nevertheless, it serves as a useful analytical tool in the context of Zimbabwe, as 
discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
The outcome of attempts to manipulate the powers of traditional institutions is that most 
countries have since independence experienced a ‘mixed polity’ or dualism of authority 
structures in rural areas and unresolved issues abound relating to questions of jurisdiction 
and authority (UNECA, 2007). Potentially competing actors are elected local 
governments, traditional authorities or elected local ‘committees.’ Overlap and lack of 
clarity on jurisdiction in relation to allocating resource rights is another factor 
constraining effective management of common property resources.  
 
This historical review of natural resource management and the institutions involved 
illustrates that contemporary policies and outcomes are shaped by colonial and pre-
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colonial institutional arrangements and values. Hyden (2008:12) aptly describes the 
resulting outcome, and argues that ‘the institutional landscape in Africa is a curious 
mixture of formal and informal behaviours.’ Contemporary political and power 
arrangements are then a reflection of colonial and pre-colonial history, the result of 
which is a complex blend of formal and informal institutions exercising power. 
Governance processes must then be analysed in relation to both formal and informal 
institutions and processes.  
 
This complexity is added to further by the resultant political nature of many 
contemporary African states. African independence leaders inherited states which 
claimed wide powers over natural resources, including land, which were placed under 
discretionary bureaucratic control. This system ensured that discretionary powers were 
concentrated in the hands of the executive and there were limited means to 
democratically contest authority. Thus control of the Presidency and other powerful 
political positions ensures a path to power and wealth and through networks of 
patronage, social and ethnic security (Ake, 2000, Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Many 
commentators have noted the high degree of informality of politics in Africa (Ake, 2000, 
Mamdani, 1996, Bayart et al., 1999, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Hyden, 2008). Political 
processes are dominated by kinship ties and relationships based on personal and 
communal patronage, rather than formal public discourses and institutions (Hyden, 
2008). Natural resources, historically placed in the public domain and with high 
economic values, become central tools in relation to patronage interests that allow 
governing elites to maintain their powers. Thus in the African context informal patron-
client relations, as well as formal and informal institutions are relevant to governance.  
 
In addition, African states also have to merge values of their own societies with norms 
and values espoused by the international community. Western donors and conservation 
organisations increasingly provided the financial and technical support for protected area 
management and conservation in general. This created dependency on outside 
institutions and allowed external agents to pursue their own strategic agendas (Roe et al., 
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2000). Western NGOs focused fund-raising campaigns upon charismatic “flagship 
species” such as rhinos, elephants and gorillas, which by default excluded the 
involvement of local people (Hutton et al., 2006). 
 
2.4 The Evolution of CBNRM Approaches  
During the 1980s, various factors - analysed in detail in Chapter 4 - combined to catalyze 
a shift in natural resource management policies away from the centralized, protectionist 
and ‘exclusionary’ approach characteristic of the colonial era to an ‘inclusive’ approach. 
This ‘inclusive’ approach encompasses policies and practices that aim to give rural 
dwellers greater involvement in managing the natural resources in the areas in which 
they are resident.  This approach encompasses many different forms and covers a wide 
variety of resource or sector-based initiatives, including community based approaches to 
forestry, fisheries, and water and rangeland management (Turner, 2004). In addition to 
this sectoral ‘focused’ CBNRM is what Fabricius et al. (2004) term ‘general’ or 
‘everyday’ CBNRM, which involve indigenous practices of most rural communities in 
their day to day use of natural resources.  
 
The result of the policy swing within the broader field of environmental management, 
has resulted in the wildlife sector in what has become generically known as ‘community 
conservation’ (Adams and Hulme, 2001), a term which itself encompasses many 
different types of initiative.   On the one end of the spectrum there are ‘park outreach’ 
initiatives which allow communities neighbouring national parks to have limited and 
passive access to park incomes. Whilst at the other end are CBNRM initiatives which 
have as their objective the development of communal capacity for adaptive governance 
of natural resources through the devolution of resource rights to communal land residents 
(Hulme and Murphree, 2001). The use of the term CBNRM within this thesis is confined 
specifically to these latter initiatives within the wildlife sector.   
 
CBNRM, as referred to here, is underpinned by four conceptual elements:   
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a) Sustainable use of natural resources, which concludes that the highest probability of 
achieving sustainable use occurs where the prime beneficiaries of use are the people 
living with the resources.  
b) Economic benefits, which in the context of rural Africa are identified as the engine 
for sustainable use and therefore the future of wildlife can only be assured in a policy 
context where wildlife becomes a competitive form of land use.  
c) Devolutionism which indicates that the delegation of responsibility is not enough to 
develop the managerial potential of resource users; delegation of responsibility has to be 
accompanied by the delegation of authority and the entitlements of full proprietorship if 
it is to provide the right incentives. The resulting devolution follows the principal of 
subsidiarity.  
d) Collective Proprietorship which means defining communities and determining how 
they can develop effective institutions of collective management are central issues. In 
determining solutions, insights from common-property management theory are sought 
which enable policy makers and practitioners to draw upon the concept of communal 
property regimes (Adapted from Jones and Murphree, 2004:64-66). 
 
Whilst a common conceptual basis for CBNRM can be identified, the details of this 
process and the programmatic development of CBNRM programmes and policy within 
each country differs depending on the specific national context, as is demonstrated in 
Chapters 5 through 8 for Zimbabwe and Botswana.   
 
2.5 Governance, Democratisation and Decentralization: Theory and 
Linkages  
The basic concepts and the underlying framing assumptions of CBNRM which this 
thesis is particularly concerned with are those that relate to ‘devolutionism’ and 
‘collective proprietorship’ as identified by Jones and Murphree (2004) above. 
Appreciating the logical, functional link between democratisation, decentralisation and 
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governance and CBNRM is essential for the discussion presented here. The concepts of 
‘devolutionism’ and ‘collective proprietorship’ and the definition and interpretations of 
these have been instrumental in guiding both policy making and implementation in 
CBNRM initiatives throughout the region (Ibid). In relation to decentralization, at the 
sub-national level, there is broad agreement amongst political science and democracy 
analysts  that it can contribute to and strengthen improved governance and vice versa 
(Manor, 2005, Mahwood, 1983), whilst good governance is frequently equated with 
democratic governance (UNDP, 2002). Thus improving governance is interpreted as 
strengthening the process of democratisation. The following sections will place these 
three concepts in their respective theoretical frameworks.  
 
2.5.1 Governance, Democracy and Democratic Politics  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of governance took on increasing 
significance amongst influential institutions and individuals as it became identified with 
the ‘fight against corruption’ (Kaufman et al., 2003).  Since then it has expanded its 
conceptual domain and is now generally defined as the way in which power and 
authority are exercised through formal and informal institutions for the common good of 
the citizenry (Kaufman et al., 2003). Local governance has to take account of all the 
institutions, rules, arrangements, and types of political, economic, and social modes of 
action that, in the local context, form the basis for exercising local authority over 
resources and benefits (Ostrom, 1999). If optimum conditions are created the result will 
be justice, equity, well-being, and environmental sustainability (Ribot, 2004)4. 
Democracy is one form of governance, containing ideas on how power and authority are 
accountable in society, and is in its most basic definition the idea of governance by the 
people. 
 
                                                            
4 The idea of justice, here taken to mean equitable access to resources and equitable vertical and 
horizontal distribution of profits is central to theories of decentralization and of local governance 
(Manor, 1997, Kaufman et al,. 2003:, Ribot, 2002b). 
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The concepts of democracy and governance in Africa have leapt to prominence in the 
last two decades and these issues now dominate the world’s interest in Africa to such a 
degree that donor funding is frequently conditional upon ‘democratisation’ and 
‘improved governance’. However, democracy is a contested concept, and there are many 
competing notions and interpretations of democracy (Gaventa 2006 provides a useful 
global overview).  It is useful for the purposes of discussion here to broadly differentiate 
‘liberal representative’ models and ‘deep’ or ‘participatory’ forms5.  
 
Liberal democracy emphasizes institutional arrangements that pre-empt tyranny, 
requiring political practices and constitutional arrangements that provide for political 
representation, participation and accountability through regular competitive, free and fair 
elections. These liberties include individual rights, freedom of expression, universal 
suffrage, and a free and independent media, which are upheld by the rule of law. An 
effective system of checks and balances is in place, based on the separation of powers, 
with independent judicial and legislative branches and effective civilian control over 
military and security forces (UNDP, 2002, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, Luckham, 
2000).  
 
Advocates of ‘deep’ or ‘participatory’ democracy also emphasise the need for political 
systems and processes that enable citizen participation, ensure accountable governments 
and provide forums for the resolution of political differences but consider that 
institutional arrangements to prevent tyranny are not sufficient (Ake, 2000, Luckham, 
2000). They stress that it requires an increase in the scope for substantive and 
empowered citizen participation (Ake, 2000, Mamdani, 1996, Jones and Gaventa, 2002) 
in the political process but note that this will require social and cultural transformations 
that can only be brought about through the economic upliftment of the poor. They stress 
the need to ‘deepen democracy’ by bringing to the fore an economic dimension. This 
                                                            
5 Gaventa (2006) identifies four conceptually overlapping and complimentary approaches to 
‘deepening’ democracy; civil society, participatory, deliberative and empowered participatory 
governance all of which respond to some of the democratic deficits that are prevalent in Africa.  
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interpretation of democracy emphasises concrete economic rights and the removal of 
conditions that block the democratic participation of people, such as gross economic 
inequalities. UNDP (2002:7) maintains that ‘the fulfilment of human rights requires 
democracy that is inclusive’. For these, elections are not enough, new ways must be 
found to secure economic, social and cultural rights for the most deprived and to ensure 
participation in decision-making (UNDP, 2002).  
 
The 1990s witnessed what was an ostensibly liberal democracy sweep through southern 
Africa. Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia all joined 
Botswana and Zimbabwe – although Zimbabwe’s claim to democratic status is now 
questioned by most analysts - in the replacement of authoritarian systems with 
democracy, leaving only Swaziland with an unelected government as of 2008.  However, 
Bratton and De Waal (1997) conclude that only if a minimalist definition of liberal 
democracy, with the single criterion being the holding of competitive elections, can it be 
claimed that democracy has, in fact, arrived in southern Africa. They consider that much 
of the apparent progress is largely cosmetic and motivated by outside forces. 
Abrahamsen (2000) goes further arguing that democratic African states are trapped 
between demands of external donors for economic liberalization and the needs of local 
constituents, resulting in the creation of ‘exclusionary democracies’ that allow political 
competition without incorporating the demands of the majority.  Many other analysts are 
even more pessimistic concerning the future of political governance in Africa (Bauer and 
Taylor, 2005 provide a useful summary), highlighting the increased ‘criminalisation of 
the state’ (Bayart et al., 1999) or the widespread use by political elites of the ‘political 
instrumentalisation of disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  
 
Cousins (2004) concludes that whilst southern Africa has experienced a spread in 
democratic institutions, this has not been accompanied by ‘democratic politics’ (Beetham 
1994). Essentially then, there is a consensus among analysts that southern Africa 
experiences a ‘democratic deficit’ in terms of how citizens engage within democratic 
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spaces to create more just and equitable states and societies (Gaventa 2006 provides a 
comprehensive review of the global literature).  
 
Ake (2000) provides a historical global analysis which leads him to conclude that the 
situation in Africa is in keeping with and reflects the global ‘trivialization of democracy’ 
promoted by the advent of liberal democracy in the west. He notes that the outcome of 
liberal democracy within the African context is such that democracy is no longer 
threatening to political elites who can now embrace it, enjoying the legitimacy that it 
confers without subjecting themselves to the ‘notorious inconveniences’ that democratic 
practices imply. Moreover, he questions whether liberal democracy - the product of a 
‘socially atomized’ society in which interests are so particularized that the notion of 
‘common interest’ is itself problematic - is indeed relevant to Africa, which remains 
predominantly pre-capitalist and pre-industrial and where communal structures and 
loyalties and communalism remain the dominant characteristics of rural society. Thus, he 
questions the very notion that the apparent spread of liberal democracy within Africa can 
be equated with democratisation of Africa. Ake (2000:32) concludes that given the 
current social, economic and political context within the continent, the only way to break 
the current impasse and begin to achieve incremental political coherence is to ‘embrace 
democracy in the sense of participative negotiated consensus’ and develop what he terms 
‘democracy of the base’.   
 
2.5.2 From Democracy to Democratic Politics  
Given the contested notions of democracy, it is useful to distinguish between democratic 
institutions and democratic politics.  Beetham (1994) considers that democratic politics 
requires not only political competition, but also that competition be mediated by basic 
moral and political principles, including popular control over governments and political 
elites and political equality among all citizens.  This will depend upon a culture of 
participation, including a range of mechanisms – e.g. pluralistic media, an active civil 
society, competing political parties - through which all citizens can acquire a political 
voice.  
 
 
 
 
44 
 
 
There is broad agreement amongst theorists (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Bayart et al., 
1999, Mamdani, 1996, Chabal, 2009) that in Africa a culture of participation, as well as 
the enabling mechanisms, is frequently absent. Mamdani (1996) maintains this is a result 
of the ‘decentralised despotism’ introduced under colonial rule. This produced a 
‘bifurcated society’ in which the colonists and urban dwellers were institutionalized as 
‘citizens’, enjoying economic, cultural and legal privileges, whilst the colonized, rural 
black majority were devalued as ‘subjects’, whose lives were shaped by customary law 
and ritual.   Reversing this process to effectively enfranchise rural people as citizens will 
require that they have rights, representation and ‘inclusive citizenship’ (Gaventa et al 
2002). However, such a shift requires commitment on the part of governments to 
participatory approaches to governance.  Many analysts question the commitment of 
African leaders and governments to even the most ‘trivialised’ form of liberal 
democracy, let alone that of participatory democracy (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Bayart et 
al., 1999, Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, Ake, 2000). Indeed, Luckham et al (2000) 
conclude that: 
in Africa political authorities or incumbent leaders have envisioned democracy 
primarily as a vent for popular pressure and a vehicle for political 
legitimation…They have accepted democracy largely as a pre-emptive defence 
against domestic opposition forces and the good governance concerns of Western 
donors. (Luckham et al, 2000:14) 
 
The conflicts and violence surrounding 2007 and 2008 elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe 
respectively - where election outcomes announced by institutions reliant on the 
incumbent ruling party were violently contested – or in Madagascar in 2009 – where a 
democratically elected incumbent President was removed from office by an opponent on 
the back of a ‘popular uprising’ and with military support - certainly seems to bear out 
this pessimistic analysis of democratic practices in Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
45 
 
However, theory suggests that it is possible to exploit existing or open new ‘political 
spaces’ to ensure that participatory democratic politics can be promoted within emerging 
liberal democracies. ‘Political spaces’ can take many forms, foremost among those 
identified by Luckham et al (2000) are: 
those forms of political activity and organization that constitute individuals as 
equal, active and responsible citizens as opposed to subjects of the state’ and 
‘those political opportunities [that] exist or can be created for citizens to gain 
access to the public sphere and hold governments and state elites accountable 
within it. (Luckham et al, 2000:26) 
 
Jones and Gaventa (2002) note, however, that focusing just on the rights, abilities and 
mechanisms to enable people to participate in democracy is only half of the equation. 
Equally important is that the state has the capacity and willingness to provide access, 
justice and legal redress based on a respect for human rights. Thus, the national social, 
political and cultural contexts will be a defining factor in determining the outcome of 
democratisation, as it is for decentralization.  
 
A growing body of research suggests that democracy must be rooted in functioning local 
self-governance institutions (Wunsch, 2003, Crook and Manor, 1998, Ribot, 2007, Ribot 
and Larson, 2005, Chabal, 2009), which effectively ‘institutionalise’ participation6.  At 
the same time, other literature (Putnam, 1992) emphasizes the growth of civil society, 
development of public ‘ownership’ of political institutions, mobilization of talents and 
resources into constructive patterns and counterbalancing power vis-á-vis national 
institutions.  
 
                                                            
6  Since the late 1990’s the focus of participatory development, traditionally concerned with 
‘community projects’, has turned towards political participation and increasing poor and 
marginalised people’s influence over the wider decision-making processes affecting their lives 
(Gaventa, 2006, Jones and Gaventa, 2002). 
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The central question that this thesis is concerned with is  whether CBNRM is or has the 
potential to contribute to the deepening of democracy within southern Africa by 
addressing some of the ‘democratic deficits’ that characterize political processes in the 
region;  and if so, under what conditions is this best achieved.  For instance, can it 
construct and support political cultures of rights and citizenship; enable people to seek 
out existing public spaces and strengthen these; create or strengthen ways in which civil 
society engages with the state; and open up policy spaces for the marginalised? In other 
words, can it facilitate the engagement of the marginalised rural poor with those in 
political power and influence the nature of this dynamic?  
 
Diamond (2008) comments that: 
for democratic structures to endure … they must listen to their citizen’s voices, 
engage their participation, tolerate their protests, protect their freedoms, and 
respond to their need (Diamond, 2008:39).  
 
Does CBNRM have a role to play in ensuring that the State develops these 
characteristics in southern Africa and if so how is this most effectively achieved? This 
study provides empirical evidence that suggests the conventional wisdom that has 
characterized CBNRM in southern Africa since the 1980s - to be successful CBNRM 
must have devolved natural resource management institutions - must be revisited if 
CBNRM is to contribute to democratic practices within the region.  
 
2.5.3 Decentralisation  
The last thirty years have witnessed the dominance of the hypothesis that 
decentralization offers considerable scope for achieving desirable functional attributes 
typically associated with ‘democratic governance’, such as transparency, accountability 
and participation. As a result since the 1980s the concept of decentralization in 
developing countries became popular with influential institutions and individuals 
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globally and was associated by them with the process of democratisation (UNDP, 2002, 
Ribot, 2004, Crook and Manor, 1998). One outcome was that by 1999 a study by the 
World Bank found that more than 80% of developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition were experimenting with some form of decentralization (Manor, 
1997). Included within these were at least 60 countries, which were decentralizing some 
aspects of natural resource management (Ribot, 2002b).  
 
Manor (2005) identifies what he terms a ‘second wave’ of decentralizations arising more 
recently, which threaten the progress made by earlier attempts at decentralization. This 
‘second wave’ has implications for people’s participation and influence, equity, and the 
institutions created in the earlier phase. The first wave of the decentralization process 
transferred powers to multi-purpose, democratically elected local governments whereas 
the second wave – pushed in large part by donors and NGOs – seeks to transfer power to 
single-purpose ‘user-committees.’ He emphasizes how these ‘devolved’ committees are 
undermining the democratic processes that were institutionalized by the earlier 
decentralization process and undermine local government authority. This concern is 
central to this thesis and empirical evidence is presented in the following chapters that 
explore related outcomes in Botswana and Zimbabwe.  
 
Initially, decentralisation held broad appeal for a variety of different reasons. Firstly, 
economists, influenced by neo-liberal ideas, saw it as a means to shift power from the 
discredited central state: whilst those supporting bottom-up and participatory approaches, 
saw it as a means through which village communities could achieve their objectives 
through cooperation rather than competition. Within the political arena, some autocratic 
leaders saw it as a substitute for democratisation that could be used as a ‘sop’ for donors 
who were pushing in this direction; whilst genuinely democratic politicians saw it as a 
way to make government more responsive (Crook and Manor, 1998).  More recently, 
decentralisation has become commonly viewed as the means, through which new public 
spaces for participation can be opened up (Gaventa, 2006).  
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Ribot and Larson (2005:2) describe, in a comprehensive review, the ‘tidal wave of 
decentralization discourse’ as well as detail the various justifications for decentralization 
provided by the host of different analysts working in this field. These justifications 
include:    
 
- increased efficiency, equity and inclusion which arise from 
decentralization resulting in better and more sustainable management; 
- political and economic advantages, decentralization is believed to play 
an important role in democratisation and people’s participation;  
- improved public service performance; 
- relief of fiscal crisis; 
- political and macroeconomic stability; 
- national unity and state building; and 
- increasing legitimacy of government.  
 
The outcome is  that decentralisation is generally viewed as one of those concepts - like 
‘good governance’ or ‘sustainable development’ - that most governments, organizations 
and individuals involved in political and socio-economic development in Africa view as 
a ‘good thing,’ 7 which enhances participation, good governance and democratisation. 
  
However, despite the overwhelming endorsement of decentralization, there is very little 
consensus on what it involves. In Africa, many types and forms of decentralization have 
been implemented since the colonial period with varying degrees of success (Oyono, 
                                                            
7 Apparent contradictions or problems that can arise as a result of decentralization, such as the 
bolstering of the state through legitimisation of national regulation (Agrawal, 2001) or the 
expansion of state-centred patronage networks throughout rural areas (Blaikie, 2006) are largely 
brushed aside.   
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2004, Mamdani, 1996).  Decentralisation, it is generally agreed, is a process whereby 
there is a shift in the locus of power from the centre to the periphery, with theorists 
agreeing that the primary rational is that efficiency and equity are increased by public 
decisions being brought closer to and more open and accountable to local populations. 
Nevertheless, beyond this, there is little definitional consensus (Mahwood, 1983, Ribot, 
2004, Oyono, 2004)8. What is apparent is that the complex issues with which this process 
is faced are often reduced to simplistic discourses of devolved/decentralised versus 
centralized governance.  As this research highlights, this lack of definitional clarity 
characterizing global decentralisation discourse is mirrored within the discourse 
surrounding ‘aborted devolution’ or ‘decentralization’ in the CBNRM context of 
southern Africa. One result of this has been that whilst there has been considerable 
progress in decentralizing natural resource management in southern Africa, particularly 
in relation to wildlife, this decentralization has taken many different forms (Campbell 
and Shackleton, 2001, Katerere, 2002).  
 
2.5.4 Critical Assessment of the Literature 
Despite the definitional ‘maze’ surrounding decentralization, it is necessary to define the 
terminologies adopted here.  The two forms of decentralization that are of primary 
relevance to CBNRM are those that are commonly referred to as ‘deconcentration’ and 
‘devolution’ – the latter of which is also commonly, but mistakenly (see below), 
conflated with ‘democratic decentralisation’.  To explore the meaning and implications 
of devolution as it is used in the southern African context, it is necessary to define it in 
relation to ‘decentralisation’ and other related terms, such as ‘deconcentration.’   
 
                                                            
8 Oyono (2004) identifies five different forms of decentralization. These include: deconcentration’ 
or ‘administrative decentralisation’, which involves the transfer of power from central to local 
branches of the state; ‘privatisation’ which is the transfer of power from the central state to non-
state entities; ‘fiscal decentralisation’ whereby the centre cedes financial power to lower levels; 
‘delegation’ where specific powers are transferred to semi-independent units; and ‘devolution’ or 
‘democratic decentralisation’, a process which aims to transfer power to local institutions and to 
authorities representative of, and accountable to, local people. 
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‘Deconcentration’ results in the delegation of local competences to agents of national 
government that have powers within localized territorial units. Control is maintained 
centrally by financial or disciplinary measures and central government maintains the 
right to withdraw or supervise control (Ribot, 2002b). It is this form of decentralization 
that Manor (2005) identifies as the ‘first wave’, which has characterized government’s 
decentralization efforts globally throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Ribot characterizes 
‘deconcentration’ as a ‘weak’ form of decentralization as accountability lies upwards, 
with primary responsibility being to central government.  
 
A stronger form of decentralization is that which Murphree (2000a) identifies as 
devolution and defines as: 
the creation of relatively autonomous realms of authority, responsibility and 
entitlement, with a primary accountability to their own constituencies. 
(Murphree, 2000a:6). 
 
It is this form of decentralisation that Manor refers to as the ‘second wave,’ which he 
maintains undermines the institutionalization of local democracy within local 
government. Devolution has many similarities with what Ribot (2002b) terms 
‘democratic decentralisation’, but there are also important differences. Both analysts 
agree that the principle of downward accountability and representation to a local 
constituency, rather than upward accountability and representation to central government 
is of central importance and that a key component of ensuring downward accountability 
is securing the transfer of power through legislation in the form of rights that can be 
legally upheld and defended. However, the devolution narrative is concerned with 
‘relatively autonomous’ entities that can encompass bodies holding, for example, land or 
resource title and legal entity status (such as Trusts or cooperatives) and that may be 
external to the government political-administrative hierarchy (Anstey and Rihoy, 2009). 
The democratic decentralisation narrative theorises that this devolution approach to 
natural resources management operates on an exclusive logic and endangers the 
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emergence, cohesiveness and effectiveness of elected local government in consolidating 
local interests in the political-administrative hierarchy (Ribot, 2007, Manor, 2005). It 
consigns devolution, as commonly used in southern African discourse, as beyond the 
pale of democratic decentralisation. Ribot and Larson (2005) and Manor (2005) see 
dangers in non-public entities (as in the ‘devolution’ options) in natural resource 
management and local government, as discussed above. In particular, they point to 
threats of elite capture of natural resources in conditions with: weak elected local 
government; a proliferation of local institutions; and in the growth of the stature of 
‘traditional’ authority in local governance.  
 
However, there is emerging within southern African scholarship a more nuanced and less 
doctrinal approach to options for local scale management of natural resources. This is 
manifested in the ‘beyond devolution’ shifts emphasizing jurisdictional scale in inter-
dependent institutions for natural resource governance, as discussed below. At the same 
time, the ‘democratic decentralisation’ narrative is becoming more entrenched and 
doctrinal, maintaining that only by ensuring interventions are made through local 
government can democracy be strengthened: 
Choose democracy by working directly with local democratic authorities. When 
engaging local people in decision making do so through elected local decision 
makers who are systematically accountable and responsive to the local citizens. 
Where democratic local government does not exist, work with central government 
to establish and enable local democracy (original emphasis; Ribot 2008:2). 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, creating devolved localized regimes of governance for natural 
resources has proven to be an elusive exercise in southern Africa. Murphree (2000a) 
points to the primary cause of this.  Establishing local jurisdictions over natural resources 
can only be carried out with the legitimation of the state. However, the state has its own 
appropriative interests in local resources and is reluctant to legitimize local jurisdictions 
as this ultimately undermines the state’s own ability to claim the benefits of these 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
resources. Thus, states will always prefer deconcentration, whereby they retain control 
over devolution. Murphree (2000a:6) considers that this tendency on the part of states to 
opt for decentralization rather than devolution is ‘more than any other factor, responsible 
for the failure of programmes ostensibly designed to create local natural resource 
management jurisdictions.’ Studies by Gibson (1999), Duffy (2000) and Anstey (2005) 
indicate that the incentive structures working against devolution may be compounded 
even further in the case of policy specific to wildlife. Their analysis concludes that the 
political and economic significance of wildlife is such that it is essentially a means 
through which political patronage can be dispensed, with the result that individuals and 
groups in positions of power attempt to structure wildlife policy to secure its benefits for 
themselves. Empirical evidence presented here indicates that this is also the case in 
Zimbabwe and Botswana.  
 
Pursuant to this, as outlined in my problem statement, there is little if any success in 
achieving devolution of power to communities despite the rhetoric of devolution upheld 
in CBNRM discourse and claims that devolution is crucial to long-term CBNRM success 
(Shackleton and Campbell, 2001, Murphree and Mazambani, 2002, Murombedzi, 2003b, 
Katerere, 2002, Fabricius and Kock, 2004). There is what Ake (2000) calls an intractable 
contradiction between power and the imperative for its redistribution.  
 
Even in those cases where devolution has been achieved in spite of the contradictory 
interests of the state, a review of global experiences brings into question the ability of 
devolution to live up to expectations and raises questions as to whether it may actually 
undermine democratic dynamics that deconcentration has unleashed.  Over the last 10 
years there have been many studies demonstrating that when it is achieved it does not 
necessarily result in poverty reduction or democratisation (Johnson, 2001, Crook and 
Manor, 1998, Agrawal, 2001, Manor, 2005). At the forefront of problems in this regard 
is the possibility of devolution leading to elite capture, simply empowering local elites 
and perpetuating poverty and inequality. This highlights the challenge of encouraging 
democracy in rural areas where large numbers of people are dependent upon small 
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numbers of powerful elites. Yet, despite such concerns and the lack of progress in 
achieving objectives to date, devolution continues to be widely embraced not only as a 
conceptual root but as the ‘holy grail’ of CBNRM.  One of the threads of this research 
traces how the policy process itself has led to entrenchment of devolution and persists in 
spite of evidence within the broader development/democratisation literature that it may 
not always empower the poor and in some cases may undermine them.   
 
These comments on devolution are not to deny that it can enhance rural livelihoods in 
various ways, as many studies have indicated9 but these do not in themselves amount to 
sufficient conditions to lead to enhanced democratic practices.  Johnson (2001) notes that 
the complexity lies in finding the appropriate balance between autonomy and 
accountability, with the challenge being to maintain the autonomy to overcome powerful 
interests in society while at the same time engaging the views and preferences of non-
state actors. Crook and Sverrisson (2001) note the role that ‘higher-level’ echelons 
within government can play, providing an important ‘counter elite’ to local groups that 
resist efforts to make local institutions more democratic. This crucial role involves 
structuring incentives and systems that allow participation and accountability to take 
root. Whilst Crook and Manor (1998) draw attention to the importance of encouraging a 
‘culture of accountability’ in local political processes and highlight the vital role that 
external actors such as NGOs and government agents can play in empowering poor and 
marginalised groups.  
 
                                                            
9 Johnson (2001) summarizes these as:  1) empowerment of local resource users groups improves 
local management and thereby the resource base on which the poor disproportionately depends 
because of local knowledge, information and incentives. 2) Collaboration between public 
agencies and local resource users produces synergies. 3) democratisation and empowerment of 
local administrative bodies can enhance participation in decision-making fora, particularly among 
traditionally politically marginalised groups. Participation in local democratically elected bodies 
can lead to improvements in self-confidence and self-identify, breaking down customs of 
inequality and discrimination and improve and enhance skills, e.g. leadership, bookkeeping which 
are transferable to other areas of life.  
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These and other such commentaries suggest that the central state may have a larger role 
to play in local development than the more idealized theories of devolution would imply.  
Sundar (2001) argues that what matters is not the degree of state intervention - i.e. more 
or less devolution - but the level of state accountability and that finding the right balance 
is the key but will be variable depending on the particular context of each country.  In 
some cases, more rather than less government intervention may be the answer – in the 
form of enforcing laws or providing balances to the power of local elites. This may have 
more democratic consequences than formal devolution. The findings presented here from 
both Botswana and Zimbabwe bear out these commentaries.  
 
As noted above, if state intervention is to prove beneficial it will depend on the nature of 
the state and its commitment to democratic processes. Cohen (1974) advises not to 
expect semi-autonomous, democratic local government to take shape while the 
overarching political and socioeconomic structure of an autocratic regime is in place 
(quoted in Harbeson, 2001).  From this perspective, the question revolves around how to 
construct mechanisms and patterns of political accountability between grassroots and 
national levels of government that afford new discretion to the former.  This requires 
links between local empowerment and national level democratisation. However, 
Harbeson (2001) notes that: 
the design of local level democratic participation and its relationship to national 
level processes of political reform in sub-Saharan Africa have received relatively 
scant attention in both theoretical terms and at the policy-making level, in 
strategic terms. (Harbeson, 2001:10). 
 
He goes on to highlight how many authors seminal in the development of theory in the 
late 20 Century - such as Dahl (1971), Bratton and van de Walle (1997) and Putnam 
(1992) - have skirted the issue of the place of local government in the process of 
democratisation. He notes that simultaneous and interdependent processes of local and 
national-level democratisation are required. Nevertheless, the focus to date has largely 
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been on the local context and processes despite the need to elaborate and create 
mechanisms to enable the local to influence national political reform processes 
(Harbeson, 2001:91). In his analysis, what is required is vertical integration between 
upward grassroots pressures for participation and downward, central government-
generated measures for integrating grassroots participation with its own initiatives for 
political structural reform to institutionalize democracy, or what he terms ‘pact 
formation’ between local and national interests in securing political reform.  
 
Such sentiments do find echoes within serious CBNRM scholarship in the region in the 
last few years. This was propelled by a paper by Murphree (2000a) that tackled 
interaction between jurisdictional scales and institutions in natural resource governance. 
It pointed out that scaling down to be sustainable also requires scaling up. This paper and 
elaborations on it (Martin, 2003) emphasize that devolution is not an exercise in 
isolationism, but a process of finding local regime inter-dependence within the larger 
setting of inter-dependence at many scales. The key elements of this ‘scaling-down, 
scaling up approach’ are: 
- the principle of delegated aggregation: Local jurisdictions delegate 
upwards aspects of their responsibility and authority to collective governance of 
larger scope (local District Councils) in which they continue to play a role; 
- the principle of constituent accountability: each institutional tier above the 
community level is accountable downwards to the constituency that empowered 
it.  
 
However, for reasons explored in Chapters 4, 7 and 8 regarding the analysis of the policy 
process, the influence that these individuals (Murphree and Martin) once wielded in the 
conceptual and programmatic development of CBNRM throughout the region has 
diminished, and there is a limited reflection in the broader regional CBNRM literature or 
in practice of such ideas being embraced.  
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As already noted above, Luckham et al (2001) and other analysts, conclude that in order 
to achieve the necessary political structural reform a shift from ‘procedural democracy’ 
to ‘deep’ democracy is required. Whilst Gaventa (2006) stresses that building democracy 
is an ongoing process of ‘struggle and contestation rather than the adoption of a standard 
institutional design’.  Whilst the institutional forms and procedures of democracy may be 
in place in Botswana and Zimbabwe - although in the latter these have been significantly 
eroded over the last decade  -  this research indicates that empowerment and participation 
are diminishing in both countries. The critical question is then whether CBNRM can 
deepen inclusiveness and substance, especially in terms of how citizens engage with 
democratic spaces to create more just and equitable states and societies, and what 
governance reforms best facilitate this.  
 
2.6 Conclusion 
The following section provides a summary of the main points raised in this Chapter to 
provide the basis for further discussion. The historical review presented above illustrates 
that colonial approaches and policies to natural resource management and post-colonial 
responses to this have had a profound and lasting impact on rural areas and production 
systems throughout Africa. One legacy of this history is that natural resource 
management is now a highly contested and politicized realm. At the heart of CBNRM lie 
issues of power and authority concerning access to and management of valuable land and 
natural resources. Consequently, CBNRM attempts to develop appropriate natural 
resource governance regimes rest firmly within the realm of some of the most complex 
and contested social and political issues affecting southern Africa today. In attempting to 
establish appropriate natural resource management regimes, CBNRM brings to the fore 
issues of governance, decentralization/devolution, and democratisation. Therefore, 
CBNRM is itself an intensely ideological and political issue. Given this history and 
context, CBNRM should engage with the broader political and agrarian debates, such as 
land reform, institutional reforms and decentralisation reforms.  
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However, for reasons this thesis explores and explains in detail, CBNRM has been 
promoted as a largely ‘apolitical’ process. One outcome of has been adherence to 
devolution and condemnation of decentralisation in what has amounted to a blue print 
approach to natural resource management reforms. To date, implementation efforts have 
largely striven to ensure that devolution is delivered by the stroke of a pen through 
legislation at the outset of implementation, leap-frogging local government structures 
along the way.  However, global research from the fields of democratisation and 
decentralisation indicates that this approach may hinder political processes of negotiation 
between different institutional tiers that are essential if positive engagement with policy 
makers is to be facilitated, political pitfalls negotiated and ultimately democratic space 
created for citizen engagement in the policy process. Such a process is an essential 
ingredient in the development of what Ake (2000:32) terms the ‘participative negotiated 
consensus’, which in turn strengthens ‘democracy of the base’.   
 
The development of effective and representative institutions and good governance 
regimes requires accountability, transparency, participation and respect for human rights, 
some of the basic principles of democracy (Ribot, 2004, Agrawal and Gibson, 1999, 
Jones and Murphree, 2004). There is then at one level a strong convergence between the 
conceptual foundations of CBNRM and contemporary thinking concerning the 
promotion of democracy and the provision of rights to local people. However, despite 
this conceptual convergence, there is a notable disconnect between CBNRM and 
mainstream democratisation discourses and politics. This disconnect has affected the 
prospects of CBNRM in Zimbabwe, Botswana and elsewhere, resulting in adherence to 
idealized versions of devolution and explicit criticism of decentralization. This ignores 
the growing body of evidence both regionally and globally, which demonstrates that 
processes of negotiation and contestation between different institutional tiers in some 
instances can ensure that decentralisation leads to more equitable and democratic 
outcomes.   
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This analysis suggests that the central state may have a larger role to play in local 
development than the more idealized theories of devolution would imply. Even so, if 
state intervention is to prove beneficial, it will depend on the nature of the state and its 
commitment to democratic processes, a commitment frequently lacking in African 
politics.  This would imply that Sundar’s (2001) argument that what matters is not the 
degree of state intervention - i.e. more or less devolution - but the level of state 
accountability and that finding the right balance is the key but will be variable depending 
on the  particular context of each country, provides an important guide to further 
analysis. The following Chapter explores how and why such an analysis of the broader 
policy context and process at both national and international level guides this research.  
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CHAPTER 3  
UNDERSTANDING POLICY PROCESSES 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Chapter 2 has illustrated that CBNRM is based largely on a common conceptual 
foundation throughout the southern Africa region and that this conceptual basis has 
informed policy development.   However, as chapters 4-8 illustrate, of equal if not 
greater significance in the process of policy development has been the specific and 
varied contexts of individual countries. CBNRM policy development does not take place 
within a vacuum but is affected by political processes, competing discourses, conflicting 
national policies, international forces and market trends. For example, Chapters 5 and 7 
illustrate that both Botswana and Zimbabwe are to varying degrees undergoing 
significant shifts in their political governance arrangements and dominant political 
personalities. They are also involved in policy and legislative reforms affecting local 
government, land reform, affirmative action and economic and constitutional reforms.  
These shifts provide a background to the political, economic, and legal and policy 
environment, which have direct and indirect impacts on the policy process determining 
CBNRM outcomes.  
 
Further complicating this already complex picture is that regional and international 
processes may in turn shape these influences (Roe et al., 2000).  These complex linkages, 
processes and effects determine the policy environment in which CBNRM decision-
making takes place. This policy environment in effect defines the issues and determines 
the range of policy choices available, as they are the key components of the policy 
process.  This situation ensures that there are complex linkages between CBNRM 
outcome and process. The literature review on CBNRM, decentralisation and 
democratisation presented in Chapter 2 provided the analytical framework for exploring 
and explaining the substantive outcomes. The aim of this chapter is to provide the 
analytical framework for exploring and unpacking the policy process that has led to these 
outcomes.  
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Globally, and within the region, much attention is paid to ‘getting things right’ within 
policy frameworks as central to development broadly and environmental management in 
particular. In the area of natural resource management this is seen as particularly vital 
given the whole range of policies that are relevant to it, e.g. agricultural services, 
environmental protection, land tenure, input supply, etc (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). As 
the discussion above has indicated, this holds even truer for CBNRM given the 
complexity introduced by the wide range of other social and political processes, the 
complexity of scales at which these occur and their attendant policy frameworks - 
beyond even those directly relevant to environmental management -  that affect it. 
 
Keeley and Scoones (2003) consider that in order to understand policy processes: 
we must ask how policies are framed, who is included and who is excluded in the 
process, which actors and which interests are dominant, and how policy changed 
over time. (Keeley and Scoones, 2003: viii). 
 
Therefore, I adopted the analytical framework developed by Keeley and Scoones (2003), 
policy process analysis, to provide answers to these research questions. This approach 
allows for an analysis using a variety of ‘conceptual lenses’, which highlight the 
continuous interactions between discourse, political interests and multiple actors. This 
will illustrate the complex dynamics and structural constraints affecting governance 
reform outcomes. Light is thrown on the political dynamics and complexities, whilst an 
emphasis is also given to the opportunities for action and change, which can lead to 
improved understanding of the importance of the policy environment.  
 
3.2 Defining Policy and the Policy Process  
Traditional models of policy view change in policy systems as discrete, well-defined 
events, often precipitated by failures of the earlier systems. In this view, policy 
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constitutes decisions taken by those with responsibility for a given policy area, assumes 
that these decisions will usually take the form of statements or formal positions on an 
issue, and that these will then be implemented by the bureaucracy (Sutton, 1999, Hill, 
1997). It is assumed that policy makers approach each issue rationally, going through 
each logical stage of the process fully informed.  This definition of policy led to the 
development of the traditional ‘rationalist’ model, which presented policy as a linear 
process with discrete, well-defined events leading to policy changes (Hogwood and 
Gunn, 1984, Sutton, 1999).  
 
However, the last few decades have seen a shift in this concept of policy.  Rather than 
seeing it as a single decision implemented in a linear fashion, many now consider that in 
practice policies generally consist of a broad course of action, or a web of interrelated 
decisions which evolve over time during the process of implementation (Garret and 
Islam, 1988). There is growing acknowledgement that the policy process is incremental, 
complex and dynamic, rarely following precise analytical stages (Lindblom, 1986, 
Adams and Hulme, 2001, Sutton, 1999). Policy development is subjected to political, 
economic and social pressures, whilst there may be no clear distinction between policy 
making and implementation. As Barker (1996) notes: 
policy is never made once and for all. A policy may change in the process of 
implementation; the intended outputs and outcomes may not at all be those which 
result, and those who were intended to benefit, are not always those who do. 
(Barker, 1996:27).  
 
Learning and change are continuous and pervasive.  Hence, a process of ‘adaptive social 
learning’ is applied by many different actors at different levels as they are affected by 
new knowledge, shifting expectations and practical experience all of which will have a 
cumulative effect on policy. Whilst Keeley and Scoones (2003) maintain that: 
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policies emerge…through the interacting, situated practices of scientists and 
policy-makers and through the mutual construction of story lines and the building 
of networks and coalitions. (Keeley and Scoones, 2003:52). 
 
Policy is then influenced by many different factors, including the capacities and beliefs 
of policy or epistemic communities10, political and other resources available within 
policy networks11 and the availability of scientific and other knowledge’s, whilst the 
pace and nature of policy change are highly dependent on context. Policy making is 
driven by complex interactions of various actors with different, sometimes contradictory, 
interests and objectives regarding the planned outcomes of any particular regulatory 
regime. Sutton (1999) illustrates how the policy itself is typically an attempt at 
accommodating different actors and their interests, which reflects the particular balance 
of power between the different actors at a specific moment in time. Changes in the 
balance of power, or in the interests or objectives of the actors, will stimulate changes in 
the policy. Such moments of change in the cultural, political or economic environment 
provide important ‘windows of opportunity’ to influence the policy process (Kingdom, 
1984). Consequently, any assessment of the processes of policy making and 
implementation is at the same time an assessment of power and political economy, and is 
by definition complex and dynamic. 
 
                                                            
10 Sutton (1999) defines epistemic communities as elite groups of technical experts who have 
access to privileged information, sharing and discussing ideas amongst themselves and sharing 
similar basic assumptions about cause and effect relationships. Others who do not have access to 
this information are excluded. Such communities transcend national boundaries (Haas, 1992) and 
strategizing amongst them leads to cooperation on environmental agreements and treaties (Keeley 
and Scoones, 2003). Individuals can be from a broad range of backgrounds and institutions, 
including research communities, NGOs, international organizations and government 
bureaucracies. Epistemic communities can have powerful influences on policy making.  
11 The distinction between policy networks and coalitions is the subject of much debate in 
political science literature. The definition adopted here follows that of Sutton (1999) whereby a 
policy community is defined as a tightly knit group of organizations and individuals who share 
similar belief systems and established patterns of behaviours, with greater insulation and more 
restrictive membership than that of a policy network. Therefore, a policy community is seen as a 
subset of a policy network.  
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The conceptual approach developed by Keeley and Scoones (2003) in acknowledgement 
of the complexity of policy making, brings together analytical approaches and tools from 
a range of disciplines in an attempt to understand the multiple, incremental and diverse 
processes of policy formulation. Central to an analysis of the policy process has to be an 
understanding of the relationships between science, expertise and policy. In addition, 
Keeley and Scoones (2003) maintain that knowledge is established in policy in different 
ways. Therefore, policy serves: 
- As a reflection of structured political interests; 
- As a product of the agency of actors engaged in the policy area; 
- As art of overarching power-knowledge relations that discursively frame 
practice in particular ways (adapted from Keeley and Scoones, 2003:38). 
 
This conceptualization of the policy process enables the researcher to identify and draw 
upon three overlapping and mutually supportive approaches through which policy 
change can be analysed.  These explore how policy approaches are influenced by 
dominant policy narratives and discourses, by political interests, and by actor networks. 
This enables analysis of issues and questions from multiple angles, essentially 
‘triangulating’ the research methodology in an attempt to expand and deepen 
understanding. Keeley and Scoones (2003) note that these elements frame the 
relationships between science, expertise, the state and citizens and  therefore, ultimately 
determine whether citizens will engage with policy processes and lead to democratic 
practices.  
 
3.3 Science, Knowledge and the Policy Process  
Keeley and Scoones (2003) argue that knowledge for policy is produced discursively, 
and consequently reflects and shapes particular institutional and political practices and 
worldviews. Knowledge for policy may be associated with the creation of ‘iconic facts’, 
which can be critical in shaping the management and control of people and resources. 
Understanding the processes by which knowledge is generated, particularly the creation 
of influential facts and their supporting data is central to understanding the policy 
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process as a whole as it reveals the centrality of social and political values to the 
presentation of what are portrayed as ‘rational/scientific’ policy.   
 
The traditional ‘rationalist’ approach to defining environmental policy is based on the 
assumption that environmental decision-making is driven by scientific certainties, 
expertise and technocracies, with policy makers developing rational policies based upon 
‘received wisdom’ (Leach and Mearns, 1996) manifesting itself as indisputable scientific 
fact (Garret and Islam, 1988, Sutton, 1999). The public is generally perceived to be 
largely ignorant of the science and incapable of understanding the complexities. This 
‘scientific’ view of environmental policy making essentially views it as an apolitical 
process, and it has recently been the subject of wide ranging critiques, which raise a 
number of important questions in understanding the environmental policy process (Clay 
and Schaffer, 1984, Hajer, 1995). For example, Keeley and Scoones (2003) question 
what happens to democracy and public debates when environmental issues are reified as 
technical and the sole preserve of experts, whilst other analysts note that it entirely 
ignores the political, economic and social influences of the broader policy making 
context (Hajer, 1995, Hill, 1997).  
 
Much of the literature on the sociology of science highlights how science should be 
viewed as constructed knowledge that arises from competition between different interest 
groups (Latour, 1987, Long, 2001). New knowledge, and the prospect of policy change 
that it brings, frequently threatens existing policy relationships and structures of power. 
In the context of natural resource management and environment in Africa, analysts argue 
that science plays a critical role in policy development (Western and Wright, 1994, Roe 
et al., 2000, Adams and Hulme, 2001, Child, 2004), and the colonial and post-colonial 
states have used it to justify expropriation of land and resources (Tshuma, 1997, 
Mandondo, 2000, Murombedzi, 2003b). Science has thus shaped the way development 
and environment problems have been thought about, articulated and framed (Adams and 
Mulligan, 2003).  
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In different policy areas, the way issues are talked about can be extremely important. 
This is certainly true for environment and conservation policy, where scientific 
knowledge is important in framing the debate.  Lyotard (1979:25) states that ‘scientific 
knowledge requires that one language game be retained and all others excluded’. For 
example, in the context of southern Africa, conservation discourses are premised on 
technical notions of ‘sustainable use’ (SASUSG, 1996, Duffy, 2000). Scientific 
knowledge develops into a profession that gives rise to institutions, which are 
consolidated by ‘language games run by the professional classes’ (Lyotard, 1979:25). 
This may exclude the knowledge and participation of many others from involvement in 
the policy process and the network. For example, it may exclude local people’s 
knowledge systems and participation by others from different sectoral backgrounds. 
Lyotard (1979) maintains that the way in which arguments are framed and articulated 
will empower those people and institutions whose competencies they are associated with, 
whilst marginalizing others. Whande (2008) and Welford (2001) both illustrate how this 
does indeed play out within the context of CBNRM policy making which is dominated 
by ecologists, environmentalists and economists that ensure that policy making remains 
far removed from local realities. This has a negative effect on local people’s views and 
perceptions of conservation, including alienation from the natural resource base.   
 
Policy process analysis puts this diverse role of science at centre stage, maintaining that 
science is highly political and dependent on the role of networks and relationships, 
alliances and coalitions in establishing the validity of knowledge. This draws upon a  
Foucauldian (1982) interpretation which places multiple power relations at the heart of 
discussion, maintaining that linkages between groups are made through knowledge and 
power relationships of various types, and it is through these networks of knowledge and 
power that policies are created (Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  
 
It is this perspective that leads Keeley and Scoones (2003) to note that: 
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understanding policy processes means understanding the interaction of networks 
and relationships, agency and practice, and knowledge and power dynamics in 
particular contexts. (Keeley and Scoones, 2003:4-5) 
 
In their view, the development of policy therefore consists of an ongoing process of 
‘policy contests’ – essentially contests about knowledge. Policy making cannot be 
viewed as a gradual moving towards an ideal and a rational approach to problems 
solving. However, it is important to explain how different types of knowledge get 
established and the policy process analysis has to focus on the roles of political interests, 
actor-oriented and practice-based approaches and policy discourses.  
 
3.4 Structured Political Interests 
Political scientists maintain that policy change is primarily the result of interactions 
between different groups with different political interests (Burgess and Harrison, 1998, 
Gibson, 1999, Halperin, 1971, Ake, 2000). They interpret the actions and responses of 
different groups towards policy as a reflection of these group interests, concluding that 
policy is a consequence of political interactions between and within differing elements of 
state and society. Ake (2000) considers that within Africa: 
development strategies do not simply emerge and get implemented, their 
feasibility and success being determined by their formal character. Strategies and 
policies are made and managed by a government in office and political elite in 
power in a determinate historical state, and a particular configuration of social 
forces. (Ake, 2000:37). 
 
The work on policy networks (Knocke, 1990) and discourse coalitions (Hajer, 1995) 
brings together the various strands within the field of political science. These concur that 
an empirical analysis of each policy domain needs to be undertaken in order to see how 
different social, economic and political forces are able to influence policy, to identify 
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whether the state is weak or strong and how bureaucratic interactions work. Gibson 
(1999) notes that this approach explicitly focuses upon the institutions through which 
policy and laws are created and the political consequences of such changes and by doing 
so it enables an analysis of the impact of the wider political institutional environment on 
policymakers decisions.  
 
Political scientists agree that policy is the result of deals made in the policy networks12 
that effectively constitute what are identified by Keeley and Scoones (2003) as ‘sub 
governments’. They recognize that processes of interaction, bargaining and the 
construction of coalitions are important. The sheer complexity of networks of actors 
engaged in any given policy process should be recognized. Networks and individuals 
may have connections and interactions, which weave across what is the artificial divide 
of ‘citizens’ and ‘the state’ (Brock et al., 2005); whilst different actors may have multiple 
and even competing interests and allegiances, and may be embedded in social, political 
and professional networks that cross multiple networks and discourses. They may use 
their agency to open or deny access to political space for the engagement of others.  
 
Within the environmental literature, there is general acknowledgement of the diverse 
array of different groups involved in environmental policy networks (Hutton et al., 2006, 
Duffy, 2000, World Resources Institute (WRI) et al., 2005, WBGU (German Advisory 
Council on Global Change), 2005, Wilshusen et al., 2002). These include not only 
various elements within government – bureaucrats, politicians and scientists - but also 
business, consumer and local interest groups, communities, donors, the media, NGOs 
and international agencies, all of whom exert significant influence on policy choices, 
collectively comprising the ‘policy network’. The influence of various groups within the 
policy networks varies.  For example, Lipsky’s (1979) analysis of ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ illustrates the extent to which the discretion they employ in interpreting and 
implementing policy affects the form and impact that policy will have in practice. 
                                                            
12 Also usefully conceptualized as “flexible circles of association” (Giarchi, 2001), networks 
facilitate flows of information and resources through interpersonal ties between business 
associates, colleagues, friends, acquaintances and relations. 
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Additionally, bureaucratic politics, such as battles within Ministries for control over 
policy arenas, are relevant. Bureaucrats are not neutral executors of policy but will have 
their own personal and political agendas to negotiate.  The impact of a network will 
depend on how powerful the group is. The network’s power is determined by its control 
over resources and access to information, its skill in using these advantages, including 
generation of media coverage, and other player’s perceptions of these characteristics, 
including perceptions of their credibility (Allison, 1971).  
 
Long (2001) defines policy networks as: 
sets of direct and indirect relationships and exchanges (interpersonal, inter-
organisational and socio-technical).  They usually transcend institutional 
domains and link together a variety of arenas.  Networks are characterised by 
flows, content, span, density and multiplicity (Long, 2001:242).  
 
Long (2001) notes that the outcome of interactions fostered by a network depends upon 
the interplay between strategically motivated behaviour of network members, the 
structure and nature of which may evolve over time to meet shifting objectives.  Through 
these multi-leveled, often interpenetrating networks of affiliation, knowledge is 
interpreted and validated, identities are constructed, power relationships are perpetuated, 
and strategic aims are played out.  
 
Individuals in specific localities (e.g. at village, national and international levels) are 
linked both with each other and to wider sets of relationships elsewhere through 
networks.  Network relationships, therefore, criss-cross between multiple actors and 
intersect through multiple scales.  These affiliations shed light on the tensions between 
economic activities, social relations, political action and cultural practices. 
 
The role of the state in policy formulation will vary from country to country and across 
different fields, depending on the different histories, administrative settings and 
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capacities. Policies that (re)define property rights have a clear political impetus, 
especially for politicians in nascent states, new regimes or governments facing 
significant political challenges. In these contexts, redefining property rights over natural 
resources offers a strategy for consolidating power. Politicians utilize rights to land and 
other natural resources to redefine political identities, redirect political loyalties and 
establish their authority (Berry, 1993, Hyden, 2008). The last two decades have seen an 
increasing stream of work from various environmental historians who support the view 
that wildlife is no exception and has been used as a significant political commodity 
historically within Africa (Anderson and Grove, 1987, Beinart, 1989,  Gibson, 1999). 
More recently, the work of political ecologists and others supports the view that post-
independence, in an era characterized by political uncertainty and economic stress, this 
situation has not only continued but may have intensified (Hill, 1994, Duffy, 2000, 
Mandondo, 2000, Anstey, 2005).  
 
Several recent studies in southern Africa (Anstey, 2005, Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 
2007) have illustrated the highly politicized nature of wildlife and the impact that this 
has in terms of policy development. Gibson (1999) demonstrates the ways in which 
political institutions have influenced the choices of individuals and groups in their 
pursuit of personally advantageous wildlife policies, both at national and local levels in 
Zimbabwe, Kenya and Zambia.   He argues that policy processes and implementation are 
only components of a larger political conflict between individuals and groups seeking to 
produce wildlife policy to suit their preferences. He demonstrates this in the case of  
Zambia, tracing how President Kaunda could exercise his position of dominance within 
the policy network to maintain the highly unpopular conservation policies of the colonial 
era because the national political institutions ensured that politicians were accountable to 
the President, rather than to their constituents. This created a situation whereby Kaunda 
could establish his personally preferred policy positions.  
 
Gibson (1999) also illustrates how the structure of political institutions is equally as 
influential at a localised level, and demonstrates that the rural residents did not respond 
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to the incentives to cease ‘illegal’ hunting offered by community-based wildlife schemes 
as no real authority had been vested with them. This remained vested with local 
government authorities, who were operating within political institutions that provided no 
incentive for them to undercut their own authority. He concludes that wildlife resources 
in post independent Kenya, Zimbabwe and Zambia in which central government/elites 
controlled wildlife and parks: 
became another source of goods which an incumbent party could distribute … 
Political actors in all three countries regarded the primary benefits of wildlife 
policy to be distributive goods, and not the collective good of conservation 
(Gibson 1999:3). 
 
Using a similar analytical approach to understanding wildlife policy in Zimbabwe, Duffy 
(2000) argues that the adoption of sustainable use policies (which provide the 
philosophical underpinnings for CBNRM) adopted after the country’s transition to 
independence, enabled the negotiation of a political settlement between potentially 
competing domestic interest groups.  She shows how diverse interest groups – ranging 
from the state agencies, local NGO’s, local communities and the tourism business -  each 
of which derived some benefit from wildlife use, developed into a strong policy network 
which determined the outcome of policy decisions. Similarly, Anstey (2000) concludes 
that complex developments surrounding natural resource management policy that have 
unfolded in the last decade in Mozambique: 
reflect an essentially political process involving struggles over access and 
gatekeeper roles for resources (wildlife, wilderness, timber) of increasing value 
(Anstey, 2000:23).  
 
These studies illustrate that whilst the role and impact of political interests and 
institutions differs depending on national contexts, they do, nevertheless, play a crucial 
role in determining the outcome of wildlife (and therefore, CBNRM) policy. They 
demonstrate that as well as understanding the details of the policy networks themselves, 
to understand the overall process, it is necessary to contextualize this understanding 
 
 
 
 
71 
 
within the specific characteristics and histories of different national settings. This 
involves engaging with the broader processes of state formation that determine the nature 
of political and governance institutions (Sivaramakrishnan, 1995). A review of the level 
of homogeneity in the state and bureaucracy and of the way in which networks of 
political patronage and lines of affiliation have been developed over time is required. 
However, political interests alone have not determined conservation and CBNRM policy. 
What these other factors are and how they have been influential will be analysed using 
the two other interconnected analytical tools suggested by Keeley and Scoones (2003).   
 
3.5 Actor-Networks  
The second ‘lens’ used in policy process analysis are the approaches adopted by ‘actor-
oriented’ and ‘practice-based approaches’. Actor networks are networks of actors 
(individuals or institutions) with a shared vision. These are important in spreading and 
maintaining narratives through chains of persuasion and influence, which can include 
journals, conferences, informal introductions and teaching. Keeley and Scoones (2000) 
maintain that it is through these networks that: 
norms of good and bad practice are reinforced, research agendas are set, and 
orthodoxies or conventional wisdoms are reiterated and, very often, dissenting 
opinions or unconventional views are suppressed. (Keeley and Scoones, 2000:20) 
 
They note that actor networks focus on the practices of individuals and groups of actors, 
connected in networks, alliances and coalitions of different sorts. Consequently, 
individual actors that are involved in the policy process, exercise discretion and choice in 
their actions although their actions occur within socially embedded networks and cultural 
settings. Keeley and Scoones (2003) differentiate between actor-oriented approaches and 
structural analyses that are typical in conventional political science literature, such as the 
‘policy network’ approach discussed in the preceding section. They note that the latter 
focus more on aggregate pictures of interest groups and policy communities, in contrast 
with actor-oriented approaches which acknowledge that expressions of agency through 
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practices can lead to both intended and unintended outcomes. Thus, ‘serendipity, 
contingency and chance’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2000:34) can be important elements in 
policy change.  
 
Actor-network theory is a useful way of looking at uncertainty and interconnectedness. It 
attempts to collapse dichotomies, such as nature/society, local/global or bottom-up/top-
down, by looking not at hierarchies but at interconnections and networks that change the 
nature of distance and space (Long, 2001). Actor networks allow for the fact that some 
actors may shape the actions of others from a distance (Ibid). These approaches draw on 
theories of practice and agency developed by Giddens (1984) and Bourdieu (1977).  
Giddens (1984) notes that change is affected by people’s agency, and he defines agency 
not in terms of people’s intentions to do something but rather in terms ‘of their capability 
of doing those things in the first place’ (Giddens, 1984:9). For Giddens (1984), actors are 
powerful, conscious and reflexive agents, and through engaging in practice, they produce 
social structures through rules and resources.  Agents draw on stocks of economic, 
social, cultural and symbolic capital in order to achieve their strategic aims.  Therefore, 
human agency is conceptualised as dynamic and historical rather than an aggregate of 
separate actions. Long (2001) provides a further useful definition of agency as: 
the knowledgeability, capability and social embeddedness associated with acts of 
doing (and reflecting) that impact upon or shape one’s own and others’ actions 
and interpretations…Persons or networks of persons have agency… Agency is 
composed, therefore, of a complex mix of social, cultural and material element. 
(Long, 2001:240-1). 
 
Several theorists highlight that agency is not simply the ability of social actors to act or 
react, but strategically to influence others (Long, 2001, Latour, 1987). Latour (1986) 
argues that agency is based upon the ‘actions of a chain of agents, each of whom 
“translates” it in accordance with his/her own projects’ (264).  Long and van der Ploeg 
(1989) note that: 
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agency depends crucially upon the emergence of a network of actors who become 
partially, though hardly ever completely, enrolled in the projects and practices of 
some other person or persons.  Effective agency then requires the strategic 
generation/manipulation of a network of social relations (Long and van der 
Ploeg, 1989:76). 
 
Latour (1987) argues that there are several factors restricting access and power within 
these networks; foremost among these factors is access to sufficient financial resources. 
Nevertheless, this is not the only constraint, of perhaps equal importance is access to the 
fora where networks are built and claims established, be these academic journals, 
conferences or web based discussion groups.  Callon (1986) considers that popularisation 
of a particular perspective depends upon interaction with effective networks and the 
application of human and financial resources to the efforts.  Even assuming financial 
resources and access, there is still a communications and credibility gulf between those 
with formal, scientifically recognised knowledge and those with ‘indigenous’ or 
‘traditional’ knowledge.  
 
A central element of successful actor networks is what Keeley and Scoones (2003) term 
‘policy entrepreneurs’. These may be individuals or groups whose key role in the policy 
process places them at the centre of any attempt to understand the policy process.  Their 
aim is to direct policy in particular ways, through the mobilisation of networks, 
knowledge and expertise. They are well placed to influence policy and identify ‘trigger’ 
events, or ‘windows of opportunity’ when they occur.  
 
Actor-network approaches provide a tool to enable an understanding of the spread of 
knowledge through the actions of different actors. This in turn enables the researcher to 
identify which groups have been influential and/or marginalised from the policy making 
process. In the context of this thesis, it enabled me to analyse to what degree CBNRM 
policy and practice have been viewed as a domain for ‘conservation’ professionals only; 
whether this has led to certain individuals or groups being excluded in the policy making 
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process and if so why; and to what degree the rhetoric of ‘participation’, ‘devolution’ and 
‘empowerment’ have been translated into action on the ground. This in turn will enable 
the posing of a key question of whether the policy process is conducive to participation 
of the marginalised, rural populations; and if not, how could it become so? 
  
As the above discussion has noted, whilst policy change is the prerogative of government 
decision makers, decisions are not made and implemented in isolation. Policies and 
programmes are the cumulative result of co-operation and conflict among networks of 
politicians and bureaucrats from government and various external interest groups. In 
southern Africa, the trend for global environmental policy to shape and influence 
national policy agendas, furthered by international donor initiatives, has been 
documented by many analysts (Duffy, 2000, Roe et al., 2000, Gibson, 1999, Dzingirai 
and Breen, 2005, Hughes, 2006, Hutton et al., 2006). A very diverse group of individuals 
and organizations has influenced policy. Foremost among these have been agents of the 
state, government scientists, bureaucrats and politicians, but other crucial national 
players have included academics, environmental NGOs, development practitioners,  
media professionals,  traditional leaders, community representatives and the private 
sector - notably tourism and safari hunting representatives.  
 
Chapter 4 explores and analyses the intersection of national, regional and international 
environmental policy processes, which have also been important and instrumental in 
framing national CBNRM policies.  Within southern Africa, regional connections have 
played a central role in spreading lessons and political imperatives, both through SADC 
(particularly the Wildlife Sector Technical Cooperation Unit, Malawi) and through other 
regional bodies and institutions, e.g. IUCN’s Southern African Sustainable Use 
Specialist Group (SASUSG); the USAID Regional NRMP programme and Africa 
Resources Trust (ART).  
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The emergence of international agreements on environmental issues, notably in this case 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), has led to the development of connections at 
international levels, resulting in national scientists and others being exposed to and 
influencing global agendas and practices. These international links have drawn many key 
southern African actors into the global ‘epistemic community’ (Haas, 1992) of scientific 
experts who influence the processes of international environmental policy making. This 
international relationship has had considerable implications for CBNRM policy making, 
as explored in detail in Chapter 4. 
  
3.6 Discourse and Narrative 
The third tool by which policy processes can be analysed is that of discourse analysis.  
Keeley and Scoones (2003) explain discourses as ‘frames that define the world in certain 
ways; in the process, they exclude alternative interpretations and they provide the 
following definition adopted from Hajer (1995):  
a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, 
reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which 
meaning is given to physical and social realities (quoted in Keeley and Scoones, 
2003:37).  
 
The concept of discourse as it applies here draws once again upon the work of Foucault 
(1982) to include the socio-political and historical contexts of the production of ideas. 
Thus discourses have to be understood in the wider context of how certain forms of 
knowledge are used to exclude others and thereby exercise power through practice. This 
Foucauldian interpretation of discourse conceptualizes policies as underlain by power 
relations. Escobar (1995) argues that ideas develop through the acquisition of 
knowledge. Therefore, discourses are about how knowledge and power are articulated. 
Keeley and Scoones (2003:21) comment that ‘Discourses frame the way in which 
problems are thought about, linking up different issues, often in highly programmatic, 
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narrative, cause-and-effect form.’ Such discourses and the institutional practices upon 
which they lie may be so entrenched that people are unaware of them and their influence 
upon them. 
 
Adams and Hulme (2003) note that in the environmental arena, discourse analyses and 
related approaches (narratives and counter narratives, tropes and rhetoric) have been 
used to characterize received wisdoms, the evolution of environmental crises and their 
social construction. Various analysts (Roe, 1991, Apthorpe and Gasper, 1996) have 
demonstrated how ideas (discourses or narratives) become established and entrenched by 
national leaders, aid agencies, and elite interest groups. This knowledge becomes 
institutionalized as ‘received wisdom’ (Leach and Mearns, 1996) and finds its way into 
policy through prolonged reiteration of ‘stories’ about what will happen if events unfold 
as they describe (Roe, 1991, Roe, 1995)13.  
 
Hajer (1995) contributes two useful concepts, those of ‘story lines’ and those of 
‘discourse coalitions’. He argues that these gain their discursive power by combining 
elements from different domains to provide actors with a series of symbolic references 
that suggest not only a symbolic understanding but one that ‘sounds right’. This in turn is 
influenced as much by the trust that people have in the story teller as the persuasiveness 
of the story itself, and the acceptability of the story for their own identities. Story lines 
then not only cluster knowledge but position actors, proving ‘the essential discursive 
cement that creates communicative networks amongst actors with different or at best 
overlapping perceptions and understandings’ (Hajer, 1995:61-62). Network members 
construct collective identities that are maintained through subscription to particular 
discourses. The stories constructed by these networks then become useful to policy 
makers and planners as they provide apparently secure platforms for policy (Adger et al., 
2001).  Long (2001) argues that discourses: 
                                                            
13 Such ‘stories’ are commonly known as ‘policy narratives’ which describe events, or define the 
world, in certain ways which consequently shape policy decisions. They often gain validity 
despite the fact that they often simplify complex issues and processes.  
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belong to institutions such as the state, the World Bank, or the local community, 
but it is actors (individuals or institutional representatives) who use them, 
manipulate them and transform them (Long, 2001:53). 
 
Roe (1991) describes how narratives develop as an attempt to bring order and clarity to 
the complex interactions and processes which characterize development situations. As 
narratives are transmitted through policy networks and communities, they assume what 
Sutton (1999) refers to as their own ‘cultural paradigm’ as they become influential.  
According to Sutton (1999) their effect is to reduce the ‘policy space’14 of policy makers, 
as they curtail their ability to think and gather information on alternative approaches. 
Narratives are critiqued because they lead to a prescribed approach to development that 
relies upon the imposition of a set of solutions to an issue which may not always be 
applicable, resulting in ‘blue-print’ approaches. Frequently they serve the interests of the 
epistemic communities that espouse them, but reduce the ability of others to engage in 
the policy process.  
 
Roe (1991) describes how African development narratives seek to persuade their 
audience to take a particular course of action, thriving even in the face of strong evidence 
against their ‘story lines’. Whilst Chambers (1993) demonstrates how narratives are 
established and entrenched by national leaders, donors, elite interest groups who benefit 
in some way from them, such as scientists, researchers and development professionals. 
They are then disseminated internationally by donors and nationally by media campaigns 
and accounts of ‘successes’. Adams and Hulme (2001) illustrate how these discourse or 
narrative notions fit changes that have taken place in the ideology of conservation in 
                                                            
14  Policy spaces refer to the arenas where various actors engage each other to influence policy. It 
essentially entails the public domain and political processes of policy making where different 
interest groups (actors) seek to shape policy depending on their relative political economic power 
and influence.  
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southern Africa as its move away from ‘fortress’ to ‘community’ conservation. Adams 
and Hulme (2001) note that this process leads to a situation whereby: 
development policy narratives become culturally, institutionally, and politically 
embedded, their influence and their longevity related less to their actual 
economic, social or environmental achievements than to the interests of a 
complex web of politicians, policy makers, bureaucrats, donors, technical 
specialists and private sector operators whose needs they serve (Adams and 
Hulme, 2001:10). 
 
However, they also note that: 
it is erroneous to assume that such changes in discourse translate directly into 
changed policies and practices… the links between discourses, policies and 
practices are much more complex than the narrative/counter-narrative 
framework infers (Adams and Hulme, 2001:21).  
 
Keeley and Scoones (2003:38) concur with this noting that some of these discourse 
analyses alone ‘fail to give credit to varied actors’ consciousness, intentionality and 
responsibilities – in other words their agency.’ Hajer (1995:43) argues that discourse 
analysis ‘has come to mean many different things in as many different places.’ 
Therefore, here  I have followed the lead of Adger et al. (2001) in confining 
interpretation of discourse as being represented by the following three elements: analysis 
of regularities in expressions to identify discourse; analysis of the actors producing, 
reproducing and transforming discourses; and social impacts and policy outcomes of 
discourses. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
The review offered here makes clear that any assessment of the processes of 
policymaking and implementation is at the same time an assessment of power and 
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political economy. Environmental policymaking can be viewed as the product of 
ongoing interactions and compromise between local, national and international 
processes. This involves accommodating different actors and their varied interests, which 
reflects the particular balance of power between different actors at a specific moment in 
time. Changes in the balance of power, or in the interests or objectives of the actors, will 
stimulate changes in policy. Policy development is then an extremely complex and 
dynamic process, and it is this process, which ultimately determines natural resource 
governance outcomes. Outcomes can then be examined and explained, the threads teased 
apart and complexities explored, by undertaking an analysis of the policy process itself.   
 
Policy process analysis facilitates an understanding of these complexities and linkages by 
highlighting the continuous interactions between discourse, political interests and 
multiple actors. This effectively focuses attention on the interface of power, knowledge 
and politics and emphasizes the complex dynamics and structural constraints, which 
determine policy outcomes. Particularly revealing in the context of this research is the 
light thrown by this analytical tool upon the political dynamics and prospects for 
expansion of political space. Key components of the policy process will be the science or 
knowledge upon which practices rely, the structured political interests, the agency of 
actors engaged in the policy area, and the discourse which frames practice.  
 
Science or knowledge plays a critical role in policy development (Western and Wright, 
1994, Roe et al., 2000, Adams and Mulligan, 2003, Child, 2004) as it shapes the way 
development and environment problems are thought about, and articulated and/or framed 
(Anderson and Grove, 1987, Adams and Mulligan, 2003). Thus the science - often boiled 
down to ‘iconic facts’ - framing policy can be critical in shaping the management and 
control of people and resources. Understanding the processes by which knowledge is 
generated, particularly the creation of influential facts is central to understanding the 
policy process as a whole as it reveals the centrality of social and political values to the 
presentation of what are portrayed as ‘rational/scientific’ policy. Understanding by 
whom and how knowledge has been generated assists in revealing who has been 
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included and excluded in the policy process and the network. Historically CBNRM has 
been dominated by scientific ‘facts’ developed by ecologists, environmentalists and 
economists. Chapters 4 to 8 explore whether this domination has opened or denied 
access to political space and engagement within the policy process by others, and thus 
strengthened or weakened local processes of democratisation.  
 
Chapter 2 has already illustrated that at the heart of CBNRM lie issues of power and 
authority concerning access to and management of natural resources and that this places 
natural resource governance within the realm of complex and contested social and 
political issues. Policies that (re)define property rights have a clear political impetus. In 
these contexts, redefining property rights over natural resources offers a strategy for 
consolidating power. The role and impact of political interests will differ depending on 
the national context. In addition to understanding policy networks, it is necessary to 
contextualize this understanding within the specific characteristics and histories of 
different national settings. This involves understanding the broader processes of state 
formation and transformation that determine the nature of political and governance 
institutions. A review of the level of homogeneity in the state and bureaucracy and of the 
way in which networks of political patronage and lines of affiliation have been 
developed over time is required.  
 
The agency exercised by individual actors and groups of actors, actor-networks, involved 
in the policy process is instrumental in determining outcomes. The actions of actors 
occur within socially embedded networks and cultural settings. Therefore, agency is 
dynamic and historical. A central element of successful actor networks will be ‘policy 
entrepreneurs’, individuals or groups whose key role places them at the centre of any 
attempt to understand the policy process. Policies and programmes will be the 
cumulative result of co-operation and conflict amongst networks. Understanding 
networks enables an understanding of the spread of knowledge through the actions of 
different actors. This in turn facilitates identification of which groups have been 
influential and which marginalised from the policy making process.  
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Analysis of the discourse that has dominated policy processes throws further light on 
who has been included and who excluded in policy making processes. The discourses 
adopted by leaders, interest groups and donors serve to entrench key ideas and 
approaches, which find their way into policy through prolonged reiteration of ‘stories’ 
about what will happen if events unfold as they describe. Such discourses and the 
institutional practices upon which they lie may be so entrenched that people are unaware 
of them and their influence upon them. The effect of discourses may be to reduce the 
‘policy space’ of policy makers, as they curtail their ability to think and gather 
information on alternative approaches, which leads to prescribed approaches and the 
imposition of a set of solutions to an issue which may not always be applicable.  
Frequently, they serve the interests of the epistemic communities that espouse them, but 
reduce the ability of others to engage in the policy process.  
 
The following chapters adopt the analytical framework described here and in Chapter 2 
in an attempt to unpack and understand the multi-level and complex linkages affecting 
the policy processes that determine CBNRM outcomes. The following Chapter, Chapter 
4, investigates policy processes and their effects at regional and international scales. 
Processes at these scales will affect national and local processes and outcomes, which are 
described in Chapters 5- 8. Therefore, it is essential to undertake an analysis of the policy 
process at all scales in order to understand its impact upon natural resource governance 
outcomes. Ultimately, the dual analytical framework adopted in the following chapters 
enables an exploration of the prospects of CBNRM contributing to increased political 
participation and citizen engagement with natural resource management. 
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CHAPTER 4  
INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL LINKAGES AND EFFECTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
As the previous chapters have discussed, conservation can be viewed as a social process, 
intimately linked to political, social and economic institutions, networks and narratives 
influencing natural resource management. Natural resource governance is fundamentally 
important to rural and national economies but also to local, national and global concerns 
about environmental management and sustainable development. This represents a 
diverse array of parties and systems with a stake in Africa’s environmental future, many 
of whom have different, sometimes conflicting, interests. These systems are multi-level 
and complex15, with institutions and processes at various levels of organization from 
local to international, all of which are linked but will have differing perspectives 
depending on their level. Interactions across these spatial scales and competing policy 
sub-systems and networks of actors and ideas at international scales shape national 
environmental/conservation policy processes and outcomes.  
 
Keeley and Scoones (2003) examine the influence that the internationalization of the 
science-policy interface has on environmental policy processes in Africa. Drawing upon 
the environmental debates which dominated the 1980’s and 1990’s, they demonstrate 
how policy is informed and shaped by the ‘crisis situation’ perceptions that predominate 
internationally.  They illustrate how the process is driven through the creation of 
scientific commissions, advisory boards, international initiatives, expert consultations, 
donor-driven technical support and the hosting of conferences. They also explore the role 
of local networks in co-producing ‘facts’. Keeley and Scoones (2003) illustrate how the 
construction of local knowledge and policy is informed by ‘borrowing’ from 
international discourses.  
                                                            
15 The definition of complexity used here follows Berkes (2007:15189) ‘complexity may be 
defined as a an interconnected network of components that cannot be described by a few rules; 
order and function of complexity generally manifest themselves in structure and emerge from 
interactions among the diverse components.’. 
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The following chapters adopt the same approach in unravelling CBNRM’s policy 
process in order to understand and explain how this has affected its ability to achieve its 
aims in relation to natural resource governance reforms. This demonstrates how the 
sectoral roots of the dominant implementing organizations served to ensure the complex 
integrated political, social and macro-economic aspects of CBNRM have gone largely 
unexplored, whilst key framing assumptions have gone unanalyzed and untested. It 
unpacks how its wildlife management roots ensured that CBNRM concepts and 
approaches were developed within a narrow actor-network, informed by an international 
and national epistemic community and discourse whose conceptual framework and 
knowledge base provided little common ground to engage with other disciplines or 
policy processes. This has determined what international networks and fora are engaged 
with; which agencies are involved in implementation; what technical skills are available 
and which excluded; and who should be included and who excluded in the policy making 
process. This in turn has determined the nature of interactions with other social and 
political process’s and institutions. At national levels, there were differences in the 
degree to which CBNRM may have been entrenched within the field of environment to 
the exclusion of others - for example, CAMPFIRE implementers in Zimbabwe did make 
concerted efforts to embrace other disciplines and a broad range of stakeholders in 
comparison with Botswana.  
 
This chapter illustrates how CBNRM became conceptually ‘boxed' into the environment 
arena at the international and regional levels. It explores how this has influenced the 
framing assumptions on which CBNRM is based, how and why these framing 
assumptions have become entrenched and the implications of this.  It looks at how policy 
has changed over time, who was dominant in this process, whose interests did this 
represent and who was excluded. This chapter and the following four are then attempts to 
draw out the continuous interactions between discourse, political interests and multiple 
actors and draw attention to ‘the interface of power, knowledge and politics’ at and 
between all scales.  This illustrates why CBNRM has become marginalised not just from 
national and international political and rural development processes, but also from the 
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contemporary international environmental context and priorities, such as climate change, 
despite its potential significance to both.  
 
4.2 Global Policy Processes and Catalysts: The Background 
Conservation narratives, like all others, are situated within and respond to broader 
developments within the global political economy.  During the 1980’s various factors 
combined to catalyze a shift in natural resource management policies away from the 
centralized, protectionist and ‘exclusionary’ approach characteristic of the colonial era to 
an ‘inclusive’ approach. This ‘inclusive’ approach encompasses policies and practices, 
which aim to give rural dwellers greater involvement in managing the natural resources 
in the areas in which they are resident. Adams and Hulme (2001) identify two common 
elements that underlie community conservation narratives; firstly, participation by those 
in and around protected areas in the management of conservation resources; secondly, 
the linking of conservation objectives to local development needs. They consider that 
‘community conservation’ approaches have now supplanted what they term ‘fortress 
conservation’ to such a degree ‘that is has been adopted as a central element in global 
conservation discourse and policy’. Indeed, they consider that this process has gone so 
far that they regard it as simply a new ‘privileged solution’ resulting from the dominant 
discourse over the last 20 years. 
 
The shift from highly centralized, exclusionary approaches to conservation to policies 
that acknowledged its human dimensions was brought about by both economic and 
ideological shifts within the region and globally.   One of the most significant regional 
catalysts was the arrival of liberal democracy. Newly elected and representative 
governments exerted pressure on natural resource management agencies to consider the 
demands of the rural electorate for greater access to natural resources and to redress the 
racial imbalances of the past (Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Mandondo, 2000, Hutton et al., 
2006, Child, 2004). Meanwhile, key people within these resource management agencies 
had already recognized the wildlife management merits, as well as the pragmatic 
political imperative, for a dramatic shift in conservation strategies from exclusion to 
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inclusion (Child, 1995, Hutton et al., 2006). For example, the initial impetus for 
CAMPFIRE was ostensibly an attempt to do away with racial discrimination and transfer 
the economic opportunities that had been granted to private property holders to 
communal land dwellers by decentralizing rights over wildlife from central to local 
government authorities (Child, 1995, Jones and Murphree, 2004). The development of 
conservancy legislation in Namibia was driven by the same motivating factor (Jones and 
Murphree, 2001). Hutton, et al (2006) and Fakir (2001) point out that the conservation 
constituency was acting in its own self-interest in pursuing this shift, representing 
themselves as pursuing conservation ‘with the people’ and ‘by the people’ rather than 
‘against the people’ as in fortress conservation.  Whatever the motivation, clearly the 
transfer of authority did not, in fact, confer on communal land dwellers the same legal 
rights as private landholders (Murphree, 1997b, Murombedzi, 2003b).  
 
The political imperative, which drove the self-interest of the conservation community, 
was coupled with other practical driving forces at the regional level. State capacities for 
conservation were becoming increasingly limited. After independence many states 
adopted structural adjustment packages with accompanying market-oriented economic 
reforms, public sector retrenchment and in theory decentralized state authority and 
control (Toye, 1993). The result was a decline in national budgets and lack of resources 
for law enforcement and management (Child, 2004, SASUSG, 1996). This was 
accompanied by widespread encroachment of national parks, increasing conflict between 
rural people and national parks staff and widespread illegal hunting. Clearly, new 
approaches were required.  
 
These regional factors were accompanied and benefited from significant shifts in the 
dominant development discourses and narratives at the global level arising from 
disillusionment with progress made in the preceding decades. The result was a shift from 
support of centrally planned development schemes towards community development 
initiatives (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999); the mainstreaming of ‘participatory’ approaches 
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in development theory and practice (Roe et al., 2000) and an appreciation of the ‘small is 
beautiful’ philosophy advocated by Schumacher (1973).  
 
This shift was underpinned by several factors and emerging trends. Firstly, there was 
increased understanding and appreciation that natural resources had been integral parts of 
rural livelihood strategies, contributing to economic development and cultural identities 
and an appreciation of indigenous technical knowledge and community capacity to 
manage resources (Roe et al., 2000, WRI et al., 2005). Secondly, there was an increasing 
emphasis upon governance, empowerment and democracy and, since the turn of the 
century, on human rights and the concept of ‘citizenship’ as integral components of the 
development process (UNDP, 2002, Mander and Asif, 2004). Thirdly, the process of 
intergovernmental decentralization of governance from the centre to the periphery sought 
to bring government closer to the people (Ribot, 2004, WRI et al, 2005). Finally, the 
criticism of ‘developmentalism’ as a hegemonic western construct shifted attention to the 
micro-political scale and placed increasing emphasis on development philosophies that 
encompassed understanding of local heterogeneity and politics of difference (Goetz, 
1991, Escobar, 1995, Peet and Watts, 1996).  
 
 The result was a growing global trend within conservation to attempt to achieve the dual 
goals of environmental sustainability and economic development. This was to be 
achieved by embracing approaches that enhanced biodiversity conservation through 
addressing the needs of ‘communities’ and enlisting their support in environmental 
management (Adams and McShane, 1992, Western and Wright, 1994, Anderson and 
Grove, 1987). The World Resources Institute (WRI, 2008) notes that the evolutionary 
process of this international policy shift can be traced through key ‘milestone’ 
international environment and development events: starting with the ‘World 
Conservation Strategy’ (IUCN/UNEP/WWF, 1980), the Brundtland Report, (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987), the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED, 1992), the World Summit on Sustainable 
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Development (2002) and the articulation of the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 
2003).   
 
These discursive and conceptual shifts - given further impetus by the collapse of 
communism in 1989 and the end of the Cold War and the resulting dominance of neo-
liberal capitalist ideology -  resulted in the early 1990’s in the development of the 
‘Washington Consensus’16. This came to dominate international relations and 
‘development’ and was based on dual poles of neo-classical economics and liberal 
democratic theory (Buscher and Whande, 2007). Community conservation and CBNRM 
fitted in with its economic arguments as it recognized the importance of economic 
incentives and markets, whilst reducing the role of state. This supported liberal 
democratic positions as it helped communities to organize themselves to manage natural 
resources thus adding vibrancy to associational life and deepening the democratic 
process. At the same time a belief in the congruence between democracy and enhanced 
environmental management was emerging, although in these early years this belief 
tended to lack an analytical or empirical basis (USAID, 1996, Walker, 1999). This 
convergence of influences internationally ensured that CBNRM achieved not only 
acclaim but considerable financial support from donors, particularly USAID, as it 
appeared to embody the aims and priorities of Western governments in promoting 
development in Africa.  
 
Thus, CBNRM policy has been driven in part by seemingly pragmatic national political 
agendas and economic realities, but it has also been influenced by changing international 
perspectives, discourses and paradigms of conservation and development. This 
international influence manifests itself perhaps most obviously through the interventions 
of international donors17 and NGOs, which have been influential in the development of 
CBNRM policy and programme implementation but, as the following discussion 
                                                            
16 The election of President Obama and the international financial crisis has seen much  
speculation on ‘the end of the Washington Consensus’ in 2009 (Hudson and Sommers, 2008)  
17 The tendency of donors to use their purse strings to influence wildlife policy throughout Africa 
has been extensively documented (Swatuk, 2005, Suzuki, 2001, Duffy 2000) 
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illustrates, it also flowed from broader interactions with the international and regional 
policy and actor networks that CBNRM implementers and advocates were drawn into.   
 
The influence has been a two way process. Not only has policy development within 
southern Africa been affected by international agendas, southern African countries’ 
policies have also had a considerable effect upon the international environmental agenda.  
For example, the early successes of the CAMPFIRE programme are generally 
acknowledged to have given significant impetus to the international shift towards 
community involvement within conservation  (Adams and McShane, 1992, Western and 
Wright, 1994, Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Turner, 2004, Swatuk, 2005); whilst the 
influence of many of the advocates of CBNRM from SADC countries - particularly of 
the sustainable use principles that it encompasses – have been evident in the 
development of international environmental instruments such as CITES and the 
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), as discussed in more detail below. This 
international role and influence of particular countries, notably Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Botswana, has often translated back into a component of the national political agenda - 
senior politicians using issues of national sovereignty, self-determination and human - as 
opposed to animal - rights as potent political platforms around which to garner populist 
support for their political agendas both nationally and internationally. Such national level 
political activities are discussed further in Chapters 5 (Botswana) and 7 (Zimbabwe). 
However,  this support for CBNRM articulated by senior political figures on specific, 
high profile occasions internationally - accompanied by a great deal of national and 
international media attention - has rarely been translated into ongoing political 
engagement and support for CBNRM at national and local levels. 
 
4.3 The Driving Forces: International and Regional Environmental 
Context, Catalysts and Linkages 
Why was CBNRM able to exert so much influence internationally on environmental 
policy making for a decade, and yet fail to translate this influence into the necessary 
domestic political acceptance and support to ensure its success and sustainability? The 
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following analysis investigates this process at an international and regional level, 
examining how actors within the ‘community conservation’ and ‘sustainable use’ 
coalitions participated in various degrees in the production and reproduction of these 
approaches, whilst Chapters 5 and 7 elaborate upon this domestically for Botswana and 
Zimbabwe. The aim of this is to identify whether these multi-layered processes have 
enabled or excluded broad based citizen participation in the relevant national level policy 
making processes.  
 
Clearly, regional and international discourse coalitions, policy, and actor-networks have 
been a key component in the policy process. This analysis follows the process and tactics 
by which networks were built and actors enrolled in order to construct the necessary 
national, regional and international coalitions. It identifies the ‘policy entrepreneurs’ - 
the main protagonists of these networks - and the roles they play(ed) and strategies 
developed to promote CBNRM policy. It identifies the discourse, knowledge and science 
driving CBNRM policy; where this knowledge came from, who is able to use it and how 
it is used. Finally, it investigates who is included and who is excluded and the 
implications of this.   
 
Notwithstanding the debate about which country is the ‘home’ of CBNRM, it was 
Zimbabweans who took the lead in promoting and disseminating CBNRM and its 
underlying concepts, particularly that of sustainable use, globally.  Chapter 6 elaborates 
on how and why an influential, inclusive and cohesive policy network built up within 
Zimbabwe, while the focus in this Chapter is on the role this network has played 
globally.  
 
Whilst there had been earlier experiments with community wildlife management in 
Zimbabwe, it was not until 1986 that the CAMPFIRE programme, based on an 
elaboration of CBNRM principles, was introduced (Martin, 1986). The gradual and 
localized nature of its evolution, detailed in Chapter 7, ensured that by the time it was 
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formally introduced, CAMPFIRE already had an established and powerful national 
constituency of advocates and implementers, primarily, but not exclusively, with 
backgrounds in the environment and wildlife management sectors. These included 
government, local NGOs, academics, the private sector represented by tourism operators, 
the local media as well as international conservation organisations.  Many of these 
already had established international relationships, networks and roles. For example, the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) had played a key 
role in regional and to some degree international wildlife management discussions for 
several decades (Graham Child, personal communication, May 2008); the regional WWF 
office, a key CAMPFIRE implementer, was part of WWF-International and the global 
conservation community that this implies (Jeanrenaud, 2002); and the University of 
Zimbabwe had linkages with other social science research institutions and networks, 
particularly in the US. Notably these included Fulbright scholars, several of whom had 
played a role in developing some of the scientific underpinnings of CAMPFIRE 
(Dasmann and Mossman, 1961).  This expansive network ensured that CAMPFIRE 
achieved iconic status and rapidly became the most famous example of CBNRM 
(Wolmer et al., 2003, Frost and Bond, 2008).   
 
Within a few years of its introduction, CAMPFIRE was the recipient of funding from a 
variety of Western donors, e.g. The UK Department for International Development 
(DFID) and Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) along with 
other Nordic countries. In 1989, it received its first significant funding from USAID, 
which was to prove the main donor for CAMPFIRE, accounting for about two-thirds of 
external support, amounting to $25.2million, between 1989-2003 (Frost and Bond, 
2008). This USAID funding came as a component of a regional Natural Resource 
Management Programme (NRMP) – initially funding CBNRM initiatives in Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Malawi and Botswana (USAID, 1989) and later extended to Namibia. This 
regional programme encompassed a regional networking and information exchange 
component, which was to prove a principal driver of the rapid spread of CBNRM 
throughout the region. 
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From its beginning, the CAMPFIRE programme was at the forefront internationally of 
one of the most emotive and controversial issues in conservation, trading in wildlife 
products (Zimbabwe Trust, 1990a, Zimbabwe Trust, 1990b). This issue lies at the heart 
of the divergent conservation philosophies of preservation in contrast to sustainable use.  
The economic underpinning of CAMPFIRE is environmentally sustainable trophy 
hunting and this has been a prominent concept in the development of sustainable use 
approaches to nature conservation (SASUSG, 1996). But it is highly contested by 
preservationists - particularly animal rights organizations - whose own conservation 
narratives explicitly condemns any form of use of animals by humans, maintaining that 
the most basic interests of animals should be afforded the same consideration as the 
similar interests of human beings (Singer, 1975).  
 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna 
(CITES) was established to regulate the trade in wildlife products. In the view of 
Zimbabwean policy-makers, CITES was then evolving from a regulatory regime into a 
prohibition regime with regards to certain species, most notably the elephant and rhino 
(Duffy, 2000). Within Zimbabwe, prohibition in the trade of ivory products was 
generally perceived to be unfair and detrimental to Zimbabwe’s elephant management 
strategies, which were based on sustainable use of elephant populations, including trophy 
hunting, and trade in the resulting products (DNPWLM, 1991, Zimbabwe Trust, 1990a). 
This provided the incentive for the Government of Zimbabwe (GOZ) and civil society 
proponents to take a leading role in elephant management debates at CITES, and in 
debates relating to principles of use within CITES generally (Duffy, 2000).  
 
Rowan Martin was the key ‘policy entrepreneur’ advancing the position of Zimbabwe at 
CITES during the 1980s and early 1990s, and was optimally placed as Deputy Director 
of DNPWLM - working in close liaison with Zimbabwean allies from NGOs, initially 
notably David Cummings (WWF) and Rob Monroe (Zimbabwe Trust), and in later years 
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Tap Maveneke (CAMPFIRE Association), Jon Hutton (ART) and Professor Marshall 
Murphree (in his role as Chairman of the IUCN Sustainable Use Initiative). 
Subsequently, the active role of these individuals, along with a large ‘supporting cast’ 
from throughout the region, expanded to other relevant influential international 
environmental fora and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) where 
principles of use versus preservation were decided, notably the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and IUCN World Conservation 
Congresses.  These international links have drawn these Zimbabweans, other key 
southern African actors, or those who have worked there and been influenced by such 
perspectives,18  into the heart of the global environmental ‘epistemic community’ of 
scientific experts and policy makers who influence the processes of international 
environmental policy making (Haas, 1992). Such policy entrepreneurs have 
demonstrated their ability to exercise their ‘agency’ by strategically influencing others 
and enrolling them in their projects, as the following discussion demonstrates.  
 
In order to achieve their objectives internationally - which was believed to be essential if 
national conservation strategies based on sustainable use were to be successful - 
Zimbabwean CBNRM advocates built close alliances with others in the international 
community who espoused wildlife management strategies and principles aligned to those 
of Zimbabwe. This included working with and developing common positions with a 
variety of different governments and indigenous peoples from countries such as Japan, 
Norway, Canada and Australia, who shared Zimbabwe’s sustainable use approach to the 
management of their wildlife populations. A central component of the strategy adopted 
vis-á-vis CITES was to also build a strong coordinated regional consensus, initially 
around the issue of ivory trading and later to sustainable use in general. This was 
eventually formalized as the southern African Convention for Wildlife Management 
(SACWM), which included Botswana, Namibia, Malawi and Zimbabwe. It generally had 
                                                            
18 For example, Dr M Lindique, the former director of the Ministry of Wildlife and Tourism in 
Namibia and an active international proponent of CBNRM and sustainable use, was recruited as a 
senior member of the CITES secretariat, before returning to Namibia and taking up the position of 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Environment and Tourism. Likewise, Achim Steiner, 
formerly with the IUCN ROSA office in Zimbabwe, subsequently became Director General of 
IUCN and later the Executive Director of UNEP. 
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the support of the great majority of SADC nations at CITES meetings throughout the 
1990s. The regional position was consolidated in 1999 with the SADC Protocol on 
Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement, which commits member states to adopt 
measures that facilitate CBNRM in the management of wildlife and law enforcement. 
 
In addition to likeminded governments, relationships and alliances were also formed 
with a variety of NGO’s internationally. These ranged from organizations whose primary 
‘raison d’être’ was the promotion of hunting - such as Safari Club International (SCI) - 
or the promotion of sustainable use as a tool for wildlife management - such as the 
World Conservation Trust (IWMC) -  to the mainstream conservation organizations, 
notably IUCN and WWF. Indeed IUCN, through its secretariat, Specialist Groups and 
General Assemblies - later known as World Conservation Congress’s - provided further 
important forums in which southern Africans promoted principles of sustainable use that 
eventually gained endorsement globally.  
 
One outcome of CAMPFIRE implementers’ concern about their influence on 
international environmental policy making was the establishment in 1992 of Africa 
Resources Trust (ART), an NGO with the express aim of ‘promoting CAMPFIRE 
interests to policy makers and interest groups at regional and international levels’ 
(Zimbabwe Trust, 1996:22). The following quote from Zimtrust’s 1996 ‘15th 
Anniversary Report’, perhaps sums up the prevailing attitude and illustrates the dominant 
discourses – replete with storylines of ‘heroes’ (African communities and ART) and 
‘villains’ (northern preservationists) (Hajer, 1995) - among CAMPFIRE implementers 
from the late 1980s onwards: 
ART aims to protect the rights of communities involved in the CAMPFIRE 
programme, and in other similar programmes in the region, to exploit their own 
resources in a manner which is both sustainable and meets their own needs for 
economic development. Wildlife markets are threatened by ‘northern 
preservationists’ who believe, contrary to CAMPFIRE, that wildlife should be 
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protected and not utilized, and who lobby fiercely for the retention of such 
inhibiting laws as the ban on ivory sales. This is the fundamental issue that is 
being strongly promoted by the ‘animal rights’ advocates, which is forcing 
CAMPFIRE to defend its ground (Zimbabwe Trust, 1996:22).   
 
Such rhetoric clearly presents communities as powerless in the face of external predators, 
both state and NGO, requiring the protection of well meaning external agents.  
Throughout the 1990’s, ART spearheaded and coordinated the international activities of 
the civil society organisations of Zimbabwe and its southern African neighbours in 
relation to CBNRM, working in close coordination with regional governments.    During 
this period ART established offices in Washington DC19, London and Brussels with the 
aim of informing and influencing wildlife management policy, particularly trade policy, 
in the US and Europe. These offices built upon and expanded the actor-networks already 
established by Zimbabwe in earlier CITES related activities, once again focusing on 
issues related to sustainable use and wildlife management with those organizations and 
government departments who were primarily concerned with wildlife management and 
environmental issues.20 One impact of ART international activities was further 
strengthening the existing regional CBRNM actor-network through continuous process 
of interactions between key regional CBNRM advocates - from  government, NGO’s and 
community representatives - involved in ART international activities. For example, 
senior government, NGO and community representatives from all SADC countries 
frequently undertook joint activities throughout Europe and the US. These activities 
included study tours and provision of testimony at US Congressional hearings on 
CBNRM related issues (Africa Resources Trust, 1998). Such activities further 
strengthened actor-networks vertically - from community level to senior government 
                                                            
19 The Washington office was  established in 1995 and closed in 1998, and  at that time was the 
only permanent representative office of any African NGO in the US.  
20 The activities of these offices ranged from ensuring Southern African representation – drawn 
from government, NGO and communities -  was made at the relevant US Congressional Hearings 
to arrange academic ‘study tours’ of southern Africans to US and European Universities; 
extensive communications and media work; to lobbying the US Congress on particular 
legislation, such as the Endangered Species Act; and responding to the campaign unleashed by 
animal rights activists  to discredit CAMPFIRE, CBNRM and sustainable use in general. 
 
 
 
 
95 
 
level - and horizontally – between similar groups and organizations from different 
countries – throughout the region. These activities also strengthened and expanded upon 
the existing networks within the environmental community. Supporters in the region 
constituted local nodes of a global epistemic community mobilized behind sustainable 
use. This network, or what Hajer (1995) calls ‘discourse coalition’ was brought and held 
together through the ‘story line’ of ‘sustainable use’. This sustainable use ‘story line’ can 
then be considered as having provided:  
the essential discursive cement that creates communicative networks amongst 
actors with different or at best overlapping perceptions and understandings 
(Hajer, 1995:63). 
 
A collective identity was effectively maintained through subscription to the discourse of 
sustainable use. This served not only to incorporate a diverse group of actors 
internationally, but also to exclude others.   
 
This alignment of CBNRM internationally with those countries and organizations that 
represented one extreme end of the conservation spectrum - albeit that there was also 
considerable interaction and support from mainstream conservation groups – resulted in 
it being vilified and attacked by the influential and financially well-endowed animal 
rights movement in the West (Fortman, 2005). Animal rights activists targeted 
CAMPFIRE and CBNRM in a high profile international campaign. The short term 
objective of this campaign was to cut off USAID funding for CBNRM. The longer term 
objective being to ensure that sustainable use (as a wildlife management tool) was 
discredited and a strict preservationist agenda allowed to dominate international 
conservation policies once again (Africa Resources Trust, 1998). The activities of the 
animal rights activists soon became viewed throughout the southern Africa region as one 
of the most significant threats to natural resource management and conservation as well 
as constituting a renewed form of ‘eco-imperialism.’ Even heads of state aired their 
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concern internationally, and President Quett Masire of Botswana stated during an 
address to the Washington DC conservation and development community in 1997 that: 
In Botswana, we are proud of our successful conservation efforts. This success 
has been achieved in part because our natural resource management strategies 
ensure that conservation contributes to the livelihoods of those who live in 
proximity to protected areas and wildlife. Unfortunately, our successful 
conservation record is now being threatened by the activities of certain 
international organizations who believe that the rights of animals must be on an 
equal footing with African people…It is environmental imperialism…Let us 
manage our own resources without interference from these groups (Masire, 
1997:5). 
 
Whilst the CAMPFIRE Associations’ Maveneke commented that: 
Although trophy export is permitted by CITES, it is constantly threatened by 
domestic legislation, particularly because of the pressure from animal rights 
organization in the USA. Should export of elephant trophies be jeopardized, then 
the entire CAMPFIRE program would be severely threatened. We believe that is 
what these groups want, not just because they hold elephants in such high esteem 
but because they basically disagree with sustainable use of wildlife…CAMPFIRE 
views the campaign as a form of environmental fundamentalism (Africa 
Resources Trust, 1998:28-29).  
 
Even the normally circumspect Murphree identified the activities of animal rights groups 
as one of the four major threats to conservation and sustainable use globally: 
[the fourth threat is] the intentional distortion of conservation concerns by 
certain individuals and organisations. I referred to these people before in the 
context of the animal rights movement....  sowing confusion and making real 
solutions to real problems harder to achieve (Murphree, 1997a). 
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The vilification of CBNRM by animal rights groups, ultimately served to cement its 
international relationships firmly within environmental and conservation policy-networks 
and epistemic communities, including the sustainable use community. CBNRM actor-
networks became embedded in and responded to a ‘crisis’ narrative (Keeley and 
Scoones, 2003) - sustainable use, and by extension CBNRM, was under threat from 
animal rights groups and preservationists. The result was that the epistemic community 
and actor networks with which CBNRM was engaged were dominated by environmental 
issues to the exclusion and ultimately detriment of a range of other critical issues and 
networks which CBNRM could constructively have engaged with in order to inform 
critical elements of its policy process. Of principle concern to this thesis, being those 
related to politics, governance and democracy.  Magome and Murombedzi (2003) argue 
that the degree to which other issues were addressed was largely rhetorical:  
[CBNRM discourse]…is often couched and packaged with the rhetoric of 
appealing terms, such as ‘community participation and empowerment’ or ‘joint 
management’ in order to disguise its main agenda of biodiversity conservation 
(Magome and Murombedzi 2003:116). 
 
However, this is not to suggest that the international policy network and epistemic 
communities with which CBNRM advocates were involved were limited exclusively to 
those concerned with conservation or environmental issues. The involvement of the 
University of Zimbabwe through CASS, ensured that there were also interactions with 
academic institutions globally, primarily those focusing on social sciences and more 
specifically with Common Property Resource (CPR) management.  This manifested 
itself in various ways, including the attraction of a constant stream of international 
researchers interested in CBNRM to the region.21 Indeed, common property management 
                                                            
21 One result of the constant stream of international researchers is that a ‘Google Search’ of 
‘CAMPFIRE Zimbabwe’ in 2009 yields over 70,000 hits, with over 3,400 in an academic literature 
search alone. Of the five internationally renowned development initiatives entered by this researcher, 
only the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh scores more. 
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is one of the conceptual roots of CAMPFIRE (Murphree, 1997b).  Ultimately, the 
primary international scholarship network with which CBNRM advocates were involved 
and associated were those of CPR management as illustrated by the prominence at 
successive International Association for the Study of Common Property (IASCP) 
Conferences of discussions related to CBNRM. Turner noted in a 2004 address to the 
IASCP that: 
CBNRM is an operational version of common property resource management, 
deriving from the specific context of rural development and resource 
conservation efforts in developing countries…Indeed to all intents and purposes 
CBNRM is management of the commons (Turner, 2004:3).  
 
CPR principles are a common thread found in much of the relevant academic social 
science literature relating to CBNRM. CPR is, however, criticized by some analysts on 
the grounds that it is essentially apolitical as many defences of common property possess 
a strong anti-state orientation, seemingly based on the premise that common property 
should be defended because local autonomy should be defended (Ostrom, 1990). 
Agrawal  notes that: 
Writings on common property have been...relatively inattentive to issues of power 
and the larger socio-political context within which most common property 
regimes are embedded.(Agrawal, 2001:181) 
 
 Nelson reinforces this point noting that: 
CPR focuses on how various institutional arrangements affect the behavioural 
incentives that determine the way resources are used (i.e. sustainability or lack 
thereof) rather than how those institutional arrangements evolve in the first 
place. Little if any attention is paid in terms of the political processes that 
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determine the way rights over resources are structured’ (Fred Nelson, personal 
communication, 2009).  
 
Consequently, the primary social science theoretical underpinnings and networks which 
influenced and were influenced by CBNRM in southern Africa failed to encourage the 
creation of bridges or linkages to discourses and networks focused on what were then 
contemporary political issues such as democratisation and decentralisation, and in the 
case of CPR tended to actively discourage this by its apolitical analysis of tenurial 
regimes. The influence of CPR in this regard should not be underestimated as some of 
CBNRM’s primary policy entrepreneurs have been intimately linked with this. For 
example, Professor Marshall Murphree, the individual who has arguably played the most 
influential role in the conceptual development of CBNRM and in its overall development 
and promotion at all scales, along with many of those whom he has mentored and who 
have also become influential in their own rights (e.g. Murombedzi, Nemarundwe, 
Mugabe, Jones, Anstey) have also been closely associated and linked with CPR 
scholarship and networks.     
 
4.3.1 Regional Networks  
In many respects, it is a false distinction to identify and discuss regional and international 
networks separately as the two were/are overlapping and intertwined, sharing common 
scientific underpinnings and discourses. However, the distinction does bring to the fore 
certain aspects that are useful to highlight here. Within southern Africa, regional 
connections, intentionally promoted by donors, have played a central role in spreading 
lessons and cross-border influences (Rihoy, 1995, NACSO, 2003) spreading the 
narrative of CBNRM ‘success’.  This has been done through government institutions 
such as SADC (particularly the Wildlife Sector Technical Cooperation Unit, Malawi), 
and the southern African Convention on Wildlife Management (SACWM); and through 
other regional civil society institutions, e.g. IUCN’s southern African Sustainable Use 
Specialist Group (SASUSG, 1996); the Regional NRMP programme (USAID, 1989); 
ART; the Dutch funded CBNRM network and WWF’s Southern African Regional 
 
 
 
 
100 
 
Programme Office.  The result being that by 2003, as well as the existing programmes in 
Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe,  new CBNRM programmes 
had come on line in South Africa (Magome and Murombedzi, 2003);  Tanzania 
(Shackleton and Campbell, 2001), Mozambique (Anstey, 2005) and Malawi (Shackleton 
and Campbell, 2001). These also gave impetus to new transboundary initiatives – 
variously known as Transboundary Natural Resource Management (TBNRM) or 
Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCA’s) (Munthali, 2007).  
 
Some scholars maintain that the primary beneficiaries of such network related activities 
were network members themselves. For example, Swatuk (2005:4) claims that ‘the 
emergent narrative touting CBNRM’s success reflected not local resource level realities 
but the interests of this exclusive, empowered network.’ The validity of this claim is 
difficult to ascertain, as there is no empirical evidence to substantiate it, neither is there 
any empirical evidence to suggest that there was any intention among these institutions 
or individuals that they should be beneficiaries. However, it is clearly verifiable that they 
did benefit considerably, not least through generous funding from donors, recognition 
and acclaim.   
 
As discussed above, CBNRM regional networks developed, to a large degree, from 
existing relationships within the wildlife management institutions that first launched 
them.  This was reinforced by the actions of donors, most notably USAID, Nordic 
countries and the EU, who placed CBNRM within their project portfolios as ‘Natural 
Resource Management’ and ensured that the ‘Goal’ and ‘Purpose’ reflected this focus on 
wildlife. For example, the ‘Purpose’ of the USAID Regional NRMP Phase 1 was: 
to improve social and economic well-being of residents of rural communities by 
implementing sustainable community-based wildlife conservation and utilization 
programs (USAID, 1989:15).  
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This ensured that financial and technical support from these donors was orientated 
towards the wildlife management sector and that the national implementing institutions 
were those from within this sector. For example, the regional component of the USAID 
NRMP, which aimed at disseminating knowledge and best practices within CBNRM 
regionally, was housed within the SADC Wildlife Technical Coordination Unit, based in 
Malawi. The outcome of this donor focus was the further ‘black boxing’ of CBNRM 
within the wildlife sector at regional and national levels. Attempts by some local 
implementing agencies to break out of this ‘box’ were unsuccessful. For example, efforts 
to emphasize to the responsible USAID officials that the regional NRMP contributed to 
two of USAIDs key strategic objectives in Africa, ‘protecting the environment’ and 
‘fostering democracy and participation’ (USAID, 1996) with a view to broadening and 
strengthening the programmes by engaging with activities under the ‘democracy’ 
objective were generally met with a distinct lack of enthusiasm despite being widely 
acknowledged as valid by the officials. This lack of enthusiasm by the USAID officers in 
question emanated from the fact that they had to meet targets and were responsible only 
for ‘protecting the environment’, and it was not in the interest of these mid-level 
bureaucrats to further the objectives of a different USAID strategic objective. Indeed, 
any attempt on their part to do so could have triggered an internal ‘turf war’ and 
bureaucratic wrangling22.   The consequence of the actions and perceptions of the 
principal donor was then to reinforce the ‘containment’ of CBNRM within the wildlife 
management sector, hindering its ability to interact with other relevant sectors, 
discourses and expertise within the region and internationally.  
  
The impact of a network will depend on how powerful the group is, and this in turn 
depends on its control over resources and access to information and its skill in using 
these advantages, including generation of media coverage (Allison, 1971). The regional 
CBNRM network of the 1990s was well-resourced and demonstrated remarkable 
campaigning skills.  With the support of funding from a range of bi-lateral and multi-
                                                            
22 This account is based on discussions by the researcher with various USAID officials at regional 
(Botswana) and international (Washington) levels as a representative of ART and ZimTrust in the 
1990s. 
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lateral donors and private foundations - including the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF), EU, USAID, Nordics, Ford Foundation and other private foundations  - well 
funded and well connected networks were established that had excellent outreach 
mechanisms and connections, including with the local and international media. Other 
regional bodies, such as IUCN Regional Office for Southern Africa (ROSA) - under 
whose auspices the influential SASUSG was established – ART and WWF, as well as 
intergovernmental bodies and processes, such as SADC and SACWM, supported and 
complimented such initiatives. The result was that actor networks were established 
throughout the region that spanned localities from village to international levels, criss-
crossing between multiple-actors and scales. One manifestation of this was the regular 
presence of community representatives from CBNRM areas from 7 different countries at 
international fora and MEA negotiations throughout the 1990’s, fora which still remain 
today largely dominated by technical experts and scientists. However, these 
representatives were entrenched members of these networks, fully conversant with 
CBNRM and sustainable use discourse and narrative.  
 
At the regional level, multiple conferences, seminars, ‘exposure tours23’, training 
programmes, joint research initiatives, press briefings and email groups/list servers were 
established.  As individuals moved across locales, practices became linked and 
influenced through specific initiatives, funding networks, and professional alliances.  
 
4.4 The Effects of National and Regional Policy Processes and 
Outcomes  
This background and context of CBNRM within the international and regional 
environmental policy communities has had far reaching effects on the manner in which 
CBNRM has been implemented and its outcomes. The principles and concepts upon 
which CBNRM was premised – originating principally from within the Zimbabwean 
                                                            
23 Such ‘exposure’ tours between officials from different countries to introduce them to CBNRM 
lessons and principals were a common occurrence throughout the 1990s, including countries from 
as far away as Nigeria, the US and Latin America as well as frequent exchanges between southern 
African countries. 
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wildlife sector  -  became entrenched within the sustainable use discourse through its 
international linkage and then disbursed throughout a range of countries at many 
different levels (Rihoy, 1995) in an ongoing process of ‘co-construction of knowledge’ 
(Keeley and Scoones, 2003).  
 
One such principle was the necessity to introduce devolved institutional structures for 
natural resource governance rather than decentralization. Chapters 5, 7 and 9 describe in 
detail how this materialized in Zimbabwe and Botswana and the effects of this approach 
on outcomes.  As detailed in Chapter 2, from the early 1980’s onwards, the world 
witnessed a wave of decentralisation of power over natural resources to local 
government (Ribot, 2004). However, by the early 1990’s, this wave was being replaced 
by a second wave of decentralization or ‘devolution’ that saw the proliferation of ‘user 
committees’ and the bypassing of local government structures (Manor, 2005).  This 
second wave was largely pushed by donor enthusiasm for community participation in 
natural resource management as a means of giving rural dwellers greater influence over 
decisions that affect them (Manor, 2005, Agrawal, 2001). USAID was at the forefront in 
this regard, and the significant influence of USAID on CBNRM throughout the SADC 
region after 1990 has already been discussed above. As a consequence of these networks 
and connections, CBNRM developed internationally and regionally largely disconnected 
from mainstream democratisation and political discourses that could have provided 
further insight and alternative perspectives. The primary influence has been that of 
donors and their clearly stated preference for devolution as opposed to decentralisation.24 
The mechanism favoured by both donors and the southern African wildlife managers 
who were the original architects of CBNRM (Martin, 1986), in the absence of rigorous 
debate or analysis, soon became adopted as ‘conventional wisdom’ throughout the region 
and was advanced as a ‘blue print’ for CBNRM institutional reform. The far-reaching 
effects of these factors will be returned to and explored in detail in following Chapters.   
                                                            
24 This can be viewed as just one of many mechanisms by which biodiversity conservation 
involves ceding considerable authority and decision-making power to a range of relatively 
unaccountable supra-national entities – such as bilateral and multilateral donors, international 
NGOs and multinational or private sector companies – bypassing ‘legitimate’ state authority 
structures (Jeanrenaud, 2002, Wilshusen et al, 2002, Brosuis, 2006). 
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A further framing assumption concerned the apolitical nature of conservation, and by 
extension, CBNRM. As a result of the actor-networks with which CBNRM was 
intimately entwined in the 1980s and 1990s, the greatest influence on CBNRM practice 
and implementation – the role of CASS and other social science institutions within 
CAMPFIRE notwithstanding due to their focus on CPR - came broadly from within the 
conservation community, and more specifically from within the sustainable use sub-
sector. Within such circles, it was a generally accepted ‘adage’ that ‘conservation and 
politics don’t mix’, leading to claims that the environment was somehow above politics 
and needed to be insulated from it (Duffy, 2000, Manor, 2005, Buscher and Whande, 
2007, Anderson and Grove, 1987)25. Environmental policies and sustainable use in 
particular, were presented as non-political ‘scientific’ prescriptions, albeit that social 
science was incorporated. The rhetoric of conservation became depoliticized as 
uncontested ‘science’. Reinforcing this is that sustainable use and therefore CBNRM 
discourse tends to rely on the apolitical and ahistorical narrative of agricultural 
economics, emphasizing ‘financial and economic profitability’ and ‘Africa’s 
comparative advantage’ with a focus on returns on land area (Wolmer et al., 2003).  
 
This enabled the bypassing of complex ethical, political and governance considerations 
that lie at the heart of conservation policies. As discussed in Chapter 2, such policies 
ultimately determine access to land and other natural resources. Therefore, they have 
significant influence on rural economies generally. The conservation community, due to 
its wealth and influence compared to most local actors, often become key players. In 
short, ‘conservation practices are not benign. They alter the local playing field, 
sometimes drastically’ (Wilshusen et al., 2002:24). Only in the last decade has there been 
increasing realization that the politics of conservation is a central concern (Brosuis, 
                                                            
25 This is not to disregard the ‘political ecology’ approach first developed in the 1970’s, which 
called for an understanding of ecology within wider political economic relations (Peet and Watts, 
1996), but rather to concur with Buscher and Wolmer’s (2007) contention that the principle 
impact of such ‘shock therapies’ has been to ascribe negative connotations to the politics of 
conservation thus creating an antipathy for such politics. The outcome being the ‘pretence’ that it 
is possible to do away with politics altogether (Buscher and Wolmer, 2007:6).    
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2006) and power struggles between actors over access to resources are a principal 
determinant of policy. However, Brosius (2006) and Jeanrenaud (2002) remain sceptical 
as to whether environmentalists have accepted social science out of pragmatism in an era 
of community based conservation and whether there is any understanding of the aims of 
social science besides the conservation of biodiversity.   
 
This apolitical conservation agenda ensured that the complex myriad of issues 
encompassing CBNRM at a national level went largely unexplored by analysts and 
implementers for several decades. Isolated attempts, probably the earliest of which came 
from Murphree (1995b), to draw attention to such issues appear to have gained little 
traction at the time, perhaps soon lost among the calls from other policy entrepreneurs to 
address what were perceived by them to be the more pressing problems and threats, 
notably those emanating from the international animal rights movement.   
 
One of the key agrarian issues that CBNRM has notably failed to address is that of land 
tenure reform in communal areas. This is a direct result of the dominance of a scientific 
and technical discourse that portrayed wildlife management as an apolitical, technical 
exercise, coupled with its dominance by an array of international donors and national and 
international NGOs driven by private capital investments (Hughes, 2006). CBNRM 
initiatives are implemented in the context of southern Africa’s communal tenure regimes 
but CBNRM notably fails to problematise the nature and dynamics of tenure systems and 
their associated governance and power structures. The result has been failure on behalf 
of CBNRM to engage with broader agrarian debates, notably that of land reform. Indeed, 
Murombedzi (in press) maintains that the state-capital collaboration produced by the 
alliance of organisations dominant within CBNRM, functions to protect existing property 
rights and helps deflect attention away from the struggles of rural communities for land 
and property rights by providing limited access to financial benefits from resource use. 
CBNRM has been shaped according to the alliance of interests represented by the 
dominant players’ interests, rather than those of rural dwellers. 
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Land tenure systems must be understood in relation to the economic, political, and social 
systems, which produce them and are influenced by them (Bruce, 1988). Chapter 3 has 
already discussed the way natural resources serve as a source of political patronage for 
the elite in many African states. Control and distribution of these resources play a key 
role in shaping the post-independent state and its relationship to its citizens. As Chapters 
5 to 7 reveal, Zimbabwe and Botswana have been no exception in this regard. 
Maintenance of the existing tenurial status-quo serves the interest of the state. However, 
under the guise of CBNRM, the state has been able to present itself as having a 
modernizing, pro-reform agenda. For example, this pro-reform agenda has entailed 
righting the racial injustices of the colonial era in accessing benefits from wildlife, and 
thus the state has simultaneously appeared to speak out on behalf of the citizens of Africa 
internationally in the face of creeping ‘eco-imperialism’ – which has, in effect, served to 
deflect attention away from its failure to address broader and more pressing agrarian 
issues such as land reform. Thus, the state has effectively co-opted CBNRM in its 
attempts to maintain the status-quo. Despite the calls for tenure reform within the 
CBNRM discourse and the appearance that this is being addressed, efforts have largely 
been confined to the ‘aborted devolution’ discourse with its focus on specific, limited 
rights to wildlife to communities rather than local authorities. Such calls do not address 
the central issues underlying tenurial reform (Alexander and McGregor, 2001). CBNRM 
in southern Africa generally constitutes limited resource tenure reforms. It has created 
new, yet limited, rights to natural resources. It has essentially left unchanged communal 
tenure regimes, and fails to engage wider issues of land rights or regulation of access to 
high-value natural resources as well as make changes in the local administrative 
structures. 
 
By failing to address land tenure issues, CBNRM has not only protected the interests of 
political elites at the expense of communal land dwellers; it also serves the interests of 
‘capital’. Clearly, the private sector, both foreign and local, has historical and political 
reasons not to address the broader objectives related to land tenure reform within the 
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CBNRM agenda.  Because of the post-structural adjustment and the neo-liberal agenda 
supported by governments and aid agencies, CBNRM initiatives throughout the region 
tend to support private sector ecotourism and commercial wildlife utilization interests 
rather than local resource proprietorship (Hughes, 2006). Through CBNRM, the private 
sector has been able to expand its operations into communal areas, while also mobilizing 
state support to ensure the security of this expanded access to natural resources 
(Alexander and McGregor, 2001). Due to limited rights to natural resources under 
CBNRM approaches, local communities have little discretion to determine actual 
resource uses and only have rights to revenues generated from natural resource 
exploitation by external interests (Murombedzi, 2003).  
 
The framing of this alliance of capital and state also enables the co-optation of local 
community elites (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007, Rihoy et al., 2007) into the CBNRM 
agenda. By focusing on ‘communities’, CBNRM glosses over the problems of socio-
economic stratification and class formation in the rural societies in which it is situated 
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999). The result is that the power dynamics internal to individual 
locations, and the strategies employed by the different strata within communities to 
engage with CBNRM go largely unrecognized. Nevertheless, internal contradictions, 
conflicts and specific class interests play an important role in community organization 
and dynamics in CBNRM programmes. 
 
A focus of discussion in this chapter has been identification of those involved in the 
policy process, but of equal importance is those who were excluded from it. One 
outcome of CBNRM is that people at the margins of developing states and societies 
found themselves at the centre of the global environment and development discourse 
(Swatuk, 2005, Hughes, 2006). Communities involved in CBNRM generally occupy 
remote areas near national parks that are regarded as marginal for arable and pastoral 
activities. The new development framework introduced by CBNRM brings an entire 
infrastructure involving the state, donors, powerful conservation organizations and the 
private sector into areas that have traditionally been largely outside the interest of these 
 
 
 
 
108 
 
agents. As illustrated in the discussion above, CAMPFIRE and similar initiatives led to 
the development of a diverse network of stakeholders in support of CBNRM. 
Nevertheless, to what degree were those rural dwellers involved on a daily basis on 
natural resource management encompassed within the policy making process? The 
discourse and actor-network with which CBNRM became so intimately intertwined 
internationally served to marginalize more than just expertise and insights from other 
disciplines.  
 
In different policy areas, the way issues are talked about can be extremely important and 
this is certainly true for environment and conservation policy, where scientific 
knowledge is important in framing the debate.  As Lyotard (1979:25) points out 
‘scientific knowledge requires that one language game be retained and all others 
excluded’. The ‘sustainable use’ discourse predominant in southern Africa is just such a 
‘language game run by the professional classes’ (ibid), which has in some instances 
excluded the knowledge and participation of others from involvement in the policy 
process and network. The ways in which arguments have been framed and articulated 
has empowered those people and institutions whose competencies they are associated 
with, whilst marginalizing others. Both Whande (2009) and Welford (2001) illustrate 
how this does indeed play out within the context of CBNRM policy making, which is 
dominated by ecologists, environmentalists and economists who ensure that policy 
making remains far removed from local realities. They also explore the negative effect of 
this on local people’s views and perceptions of conservation and their alienation from the 
natural resource base.   
 
Sustainable use provides the scientific rationale for CBNRM, and this rationale has 
played a role in enabling the state, encompassing CBNRM implementers and advocates, 
to retain authority over certain wildlife resources whenever convenient. The result is that, 
rhetorically, and in reality, some aspects of community participation are encouraged 
while scientists and technical experts continue to determine the parameters of 
participation in wildlife management.  For example, the suitability for the inclusion of a 
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village in CAMPFIRE is determined at the top of the administrative hierarchy by 
DNPWLM. This denies communities the right to choose whether to engage in the 
programme. Once the community members are involved, they may be engaged in some 
proscribed elements of decision-making such as quota setting. However, the technical 
aspects of wildlife management come as predetermined technology packages, developed 
and approved by experts and bureaucrats. The RDCs, safari companies and DNPWLM 
effectively make all decisions concerning wildlife management.  The same situation 
prevails in Botswana.  
 
Thus communities continue to be constructed as ‘subjects’ of development planning, not 
‘citizens’ fully involved and engaged (Mamdani, 1996). This allows for selective 
‘participation’ in wildlife management decision making processes, and hence claims by 
advocates that the process is participatory, whilst having no bearing on whether 
communities participate in the policy making process itself. Once again, Murphree 
(2004) sums up this situation: 
This epistemic community continues to be dominated by a scientific-cum-
bureaucratic paradigm which is deterministic, reductionist and impositional. 
Applied to communal approaches this paradigm translates into the following 
assumptions and attributes: designs emanated from external agents whose 
knowledge and norms are transcendent; designs can be engineered to produce 
predictable outcomes; designs are implemented through a time and resource-
bound project mode; projects are produced by external agents on behalf of third 
parties, the communal actors who are its independent subjects (Murphree, 
2004:215). 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter has described and explored the effect of broader developments within the 
global and regional political economy upon the CBNRM policy process and 
implementation. This has revealed how CBNRM policy has been driven in part by 
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seemingly pragmatic national political agendas and economic realities;  ranging from the 
political imperative to do away with the racial inequalities of the colonial period after the 
arrival of liberal democracy in the region, to the economic necessity arising from 
budgetary cut-backs introduced by structural adjustment programmes. It has traced how 
the international influence has manifested itself most obviously through the interventions 
of international donors and NGOs which have been instrumental in shaping CBNRM 
policy and programme implementation and has explained how this influence contributed 
to the entrenchment of devolution as a blue print approach within CBNRM.  This has 
highlighted the domination of CBNRM by a neo-liberal agenda..  
 
By tracing the process and identifying the tactics whereby networks were built and actors 
enrolled, this chapter has identified where the science driving policy originated from, 
who used it and how it was used. It revealed the dominance of wildlife management 
objectives, whether by government, donors or NGOs, in policy and programme 
development.  The chapter explored how the emergence of a perceived ‘crisis’, resulting 
from challenges and threats arising from the animal rights movement, further polarized 
and entrenched networks and discourses and thus further entrenching CBNRM within the 
wildlife conservation field. Reinforcing this ‘black boxing’ has been the failure of 
primary social science theoretical underpinnings and networks influencing CBNRM, 
stemming from common property management studies, to encourage the creation of 
bridges or linkages to discourses and networks focused on political issues such as 
democratisation and decentralisation. Indeed, CPR tended to discourage this by its 
apolitical analysis of tenurial regimes. The overall effect was the boxing of CBNRM 
within the field of environment, and thus limiting its ability to engage with other 
disciplines, narratives and actors who could have constructively informed critical 
elements of policy development.  
 
Examination of this history and background has revealed the dominance and implications 
of two framing assumptions upon which CBNRM is based: adherence to the ideal of 
devolved institutional structures rather than decentralized; and the belief that 
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conservation, and by extension CBNRM, were inherently apolitical. These assumptions 
meant CBNRM implementers and policy makers ignored or bypassed complex ethical, 
political, and governance considerations that lie at the heart of conservation policies. 
Foremost among issues that CBNRM has failed to engage with are those of land rights 
and reforms in communal areas. Indeed, I maintain that CBNRM has been used by the 
state, in pursuit of the interests of the elite and private sector, to deflect attention away 
from the need for agrarian reforms. Finally, I have explained how the dominance of a 
‘scientific’ discourse and environmental epistemic community failed to create policy 
space for rural dwellers, despite rhetoric to the contrary. Indeed, CBNRM to date has 
been shaped according to the alliance of interests represented by those dominant within 
the actor-networks and political elites, rather than those of its intended beneficiaries, 
rural dwellers.  
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CHAPTER 5  
THE POLICY PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION APPROACH IN 
BOTSWANA 
 
5.1 Introduction  
This Chapter explores the process of CBNRM policy development and implementation 
in Botswana at the national level. It reveals how the process and outcomes of policy 
making reflect social and political complexities and contestations in decision making in a 
context dominated by political economic interests at both national and local levels. The 
policy environment in which CBNRM was introduced and implemented is reviewed to 
identify macro-level policy trends and structured political interests contextualising 
CBNRM, and an examination of how these have constrained and influenced policy is 
undertaken.   This focus on CBNRM policy highlights the importance of political 
choices in natural resource management, demonstrating that policy making is not a 
rational, linear process guided by scientific knowledge but rather a political process 
where ideology and individuals’ and groups’ interests interact. An analysis of the actor 
networks involved in policy making and implementation is undertaken, as is an analysis 
of the narrative dominant within conservation and shifts in this narrative over the last 
twenty years.  
 
The analysis offered in this Chapter and the following indicates that the current problems 
facing CBNRM in Botswana result from myriad and iterative, social, political and 
economic processes at local and national scales. Many problems relate directly to the 
origins of the CBNRM programme, the Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) 
and its successors, and the way CBNRM projects were and/or are being implemented. 
The problems range from the historical dominance of the NRMP by expatriate staff 
leading to the absence of a supportive national ‘actor network’, to the nature of the 
strategies adopted by the NRMP to enhance local Community-Based Organization’s 
(CBO) governance capacities.  
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The broader national policy and political environment has been a crucial determinant of 
the implementation process. It tends to contradict and undermine CBNRM. For example, 
the ‘localisation’ of wildlife management inherent within CBNRM contradicts the 
nation-building ideal on which the Constitution of Botswana is based, particularly that of 
‘nationalization’ of all natural resources. Likewise, the dominant trend towards 
privatization or the dominance of cattle-focused policies in rural development strategies 
at the national level presents impediments to progress. This operating environment 
presents challenges for CBNRM. Despite the often uncritical acceptance of the 
‘progressive’ state of democracy in Botswana, a serious re-examination of its current 
political system reveals an increasingly autocratic political atmosphere dominated by a 
few senior political figures (Molutsi, 2005, Good and Taylor, 2005, Swatuk, 2005, 
Rotberg, 2007, Makgala, 2007) several of whom play a critical role in shaping CBNRM 
outcomes.26 
 
When CBNRM was introduced into Botswana in 1989, it was greeted with optimism 
within the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP), other relevant ministries 
and NGOs. Its formal introduction was under the auspices of the well-funded USAID-
supported NRMP. Underpinning the programme was the scientific rationale of 
sustainable use and the perception that socio-political and environmental conditions in 
Botswana were ideal for the successful implementation (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 
2007).  It was accepted as an ecologically and economically viable land use option in 
significant portions of the country. Very low and sparse population densities of 
approximately 1.5 million people with an average density of 2.4 per square kilometer, 
                                                            
26 The influence of powerful political individuals, most notably President Ian Khama, in CBNRM 
reflects the dominance of the traditional / modernized political economic elites in wildlife 
conservation described by Gibson (1999).  
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high-value resources, a limited range of alternative land use options,27 with only 5% of 
the land suitable for productive agriculture (UNDP, 2005, Whiteside et al, 1995, White, 
1998), and relatively small and ‘homogenous’ communities were considered ideal 
conditions. Furthermore, the national policy and political priorities, emphasis on ‘citizen 
participation and citizen empowerment’, sustainable development and sustainable use of 
natural resources, economic diversification and commitment to decentralisation and 
democratic government (Picard, 1987) all appeared to provide an ideal context in which 
to implement CBNRM.  
 
Within this national context, the basic institutional framework developed for CBNRM 
involved the creation of local trusts or ‘community-based organizations’ (CBOs), since 
communities in rural Botswana have no pre-existing corporate identity.  Once they form 
a CBO, communities are able to apply to DWNP for user rights to wildlife, in the form of 
a quota, and until 2008 were entitled to keep 100% of revenue from wildlife utilization.  
In addition, if communities wish to develop commercial ventures on their land, such as 
tourism enterprises, the CBO must obtain a land lease from District Land Boards.  
Leases are granted on 15-year terms and enable the CBO to enter into third-party access 
agreements or ‘joint ventures’.    
 
Research in Botswana from 2005-2008 revealed an interesting unfolding scenario 
relating to the devolutionary dynamics and democratic promise of CBNRM which 
contradicted the earlier optimism.  Today its prospects look bleak. There is a general 
concern about the broadly perceived ‘failure’ of CBNRM to live up to its expectations, 
                                                            
27 Approximately 45% of land is cattle pasture, 17% national parks and game reserves, and 22% 
Wildlife Management Areas (WMAs). WMAs are meant to benefit communities that live on or 
near them, and wildlife utilization is the primary form of land use. Other forms of development 
and agricultural or pastoral land uses are restricted. There are approximately 163 Controlled 
Hunting Areas (CHAs) that overlie other forms of land use in Botswana. The Government of 
Botswana has zoned 42 CHAs for community management, of which 14 leases had been issued 
by 2003 (Rozemeijer, 2003:28). 
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and it has become mired in political controversy that has led to policy reversals in the 
form of recentralization of the benefits of natural resource management. It is now viewed 
with skepticism and, at worst, outright antagonism, having attracted opposition from 
powerful political economic elites, technocrats and local level leadership.  Support 
within DWNP is limited to a few dedicated but relatively junior individuals while senior 
managers are either overtly hostile or indifferent. Interest and support from NGOs and 
donors has waned, whilst the majorities in the influential private sector have become 
vocal in their opposition. The encompassing narrative has shifted from generally positive 
to overwhelmingly negative, moving from support of community management to the 
competing conservation paradigm of ‘protectionism’. The following Chapter explores in 
greater detail that, even within participating villages, there is little evidence of what 
Murphree (2000a) describes as a ‘politically salient constituency’ emerging. Given the 
weak influence of CBNRM implementers in broader policymaking and in directing 
strategic political dialogue with policy makers and politicians, it seems CBNRM is now 
at the mercy of the whims of political economic elites. 
 
This chapter explores the key components, linkages and effects of the policy making 
process in Botswana. In doing so, it demonstrates the interaction of different, sometimes 
competing, interests and illustrates how narratives are used to advance particular 
interests. This enables the identification of locus of power; an assessment of how these 
have shifted over time and the effects of different interests and power upon ‘policy 
spaces’. 
 
5.2 National Context 
5.2.1 Economic Status  
Since independence in 1965, the Botswana economy has undergone a transformation 
from poverty to relative affluence with an annual growth rate of 5-6% per annum since 
the 1990’s (UNDP, 2005).  During this period it has graduated from one of the poorest 
countries in the world to being classified by the World Bank as a middle-income country 
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with a per capita GDP of US$9 200 in 2005 (Ibid). Despite this, there are huge 
disparities in wealth, and 47% of the population continues to live below the poverty line 
and unemployment remains high at 25%.  Whilst Botswana’s growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita was the highest in the world for the period 1970–97, the 
country actually experienced a drop in its Human Development Index ranking, from 95th 
to 131st place, between 1991 and 2004. This makes it the only country in the world to 
suffer a fall during a period of rapid economic growth (Good and Taylor, 2005). 
Diamond mining has fuelled much of the growth and currently accounts for more than 
one-third of GDP and nine-tenths of export earnings. Tourism and cattle are other key 
sectors, and it is on the promotion of these three sectors that government policy focuses 
(Government of Botswana, 2003). 
 
5.2.2 Political Characteristics 
For many years, Botswana has been upheld as a beacon of democracy and good 
governance in Africa (Thumberg-Hartland, 1978, Samatar, 1999). However, the 
ascendancy of Ian Khama to the Vice Presidency and then Presidency in 2008 has, 
because of his autocratic tendencies, raised questions about possibilities of classic ‘big 
man’ rule and political dominance (Rotberg, 2007, Good and Taylor, 2005, Makgala, 
2007) characteristic of many African countries (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This is 
accompanied by growing concern that ‘Botswana is governed by a small elite whose 
political and business interests are mutually reinforcing’ (Swatuk 2005:1).  
 
The political and economic interests of these elites are interconnected and historically 
rooted in the ‘cattle culture’ (Peters, 1994) and in mineral exploitation, particularly 
diamonds (Good and Taylor, 2005). There are also indications that senior politicians are 
becoming increasingly involved in the tourism industry (Swatuk, 2005), often as 
members of the boards of directors of the larger international tour companies, such as the 
Okavango Wilderness Safaris, the Botswana affiliate of Wilderness Safaris, the largest 
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tourism operator in Africa (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). This has profound 
implications for CBNRM policy development. In order to understand how and why 
CBNRM policy is developing in a pro-elite manner, it is necessary to understand its 
implications for these governing elites.  
 
Inasmuch as all the trappings and institutions of a liberal democracy are in place in 
Botswana (Obeng, 2001, Rotberg, 2007), Good and Taylor (2005) argue that these are 
manipulated by the ruling elites through the constitution and contemporary practices of 
the ruling party, which are based on the inherited political culture. They identify the 
shortcomings of democracy in Botswana, which include the centralization of 
constitutional and political power in the office of the President, the lack of free speech 
and curtailment of the freedom of the media, the pervasiveness of secrecy and non-
accountability in government decision making, and the inability of government to accept 
or engage with criticism.   Whilst Swatuk (2005) states that: 
Politics in Botswana resembles African village democracy, where the kgotla 
(public gathering) allows for the illusion of inclusion and open (though limited) 
expression of opinion by the citizenry, but where the agenda is set and key 
decisions are taken by the ruling class.  (Swatuk, 2005:12) 
 
Such political characteristics do not increase public participation in the policy-making 
process and public debate. A further interesting development of concern to many in 
Botswana has been the change in nature of Cabinet Ministers under Khama. A third of 
the Cabinet are now ex-military personnel, including the President and Vice, and the 
Minister for Environment and Tourism, Captain Kitso Mokaila (Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007).  
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5.2.3 Civil Society28  
The autocratic nature of government in Botswana is facilitated by a weak and relatively 
disorganized civil society.  Even prior to the withdrawal of donors from the country in 
2003,29 capacity was already limited in comparison to other countries in the region in 
terms of numbers, financial and human resources, skills and specialization (Molutsi and 
Holm, 1990). Civil society is/was dependent upon donor funding and the withdrawal of 
donor funding weakened civil society further. Compounding these problems is the 
tendency of civic groups to court government favour by actively seeking representation 
of senior political figures within their governance structures, thus weakening their ability 
to represent independently alternative perspectives to government. For example, 
President Khama is a patron of all remaining environmental NGOs operating at a 
national level in Botswana.  This weakness of civil society has direct and significant 
implications for CBNRM and for policy space in Botswana.  
 
5.2.4 Policy and Legislative Context 
In order to understand CBNRM in Botswana, an examination of the policy context 
within which it operates is essential. Local-level implementation over the last 15 years 
has outpaced policymaking and legislation (Jones, 2007). Whilst attempts to draft a 
comprehensive policy had been ongoing since 1996, these became mired in controversy, 
and the draft policy document was overturned in April 2008 and a new policy 
recentralizing natural resource management passed in its place.  The draft had promoted 
a devolutionary approach to natural resource management and had been agreed upon by 
                                                            
28Civil society refers to the arena where public debate on issues is conducted, and this is known as 
the ‘deliberative’ or ‘public sphere’ perspective on civil society; and/or existence of non-market 
organisations between the household and the state, commonly known as the ‘associationalist’ 
view of civil society. The non-market organisations may include NGOs, social movements, 
informal organisations and other associational organisations (membership organisations, etc.). I 
use both interpretations of civil society to avoid ‘splitting hairs’ given the cross-cutting nature and 
dynamism of non-market organisations’ engagement in public debate.  
29 In 2003, Botswana was  reclassified by Bretton-Woods institutions as a ‘middle-income’ 
country, resulting in the withdrawal of many donors from the country. 
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all stakeholders in 2004 (IUCN, 2004). The lack of a clearly defined and comprehensive 
CBNRM policy resulted in the operation and implementation of CBNRM largely 
influenced by fragmented pieces of policy associated with wildlife conservation and rural 
development such as 1986 Wildlife Conservation Policy (GOB, 1986), 1990 Tourism 
Policy (GOB, 1990), 2002 Rural Development Policy (GOB, 2002). This policy vacuum 
laid bare the implementation and operation of CBNRM to socio-economic and political 
manipulation and abuse, inconsistencies and accountability challenges, culminating in 
the 2008 policy reversal.  
  
5.2.4.1 Wildlife, Conservation and Tourism Policy and 
Legislation  
In the 1980s and 1990s, a number of policies and laws were developed to create an 
enabling environment and make general provisions for community involvement in 
wildlife use and management. These included the Wildlife Conservation Policy (GOB, 
1986) and the Tourism Policy (GOB, 1990), which called for citizen involvement and 
participation in tourism and wildlife-related industries and provided for the acquisition of 
exclusive tourism concessions for communities and private enterprises for 15 years. The 
Wildlife Conservation and National Parks Act (GOB, 1992) also facilitated community-
based wildlife management through the creation of Wildlife Management Areas 
(WMA’s). These instruments related to wildlife and did not cover other natural resources 
nor did it contain specific provisions on how community involvement was to be achieved 
(Rozemeijer and Van der Jagt, 2000).  
 
Despite these, until 2008, the ‘Community Natural Resources Management Lease’ or 
‘head lease’ provided the legal basis for CBNRM and offered the administrative 
arrangement (Jones, 2007). This lack of an over-arching CBNRM policy document 
significantly hampered implementation over the last decade, creating competition and 
conflict between ministries and departments whose own mandates contradicted the spirit 
and method of CBNRM. The absence of integrated legislation meant that CBNRM 
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continued to be implemented primarily by DWNP, with limited co-operation from the 
Agricultural Resources Board (ARB), relevant Land Boards and district councils (DCs). 
As events relating to the 2001 SAVINGRAM30 (detailed below) illustrate, this 
arrangement undermined the ability of CBNRM to achieve its goals. This resulted from 
limited implementation capacity of an agency whose premier rationale was wildlife 
management.  Additionally, as rights were not entrenched in legislation, they were easily 
removed at the behest of senior politicians (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). 
 
5.2.4.2 Rural Development Policies   
CBNRM operates within a rural context, and therefore, synergy between it and other 
rural development policies has to be created. Without this critical integration, CBNRM 
fails to buttress rural development strategies and vice versa. The mutual objectives of 
rural development and CBNRM would be strengthened by stimulating both community 
focus and development interests in CBNRM policy and weeding off inconsistencies, 
gaps and conflict. This research does not review these policies in any detail, but 
highlights the importance of creating synergies between CBNRM and other sectors that 
have a bearing on its success, direction and impact on democratic resource governance.  
 
Twyman (2001) argues that, as recently as 1995, Botswana did not have a clear and 
coherent rural development policy, and that rural development was characterised by a set 
of overlapping and disparate programmes that hindered effective development in rural 
                                                            
30 A SAVINGRAM is a directive issued by the GOB. In January 2001, the Permanent Secretary 
in the Ministry of Local Government, Mr. E. Molale, raised government concerns relating to 
financial management in a SAVINGRAM, identifying the poor handling and use of funds earned 
from CBNRM projects, the lack of audited reports and the misappropriation of CBNRM funds by 
some trusts. As a result, the Permanent Secretary instructed that district councils – instead of 
safari operators dealing directly with participating communities – should manage all funds earned 
from community-based projects in trust. The CBNRM stakeholder group effectively blocked this 
SAVINGRAM at the time. 
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areas. The history of rural development efforts and policies in Botswana is strewn with a 
lengthy list of – often externally-driven – development ‘failures’ whose overall impact is 
generally considered to have increased rural poverty and inequality and created a culture 
of dependency and ‘clientification’ within rural areas, most notably among the Basarwa 
(Hitchcock, 2003, Hitchcock and Holm, 1993, Taylor, 2000, Saugestad, 1998, Twyman, 
1998, Twyman, 2001).  
 
In response to these shortcomings in earlier approaches, and informed by the 
international shift in development discourse, the GOB introduced the Community Based 
Strategy for Rural Development in 1997 (GOB, 1997). It marked the beginning of a shift 
in strategy away from an imposed top-down approach to one that is grounded in the 
rhetoric of ‘empowerment’ and ‘community-led’ development.31 Whilst the launch of 
this policy was greeted by many within the CBNRM community as a significant success 
on their behalf and as a significant opportunity (Arntzen et al., 2003, National CBNRM 
Forum Botswana, 2004), there appears to date to have been little effort made to capitalise 
on these opportunities.32 Other recently introduced strategies and policies mirror this 
shift in approach. These include the 2002 Revised National Policy for Rural 
Development (Government of Botswana, 2002) and the 2003 Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(Government of Botswana, 2003a). Consequently, the policy framework provided by 
both the environmental and rural development sectors appears strong and conducive to 
CBNRM.  
 
                                                            
31 This strategy explicitly recognizes the need to increase community involvement in initiating, 
developing and implementing rural development projects, calling for the devolution of 
development responsibilities and control to local communities.  
32 The degree to which the wildlife-focused CBNRM programme actually influenced these 
events, as claimed by them, rather than the broader shift in global discourses and the resulting 
impact on national development policies, is questionable given the lack of outreach from DWNP 
to other government departments and the limited involvement of sections of civil society 
(including NGOs and the private sector) in the programme prior to 1999. 
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However, there appears to be a chasm between the rhetoric of these policy documents 
and practice, a chasm that the controversy surrounding the CBNRM policy brought into 
sharp relief. Despite the apparently progressive policy framework, Arntzen (2004), 
Taylor (2000) and Hitchcock (2003) note that there has been a notable lack of progress in 
implementation of these strategies. Implementation is constrained by the inherent 
contradictions of these policies with others affecting the rural sector, such as 
land/resource tenure, decentralisation and grazing. As the following discussion indicates, 
these policies are influenced by and continue to support the economic and political 
aspirations and domination of the Tswana governing elite and bring into question the 
government’s genuine commitment to community-based approaches.  
 
5.2.4.3 Land Policies  
Due to the prominence of tribal communal lands (covering 71% of the land area),33 their 
use, productivity and management remain of central importance to the country and lie at 
the heart of rural development policy. The dominant form of land use in these areas is 
livestock farming, which has been at the centre of the Botswana economy for many 
centuries. Today the livelihoods of 80% of the rural population are dependent on this 
sector, and it is the third largest foreign exchange earner (White, 1998). Livestock also 
continues to play a central cultural role in that it is symbolic of the health of the agro-
pastoral community and of the power of its dominant members (IIED, 2004).  
 
                                                            
33 Botswana’s history as a protectorate of the British Crown, rather than a colony, ensured that it 
was less affected by colonial rule than any other country in southern Africa. This has led to 
various distinctions between Botswana and its neighbouring states, nowhere more so than in 
terms of its land tenure systems. Settlement by white farmers was never a dominant feature and 
consequently no more than 5.5% of the land was ever alienated for white-owned farms, compared 
to nearly 60% in Zimbabwe (Tshuma 1997). 
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The dominant policy approach remains that of privatizing grazing lands,34 resulting in 
shrinking communal lands as fenced ranches (de jure private) and exclusive use of 
boreholes on rangelands (de facto private) expand.35 This is driven in part by the belief 
within the powerful Ministry of Agriculture that communal rangelands were degraded, 
that degradation was caused by overgrazing, that overgrazing was caused by communal 
land ownership leading to open access, and that the solution was privatisation (IIED, 
2004). This belief in a ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin, 1968) scenario engulfing the 
communal areas still dominates within the Ministry of Agriculture, providing the 
scientific rationale for the ongoing push for privatisation within communal areas (Alden-
Wily, 2003). 
 
A further force for privatisation is overtly political. The ruling Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) has the support of and membership of many wealthy cattle owners and the 
links between government policy and benefits to this group appear clear (IIED, 2004). 
Peters (1994) notes that: 
there is no doubt that some of the highly placed members of the government and 
party who promote the policy benefit directly as wealthy cattle and borehole 
owners (Peters, 1994:218). 
 
                                                            
34 Leasehold farms were first established under the 1975 Tribal Grazing Land Policy (TGLP) and 
were reinforced under the fencing component of the 1991 National Policy on Agricultural 
Development (NAPD). Leasehold farms are owned individually and  inaccessible to non-owners 
(Peters, 1994). 
35 Whilst there have been efforts during the 1990s to promote tourism as an alternative land use in 
wildlife-rich areas, Mbaiwa (2004) and Hitchcock (2003) demonstrate that the bulk of these 
efforts have benefited the private sector rather than the communal sector. If the mounting 
evidence that senior political figures are becoming increasingly involved in the tourism sector is 
valid, it is perhaps not surprising to see increased political pressure to roll back the CBNRM 
policy and ensure greater privatisation. 
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This provides a strong incentive for driving government subsidy to the livestock sector 
and provides further incentives for national elites to expand their land accumulation for 
cattle pasturage. Whilst there is debate about the level of these subsidies (Alden-Wily, 
2003), there is general agreement that ‘government policies have made the livestock 
sector artificially attractive at the expense of other forms of land use’ (IIED 2004:24). 
 
Notwithstanding commitments in the National Development Plans (NDPs)36, to the 
contrary, government efforts to boost economic growth and diversify the economy have 
to date focused on the livestock sector at the expense of the wildlife and tourism sectors. 
 
5.2.4.5 Decentralization Policy  
Despite the long history of decentralization in Botswana,37 local government remains 
largely financially dependent upon central government and in most respects is subject to 
decisions made at the central level (Wunsch, 2003). However, there has been progress 
over the years. Picard (1987) characterised Botswana as an administrative state in which 
bureaucratic elites had control over processes of decision-making. By 2003, Wuncsh 
(2003) claimed that the last two decades had seen a considerable increase in the influence 
of local government because of expanded budgets, technical capability and 
responsibilities ranging from social service provision to land use planning.  
 
                                                            
36 Within the 7th, 8th and current (9th) NDPs, wildlife is recognised as one of the country’s three 
main valuable natural resources, along with minerals and rangelands, and emphasis is placed on 
the opportunities it provides in diversifying the economy, and its importance for rural 
development (Government of Botswana, 2003b:71). 
37 This dates back to the Tordoff Commission of 1970 whose recommendations that DC staff and 
finance be substantially improved, were adopted (Tordoff 1988). 
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Despite the ongoing debate concerning the political commitment of central government 
to decentralisation of authority to DCs rather than to local line ministries, there is a 
general agreement that local government has an excellent record in delivering key 
services such as water, education and health, and that local political processes are well 
developed and democratic (Tordoff, 1988, Wunsch, 2003, Hitchcock, 2003, Molutsi, 
2005). Wunsch’s (2003) comprehensive comparative study of local government in South 
Africa, Swaziland and Botswana concludes that local autonomy is limited, and there are 
personnel and operational weaknesses in local government. Nevertheless, Botswana has 
made great progress in the last 20 years and remains the best of the three countries in 
providing quality local governance which responds to local needs. However, despite the 
relative strengths of DCs, the implementation approach adopted by the Botswana NRMP 
(BNRMP) and its adherence to devolution in opposition to decentralisation, effectively 
marginalised DCs from CBNRM implementation. 
 
5.3 Implementation Approach and Challenges 
As discussed in Chapter 3, an important dimension in understanding the policy process 
driving CBNRM is an examination of the philosophy, science and data underlying such 
an approach. There is growing recognition that decisions around natural resource 
management policy ultimately depend on the relative political influence of different 
interest groups (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, Hyden, 2008), which will be determined in 
part by the science and knowledge base by which it is underpinned. CBNRM entails 
social and political commitments, and relies on particular audiences, knowledge/science 
and practices to support it. Various scholars (Jones and Murphree, 2001, Duffy, 2000, 
Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007, Rihoy et al., 2007) have  documented that CBNRM in 
southern Africa relies upon effective and influential actor networks, and incorporates 
bureaucrats, local and national politicians, national and international civil society 
organisations, private sector actors in the tourism industry, and, to varying degrees, 
grassroots constituencies as critical factors in influencing the direction of CBNRM.  
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To be effective, these networks have to transcend disciplinary, ideological, racial, ethnic 
and political boundaries, and unite diverse interest groups to derive benefits from the 
policy. Keeley and Scoones (2003) note that the relative influence each group brings to 
bear on policy development is dependent on a range of factors such as their economic 
power, political influence, the political climate and the issues being debated. The 
following section explores those factors affecting the development of a policy network in 
Botswana, and in doing so identifies factors that have effectively prevented the 
development of a strong and cohesive policy network supportive of CBNRM.  
 
5.3.1 The Emergence of CBNRM in Botswana 
Without understanding the contextual dynamics and conditions of CBNRM emergence, 
it is possible to overlook the political and social complexities of natural resource 
governance and policy in the country. The origins of CBNRM in Botswana are foreign 
and expatriate driven. My research indicates that this has affected the nature of the 
policy-network supporting the policy process by determining how it has been integrated 
and received nationally. CBNRM was introduced in Botswana by USAID in the form of 
the BNRMP, implemented from 1989 through 1999. After the end of the BNRMP, The 
World Conservation Union/Netherlands Development Organisation (IUCN/SNV) 
CBNRM Support Programme assumed centre stage, followed by the European Union-
funded Wildlife Conservation and Management Programme (WCMP) from 2002-6. One 
of the most striking elements characterising these programmes is the lack of continuity 
between them. Two examples suffice to illustrate this. The NRMP devoted considerable 
time and resources in developing comprehensive training tools, none of which were used 
by subsequent programmes. Both SNV and the WCMP developed alternative 
approaches. Meanwhile, the valuable documentary records of the BNRMP (amounting to 
hundreds of documents) are no longer available in the DWNP library or elsewhere in 
Botswana.  
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While each of these programmes was/is embedded within and worked together with 
DWNP, the lead government institution, CBNRM remains identified with donor agencies 
and the expatriate personnel who managed the programme.38 It is perceived to be an 
imported environmental paradigm39, thereby compromising its relevance and legitimacy 
locally. Consequently, the philosophy, science and data underlying CBNRM approaches 
in Botswana lack ‘indigenous’ conceptualisation and development. 
 
Evidence from other southern African countries demonstrates that CBNRM approaches 
have taken years to develop and involve diverse individuals and institutions. They also 
reflect unique national social and political realities and commitments in those countries 
(see Jones & Murphree 2001 for a comprehensive discussion). However, in Botswana’s 
CBNRM, there is a lack of cultural understanding, relationships, identities and 
connection to social and political networks, arising from the difficulty of embedding 
foreigners in the local institutional landscape.  Foreigners lack ‘agency’ as they are 
unable to strategically influence others through the manipulation of a network of social 
relations (Long and van der Ploeg, 1989). Therefore, attempts to develop actor-networks 
that spread or maintain narratives are compromised.  Consequently, CBNRM in 
Botswana faces immense implementation and operational challenges.  
 
                                                            
38 Bolstering this perception still further is the fact that the primary architects of the enabling 
policy framework that facilitated the introduction of the NRMP, the director of DWNP and 
several of his key staff, were also expatriates.  
39 This is in sharp contrast to the CBNRM programmes in Zimbabwe, Namibia and elsewhere, 
which have strong, locally conceived conceptual roots, as discussed in Chapter 7, the 
development of which created a dedicated, cohesive and influential network at national and local 
levels. In Botswana these networks are largely absent. 
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Foreign dominance is reflected in the term informally used to describe CBNRM within 
DWNP, ‘Dilo tsa Makgoa’, which translates as ‘Something for the white people’. The 
following quote succinctly illustrates the commonly held view:  
CBNRM is just one more approach introduced by well-meaning donors who are 
following fashions. The history of development here is full of them and, like those, 
it will fade away when all the donors and foreign experts have gone (Senior 
DWNP official – name withheld on request - Gaborone, interview on 16 
February, 2005). 
This lack of ‘indigenous’ roots, compounded by the lack of continuity in its 
implementation, has translated into limited legitimacy locally and nationally, 
compromising the development of a strong CBNRM actor-network. This manifests itself 
in the remarkable absence of a politically salient constituency at any level, and there is a 
notable lack of community representatives, politicians, local NGO ‘personalities’, 
leading academics and senior managers and conservation practitioners in DWNP among 
its supporters. Therefore, CBNRM is largely bereft of effective ‘champions’ or policy 
entrepreneurs who can influence policy making. This failure to develop an influential 
network has made it relatively easy to discard once donors withdraw their support.  
 
The perception of CBNRM as an externally imposed approach at the national level is 
mirrored also at the local level, where the ‘imposer’ is perceived to be the DWNP and 
NGOs. As expressed by one Member of Parliament (MP):  
In theory, CBNRM is a great idea and just what we need. It promotes self-
reliance and self-sufficiency and makes people value and conserve resources. But 
it is being imposed on people. The participatory elements are being ignored as 
they’re too difficult to implement. And this destroys the whole purpose (MP 
Buteti, Gaborone, interview on February 17, 2005). 
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Such perceptions de-legitimized the national and local authenticity of CBNRM and 
alienated many potential supporters. They prevent implementers and advocates from 
drawing upon the CBNRM narrative of sovereign rights and anti-colonialism that they 
have used to great effect in ensuring political support in other countries.  As detailed in 
Chapters 4 and 7, in Zimbabwe one of the most powerful arguments in terms of 
mustering political support has been the cry of ‘African solution for African problems’. 
The dominance of a narrative disparaging CBNRM has prevented what Duffy (2000) 
terms ‘the depoliticisation of internal environmental politics’. Indeed, it has done the 
opposite and effectively politicized environmental politics in Botswana.  This is 
compounded further because the discourse, narrative and rhetoric relating to 
conservation in Botswana never shifted from the earlier paradigm of ‘protectionism’ in 
the comprehensive manner that it had done so elsewhere in the region. There may be a 
variety of reasons for this but the primary driving factor is that of the effect of a single 
highly influential figure, President Ian Khama.  
 
5.3.2 Undermined from Above: CBNRM and Political 
Leadership 
President Khama’s dominance and influence extends into many social and economic 
areas, as well as the political. Not only is he President, he is also Paramount Chief of the 
Bamangwato40 and eldest son of the nationally revered Sir Seretse Khama, securer of 
independence and first President of Botswana. Thus to paraphrase from Mamdani 
(1996), Khama is simultaneously the representative power in civil society whilst also the 
despotic power over Native Authorities. A senior government official succinctly captures 
Khama’s role:  
…to understand what’s going on you have to understand about Khama and the 
affect his name has on people. He is feared like a lion. No Batswana will 
contradict him. Now he has made his position known everyone, whether they 
                                                            
40 Wylie (1990) writes persuasively about the ‘god-like’ status of a Tswana chief in the 20th 
century. Good (2005) notes that this was an idea echoed by Khama himself recently in a statement 
before his Bamangwato constituency ‘I am not God, but I am your chief’. 
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agree or not, will fall in line. (Senior DWNP official – name withheld on request 
– Gaborone, interview on February 19, 2005). 
 
While this statement may be exaggerated, the influence that Khama wields within the 
conservation sector in Botswana cannot be overlooked. He is upheld and revered as the 
‘Father of Conservation in Botswana’ (Daily News, 2001), in which role films have been 
made (e.g. Wildlife Warriors) and much media space devoted to him. This dominance of 
one individual on conservation within a country is unique throughout the region to 
Botswana. Khama’s reputation stems from his days as Commander of the Botswana 
Defence Force (BDF) when he deployed BDF personnel on anti-poaching missions to 
curb poaching of ‘endangered species’, primarily elephants (Henk, 2006). For this act, he 
received many international awards, e.g. the Endangered Wildlife Trust ‘Conservation 
Statesmen of the Year Award, 2001’ and acclaim both nationally and internationally. 
This included ‘mass’ recognition and accolades from private sector tourism operators, 
the vast majority of whom independently recognise Khama on their web sites as ‘the 
unsung hero of conservation’ – a significant serenade for one ‘unsung’.   
 
Currently, Khama remains the dominant figure behind all significant conservation 
institutions and initiatives within Botswana.  He is the Chairman of Botswana’s premier 
conservation NGO, the Kalahari Conservation Society; President of the Khama Rhino 
Sanctuary and of the Cheetah Foundation, and Chief Patron of Mokolodi Nature 
Reserve. He is on the board of the world’s best financially endowed NGO, Conservation 
International (CI) - one of the few international conservation NGOs operating in 
Botswana and he is also active in the board of the Peace Parks Foundation. He is widely 
rumoured to be a shareholder in Wilderness Safaris and has personal relationships with 
many of the larger safari operators.  
 
Khama’s open adoption of coercive conservation tactics in using the army to engage in 
anti-poaching activities and public anti-hunting statements that he has made leave no 
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doubt as to his belief in a protectionist conservation paradigm. Statements such as ‘no 
country can ignore poachers crossing their borders… we took on the poachers 
aggressively…and actually shot a few of them’ (Bauer, 2004) sum-up his approach to 
conservation. The conservation organizations with which he is associated adopt a 
‘protectionist’ approach to conservation, and it is these influences and networks which he 
interacts with as a result of his relationship with CI, Peace Parks and Wilderness Safaris. 
Providing a clear illustration of Khama’s personal interest in and commitment to 
conservation was his controversial decision in November 2008 to attend a board meeting 
of CI, rather than attend an Extra Ordinary Meeting of SADC Heads of State to discuss 
the political and security issues in the region in arising from the situation in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and Zimbabwe (Zimbabwe Guardian, 2008). 
 
 
As one ex-senior DWNP official noted: 
Khama will probably get another international conservation award if he 
undermines sustainable use in Botswana, including CBNRM, and returns us to 
exclusively protectionist conservation. He is working towards that (ex-DWNP 
official – name withheld on request – Gaborone, interview on February 23, 
2005).   
 
As demonstrated below, Khama has played a direct personnel role in the development of 
the new CBNRM policy which has resulted in recentralization. 
   
5.3.3 Constituency Building by Donors 
Since its introduction into Botswana, DWNP has been the lead agency in terms of policy 
development and technical support for CBNRM. Other government departments and 
ministries, including the ARB, Land Boards and DCs play a limited role. There is a 
consensus among analysts that CBNRM implementers largely failed to engage and be 
integrated with sectoral initiatives in other ministries or departments (Taylor, 2000, 
 
 
 
 
132 
 
Arntzen et al., 2003, Jones, 2004). The role played by other government agencies, 
notably the DCs, was determined by the BNRMP to be that of ‘facilitators of a process 
and guarantors of a fair an honest process’ (Winer, N; personal communication, 2006). It 
was a well-meaning attempt to avoid what was perceived to be the primary pitfall of the 
CAMPFIRE programme: 
[D]ecentralising to councils, as in Zimbabwe, was seen by us as using wildlife to 
provide a subsidy to local government which then passed on a percentage, under 
imposed terms and conditions, to communities (Winer, N; personal 
communication, 2006).  
 
However, from 2003 onwards, this response has been acknowledged as a tactical error by 
implementers and communities alike. The National CBNRM Forum agreed in 2004 that 
proscribing the role of DCs has effectively marginalised them from the programme and  
had proven a handicap in promoting local governance and accountability (National 
CBNRM Forum Botswana, 2004). As illustrated by the OCT case study in Chapter Six, 
community leaders themselves are now making attempts to address this situation by 
developing strategies to ensure greater involvement and responsibility be assumed by 
DCs.  
 
The failure of the BNRMP to develop a strong and diverse implementation base among 
local institutions early on has compounded problems of marginalization from 
mainstream policy-making processes. It was not until the late 1990s that Botswana begun 
to witness the diversification and strengthening of the CBNRM institutional landscape. 
Only when the BNRMP was terminated in 1999 was it recognized that there was need to 
ensure continuity and to create national-level institutions that would represent the 
interests of the growing number of CBOs. At this point, USAID was instrumental in the 
creation of a national umbrella and networking organisation for CBOs, the Botswana 
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Community-based Organisation Network (BOCOBONET) (Chapayama, O; personal 
communication, 2005). 
 
During the period 1999–2003, implementers made concerted efforts to develop an 
influential constituency that would overcome the political isolation of CBNRM as well 
as create a well-organised, cohesive stakeholder group. The IUCN/SNV CBNRM 
Support Programme was established with the objective of: 
providing a platform for broad stakeholder dialogue on issues of common 
interest, identify constraints and ways forward, and enable members to share 
experiences and exchange information (IUCN/SNV, 2000:5).  
 
It was primarily responsible for and oversaw the creation of a cohesive local interest 
group representing all stakeholders, including local communities. In 1999, this network 
consisted of a total of 35 institutions, and by 2003, it had grown to 83 CBOs, 8 
government departments (local and national); 10 local and international NGOs; 58 
private sector and NGO ‘service providers’; 12 private sector companies and their 
representative association, HATAB; and various international donors (National CBNRM 
Forum Botswana, 2004). From 2000 to 2003, regular national CBNRM conferences 
involving all stakeholders were held, as well as bi-annual forum and steering committee 
meetings. In the formal ‘CBNRM Review’ of 2003, the evaluation team concluded that:   
through the efforts of BOCOBONET and the CBNRM Forum Structures, a 
significant proportion of wildlife-based CBOs have participated in the policy 
dialogue and have played an active role in lobbying and advocacy on issues of 
importance to CBNRM. Stakeholders have become a movement with different 
interests but a common goal (Arntzen et al., 2003:12).  
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5.3.4 Recentralisation   
The extent of the political influence of this network in the short term was clearly 
demonstrated by the effective manner in which it could block the Ministry of Local 
Government’s SAVINGRAM of 2001. This SAVINGRAM represented the first overt 
signs of opposition by government to the devolutionary processes inherent within 
CBNRM. Its aim was to overturn devolution of control of resources to CBOs and create 
an alternative process of decentralisation by vesting authority with DCs. The justification 
for this decision was that: 
These funds are earned from natural resources and as such there is a strong 
feeling that there shouldn’t be a departure from the policy of these resources 
benefiting the whole nation, as is done for diamonds and other revenue earning 
natural resources (Molale, 2001). 
 
The swift and well-choreographed response from the National CBNRM Forum, steering 
committee and individual institutions, notably BOCOBONET, led to the eventual 
withdrawal of the SAVINGRAM (BOCOBONET, 2001). 
 
However, following these initial ‘successes’, a series of events began to undermine the 
ability of the stakeholder group to function as a lobby/advocacy group. By 2005, the 
seemingly strong CBNRM constituency that had thrived in the early 2000s was no longer 
functional or supportive of CBNRM, and this significantly undermined the political 
strength of its constituency.  In comparison, the reaction of the government to the 
demands from the CBNRM Forum in 2001 and 2005 reflects a dramatic shift in political 
influence and the narrowing of policy space.   
 
In 2001, the government welcomed input from the Forum into the process of finalizing 
the draft policy, and the outcome wholeheartedly reflected the Forum’s 
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recommendations. The Permanent Secretary (PS), Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and 
Tourism (MEWT) noted at the time that the policy framework must explicitly address 
the management of the proceeds from the programme as lobbied for by the forum. 
However, its position shifted dramatically in 2005 with the PS for MEWT explicitly 
stating that policy-making was government’s prerogative: 
It must be understood that policy is developed by government, taking the views of 
all stakeholders into consideration not just those of a special interest group such 
as the National CBNRM Forum might represent (Gakale, 2005; emphasis added).  
 
This dramatic shift in the government’s position was brought about by corresponding 
shifts in the interests, intentions and resources of actors, and their influence on the levers 
of power. A scrutiny of the process, by which the April 2008 CBNRM Policy was 
developed, illustrates clearly the narrowing of policy space over the period.  
 
Efforts to draft the CBNRM policy in Botswana have been ongoing for almost a decade. 
Initial signs were that the drafting process was to be relatively inclusive, participatory 
and transparent.  An early draft of what was then the ‘Joint DWNP and ARB CBNRM 
Policy’ was translated into Setswana and discussed in detail at workshops comprised of 
representatives from relevant affected communities and the concerns they raised 
incorporated (Cassidy, 2003). Consultations culminated in 2004 in a national workshop 
involving all CBNRM stakeholders, at which the draft was reviewed, inputs sort and the 
final product endorsed by all (IUCN, 2004).  The revised draft was agreed upon by 
relevant departmental directors in June of 2004 and submitted to the PS, MEWT. The PS 
requested various minor changes, although non-affecting its substance.  
 
At this point, the process of policy development changed from being transparent and 
consultative to one characterized by suppression of information and secrecy, and hence, 
contravening government’s own procedures and protocols.  In early 2005, the PS and key 
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personnel met (then Vice President) Khama, who expressed concern with the draft policy 
and expressed his desire to see unspecified changes. In March 2005 the PS, MEWT 
issued a confidential SAVINGRAM noting that: 
the VP directed that we redraft the CBNRM policy in such a way that the 
management of revenues from leases is removed from communities given the fact 
that such communities do not have the capacities to manage funds  (Senior 
DWNP officer, name withheld on request: interview September 2005). 
 
DWNP then revised the policy, developing a compromise mechanism for financial 
distribution aimed at accommodating concerns expressed by the PS but maintaining 
devolved financial responsibilities.  At the same time, the CBNRM Forum submitted 
their recommendations, which the PS declined to accept as detailed above.  
 
In June 2005, DWNP were informed by a senior government figure that their revisions 
were not acceptable and were given precise instructions on what changes needed to be 
made. These included the removal of references to devolution of financial authority and 
to participation. Amendments were made as requested, with the drafting team taking the 
unusual step of expressing their concern with these amendments in a memorandum 
submitted with the revised document. The process concluded with the passage of new 
legislation recentralizing financial authority in April 2008, ignoring advice and inputs 
from both technocrats within DWNP and the CBNRM Forum.   
 
5.3.5 A Shifting Macro Context: Changes in Political Priorities 
and Perceptions  
The shift in government’s attitude and approach to policymaking described in the 
previous section can be attributed to a series of events seemingly unrelated to CBNRM 
itself. However, these events enabled the political elite to justify their actions and 
undertake them largely unopposed.  
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5.3.5.1 The ‘Diamond Debate’  
CBNRM has drawn attention to the question of wildlife as a ‘local’ or ‘national’ 
resource. This question has political ramifications for the way the GOB deals with the 
controversial ‘diamond debate.’ The Constitution of Botswana states that all natural 
resources are national assets, and the proceeds from their exploitation should be managed 
centrally through national coffers to ensure transparent and equitable distribution. The 
ruling BDP has built its broad electoral coalition and retained control since independence 
in part by adhering to this position (Poteete, 2007). CBNRM however, ‘localizes’ 
benefits from wildlife resources to local communities since they bear the cost of wildlife 
management within their local jurisdiction. By delineating membership and rights in 
CBNRM to an individual community, it effectively de-emphasizes the constitutionally 
implied ‘national citizenship’ that entitles all citizens to benefit from mineral, land and 
other natural resources. Therefore, CBNRM appears to contradict a key national 
principle upon which the Constitution is based. Viewed from this perspective, CBNRM 
represents a divergent political strategy which invites controversy since it reinforces 
local political identities and also localizes CBNRM benefits (Poteete, 2007). 
 
Politicians and communities from diamond-rich areas are taking advantage of the 
alternative perspective offered by CBNRM and since 2000 many have been arguing for 
exemption from the constitutional rule that all natural resources are national resources so 
that they could benefit directly from diamonds in a similar manner to which CBNRM 
communities are benefiting from wildlife. As a matter of principle, they argue, their 
communities should have similar rights to benefits as those accorded wildlife-rich 
communities involved in CBNRM (MP Buteti, personal communication, interview on 
February 17, 2005). 
 
This ‘diamond debate’ has exacerbated conflict, and raised questions about the policy 
choices for managing natural resources in the context of CBNRM. Inevitably, it has 
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brought to the fore political dynamics and contested claims to resource management in 
the country. The GOB has been forced to re-examine the implications of devolution of 
wildlife resources and benefits vis-à-vis decentralization and/or recentralization of 
CBNRM benefits in line with the principle of all natural resources being ‘national 
resources.’ Decentralization of natural resources and partial devolution of management 
responsibilities seemed to fly against government’s professed commitment to the 
principle of natural resources being national resources. This principle had formed an 
integral component of Botswana’s nation-building approach, which stressed the political 
imperative of projecting the primacy of national over local, especially traditional, 
identities (Poteete, 2007).  
 
The ‘diamond debate’ brings sharply into relief this policy contradiction concerning 
natural resources. It turns the CBNRM principle of local beneficiation upside down, and 
makes a politically compelling case that all revenues from natural resources should be 
pooled in a national coffer and then redistributed for community development 
nationwide as well as cross-subsidize communities living in resource poor areas. The 
distributional struggles and claims that emerge in the ‘diamond debate’ have to be 
understood in terms of their political implications, and the political stance of the ruling 
party. The BDP government’s call for centrally managing CBNRM funds is an attempt 
to address questions raised about its coalition building strategy (Poteete, 2007) and 
discrepancy in the treatment of mineral and wildlife resources. It has used the ‘diamond 
debate’ to recentralize CBNRM benefits and dictate the future based on its political 
agenda. 
 
In Botswana, clearly, politics frames the trajectory of CBNRM, and [re]shapes 
boundaries within which activities and outcomes occur. The 2008 CBNRM Policy 
successfully managed to recentralize funds, allocating 65 percent of the revenue 
generated to a National Environmental Fund, which would ensure the community 
projects nationwide are financed.  Under the leadership of President Khama, the BDP 
government seems to have succeeded in ‘nationalizing’ CBNRM funds in ways that 
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address the ‘diamond debate,’ making all natural resources benefit the ‘nation’ rather 
than the ‘local.’ 
 
This recentralization of funds fails to recognize that wildlife and minerals present 
different management challenges. It removes the incentives for effective local 
management of wildlife. Local control of benefits flowing out of resource management is 
necessary for efficient management of wildlife resources, which does not necessarily 
hold true for mineral resource management. As pointed out by the CBNRM Forum 
‘diamonds do not eat goats’ (Mmegi, 2002) while wildlife does destroy local 
communities’ livestock. Therefore, different management regimes are required.   
 
5.3.5.2 Alienation of Donors and the Private Sector  
In previous sections, I have highlighted the weakening of civil society’s influence and 
ability to create independent, alternative perspectives to government. This situation was 
compounded in 2003 when Botswana was officially reclassified by Bretton-Woods 
institutions as a ‘middle-income’ country, one result of which was the withdrawal of 
many donors from the country. This withdrawal served to undermine many of the donor-
dependent NGOs active within the policy network of CBNRM through their membership 
of the National CBNRM Forum.  For example, SNV withdrew its financial support of 
the ‘CBNRM Support Programme’ and BOCOBONET. BOCOBONET has subsequently 
had to refocus its activities on ‘rural development’ in general and since 2003 has played 
a marginal role in CBNRM (A. Mabei, personal communication, interview in Gaborone 
February, 23, 2005). In addition, several NGOs formerly active in the CBNRM Forum, 
such as the Forestry Association of Botswana, collapsed while others withdrew from the 
country, including the Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development 
(ACORD). The net result was a weakened stakeholder group and increasing problems of 
accountability within CBOs.41 Without a voice and forms of political leverage, civil 
                                                            
41 CBOs traditionally relied on external capacity-building inputs, which, when withdrawn, 
weakened their institutional support base.  
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society organizations’ influence on CBNRM policy outcomes was limited. Government 
intolerance of the National CBNRM Forum’s expectations of having strong input into 
the policy-making process clearly demonstrated the waning of civil societies influence. 
 
Meanwhile, the private sector continues to alienate itself from CBNRM, and has 
collectively become a vocal and influential critic because there is a prevalence of 
incidents of misuse and abuse of funds by CBOs and lack of reinvestment in the resource 
base by communities. Narratives and ‘stories’ of mismanagement by communities 
abound among the private sector. These perceptions culminated in 2006 with the 
withdrawal of the influential private sector representative association, the Hotel and 
Tourism Association of Botswana (HATAB), from the CBNRM Forum. An analysis of 
the discourse dominant in the private sector marketing and promotional efforts reveals 
that generally they are hostile to the concept of sustainable use, which underpins 
CBNRM, and are active within an influential actor-network supportive of an alternative 
conservation paradigm based upon a protectionist approach and narrative of 
conservation. 
 
5.3.5.3 San Controversies  
The controversy over the relocation of the San from the Central Kalahari Game Reserve 
(CKGR) has alienated this already marginalised ethnic group even further from 
mainstream political and social discourse and public sympathies. One result of the 
CKGR controversy is a growing national tendency to ‘blame’ the San for the 
international condemnation of Botswana’s human rights record as they draw 
international attention to their plight in a country used to being fêted as the standard-
bearer for democracy in Africa. Confronted with increasingly hostile international 
attention, politicians, government officials and the media have unwarrantedly instituted a 
social and political backlash against the San. 
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Despite lack of official acknowledgement, the majority of the beneficiaries of CBNRM 
in Ngamiland are San. The lack of public sympathy for the San is reflected in the 
deficiency of public outcry over the prospective loss of benefits that the San receive from 
wildlife management under CBNRM. 
 
5.4 Conclusion  
This chapter offers a review and analysis of the CBNRM policy process in Botswana with 
the objective of illustrating that natural resource policy and governance depend on the 
relative political influence of different interest groups. This relative influence shifts over 
time. Failure to understand these contextual dynamics and conditions of CBNRM 
emergence may result in overlooking the political and social complexities of natural 
resource governance and policy.  
The interests of the political economic elite have largely determined CBNRM outcomes.  
Despite rhetorical commitment to community-based approaches in rural development and 
natural resource management policies, lack of progress in implementation brings into 
question GOB’s commitment to community-based approaches. Scrutiny reveals that  
policy in Botswana is generally geared towards supporting the economic and political 
aspirations of the governing elite and the economic interests of the political elite are not 
necessarily served by CBNRM. These interests are related to several key processes such as 
resource accumulation - particularly land and livestock - privatization in rural Botswana 
among the country’s elites, the overwhelmingly influential President Khama’s preferences 
for a ‘protectionist’ conservation paradigm and his reservations on the concept of 
sustainable use, and the ‘diamond debate’ over national versus local control over natural 
resource revenues.  
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The Botswana experience further demonstrates that the lack of a strong, politically salient 
constituency compromises the social and political sustainability of CBNRM. CBNRM 
entails social and political commitments, and relies on particular audiences and practices 
to support it. Sustainability requires having appropriate actor networks in place at a 
national level – with links to the local - which can function as constituencies championing 
the interests of rural communities, thus shaping and maintaining appropriate policy 
outcomes in the face of fluctuating political circumstances. The development of such an 
actor-network was hindered by the perceived foreign origins of CBNRM. This 
undermined its legitimacy and it failed to develop an indigenous identity. While donors 
did belatedly create a CBNRM stakeholder group and this did play a key role in the short 
term as a political counterweight to demands from the political elite for recentralization, 
this ultimately proved unsustainable. This group was largely marginalised from political 
processes, whilst CBNRM was becoming increasingly embattled in controversy. This was 
due to problems of mismanagement, abuse of funds and shortcomings in implementation 
as well as other factors outside its control. These included the ‘diamonds debate’, 
weakening of civil society and the political alienation of San communities. Further light is 
shed on the lack of a political constituency amongst the supposed CBNRM beneficiaries 
in rural areas by a review of local-level devolutionary dynamics, which is undertaken in 
the following Chapter. 
 
CBNRM became intertwined with the politics of national development and nation 
building, and the political leadership used these discourses to present a compelling 
argument for recentralization and appeal to ‘national’ identity. What emerges from this 
finding is that CBNRM should be understood within the wider context of national 
politics and development policy which subject questions of rural livelihoods and local 
resource governance to their dominant imperatives. The shift in response by government 
to accept civil society inputs into the policy making process from 2001 to 2005 
represents a closing of democratic and policy space. The 2008 CBNRM Policy emerged 
in the context of limited resistance since the government has succeeded in restricting 
space for rural communities and civil society to participate in the policy process. With 
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central authorities currently having prevailed in the struggle over wildlife governance 
and benefits in Botswana, the future ability of locally based natural resource governance 
regimes to contribute to conservation and rural development goals will depend largely on 
the ability of actors at local, national, and global levels to construct more influential 
constituencies for CBNRM. 
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CHAPTER 6  
LOCAL LEVEL OUTCOMES IN BOTSWANA – A CASE STUDY OF 
THE OKAVANGO COMMUNITY TRUST 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the implementation and outcomes of 
CBNRM in the villages involved in the Okavango Community Trust (OCT) in 
Botswana. It explores the social and political contestations over natural rights and 
benefits affecting CBNRM in this area. This highlights the dynamic relationship between 
processes at the local level and the national level and the impact of local level outcomes 
on policymaking processes. The linkage between local and macro is an important 
intersection as it sheds light on the opportunities and shortcomings of CBNRM in 
changing power relations, strengthening democratic space, creating accountable local 
governance institutions and empowering communities to direct their destiny and 
livelihoods.  
 
Successful CBNRM outcomes depend on local-level institutions, which are genuinely 
accountable to and representative of the interests of their members (Ribot, 2002a, 
Murphree, 2000a, World Resources Institute et al, 2005).  In Botswana, there is 
consensus that CBOs generally are marked by low levels of accountability and poorly 
represent their local constituents (Arntzen et al., 2003, Habarad, 2003, Zuze, 2004, 
Mbaiwa, 2004, Thakadu, 2005, Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). Habarad (2003) and 
Thakadu (2005) note lack of accountability as particularly evident in CBOs with 
concession-based joint venture partnerships (JVPs). Given the huge amount of money 
and influence generated by these ventures, of which there are only six in the country, the 
stakes are high for those who would control them particularly when mechanisms for 
ensuring accountability are absent or flawed. Consequently, the high-value resources 
involved in those CBOs with JVPs create unique problems that not prevalent in other 
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CBOs focusing on veld resources with relatively little economic value.42 Wildlife-related 
CBOs are the high profile ‘flagships’ of CBNRM, and it is these which are determining 
policy outcomes.   
 
Given the significance of these 6 CBOS for policy development in Botswana, I selected 
one of them as a site for in-depth field level research for this thesis. The objectives were: 
(a) to determine whether the CBO was representative of and accountable to its 
constituency, and what factors affected this; (b) to identify what strategies were being 
developed by various stakeholders to improve accountability if this was deemed 
necessary; and (c) to determine what influence local events were having on the national 
CBNRM policy making process.  
 
Research was carried out in three of the five villages of OCT, Seronga, Gunotsoga and 
Gudikwa, during 2007-8 by a research assistant and myself. I initiated the research in 
2005/6, and used information gathered through interviews with key stakeholders, 
secondary sources and grey materials to develop a semi-structured interview format for 
use by my research assistant and for briefing and training of my assistant. The assistant 
then spent 3 weeks living in the three villages in 2007 to familiarize himself with day-to-
day lifestyles, concerns and aspirations of the inhabitants. He held formal semi-
structured interviews with at least 20 general members in each village, as well as 
interviewed local leaders and held informal discussions with many more. A 
                                                            
42 CBOs established under the auspices of CBNRM in Botswana are involved in activities 
encompassing a broad range of different natural resources, including veld products such as 
thatching grass, herbal teas, medicinal plants collection and marketing, handicraft production and 
tourism-focused ventures such as the management of community campsites and photographic and 
hunting safaris in partnership with the private sector. Whilst CBOs are fairly evenly spread 
throughout the country, direct financial benefits for communities from joint venture agreements 
(JVAs) are concentrated in Ngamiland and Chobe. The total income from 12 JVAs in 2002 was 
estimated at P8.45 million or P735 772 per CBO, a substantial increase in revenues from the mid-
1990s, which were on average below P200 000 per CBO. 
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representative mix of people was interviewed, taking into account gender, age and class. 
Members of the OCT board, traditional leaders and others in positions of authority, 
government employees (e.g. teachers and health workers) employees of lodges and 
operators, private business people as well as subsistence farmers were also interviewed.  
 
Accompanied by my assistant, I undertook a week’s visit to the three villages in June 
2008, during which the initial research was verified and additional 34 interviews 
conducted in the villages. Findings were triangulated to ensure the credibility of 
information shared by interviewees. When specific facts or incidences were revealed, 
every effort was made to verify these while paying equal attention to understand why 
people perceived and interpreted events in particular ways, how these events had affected 
their lives, what information they had,  from where/how it was obtained, and what 
mitigating actions were planned.  Field level research was complimented by interviews 
with relevant government officials, politicians, donors, NGOs, academics and private 
sector representatives at both district and national level who are either currently (or 
formerly) involved in CBNRM implementation, analysis and policy development.   
 
6.2 Okavango Community Trust: Description, History, People and 
CBRNM Evolutions  
OCT represents five remotely located villages in Ngamiland, in the northern pan-handle 
of the Okavango Delta, east of the Okavango River and north of the buffalo fence. By 
Botswanan standards the area is relatively ethnically diverse, being home to the 
Hambukushu, Bayei, Basarwa and Baxeriku. Of the five villages, Beetsha, Gunutsoga 
and Eretsha are dominated by Hamukushu whilst Godikwa is settled almost entirely by 
Basarwa and the Bayei are in the majority in Seronga. The population of the five villages 
is approximately 7,000, with village size ranging from 3,600 in Seronga, to 800 in 
Godikwa43.  
                                                            
43 This ethnic diversity, relatively large population size and inclusion of five individual villages is 
the result of an arbitary decision made by the NRMP on the grounds that they were all in the 
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The people practice diversified livelihood strategies to meet their basic needs, adapting 
to the constraining environmental conditions in which they live. These multi-stranded 
livelihood activities include rain-fed arable agriculture, livestock rearing, basketry, 
fishing, hunting, gathering of wild foods, medicines and building materials, beer brewing 
and in an increasing number of cases, formal employment in the tourism sector.  A 2008 
study by the University of Botswana indicates that the most significant source of cash 
income for households in the five villages was that from the formal employment offered 
by the CBNRM related activities of the tourism operator, although this is given little 
weight by the majority of inhabitants as an important source of income.  The same study 
confirmed that all households relied upon utilization of the natural resource base to a 
significant degree to meet their basic livelihood needs, e.g. 93% for firewood, 85% for 
poles, 84% for thatching grass, and similar figures for food plants, reeds, palm leaves, 
medicinal plants and papyrus (Lapolang, 2008).  
 
6.2.1 History  
OCT was the first CBO registered in Ngamiland in March 1995 with the objective of 
representing the interests of the five villages on issues relating to the concession areas 
NG 22 and 23. NG 22 was to be used for multi-purposes, hunting and photographic, 
whilst NG 23 was exclusively photographic.  
 
The establishment of the CBO was politically motivated from the start, setting the tone 
for the future of the trust. Political interference resulted in a hasty process that prohibited 
any community participation, ensuring that there was no consultation in determining the 
constitution (ACORD, 2002). Following the establishment of the first CBNRM initiative 
                                                                                                                                                                 
vicinity of the two NG areas and it contradicts one of the five guiding principles of CBNRM 
(Murphree, 1991) - that of a small, cohesive membership. This is the root cause of many of the 
problems with which OCT is beset.  
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in Chobe in 1994, the MP for Okavango North, in collaboration with a local safari 
operator, approached DWNP with a demand that CBNRM projects be established in his 
area, following which the NRMP staff were directed to proceed immediately and 
undertake community briefing and mobilization meetings (Interview with Winer, N; 
Geneva, May 2005. Interview with a former NRMP field officer, name withheld on 
request; Maun, July 2005). The MP and representatives of the safari operator then 
accompanied the NRMP team through the initial awareness raising stages of the 
mobilization process. On returning to the area one month later to complete the process 
and prior to the registration of any CBOs, OCT had already signed a contract entering 
into a Joint Venture with the safari operator, Robert Bates, and a constitution had been 
drawn up for the trust by a lawyer in consultation with the MP but with no consultation 
with community members (Hartley, 1995). ACORD (2002) note that this represents a 
weak foundation upon which to build a community driven initiative: 
it was, as it were, driven to them… locals did not readily accept the trust as 
theirs, neither were they fully aware of its functions, nor did they participate in 
its activities (ACORD, 2002:9). 
 
Other interpretations of the process are less circumspect. As one of those involved in the 
implementation process at the time noted: 
the establishment of OCT trust was for two purposes and driven by two 
individuals. The purposes were to gain votes for the MP whilst lining his pocket 
along with the operators because of the favourable terms of the agreement with 
the operator, and not surprisingly the individuals pushing it were the MP and the 
operator, who got on board a few powerful local residents. Local participation 
and needs had nothing to do with it (Interview with former DWNP field officer - 
name withheld on request - Maun, July 2005). 
 
The local MP, the safari operator and a lawyer exclusively drew up the constitution and 
established the OCT trust. The OCT board became the de facto owners of the wildlife 
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resources in their area with ‘unlimited powers’ in determining what to do with benefits 
accruing from them. Since its inception, it has been widely perceived as an institution that 
mismanages and abuses funds derived from natural resource management for the personal 
enrichment of a few board members (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007).  Enabling this 
situation has been the weak and easily bypassed mechanisms that should have ensured that 
the process was participatory, representative and accountable to the people of OCT. 
   
6.2.2 Institutions and Economic Incentives  
Since its establishment, the OCT board of trustees, of which there are eleven members, 
has made all decisions relating to OCT. These include the five person Executive 
Committee (EC) consisting of the Chairperson and vice, Secretary and vice, and 
Treasurer. Ten of the  trustee’s are the Chairpersons and Secretaries drawn from the 
twelve members of each Village Trust Committee (VTC), which are the village level 
institutions representing each of the five villages and which report to the OCT. The 
eleventh trustee is a nominated representative of the JVP or any other individual the 
board wishes to co-opt.  No provision is made for any ex-officio members. All residents 
of the five villages, who have been resident in the area for more than one year, are 
citizens of Botswana and are over the age of eighteen, are deemed to be general members 
of the OCT  VTC members are elected every three years at a general election. The eleven 
OTC board members nominate the five EC members from amongst themselves (Notorial 
Deed Of Trust, 1995). Since its establishment the EC of the OCT has been dominated by 
the same small group of individuals - except for a three year period from 2004-744. 
 
The operations of the board are in theory governed by a ‘Notarial Deed of Trust’, 
commonly referred to as ‘the Constitution’. This stipulates how decision-making and 
benefit distribution should be carried out. The OCT constitution is unusual in that it 
explicitly gives all decision-making powers to the board rather than to the general 
                                                            
44 Following a controversy surrounding the refusal of the original OCT board members to tender 
the concession areas, the board members were all unseated during elections in 2004 and a second 
board elected. However, a further controversy in 2007 once again revolving around the need for a 
tender process saw this second board unseated. The majority of those returned to this third board, 
including all of those assuming EC positions, were members of the first board. 
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membership.  These powers include the right to hire and fire personnel, including the 
general manager; take decisions regarding all Trust income, assets and financial 
activities; decide on new trust appointees; and determine who the JVP shall be. The 
constitution also details mechanisms to ensure accountability to members, including 
frequency of elections and AGMs in each village. Once again, the constitution is unusual 
in that the requirements are negligible. For example, a VTC AGM, which is held under 
the auspices of village Khotla meetings, and considered to have a quorum if a total of 10 
general members and 6 OCT members are present. In Seronga, this means an AGM is 
considered to have been held if only 0.3% of the population attend. Despite such 
minimal requirements, even those that do exist are generally ignored, such as the 
requirement to report to AGMs on OCT finances or to advertise meetings 21 days in 
advance. Such mechanisms tend to be manipulated by the EC and used as instruments to 
increase their own power by spreading false and misleading information. The current 
situation is that there are no democratic procedures in place to ensure accountability, or 
as summed up by one interviewee: 
they [the board] have unlimited powers and can get away with anything they 
want. We [the people] have chaos. (OCT employee – name withheld on request – 
Seronga, interviewed on June 16, 2008). 
 
6.2.3 Financial Situation  
The OCT acquired the head lease over NG22 and 23 from the Tawana Land Board in 
1995. This head lease is for a period of 15 years, renewable every five years. The head 
lease empowers the trust to sign sub-leases with the private sector through a tender 
process. The private sector operators submit their tenders to a district level technical 
advisory committee (TAC) consisting of district officials from relevant line ministries. 
These officials advise the board on which JVP to choose. This advice is not binding and 
can be, and in the case of OCT always has been, ignored, with the decision being made 
exclusively by the OCT board. The time frame for the OCT contract is 15 years, 
consisting of 1+1+3+5+5 where OCT has the opportunity to review their relationship 
with the JVP at the end of each period and decide whether they want to re-tender 
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(Notorial Deed Of Trust, 1995). It is noteworthy that every decision that has been made 
by OCT to date regarding the tender has been surrounded by controversy and contested 
by both the general members and the TAC.  
 
The original concession holder and operator was the safari hunting operator, Micheletti-
Bates Safaris (MBS) who obtained the lease for NG 22 and NG 23 in 1996 (Joint 
Venture Memorandum of Understanding, 1996). In 1999, MBS sub-leased NG23 to the 
photographic operator Okavango Wilderness Safari’s (OWS) but continued to hunt in 
NG 22.  As of 2004, OWS subleased the whole area from MBS and it has been the 
exclusive operator since this time. No further contract negotiations are due until 2011. 
Despite the contractual clauses outlined above allowing for re-tendering to ensure 
maximum competition and income to OCT, and a desire on behalf of the general 
membership that this takes place, at no point has a new tender been called for by a sitting 
OCT board. The third board, as explained in Footnote 44, also decided not to re-tender 
the concession in 2006. The rationale for this decision was that OWS provided an 
interest free loan to OCT of P180,000 to enable them to pay off outstanding lease fees 
owed to the Tawana Land Board. This debt had accumulated over the years as the first 
board had never paid the annual rent to the Land Board. Without this loan from OWS, 
OCT would have had to default on their debt and lose their concession areas but OWS 
made the loan conditional on their being no re-tender process required. The decision not 
to re-tender arose then as a direct result of mismanagement by the first board, leaving the 
second board with no other economically viable alternative but to agree to the conditions 
of OWS. However, despite this and somewhat ironically, the second board was unseated 
at the next elections on the grounds that they too had failed to competitively tender the 
concession. The outcome is that OWS has never had to competitively tender for the 
concession area, this gives them a significant financial advantage, which is discussed in 
greater detail below. 
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The income from OWS that accrues to OCT every year is Pula 2.5 million. P166,00045 of 
which is paid on a monthly basis and P508,000 as a lump sum (Interview with OCT 
accountant, Seronga, 2008). Of this, the general running costs of the trust average 
between P160,000-170,000 per month in 2008 - the first year in which such figures have 
been available - or 80% of the income from concession fees (OCT, 2008a). The most 
significant expenditure items include salaries for the 54 staff equalling approximately 
P80,000 per month, vehicle running costs of approximately P50,000 and costs associated 
with VTC and OCT meetings. These include sitting allowances of P900 per person for 
each of the four mandatory OCT meetings per annum, P400pp for each of the mandatory 
4 VTC meetings per annum and P100 per person for each of the 4-5 special meetings by 
VTCs held each month and related food and accommodation costs. To put these sitting 
allowances into some perspective, full-time unskilled DC personnel, such as cleaners, 
earn P800 per month.  Such expenditure can amount to P30,000 per month. Additionally 
EC members make monthly all expense paid trips to Maun, costs for which amount to 
several thousand Pula (OCT, 2008a). 
  
Despite OCT dealing with significant funds, no accountant was employed until January 
2008. Prior to this, financial records were theoretically kept by the elected treasurer, the 
previous incumbent of this post had no financial management experience or training and 
very limited formal education. The result has been considerable problems over the years 
in accounting for income and expenditure. 2006 provides a typical example. According 
to the draft auditors report P1,595,768, over 65% of total income,  could not be 
accounted for (DSVG, 2007).  The auditors concluded: 
There were several missing records including vouchers for major expenditure 
items. There was no fixed assets register and no records on inventory held, no 
cash account to substantiate balances. There was excessive use of cash for 
payments without any supporting documentation or control system in place…We 
cannot therefore express our opinion in respect of the financial position of the 
OCT. (3)  
                                                            
45 US$1 was equivalent to 6.5 Pula as of June 2008. 
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As of January 2008, a qualified accountant had been employed but within six months 
into her job, all her written recommendations as well as those of the auditors regarding 
the need for introducing basic financial procedures such as budgeting were ignored by 
the EC. 
  
The total income for OCT between 1995 and 2007 is estimated at approximately P13, 
500,000. From this P6,000 has been disbursed to each VTC on two occasions, totaling 
only P30,000 over 12 years. Funds have, however, also been used to support various 
village level projects, which have not proven sustainable. These include projects 
requiring significant capital expenditures, such as ‘supermarkets’ in each village, boats 
for transport and construction of a funeral parlour, on which millions of Pula have been 
spent. However, the majority of such projects were abandoned mid-way during 
construction and none remained operational as of June 2008. In early 2008 the board 
decided to disburse P100,000 annually to each village. This has been achieved by issuing 
the Chairperson of each VTC with a personal cheque for P100,000. In the three case 
study villages, these funds still remained with the VTC chairperson as of June 2008.  
 
A brief review of the situation regarding vehicle management illustrates further how 
OCT funds and assets are managed and the primary beneficiaries from this. OCT funds 
have been used to purchase each of the five villages their own vehicle46. All running 
costs, including drivers salaries, fuel and maintenance, are provided by OCT. The 
vehicles are available for hire by members of each village from the VTC chairperson and 
treasurer. Villagers are informed that the hire charges are to recover the vehicle running 
costs and are returned to OCT accounts.  However, OCT does not receive these funds 
from the VTC and no records exist as to where these funds can be located. Essentially, 
these vehicles have been privatized by the VTC elites who are now operating personal 
taxi services, with all expenses being met by the supposedly communal funds of OTC.  
                                                            
46 Currently only 4 of the 5 vehicles are running following the involvement of Gudikwa in an 
accident in 2007. The EC have refused to repair this vehicle, maintaining that they do not have 
sufficient funds.  
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This brief review of the financial situation makes it clear that OCT has been 
characterized by mismanagement and abuse of funds, and significant financial benefits 
have accrued, from the outset, to a few powerful individuals within the villages and their 
external allies. There is no income or budget transparency. No general member 
interviewed perceived OCT as having provided them with any benefits nor did they 
consider OCT playing any role in natural resource management.  
 
6.3 Stakeholder Narratives  
There are many competing interest groups contending for the power and benefits 
emanating from control of OCT and de facto ownership of the concession areas that this 
affords. Each of these groups has different interests, differing levels of access to 
information and networks, and adopts different narratives or ‘stories’ to support their 
positions and explain ways forward. These stakeholder groups are both local and 
external. Very broadly defined, local groups fall into four categories, although within 
these, there is an overlap and constantly shifting alliances and networks. These groups 
are OCT board members, OCT staff, general members and ‘other local leaders’. 
 
External agents who are directly involved are the Ngamiland DC, DWNP, private 
operators and, formerly, the local MP47.  Through the networks and agency of these 
groups, the influence of external interests extends to senior national level policy makers.  
Thus the linkages between local and national are strong, influential and clearly defined. 
This section relates the stories that each group shared with me, highlighting the concerns 
and issues dominant within each group.  
 
                                                            
47 The former MP, (now deceased) Kavindama, was unseated in the 2004 elections.  His 
successor, Vista Maruti, appears to have no direct links to or specific interest in OCT. 
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6.3.1 OCT Board Members  
As already described, the OCT board consists of two members from each of the VTCs 
and therefore theoretically has equal representation from each of the five villages. 
However, the board itself is dominated by the Executive Committee (EC) consisting of 
individuals from the three villages of Eretsa, Seronga and Beetsa. Most of these 
individuals have been on the EC since the inception of OCT, with the two-year interlude 
explained in Footnote 44 above. The representatives from Gunotsoga, and in particular 
Gudikwa, do not have the authority, access to information or lengthy tenure as the 
former, and it is necessary to differentiate board members based on their membership of 
the EC.  
 
The narrative adopted by the EC to describe events surrounding OCT is one of a 
successful rural development initiative that has brought development and empowerment 
equally to the communities within the villages but which is being undermined by others. 
They recite the number of people employed, the different projects and the participation 
of the people in decision-making as evidence of success.  Problems are acknowledged 
and openly discussed but these are blamed entirely on the three different general 
managers that the Trust has employed over the years. All of whom have been accused of 
dishonesty and incompetence and have been terminated by the EC. The other group who 
the EC hold culpable is the private operators. They accuse them of manipulating the 
tender process so that they can exploit the OCT and communities. An elaborate ‘story’ 
has been developed by board members concerning the managers, private operators and 
tender process which has been widely spread by them throughout the villages and which 
has dominated the AGM’s which have been held in each village this year.48 This story, 
underlain by few if any facts, lays the blame for the financial problems of OCT firmly at 
the feet of others. They have co-opted development rhetoric in their attempts to defend 
                                                            
48 For example, the general manager of OCT was fired by them in June 2008. This followed the 
holding of AGMs in each village at which the primary agenda item presented by the board was 
the dishonesty and incompetence of the general manager and the need for his dismissal. An 
alternative interpretation as to why he was dismissed was his refusal to accept the increase in the 
sitting allowances that the board had awarded themselves.  
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the existing constitution and their actions, claiming that the constitution represents a 
‘participatory process’ as this comment by Sarkozy, OCT secretary, indicates: 
The current constitution is good, the people made it, only they have the right to 
change it. Attempts by others to change it are stopping people from participating 
and taking away their rights and our development. Only the people can change it 
(Sakuzi, Kgotla meeting, June 20, 2008).  
 
6.3.2 OCT Staff  
The OCT currently employs 54 staff members, including management, escort guides, 
cleaners, radio operators and drivers.  Following the firing of the general manager in 
May 2008 on what are considered by the remaining staff as unfair grounds, interviews 
revealed that OCT staff members are demoralized, intimidated and concerned for their 
own futures. The story they tell is one of one a failed development initiative that has 
been corrupted by the ‘unlimited power’ of the OCT board and its limited capacity, 
leading to mismanagement and misappropriation. However, they have developed their 
own strategy in an attempt to address the situation. This is based on an overt appeal to 
external authorities to intervene through a campaign of letters to officials within DWNP 
and the DC noting that:  
the trust is not far from closing down due to mismanagement, ignorance and 
dishonesty of the Board of Trustees (OCT, 2008b).  
 
The letters go on to elaborate their accusations and appeal for intervention from external 
authorities. The general perception amongst staff members was summed up as follows: 
the board misused the total authority given by the constitution, now things are 
out of control and get worse. There are no checks and balances we can put in 
place, we’ve tried things here. Our only choice is to look outside for help, we 
have written letters and asked them to come and see for themselves (Senior OCT 
employee – name withheld on request – Seronga, interviewed on June 18, 2008). 
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6.3.3 General Membership  
The membership of OCT in the three villages where research was conducted had 
extremely little information about any aspect of OCT. They did not perceive themselves 
to be beneficiaries, had no knowledge of their rights in relation to the trust and did not 
see any link between OCT and natural resource management.   Of the 70 general 
members interviewed, no general member had any accurate information concerning the 
income or expenditure of the trust or had ever been to an AGM or any other meeting 
where this information had been accurately presented49. Thirty percent had attended at 
least one Kgotla meeting in the previous 6 months at which OCT was discussed and at 
which they had been informed, incorrectly, that the trust had no income due to the lack 
of a tender process and abuse of funds by the general manager. Therefore, people who 
are generally identified as responsible for the problems with OCT are the JVP – OWS - 
and the general manager. However, the situation in each village did vary, and it is worth 
briefly exploring these differences as the dominant ‘story’ and resulting strategies are 
revealing of local communication strategies and power dynamics and the way these are 
manipulated by the EC members. 
 
6.3.3.1 Seronga  
Seronga is the largest of the 5 villages, the headquarters of OCT and the home of the 
majority of its staff. It is also the location of the Kgotla of the senior Chief, Chief Maeze, 
a critical source of information in the 5 villages. The majority of people interviewed in 
Seronga were aware of OCT and that it was intended to bring development to the area. 
However, there was a high level of dissatisfaction with its achievement, with the 
                                                            
49 A study by Mvimi et al (2003) indicates that this situation remains largely unchanged from 
earlier years. Mvimi et al  highlighted that only 14% of interviewees had had any relationship 
with the project since its initiation; only 2% thought the community had benefited from social or 
infrastructural developments, whilst 80% of respondents indicated that their expectations of the 
project were not met and that this was due ‘to poor leadership, mismanagement and 
misappropriation of funds’ (Mvimi et al, 2003:92).  
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exception that it had created some local employment50.  The most commonly cited 
reason for the lack of achievements of OCT was that it had no income because the 
concession had not been tendered due to the incompetence of the previous (second) OCT 
board51. Those perceived to be accountable for the problems were former board 
members, the general manager and the private sector. The current (third but with same 
membership as first) board bear responsibility for the situation regarding the tender 
process as outlined above, although they are not considered responsible by general 
members. Where general members could identify solutions to problems, these were 
related to ensuring that the concession was tendered.  
 
6.3.3.2 Gunotsoga  
In the village of Gunotsoga, which lies 24km west of Seronga, whilst once again all 
those interviewed had heard of OCT, 33% were unaware that there was a VTC, whilst 
nobody could identify any way in which the village had benefited or had accurate  
knowledge of the financial situation.52 Twenty five percent of respondents had attended a 
Kgotla meeting in the last 6 months at which OCT board members had been present and 
informed them that OCT had no money because of fraud on the part of the manager and 
because the concession had been awarded without a competitive tender.  As those that do 
have information in Gunotsoga have been informed that the problems lie with managers 
and JVP their strategy to address the problems is to replace the manager, ensure the 
concession goes to tender and replace the current JVP.  
 
6.3.3.3 Gudikwa  
This village, which lies 74Km from Seronga, is exclusively inhabited by Basarwa 
(Bukakwe sub-group) who have historically been marginalised from development in 
                                                            
50 The majority of interviewees was better informed about and had a higher regard for the Polars 
Trust. This was established in the late 1990’s by Seronga residents disillusioned by OCT but who 
believed they could benefit from the natural resource base in the area.  
51 Footnote 44 explains why the boards had changed.  
52 Although several respondents noted that the presence of the JVP had brought employment to 
the village and that OCT had constructed a supermarket in the village but that this had never 
operated. 
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Botswana (Taylor, 2000, Hitchcock and Holm, 1993). In Gudikwa the OCT and its 
activities are universally known, but not only do people consider that it has brought no 
benefits, it is regarded by all as having increased poverty in the village and has become a 
symbol of their marginalization.  The village had been reluctant to join OCT from the 
start, as it meant giving up their hunting licenses, which formed an important component 
of their livelihoods, but eventually were persuaded on the grounds that it would bring 
development and employment (Personal communication: interview with Nkosi Divere 
Ndando, Gudikwa, June 2008).  Initially this loss was compensated for by meat provided 
from safari hunting but as this was replaced exclusively by photographic tourism in 
2004, access to protein, as well as a traditional way of life, is now severely curtailed. 
Neither has the village benefited from employment opportunities from OCT as nobody 
from Gudikwa is employed there53. The one benefit that people recognized was the 
vehicle, but following an accident in 2007 the EC of the OCT board (on which Gudikwa 
is not represented) refused to have it repaired, and it is no longer functional. The 
dominant perception within Gudikwa towards OCT and the JVP, OWS, is one of 
resentment, summed up by one interviewee as follows: 
the other villages get jobs, projects and money but they keep us out though we 
are the only ones who paid for it with our way of life, hunting. It has brought us 
nothing but crowds, conflicts and poverty, we will leave (Interview with VDC 
vice chairperson in Gudikwa, June 22, 2008).  
 
There was a consensus among those interviewed as to the solution to this problem. 
Gudikwa wants to withdraw from OCT and instead establish their own trust with rights 
over NG 13 and 14. Letters have been written to this effect to various authorities, 
including DWNP, DC and the office of (then) Vice President Khama. As yet there has 
been no response, although the Chief and VDC continue to pursue opportunities to take 
this forward.  
 
                                                            
53 Approximately 15 people are employed in OWS camps.  
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6.3.4 Traditional and other Local Leadership  
Interviews were conducted with the chiefs of each village, members of the VDC’s and 
the District Councillor. Due to invited attendance at some OCT board meetings, this 
group was well informed about OCT, its intended objectives, history, management, 
financial status and problems. Their story and perspective is one of a process beset with 
problems but there is a consensus among them that these stemmed from the constitution 
which gave the board members ‘unlimited powers’ and did not provide any mechanism 
to ensure accountability to either state or community. Frustrations among local leaders – 
in collaboration with various external agencies - culminated in action to introduce checks 
and balances. A workshop was convened in Seronga in February 2008, attended by local 
leaders, representatives from the DC, DWNP, TAC, BOCOBONET as well as OCT 
board members, the aim of which was to amend the OCT Deed of Trust to ensure 
accountability. The outcome of this was agreement by the majority of participants that 
the VDC’s would take over the role of the VTC’s. This fundamentally changes the nature 
of the OCT from an independent devolved institution, to a decentralized one accountable 
to the DC. However, the OCT board opposes this move and as of September 2008 it 
remained unclear what the outcome of the power struggle it has unleashed between the 
OCT EC and other local leaders will be.      
 
6.3.5 District Council  
As already documented, the DC plays no formal role within CBNRM initiatives in 
Botswana and as such has no legal rights to intervene within the operations of CBOs. 
Despite this, Ngamiland DC has made attempts, at the behest of community 
representatives, to intervene in OCT in the past. These interventions resulted in rebuffs, 
which affected the attitude of the DC and its willingness to intervene in recent years.  
 
Lack of accountability and management skills and abuse of funds by the OCT executive 
has been well known by the DC for a decade, and they have made various attempts to 
address this at the request of community representatives. For example, in 2001, ACORD, 
in partnership with DWNP and Tawana Land Board and partly financed by OWS, began 
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a programme of institutional strengthening. This process led to increased awareness of 
their rights by general members and the questioning of decisions of the OCT board, 
culminating in a delegation of disaffected community representatives to the District 
Commissioner to express their dissatisfaction (ACORD, 2002).54. The Commissioner 
sought the support of the Minister of Commerce and Industry (at that time the Minister 
responsible), who wrote a Directive instructing OCT to opt for an open tender. The 
response from the OCT board, advised by their lawyer, was to invoke their legal rights as 
stipulated in the constitution to make decisions on behalf of their community (ACORD, 
2002). In the face of this legal interpretation of the constitution and status of the CBO, 
the Minister withdrew her Directive. Soon after, in 2003, ACORD withdrew from the 
country, leaving the OCT board intact and once again in control of the local process 
(ACORD, 2002).  
 
The response from the DC is one of resignation. Representatives from their constituency 
had approached the local authorities - as their legitimate, democratic representatives - in 
an attempt to elicit their support in resolving issues of non-accountability and 
misappropriation of funds. The DC, in collaboration with local DWNP staff, had 
responded appropriately, undertaking a comprehensive consultative process and 
negotiations in all five villages lasting several months (ACORD, 2002). Armed with 
considerable insights and knowledge, they then invoked the support of the Minister in 
addressing the problem, only to be rebuffed on legal grounds and informed that they had 
no rights to intervene.  This situation was summed up by one DC Officer: 
Members of the OCT trust were in alliance with national politicians and local 
councillors and formed a power block. They are in control.   They’ve shown they 
can beat the Minister and tell her to stay out of their affairs so all government 
personnel now stay away. We are only allowed to advise through our role on the 
TAC, if the trust chooses to ignore our advice they can and do (Interview with 
senior DC officer – name withheld on request - Maun, July 2005). 
                                                            
54 Prompting this delegation was the trusts decision to renew the JVP with the existing safari 
operator, ignoring the wishes of the broader community for an open tender process (ACORD, 
2002). 
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In 2006, the DC once again attempted to address problems by supporting an 
investigation into alleged corrupt activities of the OCT board by the Directorate on 
Corruption and Economic Crime (DCEC). This investigation came about at the request 
of the second board that replaced the original incumbents in 2004.  However, once again 
their efforts have been thwarted as the DCEC investigation requires follow-up, which 
will only be undertaken at the request of the OCT board. However, as the board has since 
2007 been dominated again by the original incumbents, such a request has not been 
forthcoming as it essentially means they would be requesting an investigation into their 
own activities.   
 
6.3.6 DWNP  
Likewise, DWNP have been aware of the problems in OCT for many years, noting in 
2000 that: 
…there is apparently strong private sector and political influences over the board 
activities and decisions and in the process of establishing this, members have 
been excluded from any meaningful participation in the trusts activities (DWNP, 
2000:3). 
 
As discussed above, the impact of the situation in OCT, coupled with similar situations 
in several other CBOs (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007) has had a significant impact on 
DWNP policy, resulting in the reversal of earlier CBNRM legislation and the 
recentralization of resource management throughout the country. However, how this will 
play out at the local level is as yet unclear. Implementation guidelines have yet to be 
developed, leaving local level technical staff unclear on how to proceed. In the absence 
of these guidelines, and with a similar history to the DCs of rebuffs behind them, local 
DWNP staff members are currently reluctant to become involved. For example, the 
Assistant Wildlife Warden in Maun noted that: 
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there’s been no sign of any improvements but when we have complaints we and 
the rest of the TAC just tell them to see their lawyers. They are CBO’s and must 
sort out their problems, it’s not us to do it (M Maphorisa, Assistant Wildlife 
Warden: Interviewed in Maun, June 2008).   
 
Despite DWNP being responsible for and having oversight of OCT, in the short-term, 
local staff on the ground appear to have washed their hands of the matter. This should 
change when policy guidelines are in place. 
  
6.3.7 Private Sector  
Currently, OCTs only Joint Venture Partner is the photographic operator, OWS, who 
sublease both NG22 and 23 through MBS.  The history and role that MBS played in the 
original politicization of OCT and its co-option by a local elite acting in collaboration 
with national level politicians has been documented by Rihoy and Maguranyanga (2007) 
and Hoon (2004) and will not be described further here. The nature of OWS involvement 
differs from that of MBS but is proving equally influential both locally and nationally in 
determining CBNRM outcomes and policy.  
 
OWS dominates the photographic safari industry within Botswana with over 40% of 
market share. It has four other concessions within the Okavango Delta alone, containing 
22 camps, or over 60% of the tourism beds available55. The company has institutional 
and personnel connections with senior policy makers. It is a leading member of HATAB, 
whose input is actively sought at the tourism policy making fora by the Ministry of 
Environment, Wildlife and Tourism, and has close relationships with various Ministers 
                                                            
55 Economic impact of tourism in 2007, industry accounts for 10.6% of employment and 9.7% of GDP 
(WTTC, 2007) with projected growth exceeding 5% per annum.     
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and the President56. The dominance of OWS in the tourism sector and the powerful actor 
networks with which it is involved locally and nationally gives it significant agency 
within the national policy making process as well as at the local level.   
 
The narrative that OWS adopt concerning OCT is very different from other stakeholders, 
not surprising given that the nature and objective of its involvement is fundamentally 
different. One of the primary marketing strategies adopted by OWS is to portray itself as 
an environmentally responsible company, drawing heavily upon the rhetoric of 
community conservation to achieve this:  
‘[Okavango] Wilderness Safaris is first and foremost a conservation 
company…we believe that the future of conservation in Africa depends on the 
attitude of the communities living next to wild areas. For too long the needs of 
these communities were neglected by people involved in conservation work. The 
twin benefits to the community of tourism ventures and employment create a true 
appreciation for the value of the land and its wildlife’ (OWS, undated:1).  
 
OWS also single out its support of OCT to highlight its achievements in this regard:  
In Botswana we are particularly proud of our partnership with the OCT (ibid: 
 76). 
In view of the well-known mismanagement of OCT, it is surprising that OWS should 
publicly uphold this project as a symbol of success. However, a closer analysis of long-
term priorities and perspectives of OWS provides some indication as to why it promotes 
OCT as a success story in the face of strong evidence to the contrary. The narrative that 
OWS has developed for itself and for public consumption in Botswana, and which 
underpins its business model and corporate image is based upon a protectionist 
conservation paradigm.  This involves strong anti-hunting rhetoric stemming partly from 
                                                            
56 It is a widely held belief throughout Botswana that Khama is a shareholder in OWS. However, 
as it is not a public listed company, verification is not possible.  
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ethical beliefs but also supported with claims that photographic tourism provides greater 
community benefits than hunting as well as offer more employment opportunities. This 
claim is unsubstantiated by any data or research and is contradicted by comprehensive 
studies undertaken elsewhere in Botswana (Martin, 2008). The economic claims of OWS 
in relation to the relative economic merits of photographic versus safari hunting have 
never been put to the test in OCT as they have never had to tender for the concessions for 
reasons explained above. If a competitive tender process was to go ahead, it is far from 
certain that they would be able to compete with bids from the safari hunting industry. 
This threatens their business model not just in OCT but throughout Botswana, but they 
have developed a long term strategy to remove the threat by giving strong support to 
efforts to ban hunting throughout the country.  
 
Executives based in Maun are aware that there are problems of accountability within 
OCT and have taken some steps to address these, e.g. support to an institutional 
strengthening process, hiring and funding of a (previous) general manager and local 
recruitment of a ‘community liaison officer’. However, the executives do not appear to 
be aware of the extent of the problems or aware that, in the villages of OCT, it is OWS 
that is perceived to be the root cause of problems as it has not submitted to a competitive 
tender process and has also stopped the supply of meat to the villages. Nevertheless, both 
for marketing purposes and in achieving its goal of influencing policy towards a 
protectionist conversation approach, OWS needs to call upon community success stories 
to support its position and narrative. Thus, OWS uphold OCT as a ‘success’ despite all 
the evidence to the contrary.  
 
As the financial backer of OCT, OWS could apply significant pressure to improve 
accountability. However, their efforts to do so have proven insufficient. This arises partly 
because the rationale and priorities for their community conservation and engagement lie 
in influencing national policy in a protectionist direction and the portrayal of positive 
outcomes from their community initiatives are essential in achieving this. This is 
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compounded by a lack of knowledge of the extent and nature of problems in the OCT 
villages. 
 
6.4 Discussion 
6.4.1 Networks, Patronage and Power  
The situation in OCT clearly attests to Turners’ (2004) statement that ‘money does not 
automatically unlock rural development’. A minimum estimate reveals that at least 
P15,000,000 has been realized over the last decade and yet the villages have very little to 
show for this in terms of development, there is extremely limited accurate knowledge of 
community rights and responsibilities or other information concerning OCT within the 
villages and there is no evidence of any improvement in the management of the natural 
resource base.  
 
This research reveals the wealth of opportunities offered to those gaining formal control 
of OCT, enabling them to strengthen the existing relationships of patronage and 
clientelism within the villages.  OCT illustrates how control of a CBNRM trust in 
Botswana leads ultimately to control of transport and vehicles, the allocation of valuable 
employment and training opportunities, allocation of meat derived from hunting 
concession activities, village level development projects and determination of who 
should benefit. In addition, it influences the provision of executive control over the 
expenditure and accounting of considerable sums of money. Lastly, it offers the position 
of broker with outside agencies and the multiple opportunities this brings.  
 
Not surprisingly, various factions have competed for control, ensuring in the process that 
other groups have been marginalised. Clearly, the manipulation of those mechanisms 
developed by the DWNP to ensure democratic decision-making and accountability - such 
as constitutions, general meetings and financial reporting mechanisms – is a 
straightforward process for those experienced in local politics, particularly when the 
checks and balances which external institutions introduced could legally be ignored. 
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OCT provides an example of how financial devolution can be manipulated by local elites 
as a means through which they contend for power and extend their political and financial 
domination within their villages and beyond. It illustrates how those mechanisms that do 
exist, such as AGMs, can be co-opted by elites to serve their own purposes - in this case 
through the spreading of (mis)information that justifies and upholds their own positions 
whilst misleading general members.  
 
It also illustrates how those external government agents who could assist in providing 
checks and balances are rendered powerless - from the local to Ministerial level - by a 
well meaning implementation process that has created untouchable ‘decentralised 
despots’ (Ribot, 2004) through its dedication to a model of fiscal devolution. Meanwhile, 
the role of the private sector is determined by the long and short-term strategies that they 
must adhere to in order to ensure business viability. Such strategies will not always 
coincide with prioritization of community level concerns and issues. 
 
6.4.2 A Representative Process?  
Within Botswana there are many CBOs involved in CBNRM activities. This makes it 
extremely difficult to generalize about the programme based on events in only one CBO. 
Nevertheless, I do so because a review of evidence from other sites (Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007) indicates that the case study material is representative of wider 
processes. This indicates that in the Botswana context devolution has frequently 
delivered financial decision-making powers and benefits into the hands of small village 
elites, rather than into the hands of community members in general. This has resulted in 
relatively high levels of mismanagement, and misuse and abuse of funds and financial 
powers devolved to CBOs. For example, in Ngamiland, the heartland of CBNRM in 
Botswana, as of 2004, there were 17 CBOs, 6 of which had JVPs (Mbaiwa, 2004). 
Allegations relating to mismanagement or abuse of funds have been made against each 
of these since they were established, and considerable variations in the degree of abuse 
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exist. Inasmuch as independent auditors have substantiated most of these allegations, no 
prosecutions have been embarked on to date. 
 
Despite the hype and rhetoric around these cases in Botswana, the problems of 
accountability cannot be construed to mean that CBNRM has failed to contribute to the 
improvement of rural livelihoods. Mbaiwa (2004) notes that most CBOs have used funds 
to operate grocery stores in their villages, acquire vehicles for transportation, and provide 
financial and transport assistance to community members in case of death. Therefore, 
they offer important services for remote areas that would not otherwise be available. 
CBOs and their private sector partners have also generated significant local employment. 
According to Zuze (2004), approximately 175 locals are employed directly by the six 
CBOs, whilst several hundred more are employed by the JVP. A further positive sign is 
that surveys carried out by Mbaiwa (2004) on community perceptions of wildlife 
indicate that throughout Ngamiland attitudes towards wildlife have been improving since 
the introduction of CBNRM.  
 
Additionally, there are now several examples of CBOs that, after a few difficult years, 
are responding to the needs of their members and demonstrating both accountability and 
representation. These CBOs include the Sankuyo Tshwaragano Management Trust and 
the Mababe Zokotsama Community Development Trust (MZCDT), both of which have 
early years that resemble those of OCT57. Sankuyo provided cash handouts of P500 to 
each household since 2004, and constructed a community hall and a locally owned and 
managed lodge. It has provided piped water to every household and built houses for its 
destitute community members. In addition, it provides a burial fund of P3 000 per adult 
and P1 000 per child. All those interviewed in Sankuyo were broadly supportive of the 
trust and its activities. Meanwhile MZCDT is undertaking similar projects and 
                                                            
57 The important factor in turning around both of these CBOs appears to be quality local 
leadership and external facilitation and capacity building.  
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demonstrating that it is accountable to its constituency (Mbaiwa, 2004). Perhaps of even 
greater significance and indicative of impending changes is the example provided by 
OCT, where the community is clearly exercising its own agency in reaching out to 
external agents in an effort to bring about constructive change.  
 
6.4.3 National to Local Links and Influences  
Given the significant amounts generated within villages with total populations 
numbering only a few hundred, CBNRM is frequently critiqued within Botswana as have 
shown too little, too late.  CBOs that have been subject to serious allegations of misuse, 
fraud and mismanagement, such as OCT, have entered into CBNRM ‘folklore’ and arm 
critics with evidence of the ‘failure’ of CBNRM. Such cases are advanced as the reason 
why communities should not be entrusted to manage CBNRM initiatives. This evidence 
of ‘failed’ CBNRM has had a profound impact at the policy level, and these ‘stories’ 
feed into the CBNRM policy process resulting in the perception of CBNRM as 
inevitably entrenching corruption and leading to elite capture of benefits at the expense 
of the majority. Problems of mismanagement, capture of and manipulation of CBOs by 
elites have undermined the legitimacy of CBNRM among communities themselves. The 
situation in OCT demonstrates how local political processes can become distorted, 
creating and strengthening local political and economic elites at the expense of the 
marginalised members of the community.  Such problems reflect the shortcomings of 
transferring financial powers without mechanisms to ensure accountability and 
representation are in place. Despite these problems, limited positive examples of 
CBNRM are emerging, but these are receiving little attention. Positive ‘stories’ do not 
contribute to the interests of the political elite for whom it is more valuable to exploit 
failures.  
 
However, the ‘story’ of OCT continues to unfold.  OCT illustrates how local 
communities can exercise agency and play a clear role in determining outcomes of 
CBNRM initiatives through their resistance to appropriation of their resources by local 
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elites or external agents.  In OCT, the exercising of agency by the general membership is 
rendered impossible, as they do not have access to information or mechanisms to enable 
them to do so. However, there are others in positions of authority, in this case led by the 
traditional leadership, with access to information and with extensive external networks 
who are able to exercise agency on behalf of the community.  They have recognized the 
need to develop mechanisms that tackle the practical governance arrangements between 
the first and second tier institutions that can progressively break down the current 
socially and politically constructed stalemates. Attempts by the traditional leadership to  
develop a new constitution are focused upon forging for the first time a legal relationship 
between the OCT and local government structures which they consider will build 
accountability both to the DC and to the community. The outcome of this struggle for 
power has yet to be determined.  
 
6.5 Conclusion 
The lack of accountability that characterizes CBO’s engaged in CBNRM activities 
clearly indicates that the problems besetting CBNRM cannot be ascribed to the national 
context alone.  Problems have arisen largely due to the inappropriate and politicized 
implementation process rather than from the inherent flaws within the approach or the 
inability of communities to manage the process. The OCT case study demonstrates that 
outcomes are largely determined by political economic interests and power dynamics at 
local as well as national levels. The implementation approaches and strategies adopted 
by the DWNP have created problems that compound the already difficult political 
context in which to undertake implementation described in Chapter 5.  
 
At the local level, unaccountable governance structures have facilitated the concentration 
of benefits in the hands of local elites and inhibited local attempts to address 
mismanagement of revenues.  Some national politicians and bureaucrats have used 
problems of accountability and mismanagement to justify the recentralization of wildlife 
revenues. It should be pointed out that rather than focusing on the problems and using 
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visible ‘stories’ of fraud, mismanagement and abuse of CBO funds to recentralize those 
funds, it would be plausible to build the organizational capacity of CBOs as well as 
investing institutionally in accountability and governance structures. The 2008 CBNRM 
Policy recentralized control over revenue as an ostensive response to local corruption 
and mismanagement. However, this does not deal with the organizational capacity deficit 
and poor governance mechanisms on the part of CBOs. Politics prevailed and favoured 
the transfer of financial power to the centre. While Ribot’s (2002b:3) argument that 
“transferring power without accountable representation has proven dangerous” might be 
plausible, the problems of mismanagement of CBO funds have to be understood within 
the context of CBO organizational incapacity and institutional design flaws, which 
facilitate elite predation. The politicized nature of CBNRM implementation ensures that 
such teething challenges receive scrutiny from national politicians and elites opposed to 
the concepts of sustainable use and devolution.  
 
The Botswana experience demonstrates that the lack of a strong, politically salient 
constituency compromises the social and political sustainability of CBNRM. As explored 
in the previous Chapter, sustainability requires having appropriate actor networks at a 
national level, which function as constituencies. The critical component of these 
networks will be communities themselves. A community-level constituency has not 
mobilized behind CBNRM in Botswana as elite co-option has affected the flow of 
benefits to the broader community. Ironically, the marginalisation of rural people from 
the policy process seems to have occurred largely unopposed by them. Evidence from 
OCT and elsewhere (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007) indicates that never having 
significantly benefited, most rural dwellers are disinterested when financial autonomy 
and the authority of CBOs are taken away and many are indeed supportive of 
recentralization as a way to stop abuse and mismanagement.  Thus, the process is a 
cyclical self-perpetuating one. Lack of political will to ensure appropriate policies should 
be anticipated when there is little if any constituency calling for such policies, a situation 
which will inevitably arise when CBNRM fails to deliver its anticipated outcomes due to 
implementation shortcomings. 
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CBNRM practitioners and policy-makers have sought to create strong feedback between 
local investments in wildlife management and benefit capture through devolved 
institutional arrangements.  As noted earlier, one of the main lessons regional 
practitioners took from Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE programme was that insufficient 
devolution of property rights over wildlife to local communities, in contrast to upwardly 
accountable district councils, undermined local incentives and returns on natural 
resources. In Botswana, such concerns contributed to a focus on devolving control over 
wildlife benefits and led to the marginalization of district councils in CBNRM 
implementation.  With the benefit of hindsight, this was a tactical error since district 
councils could have bridged the gulf between local communities and central government, 
and could have brought natural resource governance closer to democratically elected 
local government structures. Instead, district authorities viewed CBOs as rival single-
purpose authorities, and such perceptions undermined opportunities for collaboration 
between CBOs and district governments to challenge national politicians. This prevented 
local CBOs and other CBNRM advocates from bringing district governments into 
collaborative efforts to contest national government’s preferred policy directions as 
reflected in the 2008 CBNRM Policy. 
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CHAPTER 7  
POLICY PROCESS AND IMPLEMENTATION IN ZIMBABWE 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the process of CBNRM policy development and implementation in 
Zimbabwe. It explores the way the macro context influences the process of natural 
resource management reform. This national context has profound implications for policy 
processes, natural resource governance reforms, and ways in which CBNRM policy 
unfolds. The single most outstanding characteristic in Zimbabwe over the last twenty 
years has been profound shifts in the macro-level political, economic and social context, 
which have in turn led to dramatic changes in the policy environment and natural 
resource governance reforms. This chapter examines these shifts, investigates whether 
CAMPFIRE implementation strategies and approaches have evolved to accommodate 
changes at both national and local levels, and if so how this has been achieved. It also 
discusses the implications and lessons for natural resource governance reforms and 
democratisation within Zimbabwe. 
 
CAMPFIRE has provided much of the impetus for the replication of CBNRM 
approaches throughout the region and offered the arena through which the basic 
principles and concepts of CBNRM were established (Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Child, 
2004, Swatuk, 2005, Wolmer et al., 2003). Adapted versions of these concepts and 
principles have since been introduced in other countries in the region in the wildlife 
sector, and within Zimbabwe itself throughout the natural resource management sector. 
Given the central role that CAMPFIRE has played in the conceptual development of 
CBNRM, it remains an instructive case study to reveal why certain assumptions and 
approaches are dominant within CBNRM regionally. 
 
The chapter demonstrates how the development of CAMPFIRE policy - like that of 
CBNRM policy in Botswana – has accommodated different actors with power 
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differentials and interests shifting over time. Such changes in the balance of power, or in 
the interests of key actors, have stimulated various changes in implementation strategies.   
Once again, the three overlapping and mutually supportive ‘lenses’ of my analytical 
framework – actor networks, structured political interests and discourse analysis – are 
used to analyse  changes in the policy process and their outcomes.  Furthermore, 
reflecting the approach adopted for Botswana, an in-depth analysis of the outcome of 
CAMPFIRE at the local level - in this case the village of Mahenye – is provided in the 
following Chapter. This serves to demonstrate progress and constraints in CAMPFIRE’s 
ability to increase democratic space through the creation of accountable local governance 
institutions and empowerment of communities in their relations with external agents, 
government and others. 
 
However, it was not relevant to conduct a direct comparison with a fixed set of variables 
and identical methodology across both countries. The specifics and complexities of the 
policy process in individual countries do not accommodate such an approach. Instead, 
the research has followed the histories, contexts, networks and discourses surrounding 
the specific CBNRM policy stories in each location. Therefore, the methodology used 
has had to be qualitative and adaptive in order to accommodate the different locational 
specifics. The result is that quite different variables are highlighted in the different 
countries. The research outcome presented in this Chapter for Zimbabwe, as for 
Botswana, illuminates those factors which have affected policy making and outcomes in 
the specific location. This reveals strengths and weaknesses of different approaches.  
 
The analysis offered here indicates that despite profound shifts in the context in which 
CAMPFIRE is unfolding, it remains a robust initiative embedded in the local rural 
landscape of many, though by no means all, districts in Zimbabwe.   Whilst it may no 
longer maintain the high national and international profile of the 1990s, it does continue 
as an entrenched component of Zimbabwe’s conservation and local government 
strategies, retaining political support at all levels. The pragmatic and politically astute 
approach to implementation and policy development which has characterized 
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CAMPFIRE from its inception has enabled it to accommodate the concerns and 
perspectives of various competing interest groups and this has been a significant 
contributor to its success. The outcome of such pragmatism was a process and 
programme that created decentralised rather than the originally intended devolved 
resource management institutions. While this has led to the common critique by 
implementers and analysts that CAMPFIRE represents ‘aborted devolution’ and has been 
‘co-opted’ by the Rural District Councils (RDCs) (Hammar, 2003, Bond, 2001, 
Murombedzi, 2003b, Katerere, 2002, Shackleton and Campbell, 2001, Dzingirai and 
Breen, 2005), this study provides evidence that brings into question these assumptions of 
the negative impacts of decentralisation. 
 
7.2 National Context  
This section examines those external factors relating to the historical and current national 
context, which has affected CAMPFIRE’s progress. Zimbabwe has undergone significant 
and far-reaching political, economic and social upheavals since the mid-1980s when 
CAMPFIRE was introduced. However, since 2000, Zimbabwe has descended into an 
ever deepening ‘crisis’58. Its relatively strong economy has collapsed, its once stable 
political conditions are now characterised by civil unrest and political repression, a 
previously well-functioning bureaucracy is in tatters, and basic democratic principles and 
human rights are trampled upon (UNDP, 2008, Harold-Barry, 2004, Human Rights 
Watch, 2008). Zimbabwe, once a ‘darling’ of the international donor community, has 
become a pariah. 
 
During the same period, CAMPFIRE like Zimbabwe itself has seen dramatic fluctuations 
in its fortunes and in the way in which it is perceived. During the 1990’s it was embraced 
as a holistic approach to environment and development, endorsed by the Government of 
                                                            
58 The year 2000 is identified as the critical year here as it was in February 2000 that the 
constitutional referendum took place which marked a particular watershed in Zimbabwe’s post 
independent political history. This event catalyzed dramatic shifts in the country’s political, 
economic and social context, which is widely considered to have led to ‘Zimbabwe’s crisis’.  
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Zimbabwe (GOZ), local and international conservation NGOs, academic research centers 
and the media. It was drawn upon as a source of inspiration for natural resource 
management internationally (Fabricius and Kock, 2004, Jones and Murphree, 2001, 
Western and Wright, 1994, Wolmer et al., 2003). However, since 2000, CAMPFIRE has 
frequently been portrayed by analysts as the archetypal example of CBNRM in ‘crisis’ 
(Dzingirai and Breen, 2005, Katerere, 2002, Hughes, 2006, Balint, 2005, Hutton et al., 
2006). It has witnessed the growth, followed by the demise, of a coordinated, multi-skilled 
and expert group of institutions and individuals committed to the implementation of the 
programme, collectively known as the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (Child et al., 
2003, Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). It has grown from an initiative affecting two 
districts, to one in which 52 of the 57 districts in the country were involved (Child et al., 
2003), before shrinking back again to its current presence in 37 districts (Frost and Bond, 
2008). During the period 1990-2003, it was the recipient of approximately US$30 million 
in donor funding from a variety of international donors (Balint and Mashinya, 2006) all of 
which have now withdrawn, leaving the programme largely unfunded by donors. 
 
Yet, despite this extremely difficult operating environment and its diminishing reputation 
and support regionally and internationally, CAMPFIRE continues to show remarkable 
resilience both at local and national levels. The following section briefly traces political, 
social and economic developments in the country over the last 20 years, examining how 
these have affected the development and outcomes of CAMPFIRE and providing the 
context for the more detailed discussion on CAMPFIRE implementation that follows. This 
discussion focuses on the history and current status of Zimbabwe’s political and economic 
situation; its policy making processes; and its land tenure system, natural resource 
management policies and other rural related policies, including decentralization. 
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7.2.1 Political Characteristics  
The extreme social, economic and political problems besetting Zimbabwe over the last 
decade can best be analysed and understood in the context of its history (Raftopoulos, 
2004). In 1980, Zimbabwe emerged from almost a century of white rule, following a 
protracted, violent liberation war, fought in part over land. Since 1980, the political 
priorities of the government have been dominated by reversing decades of racially biased 
inequalities in land, resource and asset distribution (Raftopoulos, 2004, Jones and 
Murphree, 2001). However, the strategy for achieving equality and redistribution of 
resource ownership has changed dramatically over the last two decades. 
 
When the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) took over 
national government and power in 1980, it had strong rural support (Bratton, 1987). A de 
facto one party ‘socialist’ state was created, which embraced a vision of ‘national 
reconciliation’ seeking to combine continuity of existing production structures with 
policies to improve conditions for the majority that had been neglected during colonialism 
(Raftopoulos, 2004). A cornerstone of this approach was equity and redistribution of 
wealth and income, and the GOZ set itself ambitious development targets through its five 
year development plans to achieve its vision. At the forefront of the new policy priorities 
and strategies, at least rhetorically, was rural development. This was to be realized through 
the creation of a decentralized system of local representation through village, ward and 
district development committees,  (although there are more political explanations for the 
establishment of RDCs as discussed in detail below), a process which marginalised 
traditional authorities as undemocratic and co-opted and corrupted by the colonial system 
(Makumbi, 1998, Conyers, 2001, Hammar, 2003). The early 1980s witnessed a period of 
social welfare expenditure, political unity and slow land reform but there was limited 
economic growth or redistribution of wealth (Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003). It was 
this relatively encouraging and positive context that enabled CAMPFIRE to emerge.  
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However, the veneer of national unity, and concern for rural development was soon torn 
aside with the violent repression of Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) loyalists in 
Matebeland in mid-1980s. This exposed for the first time the states tendency to invoke 
force and create a culture of fear and intolerance in the face of any opposition, a 
characteristic that has become increasingly evident in the last decade (Raftopoulos, 2004). 
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of an authoritarian state. For example, in 1985, 
legislation creating politically appointed governors in the provinces was introduced with 
the aim of consolidating the ruling party’s power in rural areas. Raftopolous (ibid) sums 
up the emerging situation in the 1980s: 
there was a strong element of ‘command’ reflecting the continuing influence of the 
often militarist politics of the liberation movement. Such politics emerged in the 
context of the struggles against a colonial regime embedded in repressive politics 
and offering few opportunities for democratic participation … This style of state 
management soon became apparent in many spheres of Zimbabwean politics. 
(Raftopolous, 2004:5) 
 
By the early 1990s, it was clear that the redistribution, equity and welfare aims of the state 
were going unrealized and many of the significant gains of the 1980s, - notably the 
expansion of public services and basic infrastructure such as health and sanitation, water 
supplies, education and roads to the formerly marginalised rural areas - had slowed down 
or reversed due to macro-economic and fiscal constraints. Facing increasing economic 
pressure the government designed and adopted an Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP) at the behest of western institutions, the negative effects of which 
were to prove long-term and damaging (Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003).  
 
As poverty levels increased, the economy contracted and inequalities persisted, the state 
came under increasing criticism (Makumbi, 1998).  By the late 1990’s the political 
legitimacy of ZANU-PF was coming under increasing scrutiny, culminating in significant 
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and escalating electoral challenges and civil unrest. In 2000, the government lost the 
Constitutional Referendum, representing the first defeat of the ruling ZANU-PF party in 
20 years. The opposition had campaigned against the new constitution which, among other 
things, made provisions for large scale appropriation of white-owned farmland. 
Immediately, the government backed invasions of commercial farms as an alternative 
approach to redressing the land issue and to divert attention away from the declining 
economic situation. The farm invasions significantly cut agricultural output and exports, 
worsening the fiscal pressures on the government and resulting in the loss of foreign 
capital and skills (Mapedza, 2009). The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) withdrew their support to the government. The cumulative effect was that 
Zimbabwe entered a period of sustained hyper-inflation and economic contraction (Bond 
and Manyanya, 2002). 
 
The response on the part of the GOZ was ever increasing authoritarianism, violence and 
repression of political opposition (Raftopoulos, 2004, Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003). 
The outcome of this process has been that Zimbabwe no longer exhibits the attributes of 
an ordered political polity (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The decline has seen the country 
reduced from a constitutional democracy to a political system based on patronage and 
cronyism, inherently opposed to local initiatives or self-sufficiency. The result has been a 
dramatic shrinking of political space for all forms of democratic expression or political 
opposition (Raftopoulos, 2004, Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003). Zimbabwe is now a 
‘gatekeeper state’, with politicians acting as middlemen59 rather than regulators (Logan 
and Moseley, 2002). This middleman role is playing out across all sectors of the economy, 
including wildlife management. Under such circumstances, decentralisation can enable 
rule making, decision making and rule enforcement powers to be usurped by the elite from 
the majority previously managing wildlife resources (Mapedza, 2009). It is too early to 
judge whether the outcome of the 2008 election culminating in the formation of the 
                                                            
59 Middlemen facilitate business for a profit. For example, in the wildlife sector politicians who 
are supposed to regulate the sector facilitate hunters’ access to wildlife for a fee instead.  
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coalition government will significantly change this situation, although the evidence to date 
does not look encouraging.  
 
7.2.2 Economic Status  
The dramatic decline in the economy of Zimbabwe has reflected the decline in its political 
fortunes. This has direct and immediate implications for CAMPFIRE. The realisation of 
CAMPFIRE-related financial revenue and economic incentives is linked to 
macroeconomic dynamics, and whether these allow for continuation or improvements in 
revenue generation, encourage revenue ‘capture’ by RDCs and political economic elites, 
or constrain opportunities for growth. The economic climate is equally important for the 
generation of revenue through private sector participation, concession leases and 
investments in tourism. The negative macroeconomic and political environment in the 
post-2000 period presents major challenges for CAMPFIRE revenue generation and 
Zimbabwe generally. 
 
At independence in 1980, Zimbabwe inherited what was by the standards then prevalent 
in Africa, a highly developed economy with a large and relatively diversified formal 
sector - dominated by agriculture, manufacturing and mining - which between them 
accounted for almost half the GDP and over 50% of formal employment (Kanyenze, 
2004).  The following decade saw significant social expenditures but a shrinking 
economic base, concerns over which culminated in the adoption the ESAP in 1990.  
Whilst there is debate over the overall impact of structural adjustment programmes in 
Africa, Kanyenze (2004) concludes that the deregulation of the economy delivered net 
economic losses to the economy and to the majority of Zimbabweans. For example, 
estimated levels of those considered poor rose from 62% in 1995 to 75% in 2000. ESAP 
triggered a number of processes in the mid to late 1990s. These included a trend towards 
increased corruption, a decline in economic growth and employment opportunities and 
an increase in the rate of inflation (Ibid).  
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This escalating economic turmoil resulted in catastrophic economic decline from 2000 
onwards and an economy today that widely perceived to be on the verge of collapse.  This  
resulted in a staggering and unprecedented 231,000,000% official inflation rate as of July 
200860 and a current unemployment rate of approximately 94% (AFP, 2009). Meanwhile 
Zimbabwe’s GDP plummeted to 37% between 1998 and 2006, and averaged -5.9% 
between 2005 and 2007 (UNDP, 2008) with all major sectors of the economy – 
agriculture, tourism, manufacturing and mining – seeing progressively steeper declines 
since 1998. As of February 2009, the UN estimated that approximately 7.5 million people, 
or 75% of the population of Zimbabweans remaining in the country, would be in need of 
food aid during the year. This in a country that only a decade before had commonly been 
referred to as the ‘breadbasket’ of Africa. 
 
The political and economic turmoil led to the collapse of the tourism sector – along with 
the commercial farming and mining sectors - in the early years of the 21st Century.  
Nemarundwe (2005) highlights the negative impacts of this economic climate on 
CAMPFIRE.  CAMPFIRE’s income-generating potential through tourism is compromised 
and community investment projects are undermined as the fluctuation of prices makes a 
mockery of budgeting. Hyperinflation compromises the financial activities and economic 
viability of CAMPFIRE projects, erodes financial benefits and value, and, given that 
payments of household cash dividends from CAMPFIRE revenue activities take place six 
months to a year after activities have occurred, the losses to inflation of cash benefits 
renders them worthless, as the following case study from Mahenye illustrates.  It also 
undermines the private sector’s ability to provide the capital injection that is required as 
the economic driver of community based activities.  Finally, in the absence of many other 
income or taxable options, the current situation is further increasing the dependence of 
RDCs on CAMPFIRE wildlife revenue for survival (Frost and Bond, 2008). Thus, the 
                                                            
60 As of 2009 the real inflation rate is generally considered to be in the ‘quadrillions’ but no 
official data has been made available by the CSO since mid-2008 so it is not possible to confirm 
this.  
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current hyper-inflationary macroeconomic environment is extremely disruptive. This is 
compounded further as the difficulties experienced by urban dwellers in securing 
employment contribute to urban-rural migration, which increases pressure on the resource 
base and places additional  demands on revenues and local-level governance systems.  
 
7.2.3 Civil Society  
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Zimbabwe witnessed the growth of a plethora of well-
funded NGOs and a strong and vibrant civil society. However, the dominance of the state 
could be seen in civil society throughout this period, with NGOs adopting a low profile 
and complementary approach to the state, supporting the social welfare policies of 
government (Raftopoulos, 2004, Duffy, 2000). CAMPFIRE exemplified this with the 
CAMFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG), a joint facilitating structure of government 
agencies, NGOs and academic institutions, playing a key role in advocacy and 
implementation until 2000 (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007, Child et al., 2003) as detailed 
below.  
 
However, the shift in the political landscape immediately prior to 2000 resulted in civil 
society organizations’ opposition to government-led constitutional amendments. From 
1999, some segments of civil society began to challenge the government on land, electoral 
and human rights issues. This challenge was treated by the ruling party as a sign of 
political defiance warranting the repression of NGOs, and the GOZ introduced the 2005 
NGO Bill, which curtailed NGO functions and independence (Rihoy et al., 2007). The 
result was open conflict between the government and civil society. Thus the volatile 
political climate translated into a difficult operational environment for civil society, 
particularly in any area of governance and in rural development, both of direct relevance 
to CAMPFIRE. Notably, those components of civil society and associated social 
movements (such as the War Veterans) that are ideologically/politically aligned to the 
ruling party were given, and continue to receive, ad hoc audience and platforms to express 
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their views and deliberate on issues within the public arena (Raftopoulos and Savage, 
2005). 
 
The impact of this marginalization of civil society on CAMPFIRE has been profound. 
Throughout the 1990s, members of the CCG had played a key role in capacity building at 
grassroots level (Child et al., 2003) and fulfilled a critical role as ‘honest-brokers’, 
providing neutral arbitration in instances where community-level polarisation stalled 
progress in programme implementation, as explored in greater detail in the following 
section. As of 2003, because of the political backlash against civil society, NGOs and 
research institutions have been prevented from playing any significant role in CAMPFIRE 
implementation (Rihoy et al., 2007). Compounding this marginalization of civil society in 
implementation was the loss of access to donor funding and withdrawal during the 
political crisis in Zimbabwe. 
 
7.2.4 Policy and Legislative Context  
As with the political dynamics, Zimbabwe’s policy environment can only be understood 
within the context of Zimbabwe’s colonial past and post-independence reactions.  
Colonial land and natural resource management policies were developed to ensure that 
access and rights to land and resources were skewed in favor of white settlers and were 
based on the assumption that traditional resource management practices degraded the 
resource base (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). The outcome produced the dual land tenure 
system which political and economic developments since 2000, notably the ‘Fast Track’ 
land reform process, have ostensibly aimed at addressing. Despite the equity and 
development ideals of the state in the 1980s, much of the colonial legislation and 
bureaucratic structures were inherited unaltered by the post-colonial state (Mandondo, 
2000), and this represented a highly centralized and powerful state ill suited to 
accommodate popular demands. The result was that many aspects of environmental 
policy making and the assumptions on which it was based remained largely unchanged 
from colonial times through the 1980s and 1990s (Keeley and Scoones, 2003, Murphree, 
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1997b). As a result the policy process during the 1980s and 1990s was technicist and 
modernist in its approach, leading to planning and implementation approaches that 
marginalised local involvement and participation and were ill-suited to accommodating 
popular demands. The result of this continuation in colonial policy making practices 
within the new overarching policy framework focused on deracialisation, was described 
by Mandondo (2000) as ‘amendments…which have largely de-racialized the colonial 
acts and policies without democratizing them’ (Mandondo, 2000:1). 
 
Notwithstanding these legitimate concerns relating to the nature of the bureaucracy, the 
country had a relatively well-functioning and effective bureaucracy until 2000. After this 
period, the situation changed dramatically, as described by one former senior government 
official: 
Since the turmoil started in about 2000, Zimbabwe’s bureaucracy hasn’t 
functioned across the board because it wasn’t clear who was in charge, where 
power or authority lay.  Bureaucrats were unable to function because we were 
unsure who we would have to answer to or who we would offend in the process. 
The result was that no one made any decisions or took any action (Former senior 
government official – name withheld on request – Interviewed in Harare, 
September 2005). 
 
Once again, this has had a profound effect on CAMPFIRE. CAMPFIRE is based on 
principles of sustainable use (SASUSG, 1996). The discourse that underlies sustainable 
use has solid scientific and rational underpinnings. It is primarily a technical exercise, with 
the key goals of economic productivity and maintenance of the natural resource base. The 
resulting implementation approach assigned key regulatory and monitoring functions to 
technical arms of the state, in the form of the DNPWLM – now the Parks and Wildlife 
Management Authority (PWMA) – to ensure environmental sustainability. However, the 
scientific approach that drove environmental policy making has now been replaced by a 
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racially charged and politically biased populist moral discourse about the return of 
‘African soil to Africans’ adopted by the ruling party (Wolmer et al., 2003). The clearest 
example of this was government’s revitalization of the land reform process under the fast-
track approach, which pushed aside many of the standard planning approaches in favour of 
the populist mobilization of ‘land invaders’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) with the aim of 
boosting the ruling party’s waning popularity. 
 
This radical shift in how policy is developed and implemented in the environmental 
management context has largely undermined PWMA’s ability to regulate, monitor 
resource use, and provide programme oversight. Enforcing regulation and monitoring 
resource use could lead to retribution from powerful political forces. The leading role that 
powerful ruling party politicians have assumed within the wildlife management industry in 
Zimbabwe (a major source of scarce foreign exchange) has been the subject of much 
national and international media coverage (Hammer, 2006, Mapedza, 2009). Wildlife 
management, like so much else in Zimbabwe, has now become a political issue, in contrast 
to the technical issues of the 1980’s and 1990’s, as clearly articulated by a senior member 
of the CAMPFIRE Association:    
People’s contribution to the debate and their expertise is not as important as their 
political persuasion. If you do not have the correct political persuasion you 
become irrelevant. It is politics which is limiting or opening up the debate, 
depending on how you look at it (Member of the CAMPFIRE Association board – 
name withheld on request – interviewed in Harare, September 2005). 
 
For the last ten years, issues of land reform and redistribution have dominated the policy 
and political context in rural areas. This presents a very different context, dominated by 
political discourses that are rooted in different models of development, contrary to the 
traditional wildlife management discourse that provided the background for CAMPFIRE 
policy development. As Wolmer et al. (2003) comment: 
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the land reform exercise emphasises direct redistribution, equity and land for 
crops; whilst the wildlife management discourse tends to stress the neo-liberal 
goals of maximizing foreign exchange earnings, encouraging public-private 
partnerships and trickle down. Wolmer et al. (2003:1) 
 
This shift in the policy-making environment, rationale and priorities, from one dominated 
by linear and science-based technical arguments to one driven by political expediency, 
racial bias and a host of competing political interests, represents a fundamental shift in the 
context in which CAMPFIRE is being played out. A further factor that is now dictating 
wildlife policies in Zimbabwe is the use of wildlife as a means to dispense patronage. 
Gibson (1999) argues that central government and elites’ control over wildlife ensures that 
wildlife becomes: 
another source of goods which an incumbent party could distribute… Political 
actors… regarded the primary benefits of wildlife policy to be distributive goods 
and not the collective good of conservation. Gibson (1999:5) 
 
The same situation is now common in Zimbabwe with senior government officials able 
to capitalize upon the disarray and dispense wildlife and land as a means to cement their 
political relationships. This has been clearly demonstrated by a variety of acts by senior 
government officials over the last six years, one example of which serves to demonstrate 
the effective manner in which wildlife is now used as a means to dispense patronage. In 
2003 the then Provincial Governor of Masvingo Province, J.D Hungwe, in a letter 
addressed to  ‘All Conservancies’ provided clear directions as to who should be 
rewarded with partnerships in the lucrative wildlife conservancies, stating: 
As previously discussed and agreed, I now forward to you the following names of 
persons to be partners in your organizations (J.D Hungwe, letter dated 7 January, 
2003).  
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The letter goes on to llist individuals to be included as partners in Conservancies, among 
them the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIO), the Assistant Police 
Commissioner and various ex-army combatants. 
 
7.2.4.1 Land Policies  
As the ruling party slogan ‘The land is the economy, the economy is the land’ implies, 
struggles over land have been, at least rhetorically, at centre stage throughout the colonial 
and post-colonial period61. The violent colonial heritage of land dispossession ensured that 
‘the land question’ ‘has engraved itself deeply into Zimbabwe’s inter-related physical, 
political and psychic landscape’ (Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003:18), thus appealing to 
the racially based, nationalist narrative adopted by the State since 2000. However, despite 
such politically emotive slogans and broad appeal, the GOZ’s approach to land reform 
prior to 1997 was based on cautious, market based reforms using ‘willing-seller, willing-
buyer’ procedures laid down in the Lancaster House Conference (Moyo, 2000, 
Sachikonye, 2002). This achieved limited success in terms of reversing the racial land 
imbalances created by colonization.  In 1997 approximately 4660 large-scale commercial 
farmers, primarily white, continued to own 11.2 million hectares while approximately 6 
million black smallholder farmers occupied 16.4 million hectares, primarily in areas with 
low agricultural potential (UNDP, 1998). 
 
Since 2000, the mix of political discontent, land and race has formed a volatile political 
cocktail dominating all aspects of economic, political and social life in the country 
(Murombedzi and Gomera, 2005). A central component of the GOZ’s reaction to the 
                                                            
61 Under the dual land system introduced during the colonial period,  commercial lands were 
allocated to white farmers or companies as private or ‘alienated’ land, whilst black inhabitants 
were removed (often forcibly) to ‘native reserves’, later known as ‘communal lands’. This land 
policy culminated in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, which also recognized a third category 
of land, that of ‘state land’, which was managed directly by state forestry and wildlife authorities 
(Tshuma, 1997).  
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growing political challenges and civil unrest prior to 2000 was the revitalization of the 
land reform process under the fast-track approach. This saw a nation-wide campaign of 
land invasions onto mainly white-owned commercial farms, using violence and 
intimidation against farm owners and workers alike. This represented the sidelining of 
what had formerly been the standard technical planning approaches to land reform in favor 
of a populist and racially based mobilization of ‘land invaders’ (Alexander and McGregor, 
2001). 
 
This historical struggle over land and its resources is central to understanding the political 
dimensions of natural resource management in Zimbabwe today, and it explains why it 
receives such a high degree of political prominence. In the years following independence, 
land redistribution was construed as a bureaucratic technical exercise, in which the goals 
of productivity and maximizing returns on investment held a central place. The policy 
environment was driven by science, and it was such an environment that enabled the 
conception and provided the initial impetus and implementation context for CAMPFIRE. 
This environment has now shifted dramatically to one dominated by a nationalist 
narrative, political imperatives and racially charged appeals. Therefore, wildlife 
management is intimately woven into issues of land management and land reform, and 
generally viewed with suspicion as it was considered to be ‘a ploy of whites to forestall 
land acquisition and justify multiple and extensive land holdings’ (Wolmer et al., 2003:8).  
 
7.2.4.2 Wildlife, Environment and Tourism Policy and 
Legislation  
CAMPFIRE is philosophically premised on sustainable use of natural resources, which 
was formally endorsed in Zimbabwe by the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act which aimed to 
‘confer privileges on owners or occupiers of alienated land as custodians of wildlife, fish 
and plants’ (Government of Zimbabwe, 1996). The Act effectively makes freehold farms 
and ranches into proprietory units for wildlife management. In 1982, an amendment gave 
the Minister power to designate RDCs as ‘appropriate authorities’ (AA) over wildlife on 
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communal land. The 1989 Policy for Wildlife consolidates the GOZ’s endorsement of 
sustainable utilization (Murphree, 1997b). 
The institutional framework for CAMPFIRE and rural development, in general, was 
provided by the prime minister’s directive of 1984, which established structures for 
development at provincial, district, ward and village levels. At a sub-district level, Village 
Development Committees (VIDCOs) and Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) 
were created, neither of which can be constituted into legal entities. The RDC itself is the 
only elected body at the district level that has a legal identity. Therefore, the RDC was/is 
the only institution within which AA can be legally vested. 
 
Despite the transformed policy environment and process described above, government 
continues to promote CAMPFIRE, at least rhetorically, as the ‘flagship’ of environmental 
policy and its underlying concept of sustainable use and decentralization has been 
integrated into environmental policy in general. For example, the National Environmental 
Policy (2004) and Environmental Management Act (2004) specifically invoke the 
principle of sustainable use as developed in earlier legislation in their efforts to establish a 
general legal foundation for all environmental laws based on sustainable development. 
They also address inconsistencies, overlaps and duplication in environmental and natural 
resource legislation. Both the Policy and Act contain repeated references to devolution and 
decentralization. The National Environmental Policy (2004:12) specifically calls for 
‘promoting the CAMPFIRE concept’, extending it into new geographical areas and to 
cover additional resources, including minerals. It also prioritizes the need for participatory 
policymaking and for communities to benefit from their environmental assets, stating as a 
‘guiding principles’: 
the participation of all interested and affected parties in environmental governance 
must be promoted and all people given an opportunity to develop the 
understanding, skills and capacity for achieving equitable and effective 
participation (Government of Zimbabwe, 2004:3).  
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It goes on to identify as one of its ‘strategic directions’ the need to ‘expand devolution to 
give local communities greater authority to manage their environments more effectively’ 
(Government of Zimbabwe 2004:19). The Act takes this further and lays out mechanisms 
to enable this by specifically endorsing devolution and recognizing and providing 
opportunities for establishing sub-district level institutions. This goes further in 
empowering sub-district level institutions than previous legislation as it represents the first 
time that village based sub-committees have been provided with the opportunity to replace 
Natural Resource Committees at District level (Charles Jonga, CEO CAMPFIRE 
Association, interview in Harare, September 2005). Similarly, the 2002 Integrated 
Conservation Plan for Fast Track Land Resettlement and the 2003 Wildlife Based Land 
Reform Policy were based on the same concepts and philosophies as endorsed in the 1989 
Act and specifically endorsed CAMPFIRE and wildlife utilization as an approach to be 
emulated in under different tenurial regimes. Clearly, the discourse and networks 
catalyzed by CAMPFIRE - what might be termed ‘CAMPFIREs legacy’ - continues to 
influence emerging policy in Zimbabwe despite the changes in the broader national 
context. However, to date all evidence indicates that such commitments remain purely 
rhetorical.  
 
7.2.4.3 Decentralization and Rural-Related Policies  
At least rhetorically, rural development has been one of the priorities of the Zimbabwean 
government since independence, and decentralization was seen as a key means to achieve 
this (Hammar, 2003, Makumbi, 1998, Conyers, 2001). Consequently, natural resource 
legislation in Zimbabwe concentrated considerable power in the hands of RDCs. Child et 
al. (2003) note that in addition to the Parks and Wildlife Act, a number of other laws (e.g. 
Natural Resources Act, the Communal Land Act and the Rural District Council Act) give 
the RDCs control over natural resources. The Natural Resources Act enables RDCs to 
establish highly interventionist conservation committees and bylaws on the use of natural 
resources. The Communal Land Act vests ownership of the land with the state and its 
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administration in the hands of the RDC while the Rural District Council Act gives RDCs 
powers to take measures to conserve natural resources, permit grazing and cultivation and 
develop land use plans (ibid).  
 
Many analysts (Hammar, 2003, Makumbi, 1998, Alexander, 1993, Conyers, 2001) concur 
that since the creation of independent Zimbabwe, District Councils have been highly 
politicized structures of fundamental importance to the ruling party in its attempts to 
control the country. Makumbe (1998) notes that whilst initial administrative changes in 
RDCs were ostensibly aimed at introducing integrated and coordinated rural development 
planning, they also had an alternative political agenda, and he concludes that 
decentralisation was primarily promoted for the purposes of creating the one-party state. 
Hammer (2003) elaborates further, detailing the critical role that RDC’s have historically 
played in the territorial and political strategies of state and ruling party attempts to order, 
control and develop spaces, resources and populations in Zimbabwe.  However, Alexander 
(2003) and Conyers (2001) both note that, despite this central political significance, post-
independence decentralization efforts were largely ineffective due to the lack of resources 
and any real decision making authority. 
 
Conyers (2001) identifies three distinct phases of decentralization. The first phase, 
stretching from 1980 to 1992, is characteristic of ‘deconcentration’. Newly elected 
representative institutions at the district level were given neither decision-making 
authority nor substantial control over resources and were largely ineffective (Alexander, 
1993). Conyers’ second phase spans the period 1993 to 1999 when there was renewed 
pressure to decentralize as a means not only to give effective powers to local institutions 
but also to rationalize public services. The focus was on decentralization to elected local 
RDCs rather than appointed development committees as before. However, once again little 
was actually achieved in terms of transferring functions to RDCs due to reluctance of line 
Ministries to share responsibilities. 
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Conyers (2001:4) describes the third phase, from 1999 to 2002, as ‘government trying to 
pass the buck of its financial and political problems.’ From 1999, the line ministries 
became more interested in decentralization but this was due to increasing financial 
pressures on government having reduced ministries’ ability to deliver services (Conyers, 
2001). They seized upon decentralization as a means to save themselves and the ruling 
party from the embarrassment of being unable to deliver basic services. This 
decentralization of functions without financial resources to execute them, combined with a 
withdrawal of donor support in the early 2000’s and the declining national economic 
situation, is detracting from rather than empowering RDCs and reducing the quality of 
services provided (Conyers, 2001; Hammar, 2003; Frost and Bond, 2008). 
 
Since 2000, the difficulties for RDCs were compounded by politically motivated violence 
and intimidation. Hammer (2003) describes a ‘vast array of attacks’ - either by ‘war 
veterans’ or Zanu-PF ‘youth militia’, often with the complicity or participation of senior 
politicians and bureaucratic arms of the state - on RDCs and their associated institutions, 
which have served to radically alter the landscape of government in Zimbabwe. These 
attacks are essentially attempts on behalf of Zanu (PF) to ‘recapture the frontiers of rule’ 
(Hammar, 2003:144) that the space of local government represents. This violence, coupled 
with the overall impacts of ‘political disorder’, served to make the position of RDC’s 
precarious. Nationwide ‘political disorder’ has resulted in a growing conflation of party 
and state roles. Decentralization and the role of RDC’s is then also a highly politicized and 
complicated arena in which contests and power struggles over land, and ultimately the 
country itself, are being played out.   
 
CAMPFIRE was one of the first practical attempts at a decentralization strategy in 
Zimbabwe, although it developed relatively independently of the wider decentralization 
debates and processes (Conyers, 2001). Whilst it was not the original intent, political 
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compromises by CAMPFIRE policy makers ensured that natural resource governance 
reforms decentralized authority to manage wildlife resources to RDCs in contrast to the 
original intention of devolving authority to natural resource management cooperatives at 
the village level (Martin, 1986). Consequently, the situation of the RDCs is of 
fundamental importance in determining CAMPFIRE outcomes, and conversely, 
CAMPFIRE funds are becoming fundamentally important in determining the future of 
RDCs.  
 
As soon as CAMPFIRE was introduced these funds immediately became an important 
source of revenue for RDCs as even at this time, as discussed above, central government 
was seizing the opportunity to shed its fiscal responsibilities. Bond (1999) notes that 
between 1989-1993 income from wildlife constituted up to 24% of local revenue, and in 
several districts, it exceeded all other individual sources. These figures have escalated 
throughout the 1990s as responsibility for the provision of services has increasingly been 
decentralized to RDCs without financial resources to execute these.  Bond’s (2001) figures 
demonstrate that as of 1999, in RDCs with Appropriate Authority (AA), central 
government grants accounted for only 35% of total revenue with 65% being generated 
locally. In 10 districts with AA, income to the RDCs from wildlife management exceeded 
all other locally generated revenue. Whilst accurate figures are not available from this 
date, given the deteriorating financial situation of the RDCs and the increasing demands 
upon them, it can be assumed that dependence on CAMPFIRE revenues has become ever 
more pronounced. Anecdotal evidence would bear this out as the following quote from a 
Chiredzi RDC officer indicates:  
The Zimbabwean economy is getting worse every day and there’s less money for 
us to deliver services to people. We have problems with CAMPFIRE money 
because of inflation, it’s not worth what it used to be, but still Council would 
have a real problem without it and that means people here wouldn’t get any of 
our services (J Sambo; Human Resources Officer, Chiredzi RDC; interviewed in 
Chiredzi, October 2005). 
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The above discussion indicates that, since independence, RDCs in Zimbabwe have played 
a critical role in the ruling party’s strategies to control and develop spaces, resources and 
the population in rural Zimbabwe. Decentralization was conceived by ZANU-PF as a 
means to create and maintain the one-party state, and as such had the full political backing 
of the state. From this perspective, CAMPFIRE can be seen as a strand of this government 
strategy, and one that became increasingly important after 1999. After this date, central 
government increasingly decentralized responsibility for delivering basic social services to 
RDCs without providing the financial means to deliver services. Given the deteriorating 
financial situation of the RDCs and the increasing demands upon them, dependence on 
CAMPFIRE revenues has become ever more pronounced. Given also the central role that 
RDC’s play in the ruling parties overall strategy for penetration and control in rural areas, 
this explains why central government continues to support decentralisation of natural 
resource management through CAMPFIRE. For ZANU-PF, CAMPFIRE provides the 
financial means by which RDCs are able to continue delivering services and retain their 
influence in rural area, at no cost to central government. This support extends in some 
districts to financing of the fast-track resettlement programme (Dr Chitsike, University of 
Zimbabwe, interviewed in Harare, October 2005).  In other words, CAMPFIRE revenues 
provide financial support to ZANU-PF in its attempts to rule the rural frontier. Support for 
CAMPFIRE is then very much in the interests of the state. However, Hammar (2003) also 
points out that local government is not simply a front for the state for national processes of 
states making. They also possess their own local dynamics and demands specific to their 
situated histories and broader relations of power and accumulation. Thus, they occupy a 
unique space and role in determining future democratic outcomes. What happens at this 
level is crucial given the closure of democratic space at the macro level. This issue is 
returned to in Chapters 8 and 10.   
 
Decentralization – the institutional framework of CAMPFIRE – is a highly politicized and 
complex arena but one which ultimately ensures that CAMPFIRE maintains support from 
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the political elite within the country. Understanding this arena is essential to understanding 
the political and policy pressures facing CAMPFIRE. At the macro level, whilst the 
political climate may remain conducive to supporting decentralisation of wildlife benefits 
within CAMPFIRE, the same cannot be said for devolutionary approaches that place more 
power in the hands of local communities. Since the early 1990s, the tendency of 
government has been to centralize or decentralize authority and control. For example, 
proposals to provide local communities with proprietorship over land and natural 
resources by the Rukuni Land Commission Report (Rukuni, 1994) were either ignored or 
severely watered down. CAMPFIRE itself is another example of this as discussed in more 
detail below. Whilst the original intent of CAMPFIRE’s advocates had been devolution, 
this proved controversial and hence the ‘pragmatic compromise’ (Murphree, 1997b) of 
decentralisation. Since 2000, this tendency has been enhanced, with authoritarianism 
becoming a normal political practice in what is now a deeply polarized state (Raftopoulos, 
2004).  
 
The Traditional Leaders Act (TLA) of 2001 has significant, if unclear, implications for 
both RDCs and CAMPFIRE. As discussed above, until this date policy had focused upon 
strengthening the role and legal legitimacy of the RDCs as the democratically elected 
structures at village, ward and district levels at the expense of traditional authorities. The 
TLA is a significant shift in direction, restoring powers to chiefs, headmen and sabhukus 
in terms of natural resource management. It provides for Ward and Village Assemblies 
and mandates the demarcation of their borders, that would ‘consider and resolve’ all issues 
relating to land, water and other natural resources. Crucially though, the Act does not 
provide land rights to the Assemblies and it does not give them any legal status beyond 
being sub-committees of RDCs.  The Act can potentially have problematic consequences 
for rural communities, especially where traditional leadership views values of democracy 
and governance as western ideals. The TLA is essentially a replica of colonial strategies 
pertaining to traditional leadership, the aim of which was (is) to co-opt traditional 
leadership to ensure political penetration of the state and ruling party into rural landscapes. 
The profound influence that this newly formed alliance of party and traditional institutions 
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can have on local power dynamics and how this reverberates within local CAMPFIRE 
institutions is illustrated by the Mahenye case study in the following Chapter. The TLA 
can be viewed as a product of the ‘failed state’ and ‘retraditionalisation’ thesis (Herbst, 
2000, Chabal and Daloz, 1999, Kyed and Buur, 2006) discussed in Chapter 2. As such, it 
can be viewed as an attempt by the state to (re)gain control over territories and people in 
rural areas by capturing the authority of traditional leaders to replace that which it has lost 
through the demise of formal state institutions. The introduction of the TLA may then 
have significant implications for the ability of CAMPFIRE to open up political and 
democratic space. 
 
7.2.5 The Political Appeal of CAMPFIRE Discourse and 
Narrative 
Whilst the discourse upon which CAMPFIRE and sustainable use were based had solid 
scientific and rational underpinnings and appealed to the technical and scientifically driven 
policy-making process of the 1990s, there were also other important elements to the 
CAMPFIRE narrative that appealed to a range of other political agendas. Such elements 
included participation, racial equity, promotion of African traditional practices and values 
and above all national sovereignty. Both the government and its civil society supporters 
used such politically resonant and emotive rhetoric to good effect to bolster the image and 
political popularity of CAMPFIRE at home and internationally throughout the 1980s and 
1990s.  
 
Whilst sustainable use may have been an accepted approach nationally, it was still 
controversial internationally in the 1990s. As discussed in detail in Chapter 4, CAMPFIRE 
played an important strategic role in regional and international debates about sustainable 
use, most notably in those related to CITES and the CBD, putting Zimbabwe at the 
forefront of conservation initiatives globally. During the 1990s, it achieved what Wolmer 
et al (2003:5) refer to as ‘iconic status…rapidly becoming the most famous exemplar of 
CBNRM.’ It was the recipient of many international conservation awards and accolades. 
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Considerable international media attention was devoted to CAMPFIRE and it attracted 
generous donor support to the country, as well as researchers from all over the world and 
thousands of workshops, conferences and publications were generated. The acclaim and 
recognition generated by CAMPFIRE for Zimbabwe cemented its political and social 
popularity in the country. 
 
The international profile that CAMPFIRE achieved also made it possible for the 
government to play to populist political agendas and adopt populist stances at high-profile 
international events in ways that resonated with the electorate at home. Arguments 
concerning sovereignty over national resources, ‘African solutions to African problems’, 
and anti- eco-imperialism (the new form of colonialism) were all commonly put forward 
as arguments in support of sustainable use and CAMPFIRE at international meetings by 
the government and CCG. The following comment by the PS Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism when discussing the role of CAMPFIRE in relation to CITES is 
representative of the rhetoric employed by government officials: 
Our message is: sovereign countries must be free to decide what to do with their 
own resources rather than leaving a group of people to impose their own ideas (J 
Moyo, ANC daily news briefing, March 1, 1997). 
 
Such comments received wide media attention, in which CAMPFIRE was seen as a 
vehicle through which the government was upholding the sovereign rights of 
Zimbabweans and Africans internationally. Thus, CAMPFIRE met a wide range of 
political agendas throughout the 1990s. Alexander (2003) argues that such high profile 
appeals to politically resonant issues of redistribution of resources enabled the government 
to masquerade as addressing pressing political issues, whilst doing nothing about the far 
more significant issue of land reform.  
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Wolmer et al. (2003) note the ‘ostensibly antagonistic discourses’ of wildlife management 
and land reform in Zimbabwe that has developed in the last eight years. These two 
discourses emanate from opposing models of development; with land reform emphasizing 
equity, redistribution and agriculture; whilst wildlife management emphasizes neo-liberal 
goals encompassing the private sector, foreign exchange earnings and trickle down 
economic theory.  However, despite this apparent antagonism, the GOZ continues to 
advocate both nationally and internationally CBNRM and CAMPFIRE approaches as a 
policy priority:   
Community based natural resources management and wildlife based land reform 
policy are the key instruments to foster better land management … in this regard 
for sustainability to be achieved there is need for full participation of local 
communities in the planning and management of their environment and natural 
resources. A Programme like Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) is a good example (Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism, 2006:4). 
 
Why does the GOZ continue to espouse CAMPFIRE and CBNRM approaches despite 
the apparent contradictions in the discourse pointed out by Wolmer et al. (2003)? The 
political incentive of financing the RDC’s as a means of retaining control in rural areas 
has already been discussed. In addition, the narrative upon which CAMPFIRE relied was 
used to good effect by government when promoting its sustainable use policies in the 
1990s. There are also remarkable similarities with the narrative that the ZANU PF 
government has used over the last decade when explaining and justifying its actions in 
relation to land reform. For example, the issue of national sovereignty, which played 
centre stage in CAMFIRE rhetoric internationally, has also formed the centerpiece of the 
anti-colonial, anti-imperialist rhetoric used by Mugabe and Zanu (PF) to counter critics 
of their revived land revolution and new brand of authoritarian nationalism. For example, 
in 2002 Mugabe heralded the Fast-Track Resettlement Programme as an unqualified 
success, adding: 
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We need to put all this land to productive agricultural use …it is also our way of 
ensuring that no one takes advantage of our stomachs to get to the soul of our 
sovereignty (The Herald Newspaper, 2002).  
 
 The discourse and rhetoric employed by government officials when responding to 
criticism and issues from the international community in relation to CAMPFIRE does 
then bear a striking resemblance to that used when responding to international criticism 
over its land reform process.  From a purely discursive perspective, CAMPFIRE can be 
viewed as serving as a precursor for the position of the Zimbabwean government on land 
reform on the international stage. While from a technical and implementation 
perspective, the discourse may differ, from a political perspective, they are 
complimentary and synergistic.  
 
The above review of the national context of CBNRM reveals that, policies affecting 
CBNRM extend far beyond just environmental policy making to impact rural 
development processes as a whole.  As this discussion has illustrated, the experience in 
Zimbabwe highlights the framing of CBNRM in terms of attempts to address racial 
inequalities, policies affecting land/resource tenure, processes of decentralization and 
poverty alleviation as well as those specific to environmental management, conservation 
and tourism. 
 
7.3 Implementation Approach and Challenges 
A large number of researchers and analysts have exhaustively discussed and analysed the 
history and origins of CAMPFIRE. This analysis has been undertaken both by those 
involved in implementation (Child, 1995, Metcalfe, 1994, Murombedzi, 2003a, 
Murphree, 1997b) as well as external, independent commentators (Adams and Hulme, 
2001, Wolmer et al., 2003, Duffy, 2000). Adams and Hulme (2001) caution that much 
CBNRM literature is written by people involved in project development and therefore, 
possibly lacking in ‘sufficient critical distance to provide a complete review’ (Adams 
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and Hulme 2001:19). They note that the analysis of those involved may reflect what 
Chambers (1983) refers to as ‘project bias’, by which evaluations and analysis of a 
programme look repeatedly at the same project, reports and statistics without properly 
questioning the nature of local level changes. In order to avoid this pitfall, and in 
acknowledgement that I was involved in project implementation, whilst the following 
discussion does draw heavily upon the existing CAMPFIRE documentation, it balances 
this by ensuring that this material is primarily drawn upon for ‘data’ rather than analysis. 
The analysis offered here has been informed by the analytical framework employed 
throughout this research and as such is ‘original’.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and elaborated in the corresponding discussion in Chapter 5, 
an examination of the philosophy, science and data that underpins CBNRM is important 
in understanding the implementation of CBNRM. Decisions around natural resource 
management policy ultimately depend on the relative political influence of different 
interest groups. Policy processes are influenced by the existence of actor-networks, the 
relative political influence of which will determine their ability to promote their desired 
policy approach. As the following discussion illustrates, the history, origins and 
implementation approach of CAMFPIRE encouraged the development of a strong, united 
and cohesive policy network which has proven flexible and robust enough to withstand 
collapse in the face of the current crisis in Zimbabwe.  
 
7.3.1 The Emergence of CBNRM in Zimbabwe 
Two of the features that distinguish CAMPFIRE from CBNRM in Botswana are, firstly, 
those of its local origins, and, secondly, the gradual process of policy development and 
implementation. This section explores how these two factors have contributed to the 
development of a robust programme and policy framework in Zimbabwe. 
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Until the 1950s, the history of wildlife policy in Zimbabwe was much the same as that of 
other British colonies, detailed in Chapter 2, where government appropriated control and 
provided some use rights to settlers and visitors. The first experiments with Community 
Wildlife Management in Zimbabwe began after independence in 1980, when 
discriminatory laws, which had been enacted in the 1960s to allow only white commercial 
farmers to benefit from wildlife on their land, were amended to enable black communal 
farmers to realize similar benefit. The conceptual origins of CAMPFIRE date back to the 
early 1960s when influential studies on game meat production were conducted in the 
South-East Lowveld in Zimbabwe by three visiting Fulbright scholars, Riney, Dasmann 
and Mosmann (Metcalfe, 1994).  These studies, later verified by others conducted under 
the auspices of the WWF (Child, 1988, Cumming, 1990, Jansen et al., 1992) led to 
development of the hypothesis that, in certain ecological conditions, wildlife ranching 
could economically outperform cattle ranching and was more ecologically stable 
(Cumming, 1988). 
 
Zimbabwean policy makers concluded from this that the future of wildlife could only be 
ensured in a policy context where wildlife could be made an economically competitive 
form of land use (Child, 1995). The outcome was a radical shift in conservation paradigms 
– away from protectionism to sustainable use. This shift was formalized as policy under 
the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act. The following years saw a remarkable expansion of 
wildlife on commercial farms (Child, 2004), which established an important precedent and 
influenced future policy development to emphasize the replication of resource rights in 
communal areas. 
 
A further hypothesis underlying the development of CAMPFIRE was that proprietorship 
and the ability to earn direct economic benefits from wildlife would provide a more 
effective incentive for wildlife conservation. Whilst this could be easily put into practice 
on privately owned commercial farms, applying the principle in areas with communal 
tenure systems would be more complex. Efforts to resolve this resulted in a core group of 
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DNPWLM officers, the research Branch of Terrestrial Ecology, working in the Sebungwe 
and Nyaminyami areas. This group consisted of Graham Child, David Cumming, Rowan 
Martin, Russell Taylor and others who were aware of the administrative and management 
problems associated with transferring this approach from private to communal land 
context. They had also worked with the local District Councils to develop an 
implementation approach that could effect the transfer to communal lands (D Cummings, 
personnel communication, interview in Harare, October 2005). 
 
As an interim measure, Project WINDFALL was initiated in 1978. Its major goals were to 
reduce soil degradation in communal areas and improve community attitudes to wildlife 
(Derman, 1997). Poverty alleviation goals were clearly subsidiary to environmental 
concerns and specific to minimizing conflict between wildlife and agriculture by providing 
meat from culls in National Parks available to their communal land neighbors and 
returning revenue from safari hunting to the appropriate DC (Murphree, 1997b). Whilst 
WINDFALL was largely unsuccessful in meeting its goals, it represented a critical step in 
the development of the conceptual basis of CAMPFIRE because of the instructive lessons 
that came out of it. WINDFALL highlighted that conservation is as much a socio-
economic as an ecological issue, and that successful rural resource management 
approaches must be designed and implemented with local participation (Moore, 1997). 
Logan and Moseley (2002), Metcalfe (1994) and Derman (1997) consider that the initial 
process of WINDFALL and the consultative interactions with RDCs and communities that 
took place during the late 1980s (Metcalfe 1994 provides an in-depth description) did, in 
the words of Logan and Moseley (2001) ‘aspire to true bottom-up planning with a focus 
on community input and autonomy’ (Logan and Moseley 2001:2). 
 
A further proto-type CAMPFIRE initiative undertaken by Clive Stockil, a professional 
hunter, with the Shangaan people of Mahenye village in Chipinge District also provided 
valuable lessons (Peterson, 1991). This initiative highlighted that the mechanism by which 
funds from wildlife management would be returned to communities from the Treasury was 
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too time consuming. Therefore, it was ineffective as a conservation incentive for 
communities. Alternative mechanisms were required. 
 
In addition to local level consultations, DNPWLM policy makers also sought advice from 
economists and social scientists, as they recognised the need to integrate institutional and 
economic issues with ecological concerns. This initial dialogue eventually led to the 
formation of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) (CASS/WWF/Zimtrust, 1989), 
which in these early years served as an informal ‘incubator’, generating the conceptual 
underpinnings of CBNRM and providing the means through which a diverse network of 
actors and policy entrepreneurs was established. Thus the core group of individuals from 
which the actor-network would develop, whilst having environmental roots, did 
encompass others from different backgrounds and government departments, with broader 
expertise and networks. 
 
Encompassing leading social scientists from the Centre for Applied Social Sciences 
(CASS), rural development experts from Zimbabwe Trust, ecologists from the World 
Wildlife Fund (WWF) and economists from the Ministry of Finance, this group had 
regional and global networks, knowledge and experience that they could draw upon to 
incorporate experiences and concepts. Consequently, the underlying conceptual basis of 
CAMPFIRE was informed by experiences from India in the field of cooperative 
management; from Switzerland, it borrowed ideas of participatory management of natural 
resources; and from the US emerging theories of common property management and an 
economically instrumentalist approach to wildlife resources were built upon (D Cumming, 
personnel communication, interview in Harare, October 2005). Martin’s (1986) original 
CAMPFIRE concept document was revised by key members of this group, including 
Murphree (CASS) and Reynolds (Ministry of Finance) which ensured that their 
international as well as local experiences were incorporated (Metcalfe, 1994). However, 
while being informed by global experience, CAMPFIRE was grounded in the realities and 
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experiences of wildlife management in Zimbabwe in both the communal and commercial 
sectors.  
 
It was this group that developed the second conceptual root of CAMPFIRE, the 
identification of communal property regimes with strong tenurial rights as the appropriate 
management unit in communal land contexts (Murphree, 1997b). Murphree then 
articulated the five ‘principles’ guiding policy formation (Murphree, 1991). These 
principles have since informed policy development and guided implementation of 
CBNRM initiatives throughout the region (SASUSG, 1996, Jones and Murphree, 2004; 
Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). 
 
So whilst the original reforms were drafted by a small technocratic elite within the 
bureaucracy, the gradual, locally-led process of trial and error led to the development of a 
strong and effective actor and policy network within Zimbabwe. This shift had been made 
possible at this time by the shift in the national context after 1980 towards a democratic 
system with emphasis on racial equity. Key to the strong influence that this actor network 
could exert was its several influential ‘policy entrepreneurs’. These individuals, by virtue 
of their professional positions and influence, could introduce policy at ‘the stroke of a 
pen’. Foremost amongst these, as already mentioned in Chapter 4, was Rowan Martin, 
then Deputy Director of the DNPWLM, and Professor Marshall Murphree, Director of 
CASS and Chairman of the Parks Board.  These two individuals, working in conjunction 
with others, were responsible for laying out the conceptual basis upon which CAMPFIRE 
was to be based. The ‘landmark’ documents in this regard were Martin’s 1986 
‘CAMPFIRE’ policy document, and Murphree’s 1991 articulation of the five ‘principles’ 
for policy. The role of other policy entrepreneurs is explored further in the following 
section. 
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The process of policy development in CAMPFIRE was then a gradual one, spanning many 
years, involving people from local level to the international arena, and drawing upon 
concepts from a range of different disciplines. This process has proven essential in shaping 
the robust programme that CAMPFIRE remains today. The process ensured the 
development of a strong policy network, which proved influential in determining the 
outcome of policy decisions both nationally and internationally, and was flexible in 
adapting to the changing political context. The ultimate political endorsement came when 
CAMPFIRE was claimed as a party innovation by ZANU-PF in their manifesto in the run-
up to the 1990 General Elections. Duffy (2000) argues that the adoption of sustainable use 
policies served to negotiate a political settlement between potentially competing domestic 
interest groups. Commitment to sustainable use enabled diverse groups from government, 
civil society and the private sector, to work together as each group gained some 
advantages from the policy. This effectively depoliticized environmental politics within 
Zimbabwe, allowing the presentation of a united front internationally by articulating a 
political and ethical standpoint on sustainable use, thereby actively repolititicising 
environmental politics to meet its own agenda. This is explored further below. 
 
However, the long process of trial and error within the DNPWLM that led to the 
development of an influential actor-network and the key role played by a handful of policy 
entrepreneurs, all with conservation links and aims, has proven to be a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand,  it ensured a strong supportive actor network within Zimbabwe, 
which in the early years could pragmatically steer CAMPFIRE policy and implementation 
in a politically strategic manner and which over the last decade has been able to adapt and 
evolve with the changing national context. On the other hand, as explored in Chapter 4, it 
has led to CAMPFIRE being  ‘black boxed’ within the narrow confines of environmental 
policy process’s internationally and nationally, with the resulting disconnect from 
mainstream discourses and networks relating to decentralisation, democratisation and 
politics. 
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7.3.2 An Evolving Institutional Landscape 
While the local roots of CAMPIRE within the DNPWLM provided its institutional home, 
diverse institutions were involved in implementation of the programme from the outset 
and throughout the 1990s at the national level. However, the last eight years have 
witnessed a marked contraction in the institutions involved. This has been brought about 
largely, if inadvertently, by donors. This shift has witnessed the transformation of 
CAMPFIRE from a programme led by a technical government agency but supported by a 
strong group of civil society organisations – manifested as the CCG – to one in which civil 
society organisations and even the technical government agencies have largely been 
sidelined. Over the last five years, the programme has become dominated exclusively by 
the CAMPFIRE Association62 (CA) and through it, the RDCs. This shift has had some 
negative impacts, such as a loss of implementation expertise, innovation and capacity 
(Child et al., 2003). However, given the accompanying shifts in the political, economic 
and social climate of Zimbabwe, and the implications that this has had for policy-making 
processes, it has been a significant factor in ensuring the survival of CAMPFIRE during 
this volatile period. The ownership by CAMPFIRE by RDCs through the CA, and the 
income that it generates for RDCs have ensured the RDCs’ continued commitment to 
CAMPFIRE. 
 
Originating within the DNPWLM, CAMPFIRE – through the CCG – brought together 
from the beginning a coalition of agencies with complementary objectives and areas of 
expertise. Based on recognition of the need for an institution that would represent the 
interests of the producer communities, the CCG facilitated the creation of the CA. In 1991, 
the CCG passed the leadership of the programme to the CA, with the intention of building 
its capacity as the legitimate representative of its rural constituency. Throughout the early 
1990s, the CCG continued to expand to include Africa Resources Trust, Action Magazine, 
SAFIRE and belatedly the Ministry of Local Government, Rural and Urban Development 
(MILGRUD). 
                                                            
62 The full name of which is the CAMPFIRE Association of Rural District Councils. 
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A distinctive feature of most of these implementing organisations was that they were 
dominated by highly committed and technically expert individuals, who had 
comprehensive networks and contacts, which to some degree cross-cut sectoral, scale, 
racial and ethnic boundaries. Nevertheless, they were predominantly white NGOs and 
represented a close-knit professional community.  A further distinctive feature of this 
network is the degree to which certain key individuals played crucial roles by virtue of 
their professional positions.  
 
The pivotal role of Murphree and Martin in creating and driving policy has already been 
discussed in Chapter 4, but other individuals such as Cummings and Taylor, originally 
with DNPWLM and then with WWF, Monro and Metcalfe from Zimbabwe Trust and later 
Maveneke from CA and Hutton from ART, also shared and disseminated the same vision. 
They were to play key roles in the conceptual development, implementation and advocacy 
of CAMPFIRE. These individuals were principally technical experts, who could call upon 
and share a scientific, technically based discourse. 
 
This domination by whites was politically accepted during the 1980s and 1990s as 
government policy espoused racial reconciliation as a priority. Moreover, CAMPFIRE 
was ostensibly an effort to promote racial equality in accessing natural resources. 
Furthermore, the racial make-up of this group reflected that within the conservation 
bureaucracy in general, which was virtually alone in terms of government ministries after 
independence in retaining its personnel from the pre-independence period (Duffy, 2000). 
This reflected the widely held belief at the time that conservation/environmental 
management in general was a technical and apolitical, issue, best left to scientists and 
technocrats (Buscher and Whande, 2007). This period was characterized by a positive 
relationship between government and civil society, which created space for civil society to 
influence policymaking. 
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While these policy entrepreneurs were predominantly white, they were nevertheless all 
Zimbabweans and embedded in the social fabric of society, including its social and 
professional networks.  Therefore, they could effectively exercise ‘agency’ in this period 
through their networks, strategically influencing others, sharing their vision and bringing 
them into ‘their’ projects (Long, 2001).  Consequently, individuals such as Nduku 
(Director, DNPWLM) and Pangeti (Deputy Director), who had greater political appeal 
even at this time, were strong supporters and advocates, playing critical roles in its 
promotion within government circles, despite not being intimately identified with it 
outside of these (George Pangeti, interviewed in Harare, October 2005). By virtue of their 
professional positions, reputation and credibility, such individuals had direct access both 
to policy fora within Zimbabwe: for example, as Deputy Director of DNPWLM, and 
Chairman of the National Parks Board. They had the means to influence policy 
internationally and nationally, through publications in journals, attendance at conferences, 
and membership in professional associations. With positions as Director of CASS or 
WWF-Zimbabwe, the policy entrepreneurs could extend their influence in policy circles. 
Equally, such positions provided the means to interact with donors and so gain the 
financial resources necessary for implementation. Consequently, these individuals were 
well placed to effectively popularize their perspective through their networks and 
professional credibility, thus gaining the human and financial resources necessary to carry 
it through, all factors which are critical to the popularization of a particular perspective 
(Callon, 1986).  
 
At the macro-level, as social, political and economic conditions within Zimbabwe 
deteriorated towards the end of the 1990s, so too did the ability of this white, civil 
society dominated network to exercise agency and influence policy. However, this 
network was undergoing considerable changes, which were ultimately to work in its 
favour. As of 1989, CAMPFIRE began to attract financial support from donors, foremost 
of which was USAID, who was to provide over two-thirds of total CAMPFIRE funding 
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over the following decade (Frost and Bond, 2008). From 1995, USAID targeted the bulk 
of funding directly at the CA, which proceeded to marginalize other members of the 
CCG (Child et al. 2003). Following the withdrawal of funding for CAMPFIRE from 
USAID and most other donors in 2003, the CCG disbanded as a functional group. The 
organizations, which had originally played such a catalytic and central role, had become 
largely irrelevant within the context of CAMPFIRE as of 2005 (Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007). In this same year, efforts were made to reestablish a networking 
and support body through the WWF SARPO programme but this has neither the 
expertise nor scope of the CCG, whilst the shifts in the national context curtail its ability 
to exercise political or policy influence as it is associated with an international NGO.  
 
The degree to which the role and influence of both the original institutions and 
individuals has waned over the last decade is illustrated by the way CAMPFIRE 
scholarship – once so influential both within Zimbabwe, the region and internationally – 
now largely fails to bear relevance to CAMPFIRE policy processes. For example, in the 
last six years, CAMPFIRE scholarship propelled as in earlier years by Murphree and 
Martin,  has moved on to place CBNRM centrally in the context of applied democratic 
governance, operating within a political as well as the conventionally more emphasized 
technocratic context. This has encompassed an approach to devolution challenges that 
moves beyond the ‘full devolution’ focus or the observations of local elite distortions or 
the problems of accountability at the local level. This was propelled in a paper by 
Murphree (2000a) that tackled interaction between jurisdictional scales and institutions 
in natural resource governance. It pointed out that scaling down to be sustainable also 
requires scaling up. In this paper and elaborations on it (see Martin 2003 and 
www.sasusg.net) the emphasis is that devolution is not an exercise in isolationism, but a 
process of finding local regime inter-dependence within the larger setting of inter-
dependence at many scales.  
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Given the shifting political dynamics, priorities and affiliations within the country, the 
CCG would have become a liability for CAMPFIRE. As the discussion in the previous 
section has indicated, the racially biased and party-oriented political and policy 
environment no longer favours, or even tolerates, interventions from whites or NGOs, and 
discourages rational, technical, science-based policy solutions such as those advanced by 
the CCG. The replacement of the CCG by the CA alone as the primary advocacy group for 
CAMPFIRE represents the replacement of what has become a politically impotent group 
by one that has a significant political voice with significant incentives to use it. Members 
of the CA are embedded within the social and political fabric of contemporary Zimbabwe 
and are able to exercise agency within the charged political context and racialized 
discourse and narrative in the same effective manner that the CCG were able to do during 
the 1980s and 1990s.     
 
Reinforcing the political voice of the CA members themselves are the many individuals 
who are, or were, at the forefront of the CA. These individuals have become influential 
political figures themselves, often with strong links to the ruling party. For example, the 
now deceased Border Gezi made his political reputation with CAMPFIRE, going on to 
become the minister of the powerful Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment 
Creation. Several other leading CA board members have used CAMPFIRE as a stepping 
stone in their political careers and remain associated with it, including former MPs 
Chauke, Chafesuka and Mackenzie. Others, such as the former chairperson of the CA 
Board, Gotora, have moved on to other significant political roles, in this case as 
chairperson of the influential Association of Rural District Councils. 
 
According to conventional interpretations and discourse prevalent within the CBNRM 
community in southern Africa, this presents CAMPFIRE with a real dilemma. For whilst 
it may have secured its political survival, it also appears to have reinforced the degree to 
which its benefits and authority are captured by RDCs at the expense of local 
communities. If this process goes unchecked, stresses the dominant narrative, it will 
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ultimately lead to the failure of CAMPFIRE. However, this narrative and the assumptions 
upon which it is based require closer scrutiny and this is undertaken in the following 
Chapter, drawing upon insights offered by processes that are unfolding at the local level, 
in this case in the village of Mahenye.  
 
7.3.3 A Pragmatic Approach: Strategic Compromises 
From its beginning CAMPFIRE policy making processes have been characterized by what 
Murphree (1997b) terms ‘strategic compromises’.  The result of which was that several of 
the basic principles around which CAMPFIRE was originally developed  had to be 
compromised (See Murphree 1997b for a comprehensive description of the  compromises 
reached, the implications of this and the processes of negotiation). Foremost among these 
was abandonment of the creation of strong communal property (tenure) regimes under 
state tenure, the introduction of which would have required significant changes to the land 
tenure system. Changes to the land tenure regimes would have laid way outside the 
mandate of the DNPWLM and would have met with significant opposition from an array 
of powerful political and economic interests, among them the RDCs.  Murphree (1997b) 
recounts how recognition of its political and economic implications resulted in the 
pragmatic setting aside of a principle that was viewed as a conceptual cornerstone even 
prior to the publication of the original CAMPFIRE policy document. Murphree notes that 
this document already represented ‘a strategic compromise between concept and policy’ 
and that during the following years: 
DNPWLM and its CAMPFIRE partners were involved in adjusting the 
Programme proposal to the views of political and bureaucratic gatekeepers and 
the demands of institutional and administrative detail (Murphree, 1997b:11).  
 
Murphree goes on to describe the three main accommodations as; firstly, the rejection of 
de jure devolution of wildlife management and revenue rights to those of de facto rights; 
secondly, rejection of self-defined local institutions, co-operatives, in favor of existing 
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sub-structures of the RDC, WADCOs and VIDCOs; and thirdly, the introduction of tactics 
based on conditionality to ensure revenue distribution to sub-district levels through the 
CAMPFIRE Guidelines. These compromises have led to what are generally claimed to be 
the major weaknesses of CAMPFIRE.  
 
However, as Murphree also points out in the same paper, such compromise created a 
level of political acceptance that allowed CAMPFIRE to emerge in the first place. 
Furthermore this initial compromise has ensured that CAMPFIRE has had critical 
political support without which it is doubtful that it would have survived the political 
turmoil of recent years, which has seen the political elite and their private sector allies 
successfully appropriating a higher value of public assets, including natural resources, 
through patronage and bureaucratic recentralisation. Thus one as yet largely unexplored 
perspective of CAMPFIRE in recent years is that it has prevented wildlife being exposed 
to the worst excesses of the existing situation (Anstey et al., 2009). 
 
This pragmatic and inherently politically astute approach adopted by implementers in 
early years meant that the legal status and rights of self-definition of communities as 
originally envisaged were compromised. Distribution of revenues depends on the RDCs’ 
adherence to CAMPFIRE policy guidelines, which state that RDCs are expected to 
distribute a percentage of income (as of 2002 this was increased from 50% to 55%) 
derived from wildlife use to producer communities and to allow these communities to be 
responsible for a number of wildlife management activities. In practice then, AA 
decentralizes authority and control over wildlife to RDCs, and CAMPFIRE confers on 
communities the right to share in the benefits from the use of wildlife by others but not to 
use it themselves. 
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As already discussed, given the cash strapped nature of most RDCs and the ‘state’s virtual 
collapse’, RDCs face increasing pressure to retain financial benefits for general district 
development purposes63. There is a wide spread belief that poor fiscal devolution leads to a 
diminishing interest in the programme by communities co-existing with wildlife (Parker, 
1993, Zimbabwe Trust, 2001, Child et al., 2003, Bond, 2001, Hill, 1997). This perception 
gains momentum as attempts over the years by technical advisors and bureaucrats, from 
the government and from NGOs, to persuade RDCs to devolve greater revenues have 
proven largely futile in the face of the fiscal pressures placed upon RDCs.  
 
The Mahenye case study in the following Chapter explores whether there is evidence that 
locally emerging political and social pressures can prove more successful than 
bureaucratic pressure and technical argument in encouraging further devolution of fiscal 
responsibilities. Given that rights and responsibilities are legally vested with RDCs, the 
level to which individual communities are able to control and benefit from CAMPFIRE 
rests largely on the inclinations of individual RDCs64. Whilst CAMPFIRE activities 
generate substantial benefits the extent to which these benefits actually reach broader 
community members and improve individual household incomes remains questionable 
(Child et al., 2003, Bond, 2001, CAMPFIRE Association, 2005). The question that the 
next Chapter pursues is whether the nature and extent of these benefits are proving enough 
to generate appreciation of CBNRM by rural constituents resulting in the stimulation of 
demands from them for greater devolution. Further, if such demand does appear to be 
forthcoming, is there evidence that RDCs are responding to it?  The research presented 
here, along with a further study by Taylor and Murphree (2007) indicates that some 
communities are grasping the difficult operating context as an opportunity to demand 
greater rights from the RDCs and have developed strategies on how to overcome both the 
economic and political turmoil.  
                                                            
63 The sanctions potentially imposed upon them for doing so and thus breaching WMA guidelines 
act as little real deterrent given that despite frequent breaching of these guidelines, the WMA has 
never exercised its right to revoke AA, and it is highly unlikely to do so. 
64 Frost and Bond (2007) estimate that, during the period 1989-2001, CAMPFIRE generated over 
US$20 million of transfers to participating communities. 
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7.4 Conclusion 
CAMPFIRE has demonstrated a remarkable degree of robustness in its ability to survive 
in the face of the state’s virtual collapse and recentralizing tendencies over the last decade.  
This robustness is due in large part to its ability to maintain political support at all levels. 
This chapter has in part focused on exploring and explaining how it has managed to 
achieve this. From the beginning, its implementation has been characterized by a series of 
pragmatic, strategic compromises aimed at accommodating the varied, and sometimes 
contradictory, positions of a variety of interest groups. One outcome of these compromises 
was that CAMPFIRE represented decentralized natural resource management, rather than 
the initially envisaged approach of devolution. Conventional wisdom over the last 20 years 
has maintained that this has led to CAMPFIRE’s greatest weakness - decentralization 
rather than devolution. However, an equally valid alternative perspective is that such 
willingness to compromise not only ensured that it materialized in the first place but has 
also survived politically during the more recent crisis. 
 
The review of the history and philosophy underpinning CAMPFIRE illustrates that it is a 
genuinely local initiative, which involved thousands of people and institutions at local, 
national and international levels and which drew upon a broad range of concepts and 
practical experiences with natural resource management rooted in Zimbabwean realities. It 
was this lengthy and inclusive process, which led to the development of a strong and 
effective policy network which has effectively evolved over the past thirty  years from one 
dominated by whites, NGOs and donors to one in which the dynamics of national politics 
and power is at the forefront. This evolution has occurred in such a way that it has been 
possible for the policy network to maintain some effectiveness and influence despite the 
extreme changes in the social and political conditions and corresponding changes in the 
policy environment within the country.  
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CAMFPIRE gained political endorsement in part through the appeal that elements of its 
discourse - such as national sovereignty, racial equity and promotion of African traditional 
practices – held for a range of different political agendas and all of which government and 
CAMPFIRE advocates were able to use to good effect to bolster their image and political 
popularity. This is a discourse remarkably similar to and resonant with that adopted over 
the last decade by the GOZ when addressing land reform issues. Consequently, the 
CAMPFIRE discourse still remains compelling to GOZ and would be extremely difficult 
to reject.    
 
Furthermore, characterizing CAMPFIRE from its inception has been the wide variety of 
different organisations with different areas of expertise, skills and implementation 
capacities that they were able to bring to bear.  This has ensured an appropriate blend of 
skills and approaches and the mobilization of significant human and financial resources. 
Whilst this does not imply that implementation has been faultless or that efforts to 
establish representative institutions have always been successful, it did ensure that prior to 
2000 basic oversights in implementation did not undermine community efforts to establish 
representative local governance structures. This is best appreciated when contrasted with 
the situation in Botswana, where efforts to establish local governance institutions were tied 
to the undemocratic institution of the Kgotla by the implementing agencies, which has 
significantly contributed to the creation of institutions  accountable to no one. 
 
However, these factors alone are insufficient to explain CAMPFIRE’s endurance. This 
research indicates that one of the most significant factors contributing to the resilience of 
CAMPFIRE is that of its decentralized nature. Given the very specific situation now 
facing Zimbabwe, decentralisation, by ensuring that the relatively politically powerful 
RDCs are reliant on CAMPFIRE revenues and are therefore, outspoken in their support 
for it, has led to a situation whereby the government’s recentralizing tendencies have been 
unable to come into force. More significantly still, it continues to uphold the interests of 
the central state through its provision of financial support to the RDCs, which in turn 
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provide the state with a key means to control rural areas. The role of the RDCs and local 
level outcomes and political dynamics is explored further in the following Chapter.  
 
The research findings I present here indicate that CAMPFIRE as a conceptual and policy 
process has evolved to match the dramatically shifting context within which policy is 
being developed and implemented in Zimbabwe. Essentially, this represents an evolution 
from a technical, bureaucratic and management oriented approach to natural resource 
management to one in which political and power issues take central stage. Natural 
resource management is evolving from a technical process to a political one. This 
evolution has been key to CAMPFIRE’s survival in Zimbabwe and also represents some 
hope for the country’s democratic future as explored and explained in the following 
Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 8  
LOCAL LEVEL OUTCOMES – MAHENYE CASE STUDY 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This Chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the implementation and outcomes of 
CAMPFIRE at the local level in the village of Mahenye in Zimbabwe. It explores the 
social and political contestations over natural rights and benefits at the local level, 
focusing upon the struggles to control these between the local community and political 
economic elites and highlights the role that local government has played/can play in 
determining equitable outcomes. It also demonstrates the dynamic relationship between 
processes at the local level and the national level. This case study demonstrates the 
opportunities that CAMPFIRE provides to affect power relations, and create accountable 
local governance institutions, local government and empowered communities.  
 
Throughout Zimbabwe, there are hundreds of CAMPFIRE-related institutions at a sub-
district level. This makes it extremely difficult to generalize about the programme based 
on events in only one village. Nevertheless, I do attempt to do so because a review of 
evidence from other sites (Taylor and Murphree, 2007, Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007) 
indicates that the case study material is representative of wider processes.   As of 2006, 
there were increasingly widespread indications that RDCs were beginning to respond to 
demands from their local constituents for at least greater fiscal devolution65. These moves 
are steps towards greater devolution and appear to have been set in motion as a result of 
                                                            
65 Guruve RDC led the way in this regard with the agreement in 2006 that three wards within this 
district would receive funds directly from the safari operator (the direct payment system) rather 
than through the RDC as in the past (Taylor and Murphree, 2007). Also Chipinge RDC has in the 
past enabled direct payments from lodges in Mahenye to the local CAMPFIRE Committee 
(MCC) and has indicated willingness to facilitate direct payments from the safari operator to the 
Mahenye CAMPFIRE Committee (MCC) once the problems of fund misuse are resolved (chief 
executive officer, Chipinge RDC, personal communication 2005). Meanwhile, in 2005 in Chiredzi 
District, AA was granted direct to the ward level Wildlife Development Committee, bypassing the 
RDC altogether65 (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). Nine years ago, Chitsike (2000) identified 
similar strong demand for greater authority and rights at a sub-district level emerging in 
communities throughout the country. 
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demands from the RDC’s local constituents. Most notably, as of 2008, the CA formally 
adopted direct payment systems as policy and now actively promotes this approach among 
its members (Interview with C Jonga, Johannesburg, May 2008). Precedents are being 
established and new challenges of local scale governance and elite capture have emerged 
that suggest a need for upward and downward delegation of certain functions (Murphree, 
2000a, Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007).  
 
The following case-study is based on primary research and interviews. A research assistant 
who spent one month living in the ward in August 2005 initiated research in Mahenye. He 
focused on familiarizing himself with the day-to-day lifestyles, concerns, characters and 
aspirations of the people of Mahenye, holding both informal discussions and formal semi-
structured interviews with people living and working there. This was followed by a one-
week visit by myself in October 2005, during which I verified the initial research findings 
and undertook further interviews and analysis. Findings were also triangulated to ensure 
the credibility of the information shared by interviewees. Research in the village was 
complemented by interviews with relevant government officials, politicians, donors, 
NGOs, academics and private sector representatives at both district and national level who 
are either currently (or formerly) involved in CAMPFIRE implementation, analysis and 
policy development.  
 
In total, over 100 semi-structured interviews were conducted over a four-month period. 
More than 50 of these were with people in Mahenye. Given the sensitivity of the 
information collected, I have withheld the names of most interviewees. In Mahenye a 
representative mix of people was interviewed. These included those who are currently and 
were formerly involved with the CAMPFIRE committee, men and women, young and old, 
traditional leaders and others in positions of authority, government employees (e.g. 
teachers and health workers), employees of lodge and safari operators, private business 
people and subsistence farmers. The research intentionally explores the situation of 
CAMPFIRE in Mahenye within the broader politico-economic context of Zimbabwe 
described above. 
 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
8.2 Mahenye: Description, History, People and CBNRM Evolution,  
1982–2000 
Mahenye Ward in the south-east periphery of Zimbabwe in Chipinge District covers only 
210 km² and has a population of less than 1,000 households. However, its impact and 
reach over the past two decades in the history and practice of CBNRM nationally, 
regionally and internationally belies its size or remoteness. In the early 1990s Mahenye 
was the reference point for a widely influential publication, The Lesson from Mahenye: 
Rural Poverty, Democracy and Wildlife, that drew on the CAMPFIRE and pre-
CAMPFIRE initiatives of the ward and its people to articulate the links between local 
democracy, development and natural resources (Murphree, 1995a). Murphree was not 
alone: many others throughout the 1990s also upheld Mahenye as one of the prime 
exemplars of CAMPFIRE as a successful sustainable development model (Borrini-
Feyerabend, 1997, Child et al., 1996, Child, 1995, Peterson, 1991, Zimbabwe Trust, 
1990b).  
 
The lessons drawn from Mahenye since the early 2000s to the present have ranged from 
the ambivalent questioning of elements of CBNRM (Munyaka and Mandizadza, 2004), to 
direct critiques of the full devolution model. For example, Balint and Mashinya (2006) 
characterize the ‘crisis’ in CBNRM:  
Our study reveals the decline of a promising CBNRM programme. We found that 
the Mahenye community no longer receives the flow of significant social and 
economic benefits reported in earlier studies’ (Balint and Mashinya, 2006:814). 
 
They present a very different discourse about Mahenye, the key factors driving it and the 
lessons and questions to be drawn. It presents a completely contrasting view, to the point 
of being almost un-recognizable, of the same small ward, its inhabitants and their social 
dynamics, in a short space of five years. 
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8.2.1 Environmental Characteristics 
Mahenye Ward is located at the southern end of Chipinge District, bordered on the east by 
Mozambique, to the west and south by Gonarezhou National Park and Chiredzi District, 
and to the north by Mutandahwe Ward, also in Chipinge District. It has a low average 
rainfall of 450–500 mm supporting dry land cultivation of grains only in good seasons, but 
its relatively low population density – 20 people/km or half the district average – has 
ensured that the lowveld habitat has remained relatively intact (Central Statistical Office, 
1992, Booth, 1991). 
 
8.2.2 Historical Context 
The historical background of the ward has been extensively traced and documented (Child, 
1995, Murphree, 1995a, Zimbabwe Trust, 1990b, Peterson, 1991, Stockil, 1987). The 
following account is compiled from these sources. The population of Mahenye is from the 
minority Shangaan ethnic group, for whom hunting was traditionally a major component 
of their livelihood strategies. Their culture had evolved well-defined regulatory practices 
to make off-takes sustainable. 
 
Many of the current inhabitants of Mahenye were evicted from their traditional lands prior 
and up to 1966 as these areas became incorporated into the Gonarezhou National Park. 
Following independence in 1980, strong hopes that their land would be returned to them 
were dashed when the new government indicated that its priority was to gain the foreign 
exchange brought into the country by tourists and the national park. This resulted in 
heightened resentment towards Gonarezhou and wildlife, manifested as increasing 
incidences of illegal resource use as people sought illicit ways in which to assert their 
traditional resource rights and livelihoods. 
 
In the mid 1980s, an informal agreement between the DNPWLM, a local safari operator 
and the people of Mahenye enabled some of the benefits from elephant hunting in the area 
to be returned to the villagers. After long negotiations and having overcome many 
bureaucratic hurdles, DNPWLM eventually agreed to build a school and grinding mill in 
1987, drawing on these hunting revenues. Throughout the early negotiations, the people of 
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Mahenye showed remarkable social cohesiveness, patience and restraint in the face of a 
slow and bureaucratic decision-making process. 
 
8.2.3 Socio-Political Characteristics 
Murphree (2001) notes that the Mahenye’s geographic position has contributed to its 
isolation. Neighbors to the east are in a different country; to the south is a national park, 
while those in the west are in a different province. Thus Mahenye retains administrative 
isolation from those in its immediate vicinity. Perhaps most significantly is that within 
Chipinge District itself, the people of Mahenye are ethnically discrete as they are the only 
Shangaan-speaking people in a district exclusively dominated by the Shona-Ndau ethnic 
group. 
 
The people of Mahenye are culturally, politically and administratively distinct from their 
neighbors, which Murphree (ibid) concludes led to the development of a strong level of 
intra-communal cohesiveness – then largely manifested around the institution and 
individual occupying the role of chief – and a sense of collective communal interest. 
 
 
8.2.4 Legal Status and Institutional Basis for CBNRM 
The granting of AA status to Gazaland District Council (now Chipinge RDC) in 1991 
provided the legal mechanism through which the people of Mahenye could benefit from 
natural resource management activities in their ward.  In order to ensure effective 
management of the resource base and an accountable and representative local level 
management structure, the Mahenye CAMPFIRE Committee (MCC) was established in 
the late 1980s. 
 
The operations of the MCC are governed by bylaws (commonly referred to as ‘the 
constitution’) which were developed following lengthy consultations with the general 
community, traditional leadership and local CAMPFIRE leadership (Silas Makanza, 
Zimbabwe Trust, interviewed Harare, May 2005) and are still frequently referred to in 
CAMPFIRE discussions today. While neither the MCC institution nor the bylaws have 
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formal legal status they are (or were) strongly legitimized by use, precedent and 
acceptance by the various CAMPFIRE-related bodies. These bylaws outline the objectives 
of the institution, roles, and responsibilities and terms of the office bearers and general 
members. They also stipulate means through which accountability to the broader 
membership is to be assured. They include: 
• The holding of regular annual general meetings (AGMs) for transparent disclosure 
of management and financial activities by the MCC post holders to the community. 
• The holding of annual elections (via secret ballot by Mahenye households) for post 
holders in the Mahenye CAMPFIRE Committee (MCC) such as that of chairman, 
vice-chairman, finance manager and others. 
 
The bylaws are a written, widely known and understood representation of the standard to 
which the MCC should adhere. They represent an important benchmark against which to 
measure and exert accountability for the activities of the MCC, its post holders and the 
operation of CAMPFIRE at the producer community scales. 
 
The institutional linkages and networks between authorities and across jurisdictional and 
functional scales were also well developed over this period and were broadly perceived to 
have ensured accountability. During the early 1980s, the primary decision-making 
institutions in the ward were those of the traditional authority (through the leadership of 
chiefs, headmen and sabhukus)  working in a closely coordinated relationship with those 
of the democratically elected ‘modern’ political and development institutions’ structures 
such as the Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) to the higher scale of the Rural 
District Councils. In the 1990s, by virtue of its elected basis and development importance 
locally, the MCC also became a powerful institution. The private sector, originally 
represented by one individual (who had also facilitated early CBNRM evolutions in the 
ward between the various bodies) also had significant influence (Murphree, 2001). There 
were also strong linkages between the MCC and national CAMPFIRE capacity building 
network, providing ‘honest brokering’ and technical wildlife management advice (WWF, 
Zimbabwe Trust, CASS-University of Zimbabwe), the national CAMPFIRE 
representative and advocacy body (CAMPFIRE Association) and the state wildlife sector 
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(DNPWLM). 
 
8.2.5 Economic Basis of CAMPFIRE in Mahenye 
One of Mahenye’s progressive attributes during this period, in comparison to most 
CAMPFIRE wards, was its diversification in revenue from solely sport hunting incomes to 
joint enterprises in the eco-tourism sector. In the early 1990s the RDC, on behalf of the 
people of Mahenye, entered into a joint venture arrangement with a private tourist 
operator, the Zimbabwe Sun (now Rivers Lodges of Africa) for the construction of two 
lodges – Mahenye Safari Lodge and Chilo Lodge – catering to a high paying tourist 
market for game viewing and photographic safaris largely benefiting from easy access to 
the nearby national park. Under the terms of the 1996 agreement, land was leased from the 
RDC for a 10-year period. The lodge operator was paying 8% of gross revenue for the first 
three years, 10% for the next three years and 12% for the final four years. Initially, 
revenue earned was paid via the RDC, but in 2003/4 a more direct allocation was made to 
the MCC. In principle, this represented a significant step in fiscal devolution (albeit if 
undertaken in an informal way) but was a decision subsequently reversed at the request of 
the RDC. 
 
The income potential from these lodges was considerable from the mid 1990s and by 1997 
generated twice the income of sport hunting and was responsible for more than tripling the 
overall income for Mahenye CAMPFIRE between 1994 and 1997 (Ibid), yet the downturn 
in tourism in Zimbabwe since 2000 has meant that the real financial returns have become 
limited and sport hunting has returned as the largest revenue source. Despite this, the 
lodges have still brought considerable benefits, most notably in the form of employment. 
At the time of this research, out of a total of 37 staff employed, 32 are from Mahenye, 
including one in a management position. The construction of the lodges has also led to 
improvements in local infrastructure such as transport links, electrification, bore-hole 
construction and telephone connections. 
 
For much of the 1990s and since 2000 the primary form of income generation for the 
MCC has been from the safari hunting concession in the Mahenye/Mutandahwe area. 
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CAMPFIRE revenue in the period 1992–1997 from sport hunting was around US$15-
20,000 (largely from elephant hunting) with the total revenues achieved in the late 1990s 
from both hunting and lodge tourism reaching around US$ 40,000 (Ibid). On average in 
this period, the allocations from total revenue to household dividends were consistently 
around 50%, with around 20% allocated for RDC administration costs (essentially a tax)3, 
2% for the CAMPFIRE Association and the rest roughly shared between MCC managed 
development projects (such as grinding mills) and wildlife management costs (drawing on 
data in Murphree, 2001). 
 
The household dividends of about US$15-25 were better in comparison to other 
CAMPFIRE areas (median of US$4.49 – see Bond, 2001) and served as an important 
incentive for driving CAMPFIRE institutional change and supporting local household 
incomes. A number of interviewees in this current research had vivid memories of the cash 
dividends of the late 1990s as being key contributions to the family’s ability to purchase 
goods and food in drought years or enable the payment of school fees. 
 
The evolution of CBNRM institutions and economic arrangements during the period of 
two decades largely concurred by the late 1990s in practice (if not formal legal 
arrangements) with devolutionary principles. Namely, the MCC as a transparent 
democratically elected body with considerable if not fully devolved authority and a clear 
accountability to a constituency of local members. In addition, there was evidence of the 
equally important dynamics noted by Murphree (2000a) for CBNRM of linkages and 
delegated functions upwards from the producer community MCC scale to those scales and 
entities at district, national agency, NGO and private sector. If Mahenye Ward had been a 
precursor to the core values of devolution in CAMPFIRE, it could by the late 1990s also 
be characterised as a precursor to, and example for, the further evolutions of scholarship of 
the ‘beyond devolution’ views (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007) and to more nuanced 
recognitions of practical democratic politics in CBNRM through crucial upward linkages 
and networks between scales and institutions based on delegation and accountability. 
 
Murphree (2001) notes that this resulted from a happy congruence of a number of 
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disparate factors. These factors include local level features (such as strong leadership in 
local institutions, whether MCC or traditional authority); the incentives from the economic 
success of Mahenye CBNRM reinforced political investment and support by the RDC or 
economic partnership with the private sector; and a wider framework built from an 
‘ordered polity’, political and economic environment that drew favorable reaction from 
state agencies, and a supportive NGO network. The background to how such positive, 
reinforcing dynamics could apparently reverse into stalemate, with the benefits of 
devolution being questioned – not least by the people of Mahenye – is examined in the 
next section. 
 
8.3 Mahenye 2000–2005: Institutions, Management, Local 
Governance and Economic Incentives 
8.3.1 Institutions, Management and Local Governance 
Since 2000, there have been major shifts of power within and between institutions in 
Mahenye as well as in the macro-economic and national political context. Chapter 7 
discusses these major shifts in the macro context.  One outcome of these shifts has been 
the dramatic demise of CAMPFIRE in the view of the overwhelming majority of local 
inhabitants interviewed, and summed up as follows by one woman: 
 CAMPFIRE used to be for all the people, now it’s a family business. 
 
The demise of CAMPFIRE in Mahenye, its core local institution (the MCC) and dramatic 
falls in the value of household dividends coincides with and has been strongly influenced 
by four related local events: 
• the death of the highly respected old Chief Mahenye in 2001 and 
replacement by his son, 
• the complete change of MCC office bearers (on the explicit instructions of 
the new chief), following the flawed MCC elections of 2001, including the 
appointment (not election) of the chief’s younger brother as chairman; 
 
 
 
 
226 
 
• the election of a new councilor for the ward; and 
• the re-tendering of  the hunting concession which has led to ongoing 
conflict and the widespread belief among most local stakeholders that the 
operators currently bidding for the concession are blatantly competing among 
each other in their attempts to illicitly ‘buy off’ the chief and MCC to ensure 
preferential treatment. 
 
These changes have effectively removed the strong local leadership, whose commitment 
and accountability was formerly such a distinctive feature of Mahenye. These included the 
chief, headmen and respected elders, the school headmaster and other teachers and an 
elected leadership including the councilor and members of the MCC. Collectively, these 
people provided a leadership structure that was balanced in its sources of traditional and 
popular legitimation. 
 
Local power and authority have shifted away from the delicate balance established 
between traditional and elected democratic institutions and the leadership of these 
structures, and has become concentrated into the hands of core local elite focused around 
the traditional leadership. ‘Honest brokers’ in local dynamics, whether the private sector, 
NGO, state, RDC or other, have become rare, ineffectual or sidelined. As many people in 
Mahenye said, the result is that they have their own ‘dictator’. An important point in the 
following discussion is the premise that it is not the institution (rules of the game) of either 
the MCC or customary authority that is causal, but the distortion of the rules of both by 
particular forces since 2000 that have permitted local elite capture and perpetuated 
stalemate, contrary to the delegation and accountability mechanisms that existed in the 
past. It is this stalemate, distortions to institutions and the ‘particular forces’ that have led 
to this that are at the core of many of the narratives from Mahenye in the next section. 
 
8.3.2 Management of CAMPFIRE in 2005 
The effect on CAMPFIRE of the shifts in the balance of power between institutions and 
distortion of the rules within institutions has been dramatic. The MCC, once viewed by the 
Mahenye people with pride as contributing to the overall development of Mahenye and to 
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the livelihood needs of individual families, is now widely perceived as an institution that 
mismanages and abuse CAMPFIRE funds for the personal enrichment of the chief and his 
clan. This has included the use of project vehicles for personal transport, the privatization 
of the general store, grinding mills and other CAMPFIRE projects, and access to scarce 
employment opportunities at the lodges being mediated by the chief’s family. Enabling 
this situation has been the dismantling of those locally developed and mandated 
mechanisms that ensured that CAMPFIRE was a participatory process, representative of 
and accountable to the people of Mahenye. 
 
8.3.3 The Demise of Democratic Procedures 
Although it has no formal legal basis, according to its constitution, the MCC is responsible 
for carrying out management functions, employing local staff to monitor wildlife, 
poaching and hunting activities of the professional hunter. It sets budgets and is 
responsible to general community meetings for its activities and planning. Prior to 2000 
MCC board members were democratically and transparently elected (once every two 
years) at open AGMs, and presentation of incomes and budgets openly made with all 
decisions regarding use of revenues collectively taken at these meetings. 
 
However, only two AGMs have been held since 2000, both of which were poorly 
attended. Elections for committee members have not been held at any AGM since those of 
2001. The current chairman was never elected but was given this position by the chief 
after his predecessor (who had been elected in the 2001 elections) left the village after 
allegedly misappropriating CAMPFIRE funds. 
 
On the rare occasion when AGMs are still held, their function is now very different from 
the accountability basis outlined in the constitution. According to the MCC chairman: 
…we use AGMs as a way to tell the community how the committee and traditional 
leaders have budgeted and spent CAMPFIRE money and other things. It’s where 
we let them know what their leaders are doing for them (Elias Chafesuka, 
interviewed Mahenye, May 2005). 
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The regular monthly planning meetings of the MCC are held and known as ‘First Friday’ 
meetings. The original committee of seven has been expanded to 12. In addition to MCC 
members, these meetings are now also open to all members of the traditional leadership, 
the councilor and the ward coordinator, totaling 44 people. Minutes of the meetings for the 
years 2004/5 illustrate that discussions are dominated by issues relating to the selection of 
the safari operator and what is perceived to be the undue influence of the RDC in the 
process.  Moreover, it is at these meetings that ‘elections’ are now undertaken for new 
membership of the MCC, with candidates for membership nominated exclusively by 
existing MCC members, normally the chairman. Income and budget transparency to the 
household level has evaporated – as revealed in the quote from the chairman, the mentality 
of the leadership is not based on collective decision making by/with the people or 
accounting for actions and decisions (active and interactive) but informing the people 
(whose role is passive). 
 
  8.3.4 Shrinking Incomes and Economic Incentives 
This research indicates that significant funds are being lost due to local level problems, 
and higher ‘leakages’ occurring in a chain of transactions. Consequently, there is a 
cumulative erosion of revenue even before household dividends are paid. The major 
leakages come from national economic distortions. Primarily, these losses result from: 
• the loss in value that occurs when converting foreign exchange to the massively 
over-valued Zimbabwe $ 
• the loss in value resulting from astronomical annual inflation rates when revenue 
remains stored in bank accounts for up to a  year before household dividend 
payments are made. 
 
This has significant implications for CAMPFIRE, implying that the cash-based approach 
upon which it has traditionally relied to provide the economic incentive for resource 
management is of limited viability in the current economic context of Zimbabwe.  
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Throughout the 1990s, annual allocations to household dividends were consistently around 
50% of total budget, ranging from 48% in 1992 to 55% in 1997 (Murphree, 2001).  Since 
2001 there has only been one allocation to household dividends. This took place in May 
2004 and was on the basis (according to the official figures submitted by Chipinge RDC 
letter on 23/11/04) of a total revenue earned (2003) of Z$40,118,791.00. The household 
dividend amounted to a cash payment (in principle) of Z$6,100 per household. 
Nevertheless, Z$6,000 was deducted from each household prior to payouts, for a ‘district 
development levy’ by the traditional authority, the validity of which has never been 
verified, resulting in an actual cash in hand dividend of just Z$100 (US$0.03). As stated 
by one interviewee: 
Z$100 even then wasn’t enough to buy one match, and most didn’t know about it. I 
don’t know anyone who even went to the [MCC project] office to collect their 
money. 
 
As a proportion of the overall stated revenues, this sum of ‘actual cash in hand’ dividend 
represented less than 1% (0.2%) in comparison to the 50% averages in the 1990s. 
Meanwhile, those who attend the monthly MCC meetings get a sitting allowance of 
Z$15,000 per session, refreshments and transport. As the MCC meetings are potentially 
open to the 44 people as detailed above, total annual costs, in theory, can exceed 
Z$13,200,000, plus transport. This is in stark contrast to the total dividend payout in 2004 
of Z$5,453,400. 
 
The situation relating to income and budgets in 2004/5 is highly complicated not only by 
the state of the internal MCC accounts reviewed during this research, but by the payments 
from the lodges and hunting sectors bypassing a central revenue record system at either 
MCC or RDC level and with unclear contractual or financial agreements. 
 
Sport hunting has been the most lucrative source of income, and has been mired in 
complexity. In 1997, Tshabezi Safaris won the concession for a five-year period. In 2002 
the hunting concession was tendered again and once again awarded by the RDC to 
Tshabezi Safaris. The fact that no contract has been in place since 2002 is one of the 
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causes of the conflict surrounding the hunting concession. 
 
During this tender process, disputes broke out and are still ongoing between and within 
various interest groups within the community of Mahenye, with the RDC, and among 
three competing private sector operators. As of late 2005 the formal contract had still to be 
awarded. The resulting uncertainties and competition between the various stakeholders has 
been one of the driving forces enabling powerful local level elites to co-opt the power and 
resources of the MCC for their own political and personal financial ends. As a mirror of 
national power and politics, the situation created by the local elites appears to be an 
‘instrumentalisation of disorder’ (Chabal and Daloz, 1999), in which elites serve as 
community and lucrative resource gatekeepers, ‘vanguard’ leadership with powerful 
political capital and connections while maximizing their access to benefits through 
disorder. By maintaining disorder and gatekeeper status, the local elites successfully play 
off the private sector members against each other, monopolize the considerable benefits of 
patronage and ensure that the rules of the game (clear contracts and transparent payments) 
remain sufficiently obscure to prolong a stalemate. 
 
Whatever the accounting and contractual complexity, the simple facts are that the 
households in Mahenye are getting no meaningful economic dividends from CAMPFIRE, 
in stark contrast to the 1990s. The widely held belief in Mahenye of corruption, misuse 
and abuse of funds and power by the MCC resulted in a written request from the Mahenye 
ward councillor to the RDC requesting an internal audit, which was carried out in April, 
2004. This audit demonstrates that the picture (also observed in Balint and Mashinya 
2006), concerning abuse of funds, infrastructure, equipment, and employment 
opportunities by those who now control CAMPFIRE is clearly grounded in facts. The 
report, which as of September 2005 had not been made available to the public, concludes: 
The marginalised communities are not benefiting as much from the projects and it 
is apparent that the privileged few now stand to benefit. Recommended systems 
and procedures have been ignored, most likely deliberately (Chipinge RDC, 
2005:3).  
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The outcome of this situation is that all of those interviewed noted that there is no longer 
any independent local institution that represents the interests of the people or to which the 
grievances of the people can be aired. The entire discussions and decisions take place at 
the chief’s dare (assembly meeting). 
 
This is the background of radically changed institutions, local governance and politics and 
economic incentives against which the following section of narratives is set. 
 
 8.4 Stakeholder Narratives 
             
 Vanhu varwadziwa, havana kwavanochemera. 
            (People are not happy, but they do not know where to complain) 
 
8.4.1 Background 
Given the competing interests at stake it is perhaps not surprising that the narratives 
surrounding CAMPFIRE in Mahenye differ among the various stakeholders, and that 
different scenarios for change are identified by these groups. In very broad terms the 
stakeholder groups at a local level include the traditional leadership, the current MCC 
members, the general community members, and the private sector. Other external 
stakeholders include the RDCs and NGOs such as the CAMPFIRE Association. However, 
as the following discussion indicates, this simplistic breakdown of players hides an 
overlapping and constantly shifting array of perceptions, alliances and networks. This 
section relates the stories that each group shared with me, highlighting the concerns and 
issues dominant within each group. Wherever possible they are presented in their own 
words. However, the atmosphere of fear and mistrust in Mahenye meant that all interviews 
were conducted on condition of anonymity and therefore, no individuals are identified.  
 
  8.4.2 Traditional Leadership 
The traditional leadership in Mahenye consists of Chief Mahenye, two headmen and 29 
kraal heads. Given the co-option of the MCC by the chief and his immediate family (as of 
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September 2005 every member of the 12-person MCC was a relative of the chief) I 
identify these institutions here as falling within the same stakeholder group even though 
there are very clear ‘fault lines’ developing between individuals and sub-groups. Despite 
this close association of the chief with the programme, he claims to have no direct 
relationship with it, although he is outspoken in his support, noting that: 
CAMPFIRE has been here a long time and brought many good things but it needs 
changes. The main problem is that money from hunting goes to the RDC first; it 
should come directly to Mahenye. Also the RDC want to interfere in who we select 
as our hunter. 
 
The narrative constructed by both the chief and the MCC chairman is that of a successful 
programme that brings development to Mahenye while protecting the natural resource 
base and upholding local culture and traditions. While they identify some problems with 
the programme, they attribute them to external agents and technical deficiency in the 
implementation process. These problems are attributed to the greed and inefficiency of the 
current safari operator, and the unwillingness of the RDC to commit to fiscal devolution 
and local level decision making regarding the selection of safari operators. They 
acknowledge the problems of financial accountability in the recent past. However, they 
expressed confidence in the mechanisms now put in place to address these problems, 
which include the forming of a finance sub-committee of the MCC. 
 
However, except for these two individuals, the eight  other members of the traditional 
leadership and MCC interviewed (including the person responsible for financial 
accounting and record keeping) presented a less rosy story by identifying failures in 
leadership, financial management  and governance – and detailing several instances of 
abuse and misuse of funds and MCC assets by the chairman – coupled with the technical 
and administrative problems identified by the chief and chairman as being the biggest 
impediment to the programme. A senior member of the Chauke family said: 
The situation at the moment is a free-for-all. Soft drinks, sitting allowances, free 
transport, Christmas parties, nothing like before when things were run properly. It 
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is corruption and bribery (undyire, in Shona language). But those of us with the 
authority to do something can’t because this dispute is in our own clan. Does a son 
question his father? Someone from outside must step in, either the RDC or 
CAMPFIRE Association. We made sure an auditor came but now the council 
(RDC) does nothing, they must remove the culprit, even make arrests. Council is 
letting us down. 
 
Reinforcing this accusation were the voices of two members of the newly established 
finance sub-committee who noted that ‘they are still hiding the books’ as they were 
prevented from overseeing or having any control of finance. Demanding access to 
information was not an option as this would simply result in their removal from the 
committee and possible expulsion from the area. The general sentiment of anger and 
resentment against the chairman was further articulated by the ward councilor, who had 
also requested the RDC audit. He independently echoed the sentiments expressed above 
commenting that: 
The problems are the fault of the chairman, who overrides the financial committee. 
The people are unhappy and the problems are getting worse. If funds come direct 
here now they will just be stolen. If there is an election today the chairman and 
committee will be thrown out, people here know the problems and their rights. 
  
  8.4.3 General Population 
Of the 52 people interviewed in Mahenye, 32 can be broadly referred to as ‘general 
population’ in the sense that they did not belong to the other stakeholder groups. However, 
this hides a diverse mix of individuals. Those interviewed were roughly representative in 
terms of age, ethnicity and gender. 
 
The story told by everyone in this group had at its centre disappointment and 
disillusionment with the current situation, but also a sense that events were still unfolding, 
and that they collectively had at their disposal means to address problems. This group 
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unanimously identified poor leadership, governance issues and the misappropriation of 
power by the MCC as the root cause of problems. They expressed concern and confusion 
about private sector tourism operations, the role of NGOs and the role of the RDC. 
 
For over 10 years, CAMPFIRE was portrayed to me as a source of local pride and 
confidence as well as development. It was considered to have been a genuinely 
representative process. The majority of ward residents had considerable information 
concerning the nature and extent of their rights, technical details (for example, the value of 
individual species) and the nature of income-generating ventures in their area, in which 
they enthusiastically participated and benefited. 
 
People articulated trust in and respect for their leaders at that time, crediting them with 
having brought about this success. On many occasions, they specifically mentioned the 
former chief, former councilor, former MCC members, the private sector partner and 
NGOs formerly active in the area.  However, there is consensus on the cause of the 
problem: 
Our troubles started when the old chief passed and [the former MCC chairman] 
and the others were pushed off the committee and [the current incumbent] was 
made chairman for life. 
But they are constrained to act because: 
People fear to challenge the chairman. This is challenging the chief and would 
result in losing land or even being chased from the area. 
A widely anticipated outcome of this is that: 
People will go back to poaching because there is no benefit from wildlife 
otherwise. 
There is also a common view that: 
The RDC has more power, they should do something. 
There is little that people can do overtly, but they do have covert means of expressing their 
displeasure and translating this into political statements. Several different interviewees 
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recounted identical versions of the following story: 
The chief had been told by the District Administrator that everyone must vote 
ZANU and then he would get a vehicle. We were told to do so, but everyone here 
voted MDC to get back at him. He could not do anything about that because it was 
a secret ballot. We hoped that the chief would not get his vehicle and realize that 
everyone was aware that he was allowing our CAMPFIRE money to be lost. 
 
Thus, there is a remarkable level of agreement among the majority of those in Mahenye on 
the basic situation and how it should be resolved. However, beyond this common 
understanding there is the complication of ongoing conflict between the MCC, the safari 
operators and the RDC over the re-tendering of the hunting quota. There is a strong 
perception among the community members that this conflict is being used by the MCC as 
a smoke screen to cover its own misconduct. 
 
Some in the community do not trust the current sport hunting operator, Tshabezi Safaris, 
who is blamed for failing to conduct problem animal control (PAC) and for failing to 
maximize returns on the quota, thus reducing the revenue for Mahenye. However, others 
are aware that the MCC negotiated with Tshabezi directly to ensure that a proportion of 
payments were made in kind to avoid payment passing through the RDC. The MCC 
chairman maintains that this benefited the community as the 35% administration fee for 
Council was not subtracted. However, it is the common local belief (upheld by the RDC 
audit and this research) that those funds and assets that went directly to the MCC, such as 
vehicles, donations for the general store, materials for bridge construction and monies for 
school uniforms, have been misappropriated by the chairman. It was also commonly 
alleged that a rival operator, who is currently tendering for the Mahenye concession, was 
bribing the leadership with money, meat, beer and the construction of a house for the 
chief, in an attempt to favour the bid. 
 
Private operators in the area are not trusted, although many believe that the MCC is 
manipulating them to its own advantage. This lack of trust is compounded by the fact that 
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the MCC chairman is employed by the lodges as their community liaison officer: 
If you want to get a job at Chilo [the lodges] or even Tshabezi as a housekeeper, 
you have to see the chairman and you will be made to pay a goat or some money. 
 
The positive relationships with the operator of the lodges, identified by Murphree (2001) 
and many people in Mahenye, have, at least for most interviewees, now broken down. 
This belief is fuelled by the perception that the decreasing financial returns from the 
lodges are a result of attempts on their management’s behalf to defraud the community. 
 
Notwithstanding large-scale disillusionment with this situation, the majority of 
interviewees could identify a core strategy to solve their problems. This strategy involves 
an appeal to the RDC, as the only institution with the legal and political authority, 
legitimacy and mandate, to intervene and assist in the restoration of local institutional 
structures that are accountable and representative of the local constituency. Thus, the 
collective demand is for the RDC to accept its responsibilities as the agency granted AA 
and act accordingly to ensure that the ‘CAMPFIRE constitution’ (established and secured 
by precedent bylaws of the MCC) and democratic functioning local institutions (the MCC 
under the rules of the bylaws) are in place. Essentially, the action demanded is that 
elections be held for the posts of the MCC – under the secret ballot and transparent rules 
of the existing bylaws – after four years of these basic rules having been flouted. 
 
Only after this demand has been met do people want to see financial devolution with 
revenues coming directly to the local institutions. One former influential MCC member 
sums up the situation as follows: 
There is a lot of talk from the committee about ‘devolution’ but if the RDC lets 
funds come direct to them [the MCC] they will disappear in days along with the 
rest of our money. We would like to see funds coming directly but not at the 
moment, our problems have to be sorted out first. The RDC is the only one that can 
help us do this. They are legally responsible as the holders of AA, and they must 
accept their responsibilities. 
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Local people are collectively indicating that the RDC has an important role to play in 
fostering the conditions that will ensure their empowerment. They could do this by 
providing neutral arbitration in a situation that at present cannot be addressed locally 
owing to the current levels of distortion and complicated politics. 
 
People are clear that CAMPFIRE, by providing them with information about their rights 
and those of the other institutions involved, has provided them with the confidence and 
basis to express demands to the RDC: 
People are very much aware of their rights and obligations and they know this 
because the old committee used to bare all things and read the constitution in 
public at AGMs and other meetings, we also know from this what the RDC should 
be doing. 
 
However, this does not imply that the RDC is viewed entirely favorably in Mahenye and 
mounting frustration was articulated by many. The RDC is perceived to be primarily 
concerned with ensuring maximum income from the hunting operations to meet its own 
financial needs at the expense of the people. The delays in re-tendering are seen to be the 
result of the RDC trying to negotiate more favorable terms. These delays are bringing it 
into disrepute and fuelling damaging rumors about its motives: 
We know Chipinge RDC is aware of all the problems but they do not assist, they 
are getting something from this. 
Tshabezi hunted in the area without a contract because he managed to bribe 
officials at the RDC. Now the intention of the council is to take over the running of 
CAMPFIRE because it generates so much money. 
 
The most striking element of the narrative is the level of agreement on the nature of the 
problem (local elite capture and distortion of the MCC and its core rules and roles) and 
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how it can be solved (RDC intervention as an obligation of AA status, but not RDC as a 
substitute for MCC the institution of the bylaws). Despite problems (and dangers), the 
people of Mahenye continue to demonstrate the remarkable level of ‘intra-communal 
cohesiveness’ and capacity for expressing ‘constituency demands’ identified in 
Murphree’s past scholarship. 
 
  8.4.4 The Private Sector 
Private sector interests consist of the operator of the two lodges, River Lodges of Africa 
(RLA); the existing safari operator, Tshabezi Safaris; and Zambezi Safaris, who is 
tendering for the quota. Representatives of the Lodges (RLA) and Tshabezi were 
interviewed and told a common story of how, since 2000, it had become increasingly 
difficult to have a professional relationship with the community. 
 
While they are both aware that there are conflicts about the level of accountability of the 
MCC to general community members, both still use the narrative of ‘the community’ and 
their actions are guided by the understanding that the MCC represents ‘the community’. 
Ultimately, the primary concern of both is the national economic and political system that 
is leading to a decline of tourists and threatening their businesses, although this is clearly 
more of a threat to the lodges than safari operations. 
 
Tshabezi’s story illustrates wasted time, money and effort, a breach of trust and 
unprofessional conduct by both the RDC and the MCC. They are concerned with contracts 
going unsigned, lack of clarity on where responsibility lies or what the proper procedures 
and mechanisms for tendering should be. They fear that the current situation is leading to 
further degradation of a resource base that is already under pressure. 
We thought people were genuinely interested in the development of the area and so 
invested directly here, but it has been a waste. We’ve negotiated contracts at a 
local level because that’s what the theory is all about, but we should have been 
talking with the RDC. Now there is a conflict between the community and the RDC 
over allocation of funds and we are caught in the middle and made to look like the 
bad guys. 
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The story told by representatives of the lodges differs slightly, as may be expected given 
the long-term investment the company is making in the area. As demonstrated in their 
promotional materials, the CAMPFIRE programme and its development and conservation 
benefits are an integral component of their marketing strategy. The discourse of 
CAMPFIRE – ‘participation, community benefits, local cultural traditions and incentives 
for conservation’ – is embedded in the management strategies and rational of the lodges 
and their staff. Although they are aware that there may be problems, these tend to be 
down-played: 
We do tend to have our heads in the sand and do not really know the details but we 
know the current chief is working in his own self-interest, leading the programme 
away from where it’s supposed to be going. But there are no indications that 
anyone is going to pose a direct challenge to the royal family. It is the chief himself 
who will have to make the changes. To the extent that we get involved locally, we 
do so through the legitimate structures, those of the chief and his family. 
 
Thus, despite RLA being aware of misappropriation of funds and conflicts within the 
community, it continues to negotiate new contractual arrangements through the office of 
the chief, as evidenced in the submission of a ‘Concept Document Proposing a New 
Partnership’ to Chief Mahenye, copied to the MCC, in late 2002. Implicit in this document 
is the assumption that the chief and the MCC were the legitimate and accountable 
representatives of the people of Mahenye. According to interviewees, it was very clear 
even by this date that this was not the case. One explanation for this stance is that it harks 
back to a story line appropriate to the institutions of the 1990s, irrespective of the 
individual leadership changes from 2000 and the evolution of deep distortions that 
removed their local legitimacy. An alternative explanation, given by several members of 
staff who are from Mahenye, is that the reaction of senior management to local events has 
been pragmatic acceptance of the new political realities now prevalent at local and 
national scales: 
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The new chief does not seem to understand that getting benefits from us is a 
privilege and not a right. He comes here and demands beers and other favours. He 
demands far too much from us and threatens if we do not honour, because the 
general manager is white and he can be associated with MDC! We cannot 
retrench the chairman because he is such a powerful individual – removing him 
from the payroll will be disastrous to our relationship with the chieftainship. 
 
  8.4.5 The Rural District Council 
The role of the RDC includes formal awarding of the hunting concession following an 
established process of advertising and competitive tendering. As well as having a legal 
obligation in this regard, they also have a financial incentive to ensure that the process is 
efficiently managed as they are recipients of 20-35% of the income as an ‘administration’ 
fee. In theory, tenders are evaluated both in terms of financial value and on qualitative 
considerations, with the expectation that RDCs take into account the views of the wildlife-
producing ward. However, an independent commission of inquiry undertaken in 2005 at 
the request of the Chipinge RDC indicates that established procedure and competitive 
bidding processes have not been adhered to and that there is no clear relationship between 
the value of the resources and the payment by the safari operator.  
 
Following a written request from the Mahenye Ward councilor, backed up by anonymous 
letters from Mahenye residents, the RDC undertook an independent audit of the MCC in 
2004. As recounted above, this audit clearly revealed the validity of accusations of 
mismanagement and misappropriation of CAMPFIRE funds by the elite within Mahenye. 
The RDC’s story of Mahenye emerges from the commission of inquiry, which related the 
conflict from the hunting concessions and issues of financial mismanagement raised in the 
audit reports. 
 
According to the RDC’s CEO, the situation is ‘a big mess’ that has come about because 
‘one individual is no longer accountable’, and is bringing the RDC into disrepute: 
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Chipinge is proud of being the birthplace of the CAMPFIRE concept, but now we 
are failing to live up to our reputation. We view it as a priority that things are put 
right. 
 
The RDC’s chosen strategy involved analyzing two elements of the problem: the lack of 
accountability and the conflict between the community and the safari operator: 
And now we will approach the issues in stages. Our first priority is to sort out the 
problems with the safari operators. Once this is done we’ll address local problems 
of representation. Elections with a secret ballot need to take place, and new 
safeguards developed to make sure authority is not abused. 
 
The RDC’s story is that they are aware of problems and are in the process of making a 
measured and responsible decision about how to proceed, in order to respond to the 
demands and needs of their constituency. Given such a reasonable response, it is fair to 
speculate why there has been so little action. The audit – which clearly illustrates fraud 
and corruption – was carried out in August 2004, and the commission of inquiry took 
place in May 2005. And yet by October 2005, despite the CEO acknowledging that it was 
a priority for the RDC, no action had been taken. This may simply be a result of 
bureaucratic ineptitude, but once again it is possible to identify alternative reasons. 
 
Chief Mahenye’s position creates opportunities for networks and allows him to reach out 
to politically powerful national factions that may influence the strategies adopted by and 
the nature of the relationship with the RDC. For example, the Deputy Minister of Local 
Government, Rural and Urban Development, (who additionally holds a leading post 
within the state-approved traditional chief’s institution) has attended meetings with the 
Mahenye CAMPFIRE committee at which discussions related to securing greater financial 
devolution from the RDC. The chief has also worked closely with the former District 
Administrator of Chipinge (himself now a Member of Parliament) to influence the 
Mahenye vote for the ZANU-PF MP candidate. These personal national networks and 
 
 
 
 
242 
 
political affiliations provide a level of complexity in local power struggles that was beyond 
the scope of this research to explore in detail (and would have raised security issues had 
attempts been made to do so). However, they have a real impact on the balance of power 
between the RDC and traditional authorities and this may at least partially account for the 
reluctance of the RDC to take decisive action. 
 
  8.4.6 The NGOs 
The marginalization of civil society from policymaking and implementation in any sphere 
that relates to governance in the politically contested rural areas (described in Chapter 7) 
has had profound impact on CAMPFIRE in Mahenye. The consequence of this 
marginalization is that the former CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group (CCG) members 
(particularly NGOs such as WWF and Zimbabwe Trust) who formerly played key roles in 
institutional development within Mahenye are no longer able to do so, partly as a result of 
loss of access to funds but also because their mandate for involvement has effectively been 
removed. Field staff interviewed had formerly operated in Mahenye and aware of the 
current situation in Mahenye. However, they did not have the means and resources to 
address the problem, and they also felt intimidated to try to address them. As expressed by 
one NGO officer formerly active in the area for a decade: 
 
[Our friends] in the RDC tell us Mahenye is a mess, the chief and chairman have 
taken over. I hate to hear it after years of working with them, but with no vehicles, 
no fuel, and no reason to go there, what can we do? Anyway, I am known as MDC, 
the chief is ZANU-PF; it would not be good for my health. 
 
The one NGO that is still highly active in CAMPFIRE implementation is the CAMPFIRE 
Association (CA). They are familiar with the current situation in Mahenye, not least 
because the CEO was a member of the commission of inquiry. They are involved with the 
RDC in seeking a solution to the problems based on their understanding that: 
There are a lot of undeclared interests at play in Mahenye. There is need to 
identify the root cause of the problem and sort out the institutional problems. We 
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strongly felt as a commission that there was need for changes in tenure of office, to 
elect a new committee (Charles Jonga, CEO CAMPFIRE, interview Harare, May 
2005). 
 
As in the case of the RDC narrative, there is also a sense of deadlock in taking actions or 
decisions in the discourse of the CA; particularly given this is precisely the institution 
tasked with linking the producer communities of CAMPFIRE with district and national 
agencies and with the overall coordination of the programme. 
 
8.5 Discussion 
In discussing the issues of CBNRM, democratic governance, institutions and economic 
incentives in Mahenye, a good place to begin is to recognize the complexity of the 
current situation both in Zimbabwe and in Mahenye, but also the extent to which there is 
remarkable congruence and depth in the narratives of local, district and national scales 
about the reality of the challenges and the most urgent next steps to take.  
 
8.5.1 Local Governance, CBNRM Institutions and Historical 
Precedence 
One of the paradoxes and strengths of the case of Mahenye, clear in the narratives from 
various sources, is the extent to which the ward, the dynamics of its governance and its 
institutional evolutions place it not just as a precursor to CBNRM in the region. Mahenye 
also reached a phase in the mid to late 1990s of practically implementing the more recent 
scholarship that stressed multi-tiered governance linkages and jurisdictional and scale 
principles involving upward delegation/downward accountability depending on political 
agency, ecological and social scale requirements (Martin, 2003, Murphree, 2001). It had in 
that decade moved beyond the ‘chicken and egg’ structural dilemma of full devolution as a 
prerequisite for CBNRM, versus fragile local common property regime as a cause of 
failure of CBNRM. 
 
This situation arose as a result of congruence, where the strength of the local society, 
which could mix the modern with customary institutions, had linked up to scales and 
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institutions of the state, private sector and NGOs with powerful economic incentives and 
political capital supporting these evolutions. The challenge was to come from 2000 with 
the series of connected local and national events that generated the dramatic distortions to 
economic incentives, political dynamics and local leadership. The informal and precedent 
basis of the ‘Mahenye Constitution’ was inadequate to counterbalance this profound shift. 
In simple terms, the devolution-jurisdictional egg was hatching out in a much rougher 
neighborhood. 
 
However, it is important to stress (as do the majority of the local narratives from Mahenye, 
which speak of resilience and knowledge of the past strengths of their institutions) that this 
does not preclude the ability to react or adapt. From 1982–1991 there was a precedent of 
tackling significant challenges. This, plus the fact that the widely agreed-on strengths of 
the institution up to 2000 were achieved, gives hope that the scenarios and strategies for 
change envisaged by most Mahenye people can engage with the crisis of today. 
 
  8.5.2 National to Local links, Mirrors and Influences 
Inasmuch as problems in Mahenye reflect local failures in governance and capacity, 
clearly, local governance is being significantly affected by national governance issues. In 
Zimbabwe, recent political events have resulted in the promotion of institutions and 
individuals associated with the ruling party while those affiliated with opposition parties 
and politics have been marginalised (Raftopoulos and Savage, 2005, Bauer and Taylor, 
2005, Harold-Barry, 2004, Hill, 2005, Amnesty International, 2004, Hammar, 2003). In 
this regard, the Mahenye situation mirrors the national context, which has profoundly 
impacted the balance of power between various Mahenye institutions as well as 
determining which individuals would play active roles within institutions, based upon their 
political affiliations.  
 
One of the most significant legislative changes promoting shifts in the institutional 
dynamics and balance of power within Mahenye has been the Traditional Leaders Act 
(TLA) of 2001, which has strengthened the power of traditional authorities nationally 
while also bringing them under the influence of the ruling party, ZANU-PF. This Act has 
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not only enhanced the authority of the chief locally but has also changed the nature of the 
relationship between chiefs, RDC and the private sector. Other changes which have 
influenced events in Mahenye include the creation of new and powerful institutions 
representing the party at the local level. These include the ward coordinator (an employee 
of the Ministry of Youth, Gender and Employment Creation), while formerly, relatively 
insignificant institutions such as the ward chairman of ZANU PF have taken on new 
prominence. Compounding this is that the modern development structures and their 
representatives, notably the ward councilor, have become accountable to the  the ruling 
party, rather than the electorate.  In addition, they have sometimes, under violent pressure, 
represented party interests in rural areas (See Hammar 2003 for a detailed account). 
 
Nevertheless, changes in the national context have not only been legislative or 
administrative. As discussed in the preceding Chapter, the year 2000 saw a dramatic and 
public shift in the political dynamics of Zimbabwe, culminating in an increase in 
politically motivated violence and in the collapse of the ‘rule of law’ (Raftopoulos and 
Savage, 2005). This situation was underlain by a racially biased and populist moral 
discourse about the return of African soil to Africans, adopted by the ruling party, which 
served to marginalize and vilify whites and, by inference, political opponents of the ruling 
party. At local levels this often translated into violent persecution and marginalization of 
MDC supporters and whites. 
 
Many of those interviewed noted that the impact in Mahenye has been to support the 
process of marginalization of key figures who were known to be opposition supporters 
from decision-making roles and a further reinforcement of the powers of the chief. 
Alternatively expressed by one interviewee: 
People cannot make their concerns public for fear of being labeled opposition 
supporters. 
 
Thus, the relationship between the traditional and ruling party institutions has 
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fundamentally changed, with the result that power and influence of traditional authorities 
has been enhanced but at the expense of increased dependency on the ruling party. In 
Mahenye, all power is vested in the chief (as distinct from the institution of customary 
authority) whose position is secure because of the mutually beneficial relationship and 
endorsement from ZANU-PF and the other newly created or co-opted institutions such as 
the MCC under the current chairman. The new roles acquired by the chief and his family 
translate into real power over and beyond what was traditionally extended to them. 
 
The national context has enabled the chief to translate his newly enhanced legal position 
vis-à-vis natural resources and new position as a powerful ZANU-PF representative to 
divert the claims of others and validate his own claims over these resources. Therefore, he 
has expanded his control over development in Mahenye. One of the actions undertaken by 
the chief on his ascendancy in 2001 was to ensure that CAMPFIRE and its benefits were 
brought under his control. 
 
  8.5.3 Economic Factors - CAMPFIRE Incentives 
The narratives and realities of Mahenye illustrate that the local and national institutional 
distortions are also present in the economic context. The dramatic fall in institutional 
norms is illustrated by the decline in household dividends, between the late 1990s and 
2004, from around US$20 to three cents. The real decline of the proportion of revenue 
allocated to household dividends fell from around 50% to less than 1%. Effectively, the 
ward residents are getting no economic returns from their wildlife management or 
recompense from the costs of living with wildlife. 
 
CAMPFIRE revenue mechanisms are now effectively a long pipeline of massive 
leakages, exposed to foreign exchange losses, inflation at the world’s highest rates, ad 
hoc taxes, fraud and minimal transparency. The combined revenue disbursed as 
household dividends for the 894 households in Mahenye in 2004 was therefore a total of 
US$27. The real value of elephants sold that year was US$39,000 (Rihoy et al., 2007).  
In effect, Mahenye inhabitants therefore suffered more than a 99% loss in revenue. This 
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clearly makes no economic sense. The huge losses indicate that the ward and the RDC 
are being seriously prejudiced by maintaining a mechanism suited to a previous 
economic environment. 
 
8.5.4 Networks, Patronage and Power 
By ‘capturing’ CAMPFIRE in Mahenye, the traditional authorities have created a 
powerful patronage tool for themselves through which they can construct and reproduce 
power relationships and perpetuate their authority. CAMPFIRE provides the means to 
develop a strong network of loyal supporters. This begins with the enrolment of other 
members of their extended family as MCC members, ensuring that they receive significant 
financial benefits in the form of sitting allowances, access to valuable transport and 
prestige. The chairman and chief have ensured that these people are beholden to them. By 
extending the First Friday meetings to include all members of the traditional authorities 
and other party-endorsed positions, such as the ZANU-PF chairman, ward development 
officer and councilor, this network has been extended to all those in positions of authority 
in the village. The network is extended outside family by the manipulation of scarce and 
valuable employment opportunities within the CAMPFIRE project itself. For example, 
posts for game monitors, grinding mill operators and shop assistants are now decided upon 
exclusively by the Chairman of the MCC. 
 
The same is true for jobs with the private sector operators who maintain the façade that 
the chairman of the MCC represents ‘the community’ and give him leverage over who is 
appointed to these positions. Other benefits that the chairman extends to his network 
members include the provision of credit at the grinding mills and CAMPFIRE stores and 
the provision of personal loans. By consolidating their positions of power in other 
institutions outside the MCC, the chairman and chief can threaten retribution to anyone 
who questions their decisions, not just in the form of losing the benefits that have been 
forthcoming from being part of their network, but also through the potential loss of access 
to food aid, land or being labeled an opposition supporter. This last threat can also be 
extended to private sector operators and the RDC through the manipulation of their 
national political networks. 
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Thus, the chief and chairman would appear to have built themselves an unassailable 
position of power and authority. However, this is clearly not the case. There is a 
unanimous condemnation of the chairman and unanimous agreement on the need to find a 
solution to the current problems, even amongst those who would lose their privileged 
positions as network beneficiaries. 
 
Nevertheless, there is widespread discontent and the situation within Mahenye remains a 
socially and politically constructed stalemate with no local means of sufficient agency or 
power to break the deadlock. Therefore, people have identified alternative mechanisms to 
assist them to solve their problems. The long and successful history of CAMPFIRE in the 
area has ensured that there is considerable local knowledge about the process, including a 
thorough understanding of the roles, agency and responsibilities of various institutions. 
Thus while the RDC is widely distrusted on the grounds that it has its own agenda in 
relation to the safari operations and securing its own revenue, there is, nevertheless, clear 
recognition within Mahenye that it has a legal responsibility to step in to break the local 
stalemate and that it has the political agency and state-party linkages to do so. 
 
It is generally recognized that this consists of two different but interconnected activities. 
Firstly, addressing issues of local governance and secondly addressing fiscal 
accountability and revenue efficiency (such as the controversy over the sport hunting 
contract and the major leakages of revenue earned). Once these issues have been resolved, 
the majority of people in Mahenye want to see greater fiscal devolution occurring. That is 
to say, their scenario for change is a sequence of events in rebuilding a process of 
devolution based on responsibilities and authority but also with linkages of strategic 
delegation and practical politics to get there. 
 
  8.5.5 Building Accountability - Linking the Local and District 
The narratives suggest that one of the most significant impacts of CAMPFIRE over the 
last 15 years has been to empower local people by making them aware of the value of the 
natural resources in their areas and the extent of their rights to these, while raising 
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awareness of mechanisms through which they can exercise these rights.  Community 
members have the knowledge, confidence and organizational awareness to counter local 
elites who are usurping power and undermining democratic local decision-making and to 
articulate demands to their political representatives at the district level to assist in 
resolving the problem. Despite local political mobilization having been largely covert to 
date due to fear of reprisal, it has created space for political negotiation between the local 
and district level and has served as a catalyst to two external and damning investigations. 
This ultimately leads to greater accountability of the RDCs to their local constituents. 
 
Contrary to interpretations of Mahenye as another example of CBNRM in crisis, my 
interpretation of Mahenye narratives is an optimistic one of evolution and resilience. At 
the local level, there is ample evidence that many of those factors which Murphree (2001) 
identified as decisive in their overall success are still present, most notably intra-
communal cohesion, resource richness, social energy, flexibility, evolution, and 
acceptance of risk. However, it also provides evidence that CBNRM is evolving and has 
empowered local communities with the means and incentive to engage and negotiate with 
their local government representatives: if this process is to gain strength within the current 
context of Zimbabwe, new creative thinking will be required 
 
8.6 Conclusion  
The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the institutional and governance 
configuration represented by CAMPFIRE provides opportunities and incentives for 
interaction and negotiations between local communities and local government. 
Consequently, one of the most significant outcomes of CAMPFIRE over the last 20 
years has been making local people aware of the economic value of natural resources, 
their rights to these, and mechanisms for exercising these rights. This demonstrates that 
communities can negotiate effectively with district governments, exercising their agency 
through demands for greater responsiveness and accountability.  Inasmuch as democratic 
governance and effective environmental management in Zimbabwe has diminished at the 
national level, these have persisted in some cases at the local level through local 
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negotiations over natural resources.  This has effectively empowered selected local 
communities through the creation of democratic space and accountable local governance. 
 
Moreover, based on field evidence from Mahenye, this research indicates that under 
certain conditions RDCs can play a vital role in ensuring that local elites do not 
monopolize and capture the process at a local level. RDCs can provide a system of checks 
and balances to ensure that powerful local elites working in collaboration with 
unscrupulous private sector interests and national politicians do not abuse the process. The 
Mahenye story suggests that the community’s particular history and institutional 
configuration of CAMPFIRE in their District has genuinely empowered people to exercise 
their rights. They have the means and incentive to engage and negotiate with local 
government, collectively expressing ‘demands’ to the RDC and the RDC has responded to 
the demands. Many democracy scholars note that development of an "informed and alert 
electorate" is an essential prerequisite for the establishment of democratic governance in 
Africa and for the continent's future economic growth. The implications of this process for 
democratisation are explored in detail in the concluding Chapter.  The findings of this 
research are not in isolation, they concur with Taylor and Murphree (2007) in that 
CAMPFIRE appears to be emerging from a difficult period as a resilient, self-reliant 
initiative with some communities empowered to challenge the status quo, and RDC’s 
prepared to respond positively to this challenge.   
 
These findings indicate that it is necessary to revisit the conventional wisdom that 
decentralization undermines CAMPFIRE’s ability to deliver upon its objectives. This 
evidence suggests that decentralization is proving to be a politically expedient ‘stepping 
stone’ to devolution. It is providing a mechanism to tackle the practical governance 
arrangements between the first and second tier institutions that can progressively break 
down existing social and political barriers and in so doing create political and democratic 
space for communities to participate directly in policy making processes.  The example 
of Mahenye appears to give credence to the notion that RDCs can and will respond to the 
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needs of their local constituents should these be clearly articulated. Mahenye provides 
tentative evidence then, that in some instances CAMPFIRE has empowered communities 
to negotiate effectively with district governments in calling for greater representation and 
accountability.  As democratic governance in Zimbabwe has collapsed at the national 
level, it has persisted at the local level through local negotiations over natural resources. 
This represents some hope for the democratic future of Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER 9  
CBNRM POLICY PROCESSES AND POLITICS OF RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE IN BOTSWANA AND ZIMBABWE: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a comparative analysis of the politics and governance of CBNRM 
in Botswana and Zimbabwe. It explores the intersection between CBNRM and macro 
dynamic processes, focusing particularly on devolution, decentralization, and the nature 
of policy processes affecting the CBNRM sector. Using the policy process analytical 
framework (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) this chapter describes the dynamics within the 
CBNRM policy context in the two countries and locates them in relation to policy 
processes and contextual factors at the international and regional levels. In this chapter, I 
analyze the findings presented in earlier chapters, highlight patterns and disentangle the 
complex interactions between different levels in order to show how these shape policy 
processes and CBNRM governance outcomes.  
 
Using a comparative assessment of CBNRM processes in Zimbabwe and Botswana, I 
offer insights into the contextual dynamics that shape CBNRM. This comparative 
analysis illuminates why natural resource governance reform efforts to date have been 
unsuccessful in their attempts to bring about devolved governance structures in the two 
countries. The focus on policy processes and governance issues emerged from 
recognition of the fundamental constraints imposed by the lack of effective governance 
and democratic regimes at the local and national level. 
 
One component of the analytical framework has focused on structured political interests, 
actor networks and discourse analysis. This has enabled me to systematically construct 
and develop an understanding of those factors that are key in determining policy 
processes and outcomes in the two countries. The case studies from Botswana and 
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Zimbabwe demonstrate that CBNRM policy processes and outcomes reflect social and 
political complexities in decision-making, dominated by and interlinked with political 
and economic interests.  These dynamics are intimately and intricately interwoven, 
overlapping and mutually reinforcing, making it difficult to draw clear distinctions 
between them. Nevertheless, distinctions can be made for analytical purposes, which 
allow for an unravelling, revealing and understanding of the myriad iterative social, 
economic and political processes across all scales that affect CBNRM outcomes.   
 
Despite the sharp contrast between Zimbabwe’s turbulent political, economic and social 
‘crisis’ and Botswana’s relative stability, CBNRM appears to have more support and 
greater resilience in Zimbabwe than in Botswana.  As Chapters 7 and 8 revealed, the 
decentralisation of natural resource management in Zimbabwe through CAMPFIRE 
remains an entrenched component of the country’s conservation strategy. In contrast, the 
initial progress towards devolution of control over natural resources to communities has 
now been overturned in Botswana due to recentralization of control to the central state. 
The recentralization process in Botswana raises serious questions about central 
government’s commitment to CBNRM principles and philosophy as well as efforts to 
strengthen local democracy and empowerment.  
 
Nevertheless, it does not imply that CAMPFIRE thrives throughout the country, but 
rather there are several instances – Mahenye as detailed in Chapter 8 and Masoka as 
detailed by Taylor and Murphree (2007) - where not only does it continue to be a viable 
conservation and livelihood strategy, but further it has demonstrated that communities 
are able to negotiate effectively with local district government, contributing to greater 
responsiveness and accountability at this scale of government.  The result is that even as 
democratic governance in Zimbabwe has come under assault in the national arena, it has 
persisted and even been revitalized at the local level through negotiations over natural 
resources. 
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Quite a different scenario has unfolded in Botswana. The findings presented in Chapters 
5 and 6 highlight the shrinking of democratic space and autocratic tendencies in CBNRM 
policy processes within a country so often upheld as the beacon of democracy in Africa. 
The shrinking of democratic and policy spaces for communities and civil society have 
restricted their ability to effectively influence CBNRM policy. This has stifled 
opportunities for decentralisation of natural resource management and weakened 
accountability at local-levels. This Chapter identifies and explains those factors that 
emerged and shaped CBNRM policy and practice in the two countries resulting in these 
unexpected outcomes.  
 
9.2 Comparative Analysis: Botswana and Zimbabwe  
Evidence from Botswana and Zimbabwe provides crucial insights into natural resource 
governance and politics. The previous chapters revealed that CBNRM is being 
incorporated into existing social, economic and political relations at all levels and in 
particular, those related to the highly politicised contestations over natural resource and 
land rights. Clearly, alliances and boundaries form, and as situations change, shift and 
reconfigure the landscape of natural resource management governance and politics. 
Therefore, it is necessary to understand these shifts, reconfigurations, and constellations 
of different interest groups and alliances - ranging from the international to local - with 
particular emphasis on national political elites. The focus of attention here is on 
analyzing the impact of the different policy contexts on CBNRM outcomes. The aim is 
to understand whether the policy process allows or discourages greater local participation 
and democratisation of natural resource management.  This sheds light on how and why 
reform efforts succeed or fail, which should in turn enable the development of more 
effective strategies for influencing change.  
 
9.2.1 Structured Political Interests  
The macro-political context determines the challenges facing CBNRM in both countries. 
Chapters 5 and 7 focused on the institutions through which CBNRM policy and laws 
have been and are being created in Botswana and Zimbabwe. They present an analysis of 
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the political consequences of such changes as well as the impact of the wider political 
institutional environment on policymakers’ decisions. It appears that the most influential 
factor in determining outcomes is the perspective and attitudes of political elites, which 
are shaped by the ramifications CBNRM holds for these elites.  
 
In Zimbabwe, the state - even in its current dysfunctional condition - continues to 
support CAMPFIRE (see Chapter 5). This arises largely because the decentralized nature 
of CAMPFIRE ensures that it is an important strand of the ruling party’s efforts to exert 
control in rural areas and because the relatively politically influential RDC’s are fully 
supportive. Conversely, in Botswana – as discussed in Chapter 7 - CBNRM and its initial 
devolutionary approach have failed to engage and maintain the support of the political 
economic elite. This has been due to the significant political ramifications for the ruling 
party’s nation building strategy and its direct contradiction to the Constitution as well as 
its direct economic implications for Botswana’s small governing elite. 
 
Chapter 5 details how RDCs in Zimbabwe have since independence played a critical role 
in the ruling party’s strategies to control and develop spaces, resources and populations 
in rural areas. Decentralisation was conceived by ZANU-PF as a means to create and 
maintain the one-party state and as such had the full political backing of the state. 
CAMPFIRE offered opportunities for advancing the political objectives of 
decentralization and continued to serve political interests after 1999 and the onset of 
crisis. Since this time, central government has been increasingly unable to provide 
financial support to RDCs despite delegating increasing responsibilities for basic social 
services to them.  Given the deteriorating financial situation of RDCs and increasing 
demands upon them, dependence on CAMPFIRE revenues becomes ever more 
pronounced. The central role that RDCs play in the ruling party’s overall strategy for 
penetration and control in rural areas (Hammar and Raftopoulous, 2003) explains why 
central government continues to support the RDCs in the decentralisation of natural 
resource management through CAMPFIRE. For ZANU-PF, CAMPFIRE provides the 
financial means by which RDCs are able to continue delivering services and retain their 
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influence in rural areas with limited financial cost to central government. CAMPFIRE 
revenues provide a financial ‘life-line’ to support ZANU-PF in its efforts to ‘recapture 
the frontiers of rule’ (Hammar 2003:144) that the space of local government represents. 
Decentralisation ensures that the politically powerful RDCs are reliant on CAMPFIRE 
revenues, therefore, reinforcing RDCs’ support for CAMPFIRE. CAMPFIRE’s role in 
central government’s overall strategy for control of rural areas has ironically stifled 
government’s recentralising tendencies.  
 
The macro-political and economic dynamics in Botswana are quite different from 
Zimbabwe. As discussed in Chapter 7, Botswana is governed by a small political 
economic elite - whose economic interests have traditionally been dominated by 
diamonds and cattle - with mutually reinforcing political and business interests.  
CBNRM has direct implications for the elite, in part because it determines land use and 
control over wildlife, which underpins Botswana’s third largest income earner, tourism. 
The political economic elite influence the conditions of democracy in Botswana. Whilst 
there often appears to be an uncritical acceptance of the ‘progressive’ state of 
democracy, a serious re-examination of the current political system and climate reveals 
an increasingly autocratic political atmosphere dominated by a few senior political 
figures (Molutsi, 2005, Swatuk, 2005, Rotberg, 2007, Workman, 2009). Several of these 
have become personally involved in CBNRM policy development and often play a 
critical role in shaping its outcomes. The influence of powerful political individuals, 
most notably President Ian Khama, in CBNRM highlights the dominance of the 
traditional/modernised political economic elites in wildlife conservation. This reinforces 
Gibson’s (1999) assertion that wildlife in Africa is a political tool.  
 
These elites promote policies that favour their commercial interests in relation to cattle 
and diamonds (Peters, 1994, Swatuk, 2005, Good and Taylor, 2005). As a result, the 
broader national policy and political environment tend to contradict and undermine the 
subsidiarity and devolutionary principles of CBNRM despite the rhetorical commitment 
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to community empowerment and participatory-oriented policies in the rural development 
sector.  For example, policies that promote cattle ranching and the indirect ‘privatisation’ 
of grazing land through water management dominate the rural development sector.  The 
elites tend to pay attention to the value of wildlife as a national rather than a local 
economic resource. Devolved control does not privilege, or even favour, elite private 
commercial exploitation of wildlife. In Botswana, this is better facilitated by state 
control.   
 
Nevertheless, CBNRM has significant political ramifications beyond the immediate 
economic interests of the elite. The Constitution of Botswana states that all natural 
resources are national assets, and the proceeds from their exploitation should be managed 
centrally through national coffers to ensure transparent and equitable distribution 
(Poteete, 2007). CBNRM ‘localises’ benefits from wildlife resources to local 
communities since they bear the cost of wildlife management within their local 
jurisdiction. By delineating membership and rights in CBNRM to the local community, it 
effectively de-emphasizes the constitutionally implied ‘national citizenship’ that entitles 
all citizens to benefit from mineral, land and other natural resources. Inevitably, it has 
brought to the fore political dynamics and contested claims to natural resources in the 
country. The GOB has been forced to re-examine the implications of devolution of 
wildlife resources and benefits vis-à-vis decentralization and/or recentralization of 
CBNRM benefits in line with the principle of all natural resources being ‘national 
resources.’ Decentralization of natural resources and partial devolution of management 
responsibilities contradicted government’s professed commitment to the principle of 
natural resources as national resources. This principle had formed an integral component 
of Botswana’s nation-building approach, which stressed the political imperative of 
projecting the primacy of national over local, especially traditional identities. The 
distributional struggles and claims that emerge in the ‘diamond debate’ have to be 
understood in terms of their political implications for the ruling party. The ruling 
Botswana Democratic Party’s call for centrally managing CBNRM funds is an attempt to 
address questions raised about its coalition building strategy and the discrepancy in the 
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treatment of mineral and CBNRM-related wildlife resources. It has used the ‘diamond 
debate’ to recentralize CBNRM benefits and dictate the future based on its political 
agenda in the same manner that ZANU-PF determines the future of CAMPFIRE based 
on its political agenda.  
 
A further factor that has influenced political perspectives and support for CBNRM 
emanates from the differing colonial experiences of the two countries and the resultant 
impact on access to land and other natural resources along racial lines. As discussed in 
Chapters 2, 4 and 6, the initial impetus for the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe 
was to do away with racial discrimination introduced during the colonial and post-
colonial periods and transfer economic opportunities that had been granted to private 
property holders to communal land dwellers. CAMPFIRE was then associated with the 
political imperative of deracialising access to natural resources in Zimbabwe - a 
politically compelling narrative. In Botswana, this politically attractive discourse in 
support of CBNRM has little resonance. Botswana’s history as a protectorate of the 
British Crown, rather than a colony, ensured that it was less affected by colonial rule 
than any other country in southern Africa. This led to various distinctions between 
Botswana and its neighbouring states, nowhere more so than in terms of land tenure 
systems. Settlement by white farmers was never a dominant feature and consequently no 
more than 5.5% of the land was ever alienated for white-owned farms, compared to 
nearly 60% in Zimbabwe (Tshuma, 1997). The result is that the politically compelling 
deracialisation discourse and context for CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe is absent in 
Botswana, and additionally racial or ethnic discourse is actively discouraged by the 
Constitution and GOB (Taylor, 2000).   Thus one of the principle pillars on which 
CAMPFIRE was/is able to draw support from the political elite is absent in Botswana. 
Recent years have seen racial arguments used to great effect by the state in Zimbabwe in 
an effort to secure popular support for land redistribution along racial lines. The 
increased emphasis on racial discourse by the Zimbabwean state serves to make it 
increasingly difficult for it to discard CAMPFIRE, even if it was in its interests to do so, 
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given that its original hyped rationale was to ensure racial equality in access to wildlife 
resources.  
 
9.2.2 Discourse and Actor-Networks  
The perspectives and priorities of national political elites alone do not determine 
CBNRM outcomes and strategies. As discussed in Chapter 3, the social and political 
commitments that CBNRM entail rely on support of particular audiences and practices. 
Chapter 4 traces how international and regional discourse coalitions and actor-networks - 
with Zimbabweans at the forefront - have been instrumental in CBNRM policy 
processes. Actors within the community conservation and sustainable use coalitions 
participate to various degrees in the production and reproduction of CBNRM concepts 
and policy. They have also been involved in the ‘depoliticisation’ of CBNRM as 
discussed in Chapter 4.  The effectiveness of such networks in influencing the 
development of national policy depends on their ability to unite diverse interest groups, 
including political elites. They have to include policy entrepreneurs who are able to 
exercise agency and strategically influence a network of social relations (Long, 2001, 
Latour, 1987). These networks have to draw upon knowledge and science to drive 
policy, and it matters where this science comes from, who can use it and in what manner 
(Sutton, 1999). Involvement and exclusion in this policy process have implications, and 
these have to be considered at international, national and local levels.  
 
Chapter 4 discussed how and why CBNRM became embedded internationally and 
regionally within environmental and conservation policy-networks and epistemic 
communities and particularly those of sustainable use. It illustrated how it became caught 
up in and responded to a ‘crisis’ narrative (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) - sustainable use, 
and by extension CBNRM, was under threat from preservationists and animal rights 
groups. The result was that the networks with which CBNRM was engaged 
internationally were dominated by conservation issues to the exclusion of a range of 
other critical issues and networks. The influence of key policy entrepreneurs and 
networks permeated regional and national levels as those key individuals moved across 
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locales and shaped CBNRM practices through specific initiatives, funding networks, and 
professional alliances.  
 
This manifested itself in many ways, for example, within both Zimbabwe and Botswana, 
while CBNRM was perceived to be at the forefront of decentralization efforts, these 
progressed largely in isolated parallel of the broader national efforts to decentralize 
(Conyers, 2001, Taylor, 2000) as well as the international discourse on decentralization 
and democracy.   The outcome is that the CBNRM processes have been largely 
uninfluenced or informed by and uncoordinated with the mainstream 
decentralisation/democratisation discourses, experiences and lessons both nationally and 
internationally. A significant implication of this was the common perception among 
implementers and advocates, that devolution, in contrast to decentralisation, was the only 
appropriate form of governance arrangement. This belief persisted for several decades in 
spite of evidence within the broader development/democratisation literature, as discussed 
in Chapter 2, that it may not always empower marginalised communities and in some 
cases may undermine them.  
 
Within the international conservation community, it was a generally accepted principle 
that ‘conservation and politics don’t mix’, leading to claims that the environment was 
politically neutral (apolitical) and therefore needed to be insulated from politics. Thus the 
rhetoric of conservation became depoliticized and treated as uncontested ‘science’. As a 
result, sustainable use assumed the apolitical and ahistorical narrative of agricultural 
economics, emphasizing ‘financial and economic profitability’ and ‘Africa’s 
comparative advantage’. Chapter 4 illustrates that to the degree that CBNRM networks 
engaged internationally with social science networks through its Common Property 
Regime (CPR) conceptual underpinnings, such networks failed to encourage the creation 
of linkages to discourses and networks that focused on political issues such as 
democratisation and decentralisation. Indeed, CPR tended to actively discourage this by 
its apolitical analysis of tenurial regimes. The result is that CBNRM has never been 
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conceptualised as a political process empowering communities to challenge power 
structures, resource allocation and resource rights.  
 
Actor networks play a central role in CBNRM policy process at the national level. The 
findings presented in Chapter 5 indicate that the existence of a weak CBNRM actor 
network in Botswana has resulted in little support for CBNRM leading to 
recentralization as a result of political opposition. Conversely, the strong CBNRM actor 
network in Zimbabwe has been an important component in ensuring that decentralized 
CBNRM benefits continue to flow to local levels despite the national political and 
economic meltdown, policy turmoil and recentralising tendencies of the GOZ.  
 
As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 7, the origins of CBNRM at national level influence 
the nature and development of an actor network, including the extent to which policy 
entrepreneurs are able to exercise the required agency to influence policy. The review of 
the history and philosophy of CAMPFIRE discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 illustrates that 
the Zimbabwean initiative encompassed thousands of people and various institutions at 
all scales. CAMPFIRE was conceptualized and rooted in Zimbabwean experience and 
realities. Its development involved a lengthy and inclusive process based on learning 
through trial and error in Zimbabwe. This resulted in the generation of locally 
substantiated scientific facts and data relating to economically viable forms of land use, 
sustainable use of species, and politically expedient means of ensuring the participation 
and beneficiation of communal land dwellers in conservation activities. CAMPFIRE 
benefited from the expertise of a small but influential network of colonial and post-
colonial conservation policy makers that appreciated science and sustainable use 
approaches. 
 
This science became extremely influential through the construction of actor networks, 
which incorporated bureaucrats, politicians, donors, local and international NGOs, the 
private sector, local communities and academics, all of which supported these knowledge 
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claims.  These actor networks were involved in an ongoing process of producing facts 
that led support to the CBNRM narrative. They engaged in a process of co-construction, 
recursively shaping the way in which data and science were ‘produced’ and policy made. 
These networks were led by several key and strategically placed ‘policy entrepreneurs’ 
senior policy makers from the Department of Wildlife Management and National Parks.  
Duffy (2000:1) explains how appeals to the concept of sustainable use in the 1980s and 
1990s in Zimbabwe served to ‘depoliticize internal environmental politics’, allowing the 
local conservation movement and its allies to present a united front. 
 
This policy network has effectively evolved over the past thirty years from an apolitical 
network dominated by whites, NGOs, technical experts and a science based discourse,  
to a political body, dominated by RDCs, utilising a politically appealing discourse in 
addition to encompassing the scientific rational of earlier years. The racially biased and 
party-oriented political and policy environment of the last 10 years no longer favours, or 
even tolerates, interventions from whites or NGOs, and discourages rational, technical, 
science-based policy solutions such as those advanced by the CCG. The replacement of 
the CCG by the CA alone as the primary advocacy group for CAMPFIRE, represents the 
replacement of what has become a politically impotent group by one that has a 
significant political voice with significant incentives to use it. As such it represents a 
political body with a legitimate constituency in a manner that the CCG, consisting 
primarily of NGOs and technical agencies, could never aspire to.   
 
Thus evolution of the CAMPFIRE actor-network has kept pace with political and social 
evolutions within Zimbabwe as a whole, occurring in such a way that it has been 
possible for the policy network to maintain effectiveness and influence despite the 
extreme changes in the social and political conditions and corresponding changes in the 
policy environment within the country. CAMPFIRE is essentially evolving from a 
science-based process, which as discussed in Chapter 4, was relatively exclusionary 
because of the nature of the discourse on which it relied, into a political process that has 
the potential to increase political and policy space in natural resource management.  
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The origin of CBNRM in Botswana offers a sharp contrast to that in Zimbabwe. As 
explored in Chapter 5, CBNRM in Botswana was essentially a foreign import driven by 
donors. This significantly influenced how it was received and integrated nationally. 
Because CBNRM is perceived by Tswanas as an imported environmental paradigm, its 
local relevance and legitimacy have been compromised (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 
2007). Its ‘alien’ nature and lack of ‘indigenous’ conceptualization and development 
stand in stark contrast with the CAMPFIRE programme. Long and van der Ploeg (1994) 
argue that the absence of indigenous conceptualization and development creates a lack of 
cultural understanding, relationships, identities and connections to both local and 
national social and political networks. Foreigners who dominated CBNRM in Botswana 
generally lacked ‘agency’ and full appreciation of complexities within the local 
institutional landscape, and this presented CBNRM with immense implementation and 
operational challenges. This limited local legitimacy compromised the development of a 
strong CBNRM actor-network.  This has manifested itself in the remarkable absence of 
an indigenous ‘politically salient constituency’ (Murphree, 1995a) at all levels. Notably 
there is a  lack of  community representatives, politicians, local NGO ‘personalities’, 
leading academics, and senior managers and conservation practitioners in DWNP as 
supporters of CBNRM. Consequently, CBNRM in Botswana is largely bereft of policy 
entrepreneurs. The lack of a strong constituency at all levels compromised the social and 
political sustainability of CBNRM, making it relatively easy to discard once donors 
withdraw their support.  
 
Donor driven attempts to create an influential actor-network – the CBNRM Network -   
whilst successful in the short-term in providing a counterweight to the political economic 
elite, proved unsustainable in the face of heightened political opposition. This ‘donor’ 
actor-network was further compromised by the existence of an alternative politically 
popular conservation paradigm of ‘protectionism’. This paradigm was promoted and 
endorsed by President Khama (previously senior military official and vice president of 
the country), a ‘policy entrepreneur’ of unsurpassable national influence.  Consequently, 
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the alternative narrative of protectionism currently dominates conservation in Botswana. 
Protectionism is based on Malthusian assumptions about population growth leading 
inevitably to natural resource degradation, and a perception of rural dwellers as 
‘perpetual adolescents’ incapable of rational resource management decisions. 
Furthermore, Khama’s antagonism towards CBNRM is informed by his party’s political 
philosophy regarding ‘natural resources as national resources’ (Poteete, 2007). This is 
not a narrative or political philosophy which embraces greater democratisation of 
political space. 
 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the existence of a strong actor-network has enabled the 
mobilization of political support and greatly influenced the development of a CBNRM 
supportive policy framework, which involved pragmatic compromises. In Botswana, the 
weak actor-network undermined its political voice and exposed CBNRM to the whims of 
political economic elites, failing to counterbalance pressure for recentralisation.  
 
CAMPFIRE’s local origin helped secure its national political endorsement and appeal to 
a wide range of national political agendas. During the 1990s, it achieved critical 
international acclaim, and received many international conservation awards and 
accolades. Considerable international media attention was devoted to it; it attracted 
generous donor support, and researchers from all over the world took interest in the 
programme while thousands of conferences and publications were generated from the 
CAMPFIRE experience. This acclaim and recognition of CAMPFIRE helped cement its 
social and political popularity at home. CAMPFIRE’s international profile made it 
possible for the Zimbabwean government to play to other populist political agendas, 
enabling it to adopt populist stances at international events as well as ‘sell’ its political 
rhetoric to the national electorate.  
 
The rhetoric included arguments about ‘sovereignty over national resources,’ ‘racial 
equity,’ ‘African solutions to African problems’, and ‘anti- eco-imperialism’ (portrayed 
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as the new form of colonialism). Such political rhetoric was put forward as arguments in 
support of sustainable use and CAMPFIRE at international meetings. Government then 
manipulated these to good effect in bolstering its national image and political popularity. 
Essentially CAMPFIRE enabled the government to rhetorically champion participation 
and empowerment nationally and internationally while projecting itself as the protector 
of the underdog. Several commentators (Hughes, 2006, Fakir, 2001, Murombedzi, in 
press) note that the state-capital alliance represented by CAMPFIRE functioned to 
protect existing property rights and deflect attention away from the real struggles of 
communities for land and property (resource) rights by providing temporary and 
inadequate access to ‘benefits’ from resource use.  
 
As CBNRM in Botswana was perceived as an externally imposed practice, its 
implementers and advocates were unable to draw upon the ‘Zimbabwean rhetoric’ to 
gain national political support. The rhetoric of ‘African solution for African problems’ 
did not resonate in Botswana. Furthermore, the dominant local narrative revolving 
around CBNRM in the last decade has been one of ‘failure’ with stories of misuse and 
abuse of funds abounding at all levels (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). Far from being 
viewed as a source of national pride, as CAMPFIRE was throughout the 1990’s, it is 
widely perceived as promoting fraud and corruption in a country that prides itself on 
having been ranked by Transparency International Corruption Index as having the lowest 
corruption rate in Africa since its inception in 1998 (Transparency International, 2008). 
 
9.2.3 Contrasting Implementation Strategies and their Impacts 
CAMPFIRE has been characterized by a series of pragmatic, strategic compromises 
aimed at accommodating varied, and sometimes contradictory, positions of a variety of 
interest groups (Murphree, 1997b). For example, CAMPFIRE adopted a decentralized 
approach to natural resource management as a compromise rather than the initially 
envisaged devolution approach despite the continued criticism that this was its weakness 
(see introductory chapter and Chapter 5). I question this assumption in light of the 
empirical research findings and analysis presented here. This willingness to compromise 
 
 
 
 
266 
 
ensured that CAMPFIRE was able to materialize in the first place, as well as secure and 
maintain its broad based political support – the ingredients for its political survival even 
through the current crisis in Zimbabwe.  
 
In contrast, Botswana adopted CBNRM as an imported blueprint ‘package’. A central 
component of this package, adamantly insisted upon by the donor and expatriate 
implementing staff, was that devolution to independent grass-roots CBOs was an 
imperative and that the role of District Councils must be confined to ‘facilitator of a 
process’ (Winer, 2006, personal communication).  One of the given rationales for this 
approach drew upon the perceived ‘failures’ of CAMPFIRE relating to it having 
decentralized rather than devolved powers. Consequently, donors’ and expatriate staff’s 
approach to CBNRM did not accommodate any negotiations or compromises, which 
may have served to build political capital and develop the social and professional 
relationships necessary to ensure that CBNRM was introduced in such a way that could 
accommodate the unique complexities within the country’s local and national political 
and social context. Initial advocates of CBNRM did not pay close attention to the 
political dimensions of natural resource policy-making processes. Inattention to socio-
political processes of empowerment and the potential of CBNRM to alter levers of power 
proved costly. CBNRM strengthens social empowerment, capital, and community 
development, which could be leveraged into political capital. The OCT case study 
reveals how politics intersect with CBNRM at the local and national levels. The 
‘diamond debate’ invoked political questions and contradictory impulses of CBNRM and 
nation-building or national development.  
 
Failure to integrate other relevant line ministries and reach out to civil society for the 
first 10 years of project implementation in Botswana further alienated and isolated 
CBNRM from the mainstream national policy processes and local government structures. 
In contrast, from its inception, CAMPFIRE has been implemented nationally by a wide 
variety of organizations, including government institutions and civil society 
organizations with different areas of expertise, skills and capacities.  This has ensured a 
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blend of skills and approaches, and mobilization of human and financial resources. This 
does not imply that implementation has been without significant problems. However, it 
has insured that basic oversights in implementation - arising from lack of appropriate 
expertise - did not undermine efforts to establish representative local governance 
structures. This is best appreciated when contrasted with the situation in Botswana where 
efforts to establish local governance institutions were tied to the institutions 
underpinning the authority of the traditional leaders, the Kgotla, by the implementing 
agency on the simplistic assumption that these were democratic structures.  The Kgotla 
has its own challenges, and has enabled the domination of CBOs by local elites as well 
as reinforcing the marginalization of some community members from decision-making 
processes based on cultural values. Case study findings from OCT presented in Chapter 
6 clearly indicate that the way mobilization activities were carried out did not facilitate a 
community driven process but rather created opportunities for elite capture.  
 
The aim of this discussion is not to review in any depth the details of the implementation 
approach in Botswana or Zimbabwe but rather to identify those factors that have 
implications for the policy process. The intention of using this example is to illustrate the 
problems and distortions of the implementation process that arise when the main 
implementing agency is under resourced, lacks political influence, is inappropriately 
skilled and is uncommitted. The collaborative, multi-disciplinary approach that 
characterized implementation processes in Zimbabwe and was one of its primary 
strengths was absent in Botswana, which proved to be a critical weakness.   
 
A further contrast between Botswana and Zimbabwe - and one that is of greatest 
relevance to this research given its impact upon CBNRM governance reform outcomes - 
is the role of local government in the two countries. In Zimbabwe, despite initial efforts 
to ensure devolved governance structures, pragmatic compromises led to CAMPFIRE 
becoming decentralized to RDCs. RDCs are the legally appointed ‘Appropriate 
Authority’ over wildlife and play a central role in implementing CAMPFIRE at all 
levels.   In Botswana, the implementation approach marginalised DCs, which have no 
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legal authority over wildlife and therefore have limited involvement in CBNRM. Instead, 
authority was invested in CBOs until the recent reversals that saw authority recentralized 
to DWNP. The role of the DC in Botswana is confined to one of several technical 
advisory agencies whose advice can, and frequently is, legally ignored. This approach 
adhered to simplistic blueprint notions of devolution versus decentralisation, and was 
informed largely by the donor’s perception of shortcomings in the decentralisation 
approach adopted by CAMPFIRE.   
 
While Zimbabwe’s RDCs are notoriously associated with ‘capturing’ CAMPFIRE 
benefits, the findings in Chapters 7 and 8 indicate that RDCs have played a critical role 
in maintaining political support for CAMPFIRE at the national level and providing a 
system of checks and balances, which have largely prevented the capture of CAMPFIRE 
processes by local elites. In contrast, the research findings presented in Chapters 5 and 6 
indicate that the marginalization of DCs in Botswana led to a void in implementation 
capacity, an absence of local checks and balances to prevent elite capture, and an 
absence of political allies to add weight to those voices urging against recentralisation. 
Perhaps most interestingly the local level case studies, presented in Chapters 6 and 8, 
indicate that in both countries, communities themselves see the importance and value of 
the role of local government. In the case of OCT in Botswana, the community strategy to 
address current problems of elite capture of benefits has been to actively seek and 
formalize the inclusion of local government in CBNRM strategies. Whilst in Mahenye in 
Zimbabwe, the community held the RDC accountable and demanded that it represent the 
interests of the majority in the face of co-option of benefits by the traditional leadership. 
 
9.2.4 The Role of Local Government 
As the discussion in Chapter 5 illustrates, Botswana has a long history of 
decentralization. Whilst local government remains responsible and accountable to central 
government, its local political processes are relatively well developed and democratic.  
There is consensus among observers that local government has an excellent record in 
delivering key services, and it is well funded by central government. DCs have ultimate 
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responsibility for ‘delivering’ rural development - with proven skills and capacity to do 
so and a track record which demonstrates their competence in this regard. Regardless of 
this admirable track record, they remain largely peripheral to the implementation 
process, despite the significant capacity constraints of the primary implementing agency, 
the DWNP. The marginalization of DCs in the implementation process has made them a 
vocal critic of CBNRM, which they have branded as a ‘failure’. The OCT case study 
suggests that such an approach fails to cultivate incentives and a vibrant local political 
context that could ensure positive CBNRM outcomes.  
 
In contrast, Zimbabwe’s RDCs play a central role in CAMPFIRE at both local and 
national levels. Each RDC has its own CAMPFIRE management unit which – originally 
in collaboration with supporting NGOs and DWNPLM but since the early 2000’s 
independently – is primarily responsible for CAMPFIRE management activities locally, 
including the provision of institutional strengthening and capacity-building services. 
RDCs gain significant income from CAMPFIRE activities; from 1989 to 2002 
CAMPFIRE generated over $20 million in direct income from wildlife, with about 50% 
of this being retained by RDCs (Frost and Bond, 2008) and as a result they remain 
influential supporters of CAMPFIRE. The RDCs collectively represent a strong and 
active political constituency for CAMPFIRE, and the CAMPFIRE Association 
represents them at the national level.  Moreover, based on field evidence from Mahenye 
(see Chapter 8) as well as documented research from Masoka (Taylor and Murphree, 
2007), clearly, RDCs play a crucial role in ensuring that local elites do not monopolise 
and capture the process. The Chipinge RDC provides a system of checks and balance 
against the abuse of finances by powerful local elites, working in collaboration with 
unscrupulous private sector interests and national politicians.  
 
9.3 Key Findings  
9.3.1 Political Engagement  
The preceding discussion, based on the research findings presented in Chapters 5-8, 
demonstrate that CBNRM is essentially a contested political process. However, they also 
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illustrate that the failure of CBNRM implementers and advocates to engage with the 
wider political processes affecting natural resource management and governance stem 
from the nature of CBNRM origin’s and the framing assumptions upon which it is based.  
This failure to engage with or understand the broader political environment has been in 
large part responsible for the failure of governance reforms leading to expanded policy 
space and greater participation. Achieving appropriate natural resource governance 
reforms requires not only a good policy design but also the power to put the policy into 
practice (Hyden, 2008, Chabal, 2009). However, the avoidance of political engagement 
has compromised the abilities of CBNRM practitioners and implementers to develop 
appropriate governance reforms.  
 
The actor-networks and epistemic communities, which advanced CBNRM in the 1980s 
and 1990s, influenced CBNRM practice and implementation, and they largely came from 
within the ‘conservation and environment’ community. Within such circles, it was a 
generally accepted ‘adage’ that ‘conservation and politics don’t mix,’ and this led to 
claims that the environment was somehow above politics and needed to be insulated 
from it (Duffy, 2000, Manor, 2005, Buscher and Whande, 2007, Anderson and Grove, 
1987). Hence, environmental policies were presented as non-political ‘scientific’ 
prescriptions, and social science incorporated to the extent that it promoted conservation 
objectives.  
 
Despite these shortcomings in the conceptual framework, a certain degree of political 
pragmatism was evident in Zimbabwe and CAMPFIRE implementation was 
characterized by some political astuteness. The result was that despite its initial 
conceptual adherence to devolution, a pragmatic compromise was reached in recognition 
of the political opposition to devolution. The outcome was decentralisation to RDCs. 
Paradoxically, this has led to the unintended outcome of a policy process which has 
reconnected CBNRM to mainstream political institutions and processes.  CAMPFIRE 
appears to be evolving from a largely technical process to a political one. This evolution 
and its accompanying shifts in policy entrepreneurs and actor networks are enabling new 
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perspectives to enter the policy debate and challenge some of the framing assumptions 
and premises of the conventional policy framework. New policy spaces are being created 
through the increased interaction and negotiations between RDCs and their 
constituencies. The decentralised nature of CAMPFIRE has enabled it to achieve 
political traction. This is an unintended outcome of the policy process, but it has ensured 
that CAMPFIRE has reconnected to mainstream political institutions and processes 
despite its attempted disavowal of politics. 
 
In Botswana, the outcome of the policy process has been markedly different. As 
Chapters 5 and 6 illustrate, because of the implementation strategies, actor-networks and 
discourse adopted, CBNRM has remained external to macro political processes thus 
largely irrelevant to broader national debates and political constituencies. This 
irrelevancy has ensured that an alternative conservation paradigm, based on 
protectionism and exclusion, has been able to gain ascendancy within the policy process. 
Adoption of a protectionist approach ensures an extension and reinforcement of existing 
authority and control and a contraction of networks of those involved in policy making. 
The outcome has been a reversal of the devolutionary approach and a recentralization of 
control, leading to a reduction in policy space enabling greater participation in natural 
resource management.  
 
Differences in the political economy context, programme origins and the wider political 
dynamics in the two countries explain the different outcomes. Hence, the links between 
the policy process and outcomes are extremely complex.  
 
9.3.2 Devolution  
A core argument of this thesis is that the uncritical and simplistic focus on devolution as 
the appropriate governance arrangement for CBNRM by proponents, analysts and 
implementers over the years has been a further factor which has obscured the political 
dimensions of CBNRM.  Adherence to devolution has persisted in spite of evidence 
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within the broader development/democratisation literature (Johnson, 2001, Crook and 
Manor, 1998, Agrawal, 2001, Manor, 2005) that it may not always empower poor 
communities, and in some cases it may actually undermine them.   
 
The analysis of the CBNRM policy process in Botswana and Zimbabwe indicates that it 
is the nature of the policy process itself that is a significant causal factor of this problem. 
The assessment of actor-networks and discourses prevalent within CBNRM policy 
processes reveals that they have been driven in part by pragmatic national political 
agendas and economic realities – racially equitable redistribution and participation in the 
benefits of natural resource management – but only in so far as these coincided with the 
interests of political economic elites. It is also clear that they have been influenced by 
changing international perspectives, discourses and paradigms of conservation and 
development. Chapter 4 explored how the notion of devolution became an entrenched 
component - an ‘iconic fact’ (Keeley and Scoones, 2003) - of the discourse adopted by 
the CBNRM actor-network, framing the way in which problems were thought about and 
different issues linked in an often programmatic, cause and effect manner. The 
international influence has manifested itself perhaps most obviously through the 
interventions of international donors and NGOs, which have been influential in the 
development of CBNRM policy and programme implementation. The result was that the 
principles and concepts upon which CBNRM was premised and, which originated and 
were developed largely within the wildlife sector, were disbursed throughout a range of 
countries at many different levels (Steiner and Rihoy, 1995). One such framing principle 
was that of devolution, an approach promoted by donors as compatible with their neo-
liberal agenda.  
 
This policy narrative of devolution has been firmly adhered to for the last fifteen years. 
This has allowed complex issues and processes to be reduced and interpreted in 
simplistic ways, with failures related to CBNRM simply dismissed as having as their 
root cause ‘aborted devolution’. This response has stifled further rigorous analysis. As 
the evidence from Botswana presented in Chapters 6 and 7 illustrates, this has led to a 
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prescribed approach to implementation that relies upon the imposition of a set of 
solutions, revolving around devolution, which may not be appropriate to the national and 
local context. The effect has been to reduce the ability of the supposed beneficiaries, 
rural communities, to engage in the policy process.  
 
The emphasis on devolution has served to polarize the issue of governance. The potential 
positive interactions between first and second tier levels of governance - the ‘local arena’ 
in which the ‘ongoing process of struggle and contest’ identified by Gaventa (2006) as 
necessary for democratic practices to emerge - have gone largely unexplored. The 
evidence from Zimbabwe suggests that in this particular context where a period of crisis 
and change is underway, political space may be more effectively created through 
decentralisation. The process of negotiation and dialogue that has been initiated in 
several districts between first (local governance) and second (local government) tier 
institutions represents an important component in the development of local democratic 
politics by ensuring greater accountability on behalf of local government to their 
constituents.  This should be viewed as an important step in achieving incremental 
political coherence and a participative negotiated consensus, or ‘democracy of the base’ 
(Ake 2000:32). Decentralisation has allowed for greater participation of rural dwellers 
rather than relying primarily on CBNRM implementers, and improved their knowledge 
and practices in conservation. The greater participation of rural dwellers has widened the 
‘policy space’ within which they can influence the outcomes and trajectory of 
CAMPFIRE at the local and national levels, thereby altering power relationships.  
 
9.3.3 CBNRM and Customary Institutions  
Chapter 2 discusses the contemporary governance implications of the historical roots of 
natural resource management. In the African context, natural resources with high 
economic value feature predominantly in the public domain, often serving as tools for 
patronage interests and thereby allowing governing elites to maintain their power. 
Contemporary political and power arrangements in African countries are then a complex 
blend of formal and informal institutions exercising power (Hyden, 2008; Nelson, in 
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press). Governance processes must be analysed in relation to both formal and informal 
institutions and processes.  
 
Policy approaches to traditional leadership over the last three decades have been 
somewhat ambiguous (UNECA, 2007). Immediately post independence attempts were 
made to contain traditional authorities, but this has been followed since the early 1990s 
with a wave of ‘retraditionalisation’ which has enlarged the formal role of chiefs in local 
governance and development (Kyed and Buur, 2006). This wave of retraditionalisation 
accompanied the wave of democratisation and liberalization policies of the 1990s and 
indeed was interpreted by many as a means to reinforce democratic processes through 
the provision of new democratic space that enabled the marginalised to access the state 
(UNECA, 2007).  
 
Clearly, the empirical evidence presented by the two local level case studies that 
recognition of traditional leaders does not necessarily create public or political space, nor 
does it necessarily detract from it. As the OCT case study presented in Chapter 6 
demonstrates, in the case of Botswana where the role of traditional authorities has 
historically been recognized by the state, the local chief has been actively working with 
democratically elected representatives at the DC to try to ensure greater public 
participation, transparency and accountability.  Meanwhile the Mahenye case study 
presented in Chapter 8 illustrates that in Zimbabwe, where the policy framework 
introduced with the Traditional Leaders Act in 2001 ensured that the chief becomes an 
agent of the increasingly authoritarian state (Raftopoulos, 2004), the traditional 
authorities were actively working against the democratic interests of the majority.  
 
Irrespective of the outcomes, traditional authorities play an important role in natural 
resource governance and policy makers need to take account of their presence in framing 
policies. The implication for  natural resource governance reform is that  traditional 
authorities should be recognized as important, and should not  be seen as necessarily 
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positive or negative but rather their consequences should be scrutinized and investigated 
empirically.  
 
9.3.4 Policy Space  
Chapter 5 describes how adherence to a devolutionary approach to CBNRM imposed in 
Botswana by donors and implementers reduced opportunities for policy makers as it 
curtailed their ability to think and gather information on alternative approaches. One 
casualty of this approach is that the potentially critical links with the politics of 
democratisation have gone largely unrealized and important opportunities for improved 
natural resource management and democratisation left unexploited. However, perhaps 
even more significantly, the focus on devolution has also failed to secure greater space 
for rural communities in the policy making process, despite rhetoric to the contrary.   
 
The CAMPFIRE initiatives in Zimbabwe led to the development of a diverse network of 
stakeholders in support of CBNRM. To what degree were rural communities 
participating in CAMPFIRE involved in the policy making process? Chapter 4 explores 
how the discourse and actor-network with which CBNRM became so intimately 
intertwined internationally served to marginalize more than just expertise and insights 
from other disciplines.  In Chapters 5-9, I traced groups that have been influential and 
others marginalised from the policy making process in Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
Clearly, in both countries, policy making was initially the preserve of a few conservation 
experts and bureaucrats who facilitated policy development ostensibly to enable greater 
participation in natural resource management with the objective of strengthening 
conservation policy. Today, the situation in Zimbabwe seems to be evolving towards a 
more inclusive policy making and participative process whilst that in Botswana appears 
to be contracting the policy space.  
 
While the CBNRM policy process has not relied exclusively upon a purely scientific 
rationale, it is clear that scientific rationale has played a role in enabling the state to 
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retain authority over natural resources when convenient.  The ‘sustainable use’ discourse 
predominant in southern Africa can be characterized as a ‘language game run by the 
professional classes’ (Lyotard, 1979:25) which has in some instances excluded the 
knowledge and participation of others from involvement in the policy process and 
network. CBNRM policy making in both Botswana and Zimbabwe has been dominated 
by professional ecologists, environmentalists and economists which ensures that policy 
making remains far removed from local realities. While community participation in some 
aspects is encouraged - and notably at international fora where community 
representatives are called upon to support state and NGO positions regarding sustainable 
use and trade - scientists and technical experts continue to determine the parameters of 
this participation at a national level and in wildlife management.   
 
For example, the suitability for inclusion of a village in a CBNRM programme is 
determined at the top of the administrative hierarchy in the respective government 
department, thus denying communities the right to choose whether to engage or not. 
Once involved, community members may engage in some proscribed elements of 
decision-making such as quota setting while the technical aspects of wildlife 
management come as predetermined technology packages, developed and approved by 
scientists and technocrats. The key decisions concerning wildlife management and 
technical operations are effectively made by central government departments and safari 
companies.  Thus CBNRM continues to construct communities as ‘subjects’ of 
development planning, not ‘citizens’ fully involved and engaged (Mamdani, 1996).  This 
allows for only selective inclusion in the policy making process as only proscribed forms 
of participation are allowed.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
Situating CBNRM within its international, national and local context makes it clear that 
the policy process with which it is associated is extremely broad with a wide range of 
intervening variables influencing outcomes. Appreciating the nature and potential impact 
of this context requires an understanding of the nature of the individual state and society. 
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The comparative analysis of the situations in Botswana and Zimbabwe offered here 
demonstrates that whilst the details and circumstances may vary between the countries, 
the determining factor common in deciding where power and authority over natural 
resources will lie is political and relates to the incentives and interest’s political elites 
possess for maintaining or expanding control over natural resources. It is then political 
processes which ultimately determine the shape of natural resource management 
governance arrangements and institutions. 
 
Affecting the attitude and perspective of policy makers will be the scientific 
underpinnings, the nature of the actor network and the discourse and narrative 
surrounding CBNRM.  Enabling communities to engage with and negotiate these 
political processes themselves is a crucial ingredient in determining outcomes and needs 
to be better understood. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that the current 
simplistic belief that ‘devolution’ represents good governance arrangements for 
CBNRM, and ‘decentralisation’ bad, needs to be revisited with the focus on which 
approach will better facilitate community engagement with political processes.  
 
New social and political relations have been created around particular policy positions, 
new relations of knowledge, power, meaning and practice have emerged. My research 
has followed how this process worked itself out in Botswana and Zimbabwe and whether 
the result has enabled or excluded the involvement of rural communities. In Botswana, 
the initial policy of devolution was contested from a number of points between the micro 
and macro levels, resulting in its being substantially revised. The same process, although 
manifesting itself very differently, is unfolding in Zimbabwe. This illustrates the 
complexity and dynamism of the policy process, and it is this, which can gradually result 
in substantial challenges or shifts in knowledge and practice that enable alternative 
practices to occur. The emergence of these alternative practices creates critical ‘policy 
space’ that facilitate alternative perspectives to challenge existing power relationships. 
The outcomes of these shifts in each country are being determined by the broader macro 
political economic characteristics. 
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The local level case studies in both countries confirm that communities possess 
considerable ‘agency’ and are prepared to exercise this in attempts - through their 
resistance to appropriation of their resources by local or external elites - to advance their 
own interests in spite of various structural difficulties. The influence of community 
agency tends to be overlooked (Turner, 2004, Chhatre, 2007). In Botswana CBNRM was 
implemented as though the participating communities existed in ‘splendid isolation’, not 
impacted by or impacting upon factors external to them.  Such an ‘isolationist’ approach 
failed to cultivate incentives and a vibrant local and national political context, which 
could ensure positive CBNRM outcomes. In Zimbabwe, the evidence suggests that 
CAMPFIRE has created mechanisms and provided incentives because of its 
decentralized nature that enable local government constituents to demand greater 
representation. CAMPFIRE can then be viewed as having provided a mechanism to 
tackle the practical governance arrangements between the first and second tier 
institutions that can progressively break down existing social and political barriers.  
 
CBNRM implementers and advocates need to recognise the complexities involved in 
policy making and facilitate communities to engage with these processes themselves. A 
clear starting point for such interactions under certain circumstances can be local level 
regimes negotiating with local governments. The evidence presented here and elsewhere 
(Peluso, 1992, Larson and Ribot, 2005, Neumann, 1998) indicates that such interactions 
and negotiations can empower communities. However, whether this will always hold 
true given the variance in national contexts, is an issue I return to in the concluding 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 10  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
10.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined what factors affect the choices of policy makers when 
determining CBNRM policy and how this affects outcomes, particularly in relation to 
governance and institutional reforms.  My approach has been to examine CBNRM within 
the broad context of the political economy, its discursive framework and actor networks, 
and identify those factors that either promoted or constrained progress in achieving 
reforms. This has enabled an analysis of the complex linkages between CBNRM, power, 
politics and democratisation. A core element of the research has been to identify the 
framing assumptions on which CBNRM has been based and analyse the effect of these 
on outcomes; a second has been to assess whether CBNRM can strengthen 
democratisation processes within the region and if so how this is best facilitated.   
 
The problem statement presented in Chapter 1 notes that there has been a general failure 
within CBNRM to achieve the desired outcome of transferring powers from central to 
local institutions (devolution or decentralization) both within southern Africa and 
globally. This presents a fundamental impediment as theoretically it is based upon an ‘if-
then’ proposition, with the ‘if’ being the downward transferral of powers through 
devolution or decentralisation (Larson and Ribot, 2005).  As the first part of the 
proposition, the ‘if’, is going unachieved then it follows that there will also be a failure to 
meet the ‘then’, as is indeed happening. Understanding the failure to reach ‘if’ was then 
the core problem that I hoped to explain in this research. The overall aim is to contribute 
to the ongoing debate on the most appropriate institutional forms and governance 
arrangements to achieve sustainable natural resource management and improved 
livelihoods in southern Africa.  
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In this chapter I discuss the implications of the findings of this study for the future of 
CBNRM initiatives and democratisation in southern Africa and present policy and 
research recommendations.  
 
10.2 Relevance and Implications of the Study 
10.2.1 Recognising CBNRM as a Political Process  
The empirical evidence and analysis presented demonstrate that failure to reach ‘if’ 
arises from a complex and interrelated number of reasons. The ‘if’ assumes that 
governance reforms enabling greater participation will be achieved. This is not the case. 
Many of the reasons for this failure have little to do with CBNRM per se. Most problems 
relate to failure on behalf of those involved in policymaking, implementation and 
advocacy to take cognizance of the broader political economy in which it is situated. 
This situation arises in part because of conceptual flaws in the framing assumptions of 
CBNRM.  
 
In this study, I have identified a number of factors behind the failure of CBNRM 
governance reforms. Foremost among these are the following factors:  
• contradictions with the priorities and incentives of local and national 
political elite; 
• contradictions and competition within and between related policy sectors; 
•  national  historical and social context, social norms and the degree of 
social stratification; 
• the national economic context and priorities of the post-independence 
state; 
• the national political context and prevailing ideology, in particular  
commitment to participation and empowerment; 
• processes relating to local government reform; 
• unresolved land issues, including tenurial arrangements; 
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• weak local implementation capacities and contradictions with the primary 
goals of the implementing agencies; 
• the constraints imposed upon CBNRM conceptual development by the 
nature of the actor and policy networks by which it is dominated; 
• NGO and donor commitment to ‘blue-print’ approaches; and 
• isolation from contemporary discourses relating to governance and 
democratisation. 
 
These factors lie largely outside the current conceptual model offered by a devolutionary 
approach to CBNRM. As Ribot and Larson (2005) and Murombedzi (2006) have 
observed, when such a situation occurs it implies that it is necessary to rethink this model 
by contextualizing it within the broader political economy.    
 
In both Botswana and Zimbabwe, CBNRM outcomes have been determined primarily by 
its implications for political processes and political elites. CBNRM should then be 
viewed as a political process central to a range of political, social and economic issues at 
the national and local levels. However, the analysis of the policy process offered here 
illustrates how CBNRM has been artificially compartmentalized or ‘black boxed’ by 
both the actor networks with which it is engaged and the disciplinary structures of its 
policy discourse. Its genesis within the wildlife sector has served to prevent constructive 
engagement with many issues and processes that should be viewed as critical to its 
success. These factors constrained its ability to become an instrumental part of political 
change and confront or engage problems associated with democratic deficits or challenge 
the structure of rural economies.  Engagement has been further constrained because there 
is little overlap, common language or common concepts between conservationists, 
development experts and political analysts.   
 
CBNRM’s failure to address the political economy within which it was situated resulted 
in CBNRM being an isolated intervention in rural areas, distant from any political  
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discourse or movement that could have propelled it and created avenues for participation 
in the policy making process for community representatives. The evidence presented 
here concurs with Fakir (2001) and Murombedzi (2006, inpress) in that, in some cases, 
CBNRM has actually undermined opportunities for increasing participation in political 
processes as it provided a useful guise for governments with weak democratic credentials 
to appear as if they were addressing issues of governance, land reform, and local 
economic development. In reality, reforms were merely rhetorically robust but largely 
irrelevant in practise. However, there is compelling evidence in Zimbabwe that suggests 
that this situation may now be evolving.   
 
If CBNRM is to succeed in its goals of governance reform, there is a need to reach 
outside of the technocratic and donor driven, ‘environment/conservation’ processes and 
narratives, whilst not abandoning or disengaging with these entirely.   Likewise, there is 
a need to move beyond the neo-liberal assumptions upon which CBNRM has been 
based. This requires situating CBNRM within a political economic discourse and 
developing politically strategic approaches, which recognize that power is a critical 
variable in policymaking. Constraints in undertaking a shift from a technical approach to 
developing politically strategic approaches should be recognized and accommodated. 
These include the lack of overlap in terms of actor-networks or policy entrepreneurs, 
limited common discourse or narrative and differing knowledge and science bases. An 
interdisciplinary approach will be required, which accommodates multiple objectives and 
has flexibility to enable it to accommodate tradeoffs.  
 
CBNRM policy interventions, like any other development policy, occur within a 
complex vortex of political forces created by an array of often apparently external and 
unrelated processes. Recognising this allows for acknowledgement of the need for more 
constructive and pragmatic engagement with politics and political processes by 
implementers, analysts and advocates. This must include the creation and acceptance of 
practical spaces for critical political engagement by communities with the policy process 
at all levels. As the comparative analysis offered in Chapter 9 indicates, whilst the 
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current process rhetorically emphasises participation, the reality is that it has been 
dominated by a technocratic elite.  Recognizing the pivotal agency brought to bear on the 
policy process by a broad array of actors at many different levels should not be allowed 
to obscure or negate the agency that communities themselves exercise in the process.  
 
10.2.2 Weak Framing Assumptions  
This thesis identifies three key framing assumptions that have led to CBNRM’s inability 
to ensure greater participation in the policy making process and to engage with critical 
political processes. The first of these is a direct result of CBNRM’s genesis within the 
wildlife sector in which the dominant perception was that conservation was somehow 
‘above politics’ and needed to be kept separate from it.  This ‘depoliticisation’ of 
conservation ensured that many of those firmly entrenched in the CBNRM networks 
maintained that political engagement and manoeuvring are outside the mandate of 
CBNRM or its implementing agencies. This perspective has prevented strategic political 
engagement to date.  
 
The second framing assumption relates to the belief that semi-autonomous institutions 
with private collective rights (devolved), contrary to the transfer of powers from central 
government to lower levels within government’s political administrative hierarchy in 
public entities (decentralized), will most effectively deliver community participation in 
natural resource management.  This longstanding devolutionary discourse fails to 
accommodate the realities of highly politicized and complex context within which 
CBNRM occurs. This has direct relations to a more generalized conceptual flaw 
characterizing efforts to promote democratic reforms in African states throughout the 
1990’s. The assumption is decentralisation reforms will occur because more sustainable 
and efficient governance regimes will result and further public interests (Hyden, 2008). 
This view also interprets reform as a largely technocratic process, operating in isolation 
from political interests and on the assumption that bureaucrats and politicians will carry 
out reforms that meet the public interest. This interpretation of the policy process as 
being simply one of a technological ‘quick fix’, misinterprets fundamental aspects of 
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governance processes and is clearly contradicted by evidence presented here and 
elsewhere (Manor, 2005, Larson and Ribot, 2005, Chhatre, 2007, Rihoy and 
Maguranyanga, 2007). Natural resource governance reform processes in both Botswana 
and Zimbabwe are being driven primarily by the political interests of the elite. This 
conforms to governance processes characterizing Africa in general, discussed in Chapter 
2, which tend to be driven by the political and economic interests of the elite (Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999, Hyden, 2008).  
 
The third framing assumption is that communities themselves lack agency.  Turner 
(1999), Chhatre (2007) and evidence presented here in Chapter 4, indicates that the 
narrative which accompanies CBNRM is based upon the assumption that communities 
are powerless in the face of predatory states or external agents.   This research has looked 
beyond the stated objectives of CBNRM policies, discourse and implementation 
approaches, to an investigation of what rural people are doing inside the institutions 
established by these policies. The actions of the people of Mahenye and OCT 
demonstrate that it is not the case that communities are powerless recipients of ‘bad’ 
policies but rather that they are exercising their agency and playing a clear role in 
determining CBNRM outcomes through their resistance to appropriation of their 
resources by local elites. They have been creative and innovative in demanding more 
appropriate forms of governance and in demanding greater accountability from local 
government. In both cases, one of the forms and strategies that this resistance has taken 
is to invoke the role of the state (local government) and demand it intercedes to produce 
equitable results, with varying degrees of success.  Equally, there are examples from all 
over the world, which detail the manner of resistance of local communities to state 
efforts at resource appropriation (Peluso, 1992, Whande, 2009, Chhatre, 2007). The 
important lesson here is that the role of community agency is a key determining factor in 
shaping natural resources management outcomes, and it could be further strengthened. 
 
The case study evidence from OCT in Botswana suggests that the emphasis on 
devolution failed to take account of political forces at local and national levels and 
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ultimately served to undermine democratic outcomes by stifling opportunities for 
interaction and negotiation between local and state institutions. Conversely, the 
inadvertent adoption of a decentralized approach under the CAMPFIRE programme in 
Mahenye created opportunities and incentives for negotiations and relationships to 
develop between government and local institutions. In these cases, the decentralised 
approach offered by CAMPFIRE has proved more effective in strengthening community 
agency through the provision of policy space. But, as explained in detail below, this 
should not be interpreted to imply that decentralisation will always be the appropriate 
institutional form to adopt in every context. The lesson that it does provide is that far 
more attention has to be paid to get binding government/local government commitment 
if community agency and political space are to be sustained.  
 
The neglect of local agency in decentralisation policies may be hindering creative 
solutions to local problems. In light of this, it becomes necessary to place greater 
emphasis on understanding the way the larger political context enables or disables the 
‘demands’ or agency of communities to be affected. More effective efforts to promote 
natural resource governance reforms that ensure broad based participation in the policy 
process will be dependent upon the development of conceptual frameworks 
encompassing a more accurate description of how and why natural resource management 
reforms occur. This research is one contribution to this.  
 
10.2.3 Expanding Policy Space and Strengthening Democracy  
As discussed in Chapter 2, despite the rapid spread of ‘democracy’ within southern 
Africa during the 1990s, ‘democratisation’ to date has been characterized by incomplete 
and tenuous shifts towards more representative government. At best this has involved a 
partial movement from highly centralized political systems to systems with limited 
political checks and limited creation of democratic or policy spaces enabling greater 
participation in political and policy processes (Bauer and Taylor, 2005, provide a useful 
summary). Confirming this, Chapters 5 and 7 present evidence that whilst the 
institutional forms and procedures of democracy may be in place in Botswana and 
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Zimbabwe - although in the latter these have been enormously eroded over the last 
decade - empowerment, participation and policy space may actually be diminishing in 
both countries.  
 
Given these imperfect operating conditions, if CBNRM is to achieve its stated goals in 
terms of governance reforms, strengthening democracy through the creation of space for 
greater participation in the policy process is a prerequisite to its success. CBNRM is a 
political process of negotiating changes in authority over resources from the centre to the 
local.  Therefore, it is conceptually and operationally synonymous with the broader arena 
of struggles over rights, governance, and political authority.  Natural resource 
management reforms must then be designed to strengthen emerging local democracy. 
This requires linking the local with the national, a basic requirement of a properly 
democratic system.  
 
CBNRM provides the means and the incentives by which this can be done. However, 
ensuring that this is effective requires acknowledgement and understanding of the 
complexities facing CBNRM and of the political nature of interventions. It is in the 
immediate interests of the CBNRM networks in southern Africa to recognise the 
imperative to engage with processes of democratisation. Articulating and demonstrating 
that strengthening democratic processes is central to CBNRM must be recognized as a 
central aim and component.  Even so, to achieve this requires the development of a more 
informed, nuanced and systematic conceptual framework, network and narrative for 
understanding natural resource governance and the issues that underpin changes in 
natural resource management institutions. 
 
As the discussion in Chapter 2, highlighted strengthening democracy in the African 
context must encompass more than liberal democracy, embracing participatory 
democracy, democratic ideals, aspirations, and democratic politics. Gaventa (2006) sums 
up the situation:  
 
 
 
 
287 
 
the issue is not replicating one version of democracy, as a standard set of 
institutions and practices, but to construct and deepen democracies, which may 
work differently in different places, and to find the most effective entry points for 
doing so, based on the local contexts (Gaventa 2006:21, original emphasis).  
 
A key question pursued in this thesis has been whether CBNRM is or has the potential to 
contribute to the deepening of democracy within southern Africa by addressing some of 
the ‘democratic deficits’ that characterize political processes in the region and if so under 
what conditions is this best achieved. An increased emphasis on participation by 
communities in natural resource management and decision-making theoretically provides 
important opportunities to strengthen democratic processes from the ground up.   
Evidence from Zimbabwe and Botswana suggest that it can be instrumental in 
constructing and supporting a political culture of rights and citizenship. Evidence from 
Zimbabwe suggests that it can enable people to seek out existing public spaces and 
strengthen these. Evidence from around the region suggests that it can create or 
strengthen ways in which civil society engages with the state. However, most 
significantly, there is ample evidence that it can create new policy spaces to allow for 
greater democratic engagement. However, this study provides empirical evidence that 
the entrenched notion that devolution is the way to enhance democratic practices requires 
greater scrutiny. The case evidence from Botswana indicates that in this particular 
context, the formation of devolved committees undermined the democratic processes and 
functions of local government. These findings therefore conform in part to those of 
others (Larson and Ribot, 2005, Ribot, 2005, Ribot and Larson, 2005, Ribot, 2007, 
Manor, 2005). 
 
10.2.4 Devolution and/or Decentralisation: Alternative 
Institutional Forms and their Implications for Building 
Democracy from the Ground-Up  
The preceding discussion has highlighted the central role of community agency and local 
government in the strengthening of democratic politics.  Nevertheless, it remains clear 
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that accountability of local governments cannot be analysed independently from the 
accountability of higher scale government institutions. Woodhouse  notes that generally, 
if political goals such as improving the position of the disadvantaged are not identified 
and pursued by the central state (Woodhouse, 2003), it is unlikely they will arise 
spontaneously at the ‘local’ level. Jones and Gaventa (2002) note that the capacity and 
willingness of the state to provide access, justice and legal redress based on a respect for 
human rights will determine the accountability of local government to its constituents. 
Likewise, Harbeson (2001) advises not to expect semi-autonomous, democratic local 
government to take shape while the overarching political and socioeconomic structure of 
an autocratic regime is in place.  Ake (2000) sums up the key problem in such polities: 
Unfortunately, those who have the power to effect the changes which 
democratisation requires have a strong interest in resisting these changes, and 
those who have an objective interest in the changes do not have the power 
resources to affect them. Power and desirable change are pulling in 
diametrically opposite direction (Ake 2000:190). 
 
From this perspective, the question of how to ensure appropriate natural resource 
institutions are in place revolves around how to construct mechanisms and patterns of 
political accountability between grassroots and national levels of government that afford 
new discretion to the former. Thus in weak democratic polities like Zimbabwe, and 
increasingly Botswana, the agency of communities in demanding further rights from 
government will be insufficient to achieve greater accountability from government. It 
must be accompanied by creation of policy and democratic space to enable communities 
to participate in decision-making and politics.  
 
The empirical evidence presented here concurs in part with the findings of Ribot (2008) 
and others when they note that people actively engage with democratic processes when 
decisions that are being made affect their day to day lives. Therefore, decentralizing 
natural resource decisions involves local governments in decision-making that has direct 
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relevance to their constituent’s everyday livelihoods. This, in turn, gives people a good 
reason to engage their representative authorities. The political participation inherent in 
CBNRM may trigger other opportunities for political engagement. For example, debates 
about rights to resources in both Botswana and Zimbabwe led to direct appeals to and 
negotiations between constituents and local government, demonstrating an awakening of 
political consciousness in both cases.  This in turn builds aspirations and expectations, 
leading to the questioning of authority and processes of negotiation, which empower 
communities and ultimately lead to demands for greater accountability. The result is an 
empowered local government with natural resource management responsibilities that can 
be responsive to local needs and aspirations.  
 
When local government is accountable downwards, as well as upwards, it can provide a 
mechanism in the creation of democratic space for policymaking and political 
participation by their constituents in national policymaking processes. Ribot (2008) notes 
that the location of local government at the base of the hierarchy of government 
institutions allows people at this level to capitalize upon the power of local government 
in influencing higher levels of government. Local government is the lowest scale of 
democratic institutions for governance and in relatively close proximity to those 
communities affected by CBNRM policies. Thus Ribot (2008) concludes that natural 
resource governance institutions can strengthen processes of democratisation and achieve 
sustainability most effectively if a process of decentralisation is adhered to in all 
contexts.  
 
Chattre notes that where local governments are endowed with sufficient autonomy and 
resources, communities and sub-groups within are more likely to channel their agency 
through them to influence the implementation of policy and the functioning of parallel 
institutions (Chhatre, 2007). Such a situation is clear in Botswana where local 
communities appealed to the relatively well-funded and representative DC to exercise its 
authority to represent their democratic interests. Despite the current political chaos and 
economic collapse in Zimbabwe, the same process is unfolding there. Traditionally, 
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RDCs have played a significant role in rural areas within CAMPFIRE, and it is based on 
the historical role that the community of Mahenye was turning to the RDC as the most 
effective means they had at their disposal to resolve local stalemates.  This is an indicator 
that in those countries in the region which do have strong, effective local government, 
excluding them from CBNRM through a process of devolution may not serve the 
interests of local communities, local governments or democratic processes as a whole. 
 
However, the analysis of the policy process in Botswana and Zimbabwe reveal the 
significance of an additional dimension that is not fully accommodated within the 
scholarship outlined above.  Perhaps the most striking element of the analysis offered 
here is that context – political, historical, social and economic – is the ultimate 
determinant of outcomes. Both Botswana and Zimbabwe have relatively strong, 
democratic and well resourced local government structures and it does not necessarily 
follow that the same processes will play out in those countries where local government 
structures are unelected or weak, such as Zambia (Brian Child, personal 
communication).  Harbeson (2001) argues that the important factor is not the degree of 
state intervention - i.e. more or less devolution or decentralisation - but the level of state 
accountability and that ‘finding the right balance is key but will be variable depending 
on the  particular context of each country’ (Harbeson 2001:91; emphasis added).  
 
The case evidence from both Botswana and Zimbabwe make it apparent that alliances 
and boundaries are formed in CBNRM, and when situations change these alliances and 
boundaries shift and reconfigure the landscape of governance and politics. There is a 
high level of complexity and a multiplicity of actors with competing objectives involved 
at different scales in natural resource management reforms. Given this shifting context, 
creating governance reforms that ensure greater participation and accountability must be 
viewed as a dynamic, evolving process, rather than a binary or limited number of 
institutional choice options based on central transfers of powers. CBNRM should then be 
viewed as a process of applied and incremental experiments in democracy; of value 
because it involves not a single ‘holy grail’ of full devolution or ‘ideal democracy’ but 
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the interaction of tiers of governance over time in adaptive processes (Rihoy et al., 
2007). 
 
How do we build and sustain democratic CBNRM processes in undemocratic political 
systems? What needs to be done to build capacity for democracy and governance at the 
local level? There is a need to articulate the political intentions of CBNRM and its 
democratising objectives. This will require meaningful participation of rural people in 
policy formulation and implementation. To achieve this, it is necessary to focus on 
understanding and developing viable local governance regimes. This focus in CBNRM 
would benefit from looking beyond the standard institutional prescriptions of devolution 
or decentralisation to recognize that issues, context and circumstances determine the 
structure.  Anstey (2008) notes that the binary choices that the decentralisation 
scholarship offers, with majority weighting given to the issue of institutional choice 
between public and private entities, places too much emphasis on structure and external 
design, neglecting both context and community agency. Of greater value would be a 
focus on expanding community agency and political spaces and developing the local 
governance regimes to accommodate the specific national historical, social legitimacy 
and political context.   
 
My research and analysis of the policy processes and outcomes of CBNRM in Zimbabwe 
and Botswana moves the debate on CBNRM policy forward in two ways. Firstly, it 
argues that the binary choices of decentralisation/devolution have tended to obscure the 
importance of community agency and local context; and secondly, it emphasizes that 
there is also a need in southern Africa to re-think the CBNRM emphasis on the creation 
of autonomous entities as the policy goal in institutional choices – or devolution as the 
‘holy grail’. Clearly, evidence from the two countries indicates the significant role that 
local government plays in the political sustainability of CBNRM and in tackling the 
prevalent challenges of elite capture by central entities or others. The contrasting 
examples of Botswana and Zimbabwe illustrate that where such local government is not 
closely engaged there is a high risk of the devolution to semi-autonomous collective 
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entities failing; and in particular when donor, NGO, academic and other facilitating 
agencies are temporary or politically marginal. Therefore, this study argues that any 
policy prescription in CBNRM should recognise the significant and long term 
importance of local government roles in CBNRM and that strategic and adaptive 
compromises to the academic or policy ideals of reified ‘devolution’ or ‘decentralisation’ 
will be required not only in CBNRM but also in the closely related policy challenges of 
local resource management in the context of climate change. As succinctly stated by 
Murphree (personal communication, 2009): 
transformation comes by circumstance, guile and coercion.  It is not going to 
come from rational suasion, our long-held academic myth. 
 
10.2.5 Expanding Imperative  
This thesis has illustrated how CBNRM developed in the last three decades from a 
relatively untested conceptual approach to natural resource management to the status of 
conventional wisdom in environmental and development discourse. The last decade has 
witnessed a growing backlash in response and communal approaches are now faced with 
criticism in what Roe (1991) describes as the narrative-counter-narrative mode. Donors 
are also choosing alternative approaches having grown frustrated with slow progress 
(Adams and Hulme, 2001).  This response fails to recognize that CBNRM has been 
grappling with a broad range of issues fundamental to the economic, social and 
democratic development of African states such as the distribution of power and authority 
over natural resources, and local democratic governance, socio-economic development 
and collective tenures systems for land and natural resources. The experience and lessons 
learnt through CBNRM approaches in the governance of natural resources are then of 
significance to the future economic and political development of African states, as well 
as to biodiversity conservation.  
 
The imperative to address the governance challenges facing natural resource 
management in Africa is expanding. The environment in the 21st century has assumed an 
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immense transformative influence over global economies. Two issues – climate change 
and ecosystem degradation – have occupied public and scientific discourse since 2007 
and have cast doubt over the assumed independence of economic activity from nature. 
This has introduced a new range of global stakeholders and interest groups into issues 
relating to environmental management at international and national levels, beyond even 
the complex situation described here (Gomera and Rihoy, in press). The interests of 
some of these may further contradict and undermine those of local people.  
 
Responses to new environmental threats have the potential of undermining community 
rights and access to resources further. For example, there is a very real danger that policy 
responses to climate change will trigger a huge new ‘land grab’ throughout the continent 
(Rights and Resources, 2008). Many of the policies and responses that are currently 
being developed will give significant new value to land and natural resources. This new 
value will be escalated by increasing global demand for food, fiber and bio-energy, 
which will push up land values further. As the case studies from Botswana and 
Zimbabwe illustrate, governments and the private sector already have multiple incentives 
to take advantage of the weak governance structures, insecure property rights and loose 
regulatory frameworks in rural areas to lay claim to lands and resources on which local 
people depend. These incentives will significantly grow over the next few decades. The 
outcome may be that communities will lose access to their only real capital asset – land - 
pushing millions of people further into poverty and conflict. Thus the need for 
development of new mechanisms to ensure that policy spaces are created to enable the 
voices and perspectives of local people to be addressed assumes new imperative. The 
development of appropriate governance regimes and the provision of stronger rights will 
be foremost among mechanisms to achieve this.  
 
This amplifies the imperative, already articulated above, that future CBNRM 
implementation, research and advocacy should be mainstreamed into the global political 
economy discourse. Traditional wildlife focused CBNRM is unable to accommodate 
these shifting externalities. This belies the fact that the underlying issues that CBNRM 
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addresses - resource tenure and governance, democracy, decentralisation and devolution, 
crisis and change – are all central to climate change and other emerging global priorities. 
The expanding range of externalities represent a threat to greater local participation but 
also potentially serve as a catalyst for it if CBNRM implementers and advocates develop 
the ability to engage a constituency that extends beyond that involved in environmental 
issues.  
 
10.3 Methodological Observations  
This thesis has attempted to link within one explanatory framework two distinct research 
domains, each with its own conceptual frameworks and literature, in order to explore and 
unravel how the policy process has determined governance outcomes within CBNRM. 
This has revealed that it is the nature of the CBNRM policy process – its origin, 
networks and discourse – that hindered policy makers from engaging with wider political 
processes thus compromising its ability to deliver appropriate governance reforms.  
 
The adoption of the policy process analytical framework - with its focus on structured 
political interests, actor networks and discourse analysis - enabled me to systematically 
construct and develop an understanding of those factors that have been key in 
determining CBNRM policy processes and outcomes in the two countries and 
internationally. This approach revealed that in both countries CBNRM outcomes reflect 
social and political complexities in decision-making dominated by, often interlinked, 
political and economic interests.  In reality, two of these analytical tools, actor-networks 
and discourse analysis, are intimately and intricately interwoven, overlapping and 
mutually reinforcing, and it is not always possible to draw clear distinctions between the 
findings of the different elements. It is also clear that in the context of the Botswana and 
Zimbabwe, it was the third element, that of structured political interests, that was 
paramount in defining outcomes. In this context, it became more relevant to evaluate 
how discourse and narrative affected political interests, rather than to give each ‘lens’ 
equal ‘weight’ in affecting outcomes as envisaged by Keeley and Scoones (2003).  
Nevertheless, this approach has proven to be an effective tool for unravelling, revealing 
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and understanding the myriad and iterative social, economic and political processes 
across all scales that affect CBNRM outcomes.  
 
This melding together of the two analytical frameworks has clearly revealed conceptual 
shortcomings in the framing assumptions and theory of CBNRM as well as the origins of 
these shortcomings. These origins, within the field of wildlife management, served to 
largely obscure and ignore the political dimensions of natural resource management, thus 
hindering effective strategic manoeuvring (strategizing and manoeuvring) around 
political and power relations. The contested political nature of CBNRM was further 
obscured by weaknesses in Common Property Resource Management theory, which also 
fails to accommodate the political dimensions of natural resource governance.  
 
 
 10.4 Policy Recommendations  
This study concludes with six policy recommendations and recommendations for further 
research. The empirical evidence provided by this study clearly indicates that policy 
makers and implementers need to recognize the synergy between CBNRM and 
democratisation as mutually reinforcing processes as only then can this be strategically 
capitalized upon. To enable this CBNRM must be recognized as a political process and 
strategies developed to ensure that other political processes are engaged with. This will 
require greater attention be paid to the practical and strategic compromises required to 
apply increasingly reified policy prescriptions around devolution and recognition of the 
significance of local government in activating and sustaining transformations in power 
transfers to communities.  
 
 
To ensure greater political engagement CBNRM approaches need to abandon their 
technical or ‘managerial’ (Murombedzi, 2006) approaches to embrace those which are 
driven by community agency. To facilitate this, the current ‘project’ driven approach 
needs to shift to one that emphasizes the creation of policy space as the means to 
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promote greater participation and demand. This would facilitate the development of a 
politically active rural constituency empowered to engage with and strategically 
manoeuvre around political processes.  
 
 
There is a need to recognize the inadequacy of current narratives and conceptual flaws in 
the way that processes of institutional reform are framed and understood. In concurrence 
with Chhatre (2007) and Anstey (2008) the findings of this thesis imply that an exclusive 
focus on correct institutional forms, as embodied by the devolution versus 
decentralisation discourse within CBNRM, places too great an emphasis on structure and 
external design. Greater emphasis should instead be placed on the identification of 
factors which promote community agency in any given context. In recognition of the 
centrality of community agency, external agents should focus upon playing a facilitatory 
role in strengthening this agency by providing information, opportunities for experiential 
learning and privileged access and links with policy processes to allow for the 
strengthening of enabling conditions.  Customary and socially embedded institutions 
may play an important role in enabling, or otherwise, communities to exercise agency 
and policy makers need to take account of their presence in framing policies. The 
implication for natural resource governance reform is that recognition of customary 
authorities is important but should not be seen as necessarily positive or negative but that 
the consequences should be investigated empirically with critical scrutiny. Policy 
frameworks with guidelines for action towards building adaptive capacity and natural 
resource sustainability are required. Such policy frameworks would build adaptive 
processes and flexible multi-level governance that can learn, generate knowledge and 
cope with change.  
 
 
10.5 Research Recommendations   
This research has illustrated that improving understanding of how and why key natural 
resource governance reforms occur, or do not occur, is a priority area for improving 
knowledge of key natural resource management issues. Research of a similar nature is 
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required at all scales to uncover the threads, complexities and implications of any 
particular context to ensure greater understanding. Further research is required into the 
role that different governance arrangements can play in catalyzing negotiation and 
interactions between communities, local government and the state.  
 
Reinforcing Harbeson’s (2001) concern, further research, both theoretical and strategic, 
is required into the relationship between local level democratic participation and national 
level processes of political reform. This research should elaborate mechanisms to enable 
the local to influence national political reform processes. Greater emphasis should be 
placed on understanding the way the larger political context enables or disables the 
‘demands’ or agency of communities to be affected.  
 
Greater research attention needs to be paid to the local and national contexts in which 
CBNRM policies take shape. What layers of complexity does the historical, social and 
political context introduce and what implications do these have for future policy 
developments? Of particular interest in this regard may be Namibia and Zimbabwe. 
Research into the policy process and outcomes of the CBNRM initiatives in Namibia to 
reveal why the devolution approach adopted there has apparently delivered positive 
outcomes (Jones, in press) in apparent contradiction of Ribot and others decentralisation 
arguments would shed further light on the impact of the policy context for governance 
processes. Likewise, the implications of the current situation in Zimbabwe - arising from 
a period of crisis and change resulting in a ‘failed state’ and the accompanying demise of 
authority of state institutions and resultant state sanctioned revitalization of traditional 
authorities – in terms of its impact for democratisation through local governments 
requires further research. 
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